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2T hesis A bstract
This thesis consists of a com parative exploration of the sources o f  
dem ocratic stabilisation in independent Ireland. It asks w h e th e r  
com parative theories of the genesis and stabilisation of d e m o c ra c y  
explain the Irish experience of democratic stability after in d e p e n d e n c e . 
Each chapter tests the explanatory power of a distinct th e o re t ic a l  
approach within democratic theory. These theories can be divided in to  
two categories : those that emphasise structural pre-conditions f o r  
dem ocratisation and the stabilisation of democracy ; and those th a t  
em phasise the im portance of elite variables in these processes. M y 
conclusion is that the emergence of a democratic system in in d e p e n d e n t  
Ireland could have been predicted by m acro-sociological theories o f  
dem ocratisation, but that the stabilisation of such a system after 1922 
can be considered an example of a successful re -equ ilib ra tion  w h ic h  
occurred after the Fianna Fail party rose to power in 1932. In th a t  
process conscious democratising strategies were central. The Irish ca se  
vindicates the view that strong leadership is required for the solution of 
particularly intractable problems in democracies. What proved d e c is iv e  
was the conscious commitment of a majority of the Anti-Treaty s e c tio n  
of the political elite to building a redesigned democratic system after the 
civil war. In that sense the Irish case vindicates the view that c o r r e c t  
elite decisions and the appropriate elite values are the sine qua non  o f  
any stabilisation process. The stabilisation of a democratic sy stem  
cannot therefore be considered an automatic product of the fact that th e  
state had reached certain levels of socio-economic development by 1922. 
A high degree of modernity was a necessary but insufficien t source o f  
democratic stability. Rather a stable democratic outcome was due to t h e  
fact that the commitment of the political elites to the legitim isation o f  
the political system by democratic means was sufficiently great f o r  
democracy to survive the crisis of the civil war and its a f te rm a th .
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Chapter One : Introduction, Democratic Theory 
and the Irish Free State.
When, in January 1922, Sinn Fein, the Irish nationalist party, split in two over the terms of the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty that created a self-governing Irish state the previous December, Winston 
Churchill hastened to denounce its leadership as, 'Irish terrorists', men who were 'naturally 
drawn to imitate Trotsky and Lenin'.1 In his view the Irish were, 'members of a race who have a 
genius for conspiracy rather than government'.2 The claims of Irish nationalists to Home Rule 
had long been countered with the assertion that the Irish were entitled to but incapable of self- 
government. An eminent opponent of Home Rule had put it this way,
The confidence you repose in people will depend something upon the habits they have acquired. Well, the 
habits the Irish have acquired are very bad. They have become habituated to the use of knives and slugs 
which is wholly inconsistent with the placing of unlimited confidence in them.3
The apparent extremism of Irish politics under the Union also convinced many in Ireland itself 
that an independent state would not be stable. These included previously ardent nationalists who 
withdrew their endorsement of Home Rule during the Land War of 1879. 'The last few years have 
quite cured me of the notion that either property or liberty could be safely entrusted to an Irish
popular chamber.... I do not believe in democratic Home Rule and Home Rule which is not
democratic would never be tolerated'.4 Unionist opposition to Home Rule had been predicated on 
the idea that Home Rule would be 'Rome Rule'. During the Treaty negotiations of 1921 it was 
further argued that the Irish could not be trusted to behave fairly to its Protestant minority.5
The rapid disintegration of the new state into civil war only six months after independence 
convinced many of the accuracy of these predictions. In early July 1922, Kevin O' Higgins, a 
senior member of the Irish Provisional Government, described the outlook for the new state 'as 
unquestionably very grave'. The 'internal morale' of the country and its international reputation 
were 'at a very low ebb indeed'. Economically the country was 'heading straight for ruin'. The 
situation in the North-East, established as a separate area of administration under the terms of 
the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1920, was 'drifting from bad to worse'. Murders and burnings were 
following each other with 'dreary monotony', and refugees were fleeing the country altogether or
1 T. Towey, The Reaction of the British Governments to the Collins-de Valera Pact', Irish Historical 
Studies, 22, no.85, (March 1980),p.69.
2 Ibid, p.66.
3 Lord Salisbury May 15 1886, quoted in D.G. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles; British public 
opinion and the making of Irish policy 1918-22 (London, 1972), p.29.
4 William Lecky, quoted in D. MacCartney, Irish Democracy and its nineteenth century Irish critics 
(Dublin, 1979), p. 16.
5 See F. Packenham, Peace by Ordeal (London, 1935, 1992).
8pouring across the Irish border into counties already 'menaced with famine'.6 The amount of 
casualties, mostly Roman Catholic, from sectarian violence in Belfast alone, had exceeded five 
hundred in the eighteen months of Northern Ireland's existence. On February 3 1922, the 
Northern Premier, James Craig, had warned that 'if any attempt were made by the people in the 
South to take away large proportions of the Six Counties, there would be no other result than a 
renewal of Civil War'.7
Apart from the possibility of a clash between Northern Unionists and Southern nationalists 
over the question of partition, O' Higgins saw three other possibilities for the new state. The 
first consisted of a full-scale civil war within the area of the Free State itself. Such a war would 
be made necessary by the determination of a Republican section of the Sinn Fein movement, 
which had orchestrated the movement towards independence since 1918, to oppose the new 
government set up in conformity with the Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921. The second 
possibility was that of social revolution. 'Ominous processions of workless men are becoming a 
familiar feature', according to O' Higgins. Organised labour in Ireland had followed the reformist 
British path up to the World War, but since then the radical potential of the Irish workers' 
movement had become more pronounced. In May 1922, the Chairman of the Provisional 
Government raised the spectre of waging war against 'Bolshevism sheltering under the name of 
Republicanism'.8 A third possibility consisted in reoccupation by the British. This would be 
effected by force, but if disordered conditions continued in Ireland, it would be accompanied with 
'a moral mandate' such as the British never before had with regard to Ireland'.9 Irish 
independence would vanish before it ever became a living reality.
The Irish state was bom at what Churchill called 'the nerve centre of power, law, and freedom, 
in the Western World'.10 Firstly, the authority of the new state was at stake. 'During the 
preceding struggle the entire machinery of government had been disorganised, and respect for 
law had disappeared in the absence of law which could command respect'.11 As late as May 
1922 the vast majority of the territory of the state was under the control of forces hostile to the 
government. These Republican forces were greater in experience and number. In the opinion of 
the Provisional Government, the assertion of the mle of law was the first priority. Secondly, the 
state was exposed to a classic 'succession crisis'. A 32-county Republic had been declared in
6 K.O' Higgins, Memo, n.d., Department of an Taoiseach, S 6695, National Archives. This memo was 
circulated to the other members of the Provisional Govememnt at the beginning of July 1922.
7 The North-Eastern Situation ; Chronological Order of Events Since the Signing of Collins -Craig Pact', 
Items Connected with Collins-Craig Pact of January 21, 1922, Department of An Taoiseach, S 1801, 
National Archives.
8 Michael Collins, Provisional Government Decision, May 25 1922, Department of An Taoiseach, S 2942, 
National Archives.
9 K. O' Higgins, Memorandum, op. cit.
10 W. Churchill, The Second World War (London, 1989), p.875.
11 B. Hobson, Introduction' to Irish Free State Official Handbook (London, 1932), pp. 15-16.
1919 and most of the revolutionary movement had sworn allegiance to it. Now they were being 
asked to swear allegiance to the British Crown as head of a 26-county Irish Dominion. Such 
'conflicts of principle' were widespread throughout the post-war successor states of the time, but 
in Ireland a Republican form of government had seemed to many the ideal form of government 
since the establishment of the Irish Republican Brotherhood in 1858.12 Lastly, the issue of what 
constituted 'free' government was raised by the fact that the Pro-Treaty Provisional Government 
claimed to have received a majority of votes in the June election. It was thus the first 
democratically elected independent legal government in Irish history. On the other hand, since it 
was thought that the alternative to the Treaty was a renewal of war with the British, Republicans 
complained that the electorate had voted under duress. Accordingly the legitimacy of the 
electoral result was contested. Such 'conditional' attitudes to electoral democracy were 
widespread among radical nationalists, but they were not devoid of logic.13
1.1 Ireland and the jnterwar crisis.
The collapse of Empires in the wake of World War One gave rise to violent conflicts throughout 
the area of the former Hapsburg and Romanov Empires. The problems of the new Irish state 
were bound up with the wider crisis of the interwar era. Foremost among these was the 
intensification of national feeling brought about by the First World War and the Versailles 
settlement. That settlement was to establish an international order based on the principle of self- 
determination. This concept had played a central part in Sinn Fein's campaign for recognition of 
a 32-county Republic since 1919. The 1918 election, the first election under near universal adult 
suffrage, had resulted in a radical landslide victory for Sinn Fein and apparently for their 
Republican programme. There were however two problems with their demand. First, before 
1916 the traditional nationalist claim had been for Home Rule only. The new mandate for a 
Republic was produced by exceptional and short-lived circumstances. Chief among these was 
that the British 'first past the post' electoral system had seriously exaggerated the size of Sinn 
Fein's mandate by allowing it to obliterate practically all other parties.14 A second problem with 
the Sinn Fein demand was that the War also radicalised opposition to independence on the part 
of Ireland's large minority of Unionists who constituted a majority in the North-East of the 
country. As a result, partition was introduced by the British in 1920 as a 'provisional' solution to 
the conflict between two national loyalties in Ireland.
12 Republican currents in Irish nationalist politics in the half-century before independence are analysed in 
T. Garvin, Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland (Oxford, 1987).
13 Republican attitudes to democracy are critically analysed in T. Garvin, 1922 : The Birth o f Irish 
Democracy (Dublin, 1966), pp. 40-51.
14 See J. Coakley, The Election that made the first Dail' in B. Farrell, (ed.) The Creation of the Dail 
(Dublin, 1994), p. 36. See also the discussion in chapter seven of B O' Leary and J. McGarry Explaining 
Northern Ireland: Broken Images (Oxford,! 995).
However neither 'the Partition Act' of 1920, nor the Anglo-Irish Treaty which followed, were 
satisfactory to nationalist opinion. Republicans continually referred to the 1918 election as the 
founding election of a putative 32-county Republic. Disputes over the Peace Treaties were 
common throughout the interwar era. Most of the successor states were 'nationalising states' 
which were 'conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular 
nations, yet as incomplete or unrealised nation-states, as insufficiently national'.15 The 
achievement of foreign policy objectives, the revision of demeaning peace treaties, the 
enlargement of state boundaries to include lost irridenta, or the possession of overseas colonies, 
were all part of this compensatory complex which proved fatal to democratic government in 
many of the new states. The signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921 which 
established an Irish Free State with jurisdiction over twenty six counties of Ireland, but gave 
Northern Ireland the right to 'opt out' from this state, did little to assuage Southern nationalist 
grievance at partition. A Boundary Commission in 1925 failed to redraw the boundary line to the 
satisfaction of nationalists, and this issue, alongside that of the Treaty, remained controversial 
right down to the eve of the next war. Over time, the Treaty came to be gradually revised, but 
not without causing a major conflict in Anglo-Irish relations between 1932 and 1935. The 
enactment of a Republican constitution in 1937 to replace that of 1922, produced a further breach 
in Anglo-Irish relations since the constitution appeared to assert the sovereignty of the Free State 
over Northern Ireland too.
The First World War had been accompanied by widespread social and psychological changes. 
The war had a radicalising effect 'on an important stratum of, largely middle class, nationalist 
soldiers or young men who, after November 1918 resented their missed chances of heroism'.16 
The problems posed by demobilisation and peacetime re-employment were especially 
pronounced. In Ireland, apart from the Great War itself, the 1916 Rising, the War of 
Independence, and the subsequent civil war, all added to the miltarisation of political life and to 
a sense that 'the experience of fighting' was 'central and inspirational' to political life. By Spring 
1922 peacetime conditions had produced an IRA that was 'in danger of becoming popular' as 
'Trucileers', young volunteers who had played no part in the War of Independence, flocked to its 
ranks.17 The ranks of the IRA accordingly swelled exponentially. The civil war also saw the 
creation of an Irish national army which contained within it a small and pivotal group which 
continued to see the role of the army in an essentially political way, as an instrument for the 
realisation of nationalist objectives. As elsewhere in Europe, how the civilian authorities handled
15 R. Brubacher, Nationalism Reframed : Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe 
(Cambridge, 1996), p.79.
16 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: A Short History of the Twentieth Century (London,1994), p. 125.
17 E. O'Malley, The Singing Flame (Dublin, 1978), p. 16.
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such a fronesoldat mentality within and without the state would be crucial to the course of Irish 
political development.18
Political controversy would also be intensified by the delay of the economic recovery of Europe, 
a recovery shattered by the experience of economic depression. The civil war placed the Irish 
state under severe fiscal stress from the beginning. It was followed by years of stagnation. The 
economic conditions in which the defeated Republicans lived were particularly constricted. Many 
were forced to emigrate. Then, the Irish experience of the depression was comparatively severe : 
by the late 1920s a government spokesman could speak of a country on the verge of Famine.19 
The effects of the depression were greatly exacerbated by the closing off of traditional emigration 
routes in the early 1930s, and then by the government's willingness to wage a tariff war with the 
UK This policy placed sectors of the agricultural population in great difficulties, which helps 
explain why sections of the fanning community were willing to give their support to a radical 
right-wing movement in the 1930s.20 The continued economic difficulties of the Free State were 
arguably responsible for the resumption of emigration in the mid- to late 1930s.
Another threat to the political stability of the new states was posed by their political structures. 
Before 1918 only a handful of European states were in any meaningful sense democratic, and the 
post-war settlement encouraged a boom in constitutional experimentation. This was marked by 
an enthusiasm for radical and French models of democracy which failed to provide political 
stability afterwards. As a result they were gradually replaced by less democratic institutions, but 
this process was a controversial one, in many cases leading to authoritarian forms of government. 
The experience of the Irish Free State was no exception. Having adopted some radically new 
institutions between 1919 and 1922, including an elected judiciary and an experimental 
constitution, the Irish political elite gradually came to discard its 'continental' and experimental 
institutions in favour of more traditional British ones. While these reforms fulfilled the 
important function of bringing constitutional law in line with political practice, they also gave 
rise to a centralisation of power which led to further polarisation between the main political 
parties. Political competition took place in an increasingly authoritarian institutional framework, 
something that led to the emergence of authoritarian systems of government elsewhere.21
18 See M.G. Valiulis, Portrait of a Revolutionary ; General Richard Mulcahy and the Founding o f the 
Irish Free State (Dublin, 1992); E. O' Halpin, The Army and the Dail - Civil-Military Relations within the 
Independence Movement' in B. Farrell (ed.), The Creation of the Dail (Dublin, 1994); T. Garvin, 1922, The 
Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin: 1996).
19 Patrick McGilligan, quoted in R. Dunphy, The Making ofFianna Fail Power in Ireland 1923-1948 
(Oxford, 1995), p.59.
20 See M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics (Dublin, 1997), pp. 13 5-167
21 See L. Karvonen, Fragmentation and Consensus: Political Organisation and the interwar crisis in 
Europe (Boulder,! 994).
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In short, the Irish state was not immune to the general crisis that affected Europe in the interwar 
years. The state was founded in conditions that made the stabilisation of a democratic political 
system unlikely. Both the regime and the regime-sustaining forces came under immediate attack 
when the state was founded and continued to be subject to widespread hostility from Republicans 
well after the civil war. As elsewhere, the extent to which a state which was considered 
insufficiently 'national' was able to contain the forces of 'unsatisfied nationalism' within 
democratic politics, would determine the degree of political stability achieved by the state. Two 
variables affected this process. One was the ability of the regime-founding coalition to surmount 
the initial challenges to the authority of the state within a democratic framework.22 Another was 
the extent to which the disloyal opposition became committed to the defence of existing 
institutions 23 Rather surprisingly perhaps, in view of the dire predictions of O' Higgins, the Free 
State was to score rather well on both counts. Full-scale civil war followed, in 1922-1923, but a 
victory for the Provisional Government was a certainty by September 1922. Armed resistance to 
the authority of the Free State subsided late the following April, and the bulk of the Republicans 
confined themselves to constitutional opposition afterwards. In the shape of the Fianna Fail party 
they entered the lower house of the Irish parliament, Dail Eireann in 1927, and formed a 
government from 1932 onwards. The changeover was accompanied by no retribution. By 1938 
most of the controversial issues stemming from the Treaty had been resolved, and the state 
entered the coming world crisis with an impressive degree of political unity. The long period of 
political instability dating from before the First World War was then over.
Seventy five years later, the stabilisation of a democratic system of government is remembered as 
the chief accomplishment of the Irish state since independence.
The institutions of the state were soon established, an uncorrupt public administration and judicial system 
was in place, and within four years a public appointments system based on merit had been extended from 
the Civil Service to local government. Moreover an unarmed police force had established its moral authority 
; and by the end of the decade tight discipline had been secured within the ranks of a greatly reduced Army. 
This ensured a smooth handover of power to those defeated nine years earlier, the great bulk of whom 
within three years of the end of the Civil War had taken their seats in the Dail as the principal opposition 
party... Within ten years of the foundation of the state a second government, composed of men who had 
been defeated in the Civil War, was demonstrating similar commitment and skill in securing, through the 
introduction of a new Constitution, the domestic legitimation of the State in the eyes of the one third of the 
population who had initially been alienated by the manner in which it had been brought into being.24
22 See T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1996).
23 For an analysis see chapter six of this thesis.
24 G. FitzGerald, Days of doubt long gone as State reaches 75th birthday1 Irish Times, 6/12/97.
On the other hand critics have been less than complimentary about the political culture of the 
new state. Fred Halliday, for example, compares the state to 'the smaller, less belligerent, 
European states of the right', such as Spain, and Portugal. While it may, appear unfair to include 
Ireland in this group, since the Irish 'allowed political pluralism and a measure of constitutional 
liberty from independence in 1922', in other respects that culture was authoritarian:
particularly under the Fianna Fail government of the 1930s and 1940s, it was engaged in a mild version of 
semi-peripheral escape: ideological repression through censorship and clerical control of education, 
economic delinking through import substitution and trade controls, all of this topped off with nationalist 
cant about Hibernian exceptionalism, in the economy and in the eyes of God.25
Arguably however, the Free State did satisfy the four main criteria of democratic politics 26 
Firstly, elections were decisive in determining who would govern, despite the fact that pressures 
to ignore this procedure, particularly in 1922 and 1923, were often great. Secondly, after 1923 
the opposition was allowed to freely organise and compete on equal terms with the government, 
despite the fact that the loyalty of the Republicans to the Free State was clearly in doubt. Thirdly, 
a defeated government stood down in 1932, even though some of the outgoing government had 
viewed the changeover with trepidation. An effort to organise a preventive coup d'etat from 
within the ranks of the Free State army came to nothing, and was opposed by William Cosgrave, 
President of the cabinet or 'Executive Council'. Lastly, after 1922, the ultimate authority of Dail 
Eireann and popular sovereignty was never in doubt. This was demonstrated emphatically in 
1924 when an abortive 'army mutiny' was accompanied by the resignation of the Free State 
Minister of Defence and several commanding officers.27After a decade of paramilitary 
involvement in politics the main achievement of the new governmental elite era was to 
subordinate the military to the civilian arm of government. In contrast in Finland, a useful 
control case for the Irish experience, the army and the civil guards, the civil war winners, 
remained beyond civilian control and were able to influence government policy until 1931, when 
the Lapua crisis enabled the President to assert the authority of the government28
25 F. Halliday,Three Concepts of International Relations' Millenium , 1992, vol 21, no.3, p. 459.
26 M. Weiner, 'Empirical Democratic Theory1 in M.Weiner and E. Ozbuddun. (eds.), Competitive Elections 
in Developing Societies (Duke University Press, 1987).
27 See M. Valiulis, The 'army mutiny of 1924 and the assertion of civilian authority in independent Ireland' 
Irish Historical Studies, XXiii, no 92, (Nov 1983).
28 W. Stover, 'Military Politics in Finland between the Wars', Journal o f Contemporary History, 12, 
(1977).
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Table 1.1. Democracy in Europe in 1938.
Full Democracies Male Democracies Unstable Democracies Failed Democracies
1. Denmark.
2. Iceland.
3. Ireland
1. Belgium.
2. France.
3. Switzerland.
1. Czechoslovakia.
2. Finland. 2. Poland.
3. Lithuania.
1. Italy.
5. Luxembourg
6. Netherlands
4. Yugoslavia.
7. Norway.
8. Sweden.
9. United Kingdom.
5. Germany.
6. Portugal.
7. Estonia.
8. Bulgaria.
9. Greece.
10. Austria.
11. Spain.
12. Latvia.
13. Romania
Source: adapted from Dahl, 1989, Table 17.1, 239.
Of all the European states that were created in the wake of World War One, the Irish Free State 
can claim to be the only one that remained fully democratic. Czechoslovakia could have been 
an exception, but it collapsed under German pressure in 1938. Finland was a partial exception 
too, but its large Communist party was banned from 1925 onwards. The rest of the successor 
states all became undemocratic. Excepting Finland, every other state that had experienced a 
civil war at the beginning of the period had reverted to formal authoritarian rule by 1937. Table 
1.1. shows the fortunes of democratic government in the era. With the exception of the Irish 
case, none of the 'full democracies' were successor or new states. Iceland was still under Danish 
sovereignty, while Norwegian autonomy dated back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. In 
contrast Czechoslovakia and Finland, which were both unstable democracies, were successor 
states, as were, with the exception of Italy and Germany, practically all the states where 
democratic government collapsed in the interwar era. There was a clear relationship between the 
newness of the state and democratic breakdown.
1.2 Irish Democratic Theory
Why was the Free State democratic ? Four distinct interpretations can be found within the Irish 
literature. The first, 'the British tutelary theory', stresses the importance of the British legacy. The 
Free State had a majoritarian political system rooted in English common law. Under the terms of 
the 1922 Treaty all previously existing legal decisions were declared still valid. The bulk of its 
civil servants had joined the service before independence and the standards and procedures of 
Whitehall were put in place.29 After 1922 the British nature of Irish political practice, in
29 This was less a case of administrative practise building on established British tradition than of Irish 
politicians and civil servants insisting on a meritocratic and apolitical Irish civil service for the first time.
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constitutional conventions, decision-making, and party competition, became more pronounced. 
Irish MPs had been attending the Westminster parliament since 1801. Elections had been 
popular events in Irish life since the 1820s. Democratisation was gradual, and since it coincided 
with the replacement of Irish with English as the language of the masses, the British system 
became 'internalised'.
As is the case of the white communities of the British Commonwealth, many of the currently held political 
traditions and values were inculcated and absorbed during a most critical and formative period: the period
of the advent of mass democracy Extensions of the franchise in Britain were followed by extensions,
with modifications, in Ireland ; and Irish people acquired democratic habits and values. Political ideas were 
almost wholly expressed in British categories, for, from O'Connell to Parnell and beyond, the political 
experience of most Irish leaders was gained in British political life, and they practised the parliamentary 
ways of Westminster.30
A second, constitutional nationalist interpretation, stresses that the progress of Irish nationalism 
towards self-government was inherently democratic. Home Rule meant a sovereign parliament 
based in Dublin, one that existed in the past. Farrell argues that 'it was through parliament and 
largely within parliament that Ireland grew to both nationhood and frill independence'.31 This 
view is essentially the one adopted by the state itself. A government sponsored report on the 
Constitution in 1967 declared;
the republican status of the State, national sovereignty, the supremacy of the people, universal franchise, 
fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, association, and religion, the rule of law and equality before 
the law, were all part and parcel of this nation's struggle for independence and it is not surprising, perhaps, 
that, in the minds of the people, they are now to be regarded as virtually unalterable.32
The Irish state no longer endorses the romantic view of revolutionary struggle, and is now 
embarrassed by semi-official ceremonies like the commemoration of the 1916 Rising which 
suggest that the revolutionary Fenian tradition was the central one in Irish political life. Farrell 
argues that if this had been the case the outcome would have been different. 'That work could 
scarcely have been accomplished if the central Irish political tradition had been so robustly 
rebellious, so chronically violent and so demanding of change as has been usually suggested'.33 
The new state's achievement of political stability after 1922 'was primarily part of Ireland's
See E’ O’Halpin, ‘The Civil Service and the Political System’ Administration, 38,4,1991, pp.283-303, and 
E. O’ Halpin, ‘The Politics of Governance in the Four Counties of the United Kingdom, 1912-1922’ in S. 
Connolly (ed.) Kingdoms United (Dublin, 1999), pp.239-248.
30 B. Chubb, The Government and Politics o f Ireland (London, 1970), pp. 44-45.
31 B. Farrell (ed.), The Irish Parliamentary Tradition (Dublin, 1973), p.24.
32 Quoted in D. Smith, The Irony of Irish Democracy : the impact o f political culture on administration 
and democratic political development in Ireland (London and Toronto, 1973), p. 40.
33 Farrell, op. cit.
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British inheritance from the nineteenth century1, but a parliamentary tradition 'which Irish 
leaders and parties in parliament had done much to shape'.34 Farrell's argument focuses on the 
importance of a sovereign parliament, Dail Eireann, during the nationalist struggle from 1919 to
1921. It represented more than a de jure claim to statehood since in some respects it exercised a 
de facto authority over areas of Irish life like local government and justice. It was 'a Westminster 
import' rather than a revolutionary parliament. 'A consistent effort was made to maintain 
Westminster standards' and procedures, according to Farrell. The Speaker's rulings were 
accepted by the members, priority was given to parliamentary questions, and above all, the 
authority of the Dail over the military campaign was continuously stressed during the War of 
independence. The creation of the Dail courts, he argues, showed 'a concern to preserve as far as 
possible the existing and accepted system'.35 After 1922 both the survival of the Cosgrave 
government and Fianna Fail's decision to enter the parliament is taken by Farrell as evidence of 
the non-ideological, gradualistic nature of Irish political culture ; 'the willingness to accept what 
cannot be changed, the commitment to empirical solutions is paramount'. 36 This was 
dramatically revealed by the general acceptance of the Treaty's terms and the ruling of the 
Boundary Commission in 1925.
Arguably, both the tutelage and nationalist perspectives underestimate the problems faced by the 
Free State. Kevin O Higgins described the Provisional Government which took over the reins of 
power from the British as,
simply eight young men in the City Hall [the adjoining Dublin Castle's centuries-old association with 
British oppression made it unsuitable as a seat of government for Irish ministers] standing amidst the ruins 
of one administration, with the foundations of another not yet laid, and with wild men screaming through 
the keyhole. No police force was functioning through the country, no system of justice was operating, the 
wheels of administration hung idle, battered out of recognition by rival jurisdictions 37
The achievements of the subsequent Cosgrave governments have been widely praised by 
historians.38 Britain had left the Free State with a lot of problems : partition, a discredited 
parliamentary tradition, and a monarchical constitution repugnant to its sense of nationality. The 
Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 had solved the Irish question by stabilising 'Ireland' but temporarily 
destabilising the two states. After 1916 'the wild men' had seized the initiative and now turned 
their guns on the Pro-Treatyites. More generally, in those areas where an experience of good
34 Ibid, p.212.
35 Ibid, p.211.
36 Ibid, p.218.
37 Quoted in R. Fanning, Independent Ireland (Dublin, 1983), p.10.
38 Roy Foster reflects that "Most historians who examine the record of the 1920s become "Free Staters", R. 
Foster, More Sinner than Saint', The Independent on Sunday, (17/10/1994), p.40. See in particular, F.S.L. 
Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine, (Glasgow, 1983), pp. 484-504; O. MacDonagh, Ireland; the Union and its 
Aftermath, (London, 1977), p. 107; J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985, (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 171-174.
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government would be most obvious, respect for the law, faith in the political process, and an 
acceptance of the ultimate writ of the state, the inheritance was an ambiguous one. This forced 
the Free State elites into a tutelary attitude themselves. They were concerned with order, legality, 
and the irresponsible and irrational nature of Irish political traditions. For many Free State 
politicians, the civil war was not about anything as such, but the product of fantasy and 
lawlessness. 'Leavened in with some small amount of idealism and fanaticism', there was 'a good 
deal of greed, envy, and lust, and drunkenness and irresponsibility1 according to Kevin O' 
Higgins.39
There were two identifiable political traditions within the nationalist community which were 
expressed in the war.
1921-22 is the founding date of democratic Ireland’s political life, not just because of the coming of the 
truce in July 1921 or the signing of the treaty in December 1921, but because of the emergence, for the first 
time in Irish history, of popular expression of two poles of Irish Catholic political culture: the vision of the 
Republic as a moral community, as a community of equals submerging individual identity and self-interest 
for the common good on the one hand, and a non-magical, lawyer’s pragmatic nationalism on the other, 
which saw Irish independence as a means to the construction of a commercialised, mechanically 
representative democracy on the other.40
Kevin O Higgins was the first author of this theory. Democracy had to be taught, 'the problem is 
psychological rather than physical, we have to vindicate the idea of law and order to government, 
as against anarchy1, he declared 41 The other tradition had more in common with the secret 
society mentality of Southern Europe. Fenianism, the IRB the ERA, were part of this 'public band' 
tradition. It saw society as a 'moral community' and Republicans saw themselves as guardians of 
that community's highest values and aspirations. The nature of their commitment was expressed 
by the role of the secret oath. They were answerable only to themselves. As de Valera put it, 'the 
majority had no right to do wrong'. The Treaty split can be seen then as a conflict between 'the 
public band' tradition personified by the Anti-Treatyite ERA, and the world of 'civil society1; the 
church, the business community, the ex-Unionists, and the electorate who supported the Treaty in
1922. Garvin argues that democracy was not inevitable but the product of the defeat of one way 
of thinking by the other in 1923. After this, in his view, the 'unenthusiastic democrats' of the 
Fianna Fail party rejoined civil society in 1927.
A fourth interpretation, a Fianna Fail one, sees the progress of the Republic as the main 
constitutional theme of the inter-war years. It was later said that the 'primary misfortune' of the
39 Quoted in J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985 (Cambridge, 1989), p.98.
40 T. Garvin, The Long Division of the Irish Mind1, Irish Times, 28 December 1991.
41 Quoted in Lee, op. cit., p.98.
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new Irish state 'was that from the very beginning its existence constituted a violation of the 
principles of its founders'.42 It's common to see signs of a healthy civic spirit in public 
participation in state holidays, which celebrate independence days and re-enact foundation myths 
in the US vein. There is no such thing in Ireland. For decades the commemoration of the 1916 
Rising was the only such ritual. On the walls of Irish primary schools are hung copies of the 1916 
Proclamation of the Irish Republic, not the constitutions of 1922 or 1937. There are also photos 
of the martyred heroes of 1916, but not of the real founding fathers of the Irish state, Cosgrave, 
Mulcahy, Collins, and O' Higgins. The terms "the Free State" or "Free Stater" were used either to 
denigrate the state's status or to question someone's nationalist credentials.
For some in 1922, de Valera had unleashed a 'wild and destructive hurricane....from a thin 
insubstantial vapour',43 yet for Republicans the degree of British power implicit in the Treaty 
was more than substantial. The shelling of the Four Courts at the beginning of the war, Britain's 
possession of the ports under the terms of the Treaty, its insistence on an oath of allegiance, its 
dictatorial amending of the 1922 constitution, and the Boundary Commission fiasco, were all 
signs of Ireland's continued subordination to Britain. When de Valera tried to challenge the oath 
by using the constitutional right to initiate a referendum on it, the relevant article was later 
declared inoperative by Cosgrave. The Fianna Fail view argues that the Free State government 
was strong, but not legitimate. How did it became so, and how in turn did Irish Republicanism, at 
least in the South, become a purely constitutional form of politics ?
The constitutional republican view sees the role of Fianna Fail as crucial in creating a more 
legitimate state. Along with the Blueshirts, Fianna Fail was under threat from the IRA, which 
had around 30,000 members in 1932. Faced with opposition from both left and right it was 
necessary to put the state on a more legitimate footing. Repression, which had been the policy of 
Cumann na nGaedheal in the 1920s, was not enough. Positive constitutional measures 
undermining the Treaty settlement of 1921, especially the introduction of a new constitution, 
would have the effect of marginalising Republican opposition to the Free State and placing the 
state on a more popular footing. This view suggests that the bulk of the population, including 
those who initially saw the treaty as a stepping-stone towards greater freedom, were in favour of 
undoing the treaty. The 1937 constitution made republicanism constitutional for the first time. 
The leadership of de Valera was the sine qua non of this process.
Indeed, if we take together de Valera's move away from 1916 militarism to the constitutionalism of 
elections in 1916 and 1918, his break with abstentionist and extra-parliamentary Sinn Fein in 1926 and the
42 C.C. O' Brien, The Embers of Easter, 1916-1966', in O. Dudley Edwards and F. Pyle (eds.), The Easter 
Rising (London, 1968), p.229.
43 Cardinal Logue, cited in R. Foster More Sinner than Saint', The Independent on Sunday, 17 
October,! 994.
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stem, if  professedly anguished, steps against the IRA in the 1940s, we can say that not only did he 
epitomise at the outset of his career the ambivalence of constitutionalist and violent traditions of Irish 
nationalism but that he also bridged and transcended them, and finally and firmly asserted the supremacy of 
the civil over the military tradition, the constitutionalist principle, over that of physical force, and majority 
rule over the people have no right to do wrong assertion.44
In summary, four distinct perspectives exist within Ireland as to the sources of democratic 
stability. The former two stress the legacy of the period under the Union. The latter two stress 
post-independence developments. Which emphasis is correct ? Should stable democracy be seen 
as the culmination of developments under the Union, or was the outcome of the civil war more 
relevant to the politics of the new state ?
Luebbert has stressed that it was only in those societies where liberal parties had been historically 
dominant before World War One, such as in America, Britain, or France, that liberal solutions 
to the problem of mass democracy were institutionalised. Elsewhere, the First World War had a 
radicalising effect on political opinion, particularly on the left, and 'corporatist' institutions had 
to be established afterwards. These took either Social Democratic or Fascist forms in the 
1930's.45 In Ireland there had been both radical and liberal elements in the nationalist 
movements of the nineteenth century, but between 1881 and the First World War, liberal 
assumptions, reflected by the electoral monopoly of the Home Rule Party, were in the ascendant. 
However the Home Rule crisis of 1911 and then the First World War greatly radicalised political 
life. This undermined the hegemony of Ireland's rather conservative parliamentary elites. If, as 
Farrell suggests, the Sinn Fein elite between 1919 and 1921 were bent on institutionalising a 
democratic political order based on the Westminster system, by 1922 the control of that elite 
over the nationalist movement had weakened considerably. What followed in the summer of 
1922 was precisely the re-assertion of liberal hegemony and an attempt to reimpose a purely 
liberal solution to the problems of the new state afterwards. However liberalism, Cumann na 
nGeadheal style, failed. The one factor that could sustain a liberal polity, middle class unity, 
was absent. Significant sections of the middle or lower middle class refused to give their 
allegiance to the Free State. Irish democracy could only be stabilised if an alternative coalition of 
interests could construct a more radical alternative. In 1927, it appeared this would take the form 
of a Rainbow coalition of Labour, Nationalist, and Liberal elements. Later it appeared that an 
alliance of Labour and Fianna Fail would govern, but ultimately an alternative government 
emerged only under the nationalistic Fianna Fail governments of the 1930's.
44 J.A. Murphy, The achievement of Eamon de Valera', in J.P. O' Carroll and J.A. Murphy (eds.), The Life 
and Times of Eamon de Valera (Cork, 1968), p. 2.
45 G Luebbert, 'Social Foundations of Political Order In Interwar Europe' World Politics, vol 34, no.4, July 
1987.
As elsewhere where the First World War had undermined the traditional liberal or Lib-lab route 
to stable democracy, Irish democracy was stabilised 'in the midst of economic and political 
crises',46 which emerged in the late twenties and early thirties. This is not to deny that the 
original values of the Sinn Fein elite were democratic. They were a necessary but insufficient 
ingredient of Free State democracy. What is more important is that after 1918 purely liberal 
attempts at stabilising a mass democracy in Ireland failed. As elsewhere, for a democratic 
regime to be stabilised, wider social strata had to be mobilised behind the regime. In the Irish 
case the liberal elite remained dominant, but divided into two camps which looked to mobilise 
broader sources of support behind their agendas. In the depressed socio-economic conditions of 
the late twenties the competition between the two sides reflected a clear right -left divide.47
An attempt has been made to develop a normative model of democratic regime-change out of the 
Irish experience 48 In my view no such model can be constructed. Not only did the democratically 
elected political elite lose control of the movement to independence, they also failed to prevent a 
civil war occurring once that transition had taken place. The institutional and normative pre­
conditions that would have allowed a smooth transition to democracy to occur certainly did not 
exist in 1922. Indeed one could argue that there were four successive attempts at constructing a 
democratic order in Ireland. The first began with the 1918 election and ended with the 
intensification of the Anglo-Irish War in 1920. The second began in 1922 and ended with the 
outbreak of civil war in June. The third begins with the Free State's prosecution of the civil war 
and ends with the coming to power of de Valera in 1932. After that de Valera attempted to 
stabilise the state on a different basis to his opponents. By and large he succeeded, but only after 
previous efforts had been made .
There is therefore no model of democratic regime change to be found in the Irish case. Neither is 
there any vindication of the British legacy. Three features of British rule may account for the 
persistence of democracy after independence, according to Wiener.49 One was the creation of 
bureaucratic structures that 'stressed the legitimate role of state authority in the preservation of 
order in societies that left to themselves, would have descended into anarchic violence'. A second 
was the opportunity given to native politicians to compete in elections, form political parties, and 
gain experience of office. This enabled rival elites to internalise the norms that regulate the 
peaceful competition for power. This is related to the third feature of the tutelary model, peaceful 
regime-change. When independence came, power was transferred to elected officials not armed
46 ibid, 312.
47 See for example E. Rumpf, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland (Liverpool, 1977); 
P. Mair, The Changing Irish Party System (London, 1987); R. Dunphy,77ie Making of Fianna Fail Power 
In Ireland (Oxford, 1996); M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics (Dublin,1997).
48 See P. Mair, The Break-Up of the United Kingdom : the Irish Experience of Regime Change, 1918-49', 
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, (Glasgow,1978).
49 M. Weiner, Empirical Democratic Theory1 in M. Weiner and E. Ozbudun (eds.) Competitive Elections 
in Developing Countries (Durham,! 987).
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revolutionaries. However between 1919 and 1921 Irish elites were habituated not only to the 
peaceful competition for power, but also to conspiracy and factionalism. Power was handed over 
to elected politicians who had arrived at the negotiating table after a struggle during which their 
control of the militaiy wing of the nationalist movement was never more than nominal.50 
Regardless of the long parliamentary lineage of Irish nationalism, ' there was no tradition of 
political control of armed nationalism; nor had there been any experience of effective centralised 
control over armed movements'.51 Furthermore the Sinn Fein elite had little experience of 
genuine political competition. When they did face a competitive election in 1922, their 
reaction was to enter into an electoral pact which was denounced by Churchill as 'an outrage of 
democratic principles'.52
On the whole then Irish arguments have tended to overstate the importance of the British origins 
of Irish democracy and to downplay the importance of the civil war. Analogously the tendency to 
explain the outcome by the strength of democratic values in Ireland is open to the simple 
objection that if those values were so robust then why did the civil war occur ? Garvin's most 
recent work places the bulk of blame for the civil war on the anti-democratic instincts of the 
Anti-Treatyites, but this judgement obscures the fact that the Sinn Fein elite as a whole proved 
unable to prevent the drift to civil war occurring, despite their efforts to the contrary. Radical 
Republicanism was one reason for their failure, but no more so than the reality of continued 
British power, personal rivalry within the Sinn Fein elite, and the lack of a clear structure of 
authority within the nationalist movement.
A firm institutional basis for democratic government had still to be constructed in 1922. 'A key 
group of almost forgotten but brilliant people, principal among them William Cosgrave, Hugh 
Kennedy, Kevin O' Higgins, and Kevin O' Shiel', are credited by Garvin with this achievement.53 
However he tends to conflate two separate aspects of the stabilisation process, 
institutionalisation, or what he terms state-building, which took place between 1923 and 1927, 
and legitimation, which he tacitly but grudgingly admits was the achievement of de Valera 
afterwards.54 Legitimation was important because of the centrality of what I term 'the regime 
issue' in Irish politics. To differing degrees all the successor states suffered from 'regime-crises' 
which existed where elites were either semiloyal or disloyal to a new state that did not fulfil all of 
their their expectations. In the successor states the extent to which the new states fulfilled the 
expectations of the traditional political elites was an important factor in explaining their political
50 See E. O' Halpin, The Army and the Dail-Civil Military Relations within the Independence Movement' 
in B. Farrell (ed.) The Creation of the Dail (Dublin,1994), p. 113.
51 M. Hopkinson, Green Against Green; The Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p.4.
52 T. Towey, The reaction of the British government to the 1922 Collins - de Valera pact, Irish Historical 
Studies, 22, 85, (March 1980), pp. 65-76.
53 See T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin,1996), p. 194.
54 Ibid.
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fortunes. Unfortunately given the intractability of foreign policy questions in the interwar period 
very few of these states managed to achieve sufficient foreign policy changes to appease their 
domestic critics. In this regard the Irish state was undoubtedly fortunate in remaining at a far 
remove from the maelstrom of central and East European politics.
Even in some of the longer established European states there was no basis for consensus on the 
nature of the regime. Spain for example had never had a stable liberal regime in the nineteenth 
century and in 1932 became a Republic without any convinced Republicans. The largest socialist 
party, the P.S.O.E., had supported the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in the 1920's and saw the 
concept of a democratic Republic in instrumental and highly conditional terms.55 For the right, 
the conception of a Republic was just part of that wider mix of modem ideologies which was 
considered Anti Epsana, antithetical to the traditional order. The Spanish Republic's inability to 
gain and maintain the loyalty of its political elites in the 1930s was a chief cause of democratic 
breakdown. Regime crises also arose in states that lost out in the reorganisation of the European 
system after World War One. Such was the case in Germany, Italy, and Austria. In Austria, the 
rump state of the Hapsburg Empire, there was little consensus on the desirability of an 
independent Austrian state at the outset, rather than unification with Weimar Germany. The 
GrossDeutch idea appealed to both left and right at different times but became highly divisive 
after Hitler’s coming to power.56 Elsewhere the formation of new states after World War One 
led to a variety of constitutional crises which resulted in civil wars being fought between rival 
contenders for governmental authority in the new state. The transition to independence in 
Finland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states took place in confused conditions allowing a 
situation of 'multiple sovereignty* to emerge. The succession process was a 'typically contested 
one', with different claimants arising with regard to the exercise of governmental authority.57 
This meant that different institutions emerged to provide rival foci for national sentiment: left 
wing and Republican elements favouring more radical institutions and right wing and 
conservatives favouring more limited and traditional models of independence. Even where the 
lines of division in these conflicts were clearly sociological, as in Finland, the confusion involved 
in the transition to independence had allowed these conflicts break out in the first place.58
In the Irish case the initial attempt at secession had given rise to the declaration of a Republic in
1919. The following year the British government legislated for the existence of two separate 
parliaments, North and South, both clearly subordinate to the Crown. While Northern Unionists 
accepted that the Northern sub-state met their demand that they not be governed by Dublin, for
55 P. Preston, The Origins of the Socialist Schism in Spain, 1917-31', Journal o f Contemporary History, 
vol X I1, no. 1, (January 1977).
56 R.A. Kann, The Case of Austria1, Journal o f Contemporary History, vol XV, no.l, (January 1980).
57 J. Coakley, Political succession and regime change in new states in interwar Europe : Ireland, Finland, 
Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic Republics', European Journal of Political Research, 14, pp. 187-207.
58 See R. Alapuro, State and Revolution in Finland (Berkely, 1988).
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nationalists the powers vested in the Southern Irish parliament were too limited. The following 
year negotiations led to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in December 1921 which created a 
26-county Dominion of the British Empire in Ireland. While this compromise received majority 
support in the Dail, it was not acceptable to many of those who had sworn allegiance to a 32 
county Republic. The civil war that ensued was a classic succession crisis, with both sides 
establishing their own government with a claim to legitimate authority over the country. As in all 
the successor states the Irish state had been established under conditions that made its future 
success unlikely. The early experience of civil war made the initial divisions over the Treaty all 
the more acute. Moreover, the legality of the process of regime change was 'sufficiently 
ambiguous' for the losers in the civil wars to claim a moral victory and to continue to deny the 
legitimacy of the new regime.59 On the other hand the Irish case represents a case, like that of 
Finland, in which a disloyal opposition was gradually re-integrated into the political system. 
Despite its civil war Finland was in many respects a typical Nordic democracy by 1938. In that 
year the Social Democrats formed a coalition with their opponents in the civil war, the Agrarian 
Union. Likewise in Ireland the defeated side in the civil war regrouped and embraced democratic 
rules of political competition as a means of revising the Treaty settlement. By 1938 those features 
of the 1921 Treaty that had been objected to by Republicans in 1922, the oath of allegiance to the 
British Crown, the office of the Governor General, and British possession of Irish ports, no 
longer existed. This process, not discussed in Garvin's book, was a central part in the creation of 
a more legitimate state in Ireland.
As elsewhere, the stabilisation of a democratic system of government was a long drawn-out 
affair, consuming the collective energies of a whole generation of politicians. In this the Irish 
experience was certainly not unique. European democracies had gone through three stages in 
their development before 1945. The first began in the mid-nineteenth century and ended around
1920. The era before the Great War seemed to presage the universal triumph of the democratic 
idea. By 1914 even the three autocratic Imperial polities of Russia, Turkey, and Iran, had 
formally adopted parliamentary models of government. In the period following the war, this 
sense of democratic optimism was added to by the adoption of highly democratic constitutions, 
the introduction of proportional systems of election, and by the formation of reformist Social 
Democratic Governments. By 1920 the whole area west of the Soviet Union was under 
democratic rule. However that year proved to be the high tide of democratic optimism. Already 
between 1918 and 1920 two countries had reverted to authoritarian rule. The following decade 
was largely a period of political retrenchment, a process accelerated by the recession.60 In the 
Catholic countries such as Austria, Portugal and Spain a reversion to the clerical 
authoritarianism of the nineteenth century took place. Political systems, democratic or
59 J. Coakley, Political Succession and regime change in interwar Europe', Ireland, Finland, 
Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic Republics', European Journal of Political Research, 14, pp. 187-207.
60 D. Thomson, Europe Since Napoleon (London, 1986), pp.663-673.
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authoritarian, were consolidated on a nationalist and conservative basis. From the mid to late 
twenties right-wing or conservative governments emerged in the UK, France, Germany, and 
Hungary. Portugal, which suffered a military coup in 1926, became a Catholic authoritarian state 
under Salazar in 1929. Authoritarian coups also took place in 1926 in Poland and Lithuania. In 
1928 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia reverted to a monarchical form of government. By the late 
twenties the democratic model of government was under serious assault. The third phase in the 
development of European democracy, the period between 1930 and 1938, proved to be one of 
ideological polarisation. The early experiment with mass democracy turned out to be nothing 
more than a prelude to dictatorship in countries like Spain and Germany. In others it was a 
prelude to the emergence of social democracy. Once Nazism was established in 1933, the threat 
to European democracies was made more real. In response, democracy, often containing a strong 
social democratic element, especially in the Nordic and Benelux countries, was consolidated. 
European states became more clearly divided into democratic and authoritarian categories. 
Nevertheless, the long term direction of change was certainly authoritarian. Overall 'in 1918-20 
legislative assemblies were dissolved or became ineffective in two European states, in the 1920s 
in six, the 1930s in nine, while German occupation destroyed constitutional power in another five 
during the Second World War'.61
The place of Ireland within this scheme of things is clear. Between 1918 and 1921 its political 
life was democratised and radicalised. The first Dail was elected by universal suffrage and new 
democratic institutions such as the Republican courts were introduced. The period between 1922 
and 1932 was one of political retrenchment. As elsewhere 'reaction against the subversion of the 
old social order in 1917-1920',62 was at the root of the Cumann na nGaedheal regime, as it was 
of the Stormont regime in Northern Ireland. Ideologically, Cumann na nGaedheal governments 
advocated a mixture of tough law and order policies and economic monetarism, although they 
disassociated themselves from the radical nationalism of the European right. In the late twenties 
and early 1930's, when the depression was at its height, the political system became polarised on 
a left-right basis.63 The government introduced a New Public Safety Bill aimed at left-wing and 
subversive organisations. William Cosgrave, then President of the Executive Council, stated that 
he and his colleagues believed
that the future of the country is linked up with the traditions and teachings of the Christian religion which 
have governed the minds of its people for fifteen hundred years. We believe that the new patriotism based 
on Muscovite leanings with a sugar coating of Irish extremism is completely alien to Irish tradition. The
61 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, (London, 1994), p. 111.
62 Ibid, p. 113.
63 See P. Mair, The Changing Irish Party System (London, 1987).
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right to private property is a fundamental of Christian civilisation and so long as the government remains in 
power it will maintain that sacred right for its people .64
The rising Fianna Fail party was able to take advantage of the economic distress in the country as 
well as the unpopularity of the government's coercive measures. Its period in office saw the 
consolidation of Irish democracy, as well as the introduction of measures designed to counteract 
the depression. A small right-wing movement, the Blueshirts, temporarily linked to the Fine 
Gael party, emerged, but proved unsuccessful, as elsewhere in democratic Europe of the time.
In short, the Irish underwent the three stages of aspiration, retrenchment, and polarisation that 
were experienced by European democracies at the time. Naturally historical analysis has 
concentrated on different phases in this sequence, but until recently post-independence 
developments have been neglected. The balance is somewhat redressed by Garvin, but his work 
overlooks the limitations of the Cumann na nGaedheal regime and the positive role the defeated 
side played in the stabilisation of a democratic system. Moreover, the extent to which the civil 
war was a crucial turning point in the evolution of a stable democratic system can be debated. 
Certainly it resulted in the destruction of the IRA as a leading influence within Irish nationalism, 
but it also polarised positions on the Treaty in a way that might not have happened if moderates 
had retained their influence. Some consensus on the basis of the Anglo-Irish relationship was an 
absolute pre-condition for the existence of stable democracy in Ireland. It was only achieved well 
after the civil war.
1.3 Comparative Democratic Theory.
What is missing from all these theories is a full discussion of the explanatory power of 
comparative theories of the genesis and stabilisation of democracy for the Irish case. As the only 
'successor state' to have remained continuously democratic since independence, the Irish case 
should stand as a useful test-case for theories of democratic survival and breakdown in the 
interwar period. Curiously however, it does not feature at all in comparative analyses of the fate 
of democracy in the interwar period, and is generally ignored in the wider area of empirical 
democratic theory.65 Only twice have explicit comparisons of the Irish case with other European 
states at the time been made, and only twice have attempts been made to explain the Irish case 
in terms of comparative democratic theory.66
64 Dail Debates, October, Vol XL, Col.49, October 14 1931.
65 Two works with the unusual merit of treating a wide variety of European cases which ignore the Irish 
case completely are D. Rueschmeyer, E. Stephens, and J.D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and 
Democracy (Cambridge 1992); G. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism and Social Demccracy (Oxford, 1990).
66 For the former see J. Coakley, Political Succession and regime change in interwar Europe', Ireland, 
Finland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic Republics', European Journal of Political Research, 14, pp. 187- 
207; and D. Kirby 'Nationalism and national identity in the new states of Europe : the examples of Austria, 
Finland, and Ireland' in P. Stirk, European Unity in context: the interwar period (London,! 989). For the
Why is the Irish experience seldom referred to in comparative discussions of the fate of 
democracy in the interwar era ? Firstly, it has been argued that the Irish experience was 
untypical of European experience on the whole, and that meaningful parallels can only be made 
with the developing nations in the Third World.67 As the state is the only European state that 
can be considered a former colony of Great Britain's, comparisons with the colonial world are 
more suitable. This involves the additional assumption that Irish society, not simply Irish 
political structures and habits, was also post-colonial.68 Secondly, since the Irish state was not 
seriously challenged by a strong Communist or Fascist movement in the period, it may be 
concluded that the state was ideologically immune to the sorts of pressures that led to 
democratic breakdown on the continent. However such organisations were considered 
sufficiently important for them to be banned in the 1930s. Their failure is part of the explanan 
not the explanandum of the Irish case. Thirdly, is the Anglo-centric view that the Irish Free 
State remained democratic because of its proximity to Great Britain. This view ignores the fact 
that British influence did little to shore up democratic practice in the statelet that was part of 
Britain, as well as underestimating the difficulties the British legacy created for democratic 
statebuilding in independent Ireland. Lastly, while Irish social science has absorbed many 
Anglo-American intellectual influences, it has only recently begun to look at the development of 
the Irish state in a European context.69 Irish insularity has been the fundamental pre-condition 
of comparative neglect
To date there has been no systematic attempt to assess the explanatory powers of comparative 
democratic theory for the Irish case. The chapters which follow attempt to do that by selecting a 
number of the most influential perspectives on democratisation and the stabilisation of democracy 
and testing them against the Irish evidence. They can be divided into two types : those that 
discuss structural pre-conditions for democracy and those that emphasise the importance of elite 
and institutional variables. The sources used reflect the eclectic choice of perspectives discussed 
in this thesis. Chapters two and three rely mostly on statistical evidence of the social structure of 
the Irish state. Some is taken from comparative volumes of historical statistics, some from 
official statistical collections such as Irish censal data. The subsequent chapters rely more on 
conventional historical primary sources. Throughout, primary sources are used not to chronicle
latter see B Kissane, The Not So Amazing Case of Irish Democracy1 Irish Political Studies, vol. 10, 1995, 
pp.43-68; T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy, pp. 189-207.
67 See R. Carty, Electoral Politics in Ireland : Party and Parish Pump (Dingle, 1983); J. Prager, 
Building Democracy in Ireland (Cambridge, 1986); D. Schmitt, The Irony of Irish Democracy : the 
impact o f political culture on administration and democratic political development in Ireland (London and 
Toronto, 1973).
68 For a criticism see L. Kennedy, 'Modem Ireland : post-colonial society or post-colonial pretensions ?', 
Irish Review, (Belfast, 1992).
69 See for example J. Lee, Ireland, 1918-1985 (Cambridge, 1989); L. Mjoset, The Irish Economy in a 
Comparative Institutional Perspective (Dublin, 1992); J.H. Goldthorpe and C.T. Whelan, The Development 
of Industrial Society in Ireland (Oxford, 1992).
or illuminate the unfolding of events but to illustrate and clarify theoretical arguments. The thesis 
is a work of comparative political science, not a study in the development of Irish political 
consciousness.
Ever since Hermans’ diatribe against the effects of P.R. in the inter-war period most 
mainstream theories of democratic stability have addressed the issue of why the period proved to 
be so disastrous for democratic government.70 However, the explanatory power of such theories, 
when tested against a wide number of cases, has proven to be of limited scope.71 This doesn't 
necessarily imply that their explanatory power for individual cases can be dismissed from the 
start. Chapter two tests Upset's argument that economic development and democracy were 
positively related by comparing Irish rates of economic development with those of the democratic 
and those of the undemocratic world. Chapter three tests Barrington Moore's thesis that 
democracy can only emerge when the traditional structure of agrarian class relations has been 
radically overturned, by looking at the impact of land reform on Irish political development. 
Chapter four assesses the now fashionable claim in democratic theory that elite decision-making 
is the crucial variable in the stabilisation of any democratic system. It looks at the efforts made 
in the first half of 1922 to prevent the outbreak of civil war in Ireland. Chapter five discusses the 
view, found in Prager and Garvin, that the civil war expressed the clash of two poles of Irish 
political culture, one a pre-modem communitarian one, the other a modem liberal-democratic 
one. Chapter six discusses two recent contributions to democratic theory which analyse the 
strategies elites employ to reshape chronically unstable political systems. In particular it 
concentrates on de Valera's creation of a constitutional Republican alternative to the Free State 
after 1932. Hermen's thesis that the sources of democratic survival and breakdown were to be 
found in the institutional structures of the interwar states is discussed in chapter seven. This 
chapter assesses the traditional claim that the stabilisation of Irish democracy after 1923 was a 
vindication of the Westminster system. Finally, chapter eight discusses the relationship between 
democracy and nationalism in Ireland by looking at the conflict between the two forces in the 
careers of Collins and de Valera. This chapter concludes the substantive part of the thesis. My 
conclusions are presented in the final chapter.
The theoretical relevance of the Irish case to the wider world of democratic theory has been the 
subject of a considerable Irish literature. Unfortunately much of this literature stresses the 
exceptionalism of the Irish case, suggesting that Irish democracy emerged out of an essentially 
unmodem society. In effect it treats Ireland as the India of the west. Carty sees Ireland as an 
exception to the rule that democracy blossoms only in modem developed societies.72 Schmitt
70 F. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy : A Study of Proportional Representation (New York, London, 
1972).
71 D. Berg Schlosser, and G. de Meur, 'Conditions for democracy in interwar Europe ; a Boolean test of 
major hypotheses', Comparative Politics, 26: 3, pp 253-281.
72 R. Carty, Electoral Politics in Ireland; party and parish pump (Dingle, 1983), p.3.
argues that Ireland displayed many of the features of post- World War Two developing 
nations.73 Prager also puts Ireland firmly within a Third World perspective.74 Garvin's 
judgement is more ambiguous, although he also argues that 'the social reality of Ireland in the 
1920's was that it was slowly emerging from serfdom and pre-literate culture and could only be 
built up slowly by the gradual and long-term efforts of large numbers of people*75 In contrast I 
argue that Irish democracy emerged out of a society that was relatively modernised, with high 
levels of education and urbanisation. Moreover it emerged after a half-centuiy of land reform had 
thoroughly modernised the Irish social class structure. The stabilisation of Irish democracy after 
1922 was no surprise. The relative modernity of the Irish state is precisely what distinguishes 
the Irish case from the less fortunate states in Eastern Europe, a point emphasised by Lee 76
It has been suggested that a robust democratic culture had developed in Ireland under the Union 
and that the strength of democratic norms in Irish political culture explains why the state 
remained democratic after independence 77 Recent books by Prager and Garvin have provided 
different analyses of the nature of Irish political culture 78 Their work is discussed in chapter 
four. It concludes that whereas the Irish social structure was comparatively modernised at the 
time of independence, Irish political culture contained residues of pre-modem cultural 
orientations that were incompatible with pluralist political processes. It has been suggested 
elsewhere that the Irish case can be considered 'one of the most politically overdeveloped 
countries in the world' relative to its social base.79 However the fact that a relatively advanced 
society rapidly disintegrated into civil war in 1922 suggests an inversion of traditional wisdom 
is in order; Irish society in 1922 was socially developed but politically underdeveloped.
If the society had been underdeveloped, then the consolidation of a stable political system was a 
significant achievement, a testament to the skill and commitment of the Irish political elite. In 
this vein Garvin suggests that 'the Irish revolutionaries-tumed politicians got it more right than 
wrong'.80 In contrast, V.S. Pritchett, a correspondent based in Dublin during the civil war, 
believed that after six years of revolution 'the politicals were suffering from strain and many 
were out of their minds'. Personal relations were marked by jealousy and cruelty. 'There was 
continual talk of 'principle' but personal jealousy and vengeance were at the bottom of these
73 D. Schmitt, The irony of Irish democracy; the impact o f political culture on adminstration and 
democratic political development in Ireland (London and Toronto, 1973), p.88.
74 J. Prager, Building Politics in Ireland (Cambridge, 1986), p.29.
75 T. Garvin, 'Revolutionaries turned politicians : a painful, confusing metamorphsis' Irish Times, 6 
December, 1997.
76 J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985 (Cambridge, 1989), p.69.
77 See for example B. Farrell, 'The Paradox of Irish Politics' in B. Farrell (ed.) The Irish Parliamentary 
Tradition (Dublin, 1973).
78 J. Prager, Building Democracy in Ireland; T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy.
79 R. Carty cited in Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy, p. 191.
80 Ibid.
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actions'.81 Gavan Duffy, a Treaty signatory who resigned from the Provisional Government in 
the summer of 1922, believed that the bellicose Republicans' were to blame for the start of the 
civil war, but personal enmities that infected several of the leaders on both sides were 'of more 
lasting effect'. After the death of Collins the leaders of the Free State were not 'qualified by 
education and training to take part in constitutional controversies'. They were 'utterly perplexed 
by the problems of statecraft'.82 In this vein, Gavan Duffy advised Mulcahy, Minister of Defence, 
in August 1922, of the need to purge the Provisional Government of its weaker elements.
Time and patience would be saved by the elimination from your more intimate councils of the lesser men, 
who have been something of a dead-weight on recent ministry meetings and who scarcely contribute 
anything to counterbalance their indecision, their want of breath, and the obstinacy they mistake for 
strength.83
Naturally 'the character of elite political culture is central to any estimate of the prospects of 
democracy in any nascent polity, quite apart from economic conditions or even traditions of civic 
strife'.84 A contemporary orthodoxy in democratic theory stresses that elites can 'craft' 
democracies in inhospitable climes if only the choices they make are the right ones.85 However I 
shall criticise the voluntarist view that elites can always make a difference. Irish elites could do 
little to prevent the outbreak of civil war. Three factors, external pressure, insufficient elite 
hegemony, and the existence of a highly adversarial political culture explain their failure. The 
character of elite culture with its 'legitimist claims, abandoned oaths, and rival authorities',86 
was partially responsible for the disintegration of the nationalist movement into civil war. It 
proved compatible with democratic politics only after radical surgery had taken place.
A second characteristic of the new orthodoxy in democratic theory concerns the alleged centrality 
of elite constitutional choices for the stabilisation of democracy. A large literature has stressed 
the British origins of Irish constitutional choices.87 Politics after 1922 continued to be conducted 
in a highly adversarial fashion in a political system that moved ever closer to its Westminster 
origins. Again, the instinct of the dominant civil war parties for adversary party competition
81 V.S. Prichett, Dublin; A Portrait (London, 1992), p.5.
82 'Voice Recording made for the Bureau by the Hon. George Gavan Duffy, President of the High Court', 20 
January 1951, Gavan Duffy Papers, 1125/15 No. 17, National Archives.
83 Duffy to Mulcahy, August 29 1922, Richard Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/100, U.C.D. Archives.
84 T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1996), p. 197.
85 See G. di Palma, To Craft Democracies ; An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Baltimore and London, 
1979).
86 E. O' Halpin, The Army and the Dail- Civil/Military Relations within the Independence Movement', 
pi 14.
87 B. Chubb, The Government and Politics o f Ireland (Oxford, 1970); B. Farrell, The Founding of Dail 
Eireann (Dublin 1971); B. Farrell, The Paradox of Irish Politics' in B. Farrell (ed.), The Irish 
Parliamentary Tradition (Dublin, 1973); B. Farrell, From First Dail through Free State', in B. Farrell (ed.) 
De Valera's Constitution and Ours (Dublin 1988); A.J. Ward, The Irish Constitutional Tradition; 
Responsible Government in Ireland (Dublin, 1993).
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seems to have determined that the stabilisation of the Irish system would take a considerable 
amount of time. The viability of Westminster-type institutions was related to the nature of the 
initial divide between the civil war parties. If that division had been absent or less intense there is 
no reason to suppose that an alternative institutional framework would not have worked equally 
well.
The stabilisation of the democratic system, then, cannot be considered a vindication of Irish elite 
political culture. Rather, structural pre-conditions may have been more important. However one 
'genetic' perspective that can be applied to the Irish case was developed by Dankwart Rustow 
two decades ago.88 Rustow argued that the factors which bring a system into being are very 
different from the factors which keep it in place. In the Irish case sociological theories can tell us 
a great deal about the genesis of democracy but they tell us little about the process of democratic 
stabilisation. Rustow emphasised how important the experience of a phase of 'severe and deeply 
entrenched conflict' was to the life of a democracy. That experience can be positive if it is 
followed by the 'conscious adoption of democratic rules' by partisan elites. In this respect de 
Valera's formulation of a constitutional Republican alternative to the Free State after 1922 was a 
decisive aspect of the stabilisation of Free State democracy. Rustow also stipulated that 'national 
unity' was a pre-condition for stable democracy. In Ireland 'national unity1 came about only when 
the Treaty had been significantly revised. A basic consensus on foreign policy was then manifest 
between 1939 and 1945 when the state pursued a policy of neutrality in the war, although 
personal hatreds prevented the formation of a national government. De Valera’s creation of a 
constitutional Republican alternative to the Free State provided a necessary source of re­
legitimation and one that was ultimately successful.
To summarise, the Irish state went through a familiar experience in the interwar period : the 
genesis of a democratic system was followed by breakdown, which in turn was followed by the 
re-equilibration of a democratic system. In all these phases British power was a vital 
determining factor. It was Britain's decision to democratise its own polity in 1918 that led to the 
Sinn Fein revolution at the ballot box and in the field. It was Britain's imposition of the Treaty 
settlement in 1921 that led to the civil war, and it was Britain's extension of the policy of 
appeasement to the 'restless dominion' in the 1930s that allowed de Valera to make the changes 
that were necessary for the creation of a more legitimate state. If Britain had acted differently, the 
outcome in Ireland would have been different. In saying that the sequence was one of genesis, 
followed by breakdown, and re-equilibration, I am setting myself at odds with two lines of 
interpretation in Irish political science. The first argues that the Sinn Fein elite achieved a 
significant degree of democratic institutionalisation between 1919 and 1921. The second 
represents the civil war as a conflict 'between majority right and divine right' and credits the
88 D. Rustow, Transititons to democracy ; toward a dynamic model1 Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970); 
p.362.
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Pro-Treatyites with the stabilisation of Irish democracy.89 I argue that stable democracy came 
much later. Neither the failed attempts of the revolutionary Dail government to establish a 
democratic government in Ireland, nor the more successful efforts of the Cumann na nGaedheal 
elite to create a strong institutional base for Free State democracy, can be considered 
'consolidations' of a democratic system. Both consolidation and legitimacy came only in the 
1930s and were largely the work of de Valera.
89 J.Lee, Ireland 1912-1985, p.67
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Chapter Two : Economic Development and 
Democracy in Ireland.
Ireland belonged to a group o f countries which until the second world war had been largely 
unaffected by the main currents o f industrial growth in the past century'.
U.N. Report 1961.
Writing in 1971, Robert Dahl reflected th a t' it is widely assumed that a high level of socio­
economic development not only favours the transformation of a hegemonic regime into a 
polyarchy but also helps to maintain - may even be necessary to maintain a polyarchy1.1 The 
relationship between economic development and democracy has taken divergent patterns. First, 
development can lead to the permanent transition from an undemocratic to a stable democratic 
system. Second, where significant economic development does not take place, an undemocratic 
regime persists. Third, if the economic conditions are only 'mixed or temporarily favourable' then 
three possibilities exist: (a) democracy would break down and be replaced by an undemocratic 
system; (b) the same process occurs, but in this case the undemocratic regime also breaks down 
and is then replaced by a democratic system, (c) the second process continues without any type 
of system lasting long.2
Which pattern does Ireland fit into ? While Lee argues that between 1848 and 1918 'Southern 
Ireland modernised probably as quickly as any other western European society in this period', 3 
other writers argue that independent Ireland is relevant to democratic theory precisely because it 
is an exception to the rule that democracy blossoms only in modem developed societies.4 Irish 
democracy can be seen either as the normal outcome of processes of modernisation which 
transformed Irish society in the latter half of the nineteenth century, or as a modem polity which 
emerged out of an essentially backward society. In such a case 'unique historical events' rather 
than socio-economic processes, 'may account for either the persistence or failure of democracy*.5 
This chapter tests which of these possibilities is true, by comparing Irish rates of economic 
development with those of the democratic and those of the undemocratic world. The first section 
tests the relationship between democratisation and economic development, while the second 
examines the relationship between economic performance and the stabilisation of Irish 
democracy after 1922. The third provides a critique of the use of quantitative indicators in
1 R. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, 1971), p. 63.
2 R. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven, 1989), p. 242.
3 J. Lee, The Modernization of Irish Society 1848-1918 (Dublin, 1989), p.168.
4 See for example R. Carty, Electoral Politics in Ireland (Dingle, 1983); J. Prager, Building Democracy in 
Ireland (Cambridge, 1986); and D. Schmitt, The Irony of Irish Democracy (Lexington, Mass, 1983).
5 S.M. Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy; Economic Development and Political Legitimacy1, 
American Political Science Review, 4, 1959, p.72.
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comparative politics. The emphasis is on clarifying the comparative position of the Irish state 
with respect to the levels of development existing in the democratic and the undemocratic world.
2.1 Economic Development and Democratisation.
The most influential developmental theory of democracy was published by Lipset in 1959. He 
asked why democracies are in general much wealthier, more urbanised, more educated, and more 
industrialised than non-democracies ? His answer was that the 'economic development complex', 
consisting of industrialisation, increased wealth, urbanisation, and education, provide a crucial 
support for democratic politics by creating a larger middle class.
Increased wealth also affects the political role of the middle class through changing the shape of the
stratification structure so that it shifts from an elongated pyramid, with a large lower class base, to a 
diamond with a growing middle class. A large middle class plays a mitigating role in moderating conflict 
since it is able to reward moderate and democratic parties and penalise extremist groups.6
Upset's hypothesis was that 'the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will 
sustain democracy1.7 The diffusion of wealth makes political compromise possible since it leads 
to a more open class system, educational opportunities for more people, and more economic 
security for the working class.
From Aristotle down to the present, men have argued that only in a wealthy society in which a relatively 
few citizens lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could 
intelligently participate in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the 
appeals of irresponsible demagogues. A society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small 
favoured elite would result either in oligarchy (dictatorial rule of the small upper stratum) or in tyranny ( 
popularly based dictatorship).8
Lipset defined a democracy as 'a political system which supplies regular constitutional 
opportunities for changing the governing officials',9 and more substantively as 'a social 
mechanism for the resolution of the problem of societal decision-making among conflicting 
interest groups which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these
6 Ibid, 75.
7 Ibid, p.80. Lipset speaks of 'social requisites' rather than necessary conditions but it is clear he believes 
that both the emergence of a democratic system and its' maintenance are closely related to this complex, 
whose components are so highly correlated with each other 'as to form one common factor1 For example 
although individual characteristics, such as a high level of education may not be sufficient conditions for 
democracy, the available evidence does suggest, he argues, that it comes close to being a necessary 
condition in the modem world' (ibid).
8 Ibid, p.75.
9 Ibid, p.71.
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decisions through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office'.10 
Independent Ireland is classified as a stable democracy. Since Lipset took durability to be one 
indicator of stability, he took his data from sources at the very end of the period he was 
discussing, from the late fifties. These data were used to answer the very different questions of 
why some states become democratic while others don't, and why some democracies remain 
democratic while others don't. The data I use to study the relationship between democratisation 
and development are taken from the beginning of the interwar period, whereas I use Lipset's data 
to explore whether the stability of democratic states has anything to do with their later economic 
performance.
Unlike Lipset I use durability as the only indicator of stability, providing these states satisfy 
democratic criteria continuously since 1920. The problem with Lipset's method was that his 
indicator of durability was at odds with his indicator of what he took to be another component of 
stability, legitimacy, which was shown by the non-appearance of an anti-system movement over 
the previous 25 years, beginning in 1934.1 prefer to accept the fact that if the state continued to 
satisfy the criteria of democratic politics despite the emergence of an anti-system movement, 
then durability and legitimacy are more or less the same thing. Apart from that, I follow Lipset's 
method of testing his basic hypothesis; the higher the level of development the greater the 
chances for democratic politics, by comparing mean scores for the indices of development - 
wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation, and education - for a sample of democratic and 'less 
democratic countries'. I also include the figures for independent Ireland.
Lipset's data showed that the level of industrialisation was much higher for democracies than for 
non-democracies in 1959. His indices of industrialisation were the percentage of males employed 
in agriculture, and per capita energy consumed. It is difficult to find historical data for the latter, 
so I will concentrate only on the first, albeit for the whole of the workforce rather than males. 
Below table 2.1 shows the mean percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture for 
Lipset's samples around 1920, as well as figures for the Free State in 1926, and Ireland as a 
whole, in 1906. The figure for Ireland as a whole is exactly the same as that for Sweden in 1920, 
but with the qualified exception of Finland, no other democratic state had as high a proportion of 
its workforce in agriculture as the Free State, which has a figure midway between the democratic 
and the undemocratic mean. Ireland as a whole was not exceptional, but the independent state 
was significantly less industrialised than other democracies at the time.
10 Ibid.
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Table 2.1 Percentage of the economically active population employed in agriculture around 1920.
Mean Percentage Range
European Democracies! 27.5 7-44
Ireland 44
Irish Free State2 53
European Non-democracies3 75 58-28
1 Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Britain.
2 Figures are for 1926, and include those employed in forestry and fisheries.
3 Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Austria.
Sources : M. Alestalo, 1986, Table 2, p.26. For Ireland, Mitchell, 1978, Table B l, p. 148.
Most of the industries that had existed in the early nineteenth century, such as cotton, wool, silk, 
tanneries, and coachmaking, went into long-term decline after 1801.11 The decline in industrial 
employment was particularly striking in the Western province of Connacht where in 1881 only 
15.2 per cent of the labour force were employed in industry compared to 42.9 per cent in 1821. 
These Western areas were 'those most reliant upon foreign markets to absorb their surplus labour 
[and] were least successful in developing alternative sources of employment at home'.12 Only in 
the province of Ulster was there a similarly dramatic decline in the percentage of the labour force 
employed in industry, from 55.3 per cent to 37.1 per cent, yet that decline was only in the 
border counties of Cavan, Deny, Donegal, Fermanagh, Monaghan and Tyrone, (three of which 
would be included in the Free State).13 The closer one got to Belfast, the only example of large 
scale industrialisation in Irish history, the more decline gave way to growth. Partition, which 
removed the north-east from the territory of the new state in 1920, left the new state without a 
highly industrialised region. The censal report on the Occupation of Males over the previous 
decades in the areas of the Free State, published in 1926, showed a stagnant situation. In 1881 
approximately 59 per cent of males worked in agriculture. This didn't decrease over the next 
decade and by 1901 it had actually increased to sixty per cent. By 1911, the last censal year 
before independence, it was only 56.4 per cent.14 If Ireland did industrialise it was limited to 
certain areas. The Irish case neither supports nor refutes the thesis that industrialisation and 
democratisation are positively related. Areas of the Free State were industrialised by European 
standards. Others were less industrialised than the norm in Western Europe.
11 J. Mokyr, Industrialisation and Poverty in Ireland and the Netherlands' Journal o f Interdisciplinary 
History, {10,3, 1980), p 451.
12 Cited in S.A. Royle, Industrialisation, Urbanisation, and Urban Society in Post-Famine Ireland 1850- 
1921', in B.J. Graham, J.C. Proudfoot (eds.), An Historical Geography of Ireland (London, 1993), p.262.
13 S. Royle, ibid, table 8.2, p 263.
14 Irish Free State, Official Census, 1926.
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Max Weber argued that the modem concept of citizenship was closely related to the emergence 
of cities. Similarly Lipset maintained that occupational groups such as farmers are more 
receptive to extremist ideologies and less tolerant of differences since they, 'like workers in 
isolated industries, tend to have a more homogenous political environment than those employed 
in most urban occupations'.15 The more cosmopolitan social groups are exposed to a variety of 
influences and are less likely to accept all or nothing views. Table 2.2. shows the levels of 
urbanisation of eighteen states around 1920, ranked according to the size of the total population 
living in urban settlements of ten thousand or above. Figures are given for the percentage of the 
population living in areas of ten thousand to a hundred thousand inhabitants, a hundred 
thousand to a million inhabitants, and areas with over a million inhabitants. Rather surprisingly, 
Northern Ireland had one of the most urbanised populations in Europe, being typical of Great 
Britain rather than of Ireland as a whole. However, despite the effect of partition the Free State 
was not exceptionally rural among democracies. It was more urbanised than Sweden and Norway 
for example. A relatively large proportion of the population, fifteen percent, lived in cities of a 
hundred thousand or more. This is above the average for our sample of states and higher than 
that of Italy, Switzerland, and Denmark.
However the geographical pattern of urbanisation reveals a similar pattern to that of 
industrialisation. The overall proportion of the Irish population living in towns increased from 15 
per cent in 1841 to 35 per cent in 1914.16 Dublin, with a population of 300,000 in 1914, and 
Belfast, which saw its population grow from 100,000 to 400,000 between 1850 and 1914, were 
the largest population centres. Their growth was exceptional. Royle estimates that the mean rate 
of urbanisation for an Irish town between 1841 and 1911 was 0.47 per cent per annum. In other 
words a town would grow to 133 per cent of its 1841 size by 1911. Yet most Irish towns failed to 
grow at all, and were smaller in 1911 than in 1841. Only twelve out of thirty-two counties had 
any town with a growth rate above the mean. All the five counties with a positive general 
urbanisation rate were in the East of the country. Those towns that grew at a rate higher than the 
national mean clustered around commercial centres like Dublin, Limerick, Cork, or Galway, or 
around Belfast.17 Again, while Irish figures do not disprove the thesis that urbanisation and 
democratisation are positively related, internal variation in the rate of urbanisation suggest that 
this relationship was stronger in some areas than others.
15 Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites', p.96.
16 J. Lee, The Modernisation of Irish Society 1848-1918, p. 14.
17 Royle, op. cit., figure 8.5., p288.
37
Table 2.2. Distribution of total population hv she o f locality as a per cent of total population in European countries around 1920. 
ranked according to size of total population in urban centres of 10.000 or above.
Country Less than 10,000 10,000 -100,000 100,000 -1,000,000 More than
1,000,000.
England &
Wales
Netherlands 41J
N. Ireland 46.4
Italy S4.4
Belgium 57.9
Germany 18.6
Austria 58.7
Denmark 64.6
France 65.4
LF.S. 68.2
Switzerland 72.4
Norway 75.3
Sweden 76.5
Hungary 69.3
Finland 87.5
Czechoslovakia 81.1
U.S.S.R. 85.6
Yugoslavia 92.7
39.1
34.5 24.2
103 33.0
3 2 3  133
14.6 30.2 
08.2
083  02.6 30.4
14.0 21.4
19.2 08.0 07.5
08.9 22.9
16.1 11.5
14.9 19.8
11.0 12.5
163 14.4
06.8 05.9
113 08.0
07.9 06.5
05.3 02.0
Sources; for Western Europe, P. Flora, 1987, pp. 251-280; for Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., Schoup, 1981, Table H, pp. 397-407.
Increased wealth has positive political effects since it increases the security, income, and 
opportunities of the working class, which become reformist in their politics, according to Lipset. 
'A belief in secular reformist gradualism can only be the ideology of a relatively well-to-do lower 
class', he argues.18 The absence of a well-to-do working class also affects the upper classes' 
attitude towards democratisation.
the poorer the country, and the lower the absolute standard of the lower classes, the greater the pressure on 
the upper strata to treat the lower classes as beyond the pale of human society, as vulgar, as innately
18 Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites', p.83.
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inferior, as a lower caste. The sharp difference in the style of living between those at the top and those at 
the bottom makes this psychologically necessary.19
Only rough international comparisons are possible with respect to wealth. Here I rely on the 
figures for national income calculated by a group of Irish economic historians.20 Two estimates 
of G.N.P. are provided in table 2.3. The first set in column A relates to G.N.P. per capita 
valued at U.S. prices. The second set, in column B, is based on different sources, and relates to 
G.D.P. per capita . In their discussion of the European figures Kennedy et al showed that the 
two measurements led to different results. The first set of figures, A, suggests that Irish G.N.P 
per capita in 1913 was only slightly below the European average, and sixty per cent higher than 
the level of Eastern Europe as a whole. Ireland comes tenth out of twenty-three European 
countries and its per capita GNP was about 15 per cent higher than the European mean level, 
only slightly behind that of France, Austria, and Sweden. However the second set of figures, B, 
leaves Ireland in twelfth position, its product per capita marginally below the mean level.
Table 2.3. Real Product per capita In Democracies. Non-democracies, and Ireland relative to the UK in 1913.
A Range B
Stable 83.5 5 7 -1 2 6  97.5
Democracies
Unstable 41.8 28-72 46.6
Democracies
Ireland 61 55
Source : Kennedy et al, 1988, table 1.1, .14.
Nevertheless, the authors conclude that
both sets of figures are consistent with the broad conclusion that average income per capita in Ireland was 
not widely different from the European average in 1913. Thus, while it would be going too far to imply, as 
Lee does, that Ireland in 1913 was in the first division among European countries in terms of per capita 
income, nevertheless its relative standing was surprisingly high for a country commonly thought of as a very 
poor and undeveloped country.21
19 Ibid.
20 K. A  Kennedy, T. Giblin, and D. McHugh, The Economic Development of Ireland in the Twentieth 
Century (London and New York,1988), p.198, Table 1.1, p.14.
21 Ibid, p. 15.
Range
52-122
26-67
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Nevertheless, after including the non-European democracies, the United States, New Zealand, 
Canada, and Australia, the figures show that Ireland is, really in an intermediary position 
between the democratic and the undemocratic groups. Next to Norway it has the lowest score for 
per capita GNP on both measurements, while its position vis a vis the mean scores is midway 
between the democratic and the undemocratic countries on the first measurement, and clearly 
closer to the undemocratic mean on the second. In short, as a European democracy Ireland was 
not poor, but as a member of a larger world of democracies, it was quite a poor relation.
The widely-held view that the better educated a society the better the chances for democracy is 
shared by Lipset. Today democratic countries are almost entirely literate and have consistently 
higher rates of enrolment at all educational levels than non-democracies. Education is held to be 
an indispensable requirement of citizenship. In a basic sense, political literacy, reading 
newspapers, registering to vote, and voting, all require basic functional literacy. Education 
broadens outlooks, makes people see other's points of view, and enables them to appreciate the 
need for tolerance in a political system. Perhaps the most important educational qualification is 
the possession of literacy. The interwar data suggest that near-universal literacy is the norm for 
democratic countries. Diverse countries like Australia, Czechoslovakia, the Irish Free State and 
the United States, all had literacy rates well over 90 per cent around 1921.22 In contrast, those 
Eastern European countries that were undemocratic show a consistently lower level of literacy. In 
1928 the U.S.S.R. and Portugal had more illiterates than literates, Yugoslavia had almost as 
many illiterates as literates, while Roumania's literacy rate was only just above 50 per cent and 
Greece's was only 56.1 per cent. Poland and Italy, which had reverted to authoritarian rule by 
1928, score highest among non-democracies with 71.7 per cent and 75.7 per cent respectively. 
Unlike other developmental indicators, the individual figures for democracies do not vary much 
and are in almost all cases close to 95 per cent of the population. The one qualified exception is 
Finland with only 81.2 per cent literate, but this figure is closer to the mean figure for 
democracies than to the mean figure for non-democracies.
22 See A. Banks, Cross Polity Time-Series Data (Cambridge; Mass, 1981), segment seven, column A.
Table 2.4. Educational Enrolment Rates in 1920. ranked according to number o f enrolled students per ten thousand o f the population 
In each educational sector.
Primary Secondary University
U.S.A 1974 U.S.A. 247 U.S.A 6.5
N. Zealand 1877 Switzerland 198 Italy 4.1
Netherlands 1629 Greece 167 New Zealand 3.2
Ireland 1608 Czech/vakia 166 Austria 2.3
Germany 1572 New Zealand 128 Switzerland 1.8
Belgium 1502 Germany 117 Germany 1.5
Norway 1449 Italy 108 Hungary 1.2
Switzerland 1388 Finland 102 Belgium 1.1
Austria 1381 Bulgaria 101 U.K. 1.1
Bulgaria 1347 U.K. 83 France 1.1
U.K. 1279 Norway 83 Poland 1.1
Sweden 1211 Poland 75 Sweden 1.0
Hungary 1211 Hungary 70 Czech/vakia 1.0
Italy 1113 Ireland 69 Finland 0.9
France 1025 Austria 65 Ireland 0.9
Czech/vakia 1017 Sweden 61 U.S.S.R 0.8
Poland 899 Roumania 60 Netherlands 0.8
Greece 888 Belgium 52 Roumania 0.7
Finland 708 U.S.S.R 51 Denmark 0.6
Yugoslavia 674 Yugoslavia 43 Portugal 0.3
Roumania 642 Netherlands 43 Greece 0.1
U.S.S.R 417 France 38 Bulgaria 0.0
Portugal 313 Portugal 18 Norway 0.0
Source, A. S. Banks, 1971, Section 6, pp. 208-236.
Lipset uses three other indicators to measure the level of education in a country, primary 
enrolment, secondary enrolment, and higher education enrolment. Above table 2.4 gives figures 
for enrolment levels in these sectors per ten thousand persons. The figures suggest a strong 
relationship between the level of basic education and democratisation. They also suggest that
while basic educational development may be a necessary condition of democracy, increases in 
the level of secondary and university education will not necessarily increase the prospects of 
democratic politics, unless this first hurdle is passed. Ireland came fourth out of twenty-three 
states in this table. A system of primary education was established in Ireland in 1831, and in the
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1890's eight years of schooling was made compulsory. Where there had been 4,500 schools and 
500,000 pupils in 1848, by 1914 this had doubled to around 9,000 schools and 1,000,000 pupils 
in 1914. Lee casts doubt on the efficacy of this system in reducing illiteracy rates. Poor 
attendance rates were common. The majority of children before 1918 received only 4-5 years 
schooling, the absolute minimum necessary to cross the threshold of literacy. It was estimated for 
example that in 1921 the average school attendance under the age of fourteen was only 15 per 
cent.23 The 1927 School Attendance Act tried to enforce attendance. Nevertheless, the figues 
suggest that the Free State had achieved a comparatively high level of basic educational 
development by independence and that the vast majority of the population were functionally 
literate.
What conclusions can be drawn from these figures ? Firstly, there is little statistical backing for 
the argument that,
as a twentieth century nation faced with the problems of decolonisation, it is more comparable in character 
and conviction, in many respects, to the new nations of the Third World than to Denmark, Switzerland, or 
other small Western democracies to which it is more frequently compared. Its economy and social structure 
bear the strong imprint of its colonially dependent status. It still remains a largely rural, agriculturally 
orientated nation, unlike most of its Western counterparts.24
Ireland belonged to the developed world and in 1920 was a more developed society than the 
Eastern European states, never mind those in Asia and Africa. In comparison to the other 'small 
Western democracies' to which it is in fact infrequently compared, the Free State was an educated 
and urbanised society, although the figures for industrialisation and wealth suggest that it was in 
an intermediary position between the Western European countries and those of Eastern Europe. 
That would still have been an undreamt-of prospect to the million people who died of starvation 
and disease between 1845 and 1849. The great benefit of the industrial revolution in the late 
nineteenth century was that 'it changed the life of those who lived through it by gradually 
eliminating the great subsistence crises and catastrophes which struck Europe before'.25 Mokyr 
argues that the prospect of economic catastrophe should be counted as a measure of poverty : 
'poverty is higher when the probability of a random individual, at a random point in time, 
dropping beneath subsistence is higher'.26 When Irish harvests again failed in the 1870s there 
was no subsistence crisis. A fall in the population, a more commercialised farming sector, and a
23 J. Lee, The Modernisation of Irish Society 1848-1918, p. 28.
24 J. Prager, Building Democracy in Ireland, p.29.
25 J. Mokyr, Industrialisation and Poverty in Ireland and the Netherlands', Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, (10,3, 1980), p.262.
26 Ibid.
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more extensive railroad network had reduced the threat of high mortality.27 Economic 
development, however much it differed from that in the advanced West, was responsible for a 
considerable improvement in living standards since 1847.
On the other hand, although the Irish figures show that the new state's level of development was 
significantly higher than East European countries at the time, they do not support the stronger 
argument made by Lee that Southern Ireland modernised at a comparable rate to other Western 
societies between the Famine and independence 28 Central to the concept of development is the 
idea of growth. Most European countries saw their populations grow by an average of one per 
cent per annum in the nineteenth century. In contrast, the Irish population decreased on average 
by one per cent per annum through the nineteenth century, and between 1849 and 1911, the 
population almost halved in size. This decline affected the pattern of economic development. 
Although Ireland's G.N.P. levels remained close to the European average in 1913, the annual 
growth rate of total product in the century before was only estimated to have been 0.7 per cent, 
which was the lowest among European countries. With Spain, Ireland was the only country to 
stay behind the 1 per cent rate. In contrast the per capita growth rate was one of the highest in 
Europe for the same period, but this is largely explained by the population decline.
Given the wide disparities in income levels in 1841, and the fact that the bulk of the population decline was 
concentrated in the poorer half of the population, a significant increase in overall average income per capita 
would emerge even if the better half of the population had experienced no improvement in income per 
capita.29
Although Ireland may have been as wealthy as Norway and was wealthier than Finland in 1913, 
this was not a product of greater development. Rather the vicissitudes of persistent 
underdevelopment were mitigated by large scale emigration from the areas worst affected. What 
emerges from the historical statistics of Irish social development is not a picture of overall 
growth, but one where
a declining rural economy associated with the loss of population at and after the Famine, contrasted with 
extensive urbanisation based around the commerce of Dublin, and more particularly, the industrialisation of 
Belfast and eastern Ulster.31
27 Ibid, p. 458.
28 J. Lee, The Modernisation of Irish Society 1848-1918, p. 168.
29 Kennedy et al, The Economic Development of Ireland in the Twentieth Century, p.21.
31 S. Royle, op. cit., figure 8.5., p. 288.
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What developed was not so much two economies, an outward-looking commercial one in the 
East, and a backward subsistence economy in the West, but 'a continuum in which 
underdevelopment gradually became more severe as one moved westward'.32 National statistics 
do not reflect this complex pattern. Some areas on the future Saorstat may have been very 
developed by West European standards while others may have resembled Eastern Europe more. 
33
On the whole the Irish case seems to occupy an intermediary position between the democratic 
and the undemocratic samples. Those countries that were less developed than the Free State 
were undemocratic, while those that were more developed were democratic. A possible exception 
is Finland, but the figures do not support the view that 'the Irish case is more impressive than the 
Finnish, because Ireland was a poorer country, less well-educated, and with far less experience of 
self-government in pre-1914 times',34 since Finland scores significantly lower than the Irish case 
on each developmental indicator. Rather Finland's difficulties in establishing a stable democracy 
can be attributed to Finland's low level of socio-economic development when it became 
independent. In the Irish case the figures suggest the converse. By 1920 the Free State had 
reached those levels of socio-economic development that were necessary to sustain a democratic 
polity.
2.2. Economic Performance and the Stabilisation of Democracy.
It is frequently argued that continued economic success is a necessary condition of political 
stability in democratic states. Lipset analyses democratic persistence and breakdown in terms of 
two concepts, legitimacy and effectiveness. The first 'involves the capacity of a political system to 
engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or 
proper ones for the society'.35 The second is defined as the extent to which it satisfies the basic 
functions of government as defined by the expectations of most members of the society1.36 The 
question Lipset asks is 'how the degree of legitimacy of a democratic system may affect its 
capacity to survive the crisis of effectiveness, such as depressions or lost wars'? 37
A four-fold table is used by Lipset to analyse the fortunes of countries during the depression of 
the thirties. There are four possible combinations of his variables. These are represented 
graphically below in figure 2.1 by positions A, B, C, and D. In A he places Sweden, Britain, and
32 Mokyr, op. cit.
33 The significance of these variations is discussed in chapter five.
34 T. Garvin, Irish Democracy and British Rule' in Revising the Rising (Derry, 1991), p.26.
35 Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy1, p.86.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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the U.S.A., possessing both legitimacy and effectiveness. In C he places countries like Austria 
and Germany, low in legitimacy but which remained 'reasonably effective'. In D Lipset would 
place ineffective and illegitimate regimes which need to maintain themselves by force, as in the 
Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe. No mention is made of regimes in B during the thirties, low 
in effectiveness and high in legitimacy.38
Table 2.5. Showing the relationship between different degrees of effectiveness and legitimacy in 
different political systems.
Effectiveness.
+
+ A B
Legitimacy
C D
Source, Lipset, 1959, 90.
Lipset summarises the inter-war experience as follows,
When the effectiveness of the governments of the various countries broke down in the 1930's, those 
countries which were high on the scale of legitimacy remained democratic, while countries which were low 
such as Germany, Austria, and Spain, lost their freedom, and France narrowly escaped a similar fate. Or to 
put the changes in terms of location in the four-fold table, countries which shifted from A to B remained 
democratic, while the political systems which shifted from C to D broke down.39
The Weimar Republic failed to survive the crisis of effectiveness during the Great Depression, 
even though its economy did not suffer to the extent of those of the U.S. or the Netherlands, 
which 'entered the depression high in legitimacy and their regimes consequently endured 
intact'.40 So at first Lipset suggests that a high degree of legitimacy can compensate for short-run 
deficiencies in effectiveness. Later he seems to reverse the argument by hypothesising that
Prolonged effectiveness which lasts over a number of generations may give legitimacy to a political system; 
in the modem world, such effectiveness mainly means constant economic development. Thus those nations
38 Although as I suggest below many of the democratic survivors may be classed in this category.
39 Ibid, p.90.
40 Ibid, p.41.
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which adapted most successfully to the requirements of an industrial system had the fewest internal 
political strains, and either preserved their traditional legitimacy, the monarchy, or developed new strong 
symbols of legitimacy (my emphasis).41
This suggests that the legitimacy of traditional institutions is due to successful modernisation, 
and that effectiveness is really a side-effect of economic growth. In short stability is solely 
explained by economic success. In a later article, Lipset explains the redemocratisation of 
Western Europe and Japan after 1945 in these terms. Post-war Germany, Italy, and Japan, 
'clearly had no legitimacy at birth. But they have had the advantage of the post-war 'economic 
miracles, which produced jobs and a steadily rising standard of living. They have been 
economically effective for over four decades'.42 So regimes which lack traditional legitimacy 
must be effective if they are to be stable.
Either way, what is noticeably absent from Lipset's analysis is a consideration of states like the 
Irish Free State that did not begin the interwar period with a high degree of legitimacy, and were 
therefore in either position C or D to begin with, but did not break down during the crisis of 
effectiveness'. In contrast it became more stable as the 3Q’s went on. This leaves two possibilities. 
It could have moved from C or D to A or to B. If the former happened, its achievement of 
legitimacy could be explained by an increase in effectiveness, or if it moved to B it became 
legitimate without an improved economic performance. I test which of these possibilities was 
true by comparing the Free State's comparative position on the main developmental indicators 
around 1959, with its' position around 1920.
Table 2.6. shows the figures for industrialisation, which also include figures for the second of 
Lipset's indicators of industrialisation, per capita energy consumption, measured in terms of tons 
of coal per person per annum. These figures show that the position of the Irish Free State had 
changed dramatically since 1920. On both measures its position is typical of non-democratic 
states, whereas the 1920 figures suggested it was in an intermediary position between the two 
samples. Clearly there was little significant industrialisation between 1920 and 1959.
41 Ibid, p.91.
42 Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Conditions of the Democratic Order and Social Change: A Comparative 
Discussion', in S Eisenstadt, Democracy and Modernity (Lieden New York, 1992), p. 9.
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Table 2.6. Irish rates of industrialisation compared with 'more' and 'less' democratic countries 1956-59.
Democratic mean, 
Non-democratic mean 
Republic o f Ireland. 
Ranges.
Democracies.
Non democracies.
*/• Males in 
Agriculture 
21 
41 
41
6-46
16-60
Per capita energy consumed
3.6
1.4
1.3
1.4-7.8
2.7-3.2
Sources, Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites', Table 11, p. 76 ; U.N. Demographic Yearbook, (1956), table 12, pp. 350-370 ; U.N. Statistical 
Yearbook, (1956), table 127, pp. 308-310).
Although the Irish educational data show moderate increases on the 1920 data in all respects, the 
basic pattern shown by the 1920 data has continued. The Free State had a very high level of basic 
educational development, but this had not been translated into growth in other sectors before 
1959. Arguably the second generation in independent Ireland were not substantially better 
educated than the first. Although the level of secondary education was probably not low by 
democratic standards, university education was severely restricted by European standards, 
democratic or undemocratic. The Irish experience between 1921 and 1959, one might conclude, 
was more one of educational frustration than educational development.43
Democracies
Table 2.7. Irish rates of education compared with 'more' and 'less' democratic countries 1956-59.
Means */• Literate Primary Enrolment per Secondary Higher
1,000 Enrolment per 1,000 Education
persons persons Enrolment per 1,000
persons
99 126.5 35.9 4.2
Non-democracies 
Republic o f Ireland 
Ranges 
Democracies 
Non-Democracies
Source, Banks, 1971, Section 6,206 - 236.
93.4
96
96-106
77-100
120
176.7
92.5-183.9
91.6-152.4
18.1
25.6
12.3-76.7
6.0-30.6
3.5
22.6
1.7-17.83
1. 6- 6.1
43 On this point one counsels caution. If the figures for the 1920s hid a reality of poor school attendance, 
early drop out rates, and minimal literacy attainments, the achievement of the state after 1921 may have 
been to make the statistical illusion behind the Irish 'love of learning' more of a reality.
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Lipset doesn't specify a date for the figures for urbanisation but the year 1959 is assumed to be a 
good guide.44 Again the figures in table 2.8 show a changed situation. Whereas in 1920 the 
state was a relatively urbanised society, more so than Sweden for instance, by 1959 the number 
of people living in areas of ten thousand or less had declined by only four per cent. Over the same 
period the Swedish figure for the per cent living in areas of ten thousand or less dropped from 
over three quarters of the population to less than half. In 1920 almost a third of the Irish 
population lived in urban areas of 10,000 or more. By 1959 the figure was 35.7 per cent. This 
figure is much closer to the non-democratic mean. The percentage of the Free States' population 
living in urban areas between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants increased only slightly in this 
period. It also remains below the mean figure for the less democratic sample. In fact the Irish 
figure is the lowest of all the countries, having been passed out by Finland and Yugoslavia. The 
percentage of the Irish state's population living in large cities of 100,000 or more, slightly 
increased. The figure is still clearly closer to the democratic mean, but doesn't negate the overall 
impression picture of a society that failed to urbanise at a rate comparable to other Western 
democracies. In 1920 the Free State was an urbanised society by European standards. By 1959 it 
was an exceptionally rural democracy.
Table 2.8. Irish rates o f Urbanisation compared with 'more* and 'less' democratic countries.
Country -10,000 10,000-100,000 100,000+
European Democraciesl 56 24.4
European Non- democracies2 63.7 18.9
Republic o f Ireland 64.3 10.3
Ranges
European 40-72.3 10.3-42.6
Democracies
European 40-77.4 10.7-353
Non democracies
1 Belgium (1961) Denmark (1960) I.F.S. (1961) Netherlands (1960) Norway (1960) Sweden (1960) Switzerland (1961).
2 Austria (1961) Albania (1960) Bulgaria (1956) Czechoslovakia ( 1961) Finland (1960) France (1962) Hungary (1960) Italy (1961) Poland 
(1960) Romania (1960) Yugoslavia (1961)
Sources, see table 1.2.
44 The Irish figures are for 1961.
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For the post war period it is easier to obtain figures for Lipset's numerous indicators of wealth 
than it is for 1920.45 Table 2.9. shows that the Free State was not poor by European standards. 
What is noticeable is that its system of communications was undeveloped. Some decline is 
apparent in terms of its G.N.P. per capita. In 1913 it was placed about tenth out of twenty-three 
European countries in terms of G.N.P per capita. From these figures it had dropped to 
seventeenth out of twenty-seven countries, but its figure was still higher than those of most 
Eastern European countries, with the exceptions of East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
Table 2.9. Irish rates o f wealth compared with ’more' and 'less' democratic countries
Per capita income Thousands o f Persons per motor Telephones per Radios per Newspaper copies
in persons per vehicle 1,000 persons thousand persons per thousand
S Doctor persons
Democr-acies 695 .86 17 205 350 341
N on - 308 14 143 58 160 167
democracis
Republic o f Irelnd 550 1 16.5 52.5 174 225
Note; While all the mean figures and some of the individual figures for Ireland are taken from Lipset 1959, the following individual figures are 
taken from different sources. G.N.P. per capita for the year 1957 , thousands o f persons per doctor for the year 1959 , and newspaper circulation 
per 1,000 for the year 1960. are from B. Russett et al, 1964, tables 44, 59, and 31. The national figures for Telephones per thousand and Radios 
per thousand are from C. L. Taylor and M. C. Hudson, 1972, Tables 5.6, 5.7, and are for the years 1965, and 1960 respectively.
In summary, do these figures support Lipset's hypothesis that improved effectiveness gave 
legitimacy to the system ? Clearly the possibility is disproved by the Irish figures which show a 
decline since 1920 on practically all aspects of development. Rather than moving from C to A 
on Lipset's figure, from being a state with a high degree of effectiveness and a low degree of 
legtimacy, to being a state with a high degree of both effectiveness and legitimacy, the figures 
suggest that the Irish case moved from C to B. It went from being a state with a low degree of 
legitimacy and a high degree of effectiveness, to being a state with a high degree of legitimacy 
and a low degree of effectiveness. This suggests that the achievement of legitimacy had next to 
nothing to do with economic performance.
45 Some of these indicators are more appropriately considered measures of social mobilisation, such as 
newspaper copies per thousand person. Nevertheless social mobilisation can still be considered a 
dimension of development and is relevant to the emergence of a political system that requires at least 
periodic mass participation.
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Coakley tested the hypotheses that the collapse of liberal democracies was related to the severity 
of the economic crisis, by comparing economic fortunes of three democracies that survived the 
depression, Czechoslovakia, Finland, and Ireland, with those of three that collapsed, Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. He notes that the survivor's external trade experienced a slump of the 
same degree as the Baltic Republic's.46 An examination of the cost of living index for the latter 
group suggests that the material conditions of people in the Baltic Republics may actually have 
been improving when the Estonian and Latvian coups took place. Furthermore, data on 
unemployment levels show that unemployment increased at a dramatically higher rate in Ireland 
and Czechoslovakia, 'where, ironically, the authoritarian threat was weakest - to a point 
enormously above the Baltic and Finnish levels'47 There seems to be no relationship between 
the two variables Lipset uses to explain the fate of democracy in the period.
Similarly, within the democratic sample, economic performance explains little about political 
outcomes. For example the economic crisis in Ireland was deeper than that in Finland but it was 
in Finland that the emergence of a small right-wing party in the early thirties, the Lapuas, proved 
'almost fatal to parliamentary government'.48 In contrast the emergence of the Blueshirts did 
not present as serious a challenge to democratic government in Ireland. The immediate reason 
for the severity of the depression in Ireland was the state's dependence on agricultural exports, 
which took up about 86 per cent of total exports and made up over a third of national income in 
1 9 2 9  49 Agricultural income declined by 12.8 per cent between 1929 and 1931 and its fall 
accelerated after that.50 The situation was compounded by the fact that traditional routes of 
emigration dried up in the early 1930s, leaving the state with more and more unemployment. 
According to one estimate, whereas in 1929 over twenty thousand people emigrated, by 1932 this 
figure had dropped to less than one thousand per annum.51 The figures for those registered as 
unemployed, also show a dramatic increase from the late twenties to the mid-thirties.52 Irish 
democracy was stabilised during a time of economic hardship, and high unemployment.53 In 
Finland, the general consensus is that the state did not suffer heavily from the depression. Kirby 
argues that this was an important source of stability.54 Between 1922 and 1928 the Finnish 
economy had recovered from the war time crisis and its export goods had found new markets in
46 J. Coakley, Political Succession and regime change in new states in inter-war Europe: Ireland, Finland, 
Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic Republics', European Journal of Political Research, 1986,14.
47 Ibid.
48 M. Rintaala, Three Generations (Bloomington, 1962), p. 164.
49 A. Orridge, The Blueshirts and the 'Economic War1: A study of Ireland in the contex of Dependency 
Theory1, Political Studies, (1983), p.352.
50 Ibid.
51 Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Europe 1750-1933 (Basingstoke,1998), Table A9, p. 130.
52 Unfortunately these figures are notoriously unreliable.
53 For a discussion of economic policy in this period see R. Dunphy, The Making of Fianna Fail Power in 
Ireland 1923-1948 (Oxford, 1995).
54 D. Kirby, Finland in the Twentieth Century, (London,! 979), p.98.
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Western Europe to replace the Russian ones.55 Although the depression reduced exports, the 
larger companies survived and paper production actually increased its output. Smaller companies 
did go to the wall but by 1933 the economy was beginning to recover. The interwar period ended 
well for the Finnish economy
The industrial workforce grew from an average of 35,000 during the period 1921-25 to over 225,000 in 
1939, and the power used in industry rose from 360,000 H.P. in 1939. The agricultural population (farmers 
and their dependants) had fallen slightly from 2,015,000 in 1920 to 1,900,000 in 1940, and as a proportion 
of the total population it had come down from 65% to just over one half.56
Economic trends before and immediately after the emergence of the Lapua movement were more 
favourable in Finland than in Ireland. It is therefore difficult to explain the more severe nature of 
the political crisis in Finland in economic terms.
There was no simple relationship between economic success and democratic stability. Linz 
suggests that this may also be true of other states.
The world depression that presumably destroyed democracy in Weimar and Austria created more 
unemployment in Norway and in the Netherlands and in fact consolidated the Norwegian democracy. The 
Dutch government was one of the most long-lasting after the depression. The degree of institutional 
legitimacy was more decisive than the economic crisis.57
Brian Barry reflects that regimes that were low in efficiency and high in legitimacy in the 1930s 
may have been the rule rather than the exception in the democratic world, since in the 1930s all 
the 'stable democracies' had ‘serious unemployment problems'. The United States is the only 
such case Lipset acknowledges, but practically all the Scandinavian countries can be considered 
states that were low in effectiveness but high in legitimacy.58 This suggests that for most of the 
interwar democracies what was important was that these systems had consolidated themselves 
prior to the depression, that the sole source of stability was simply the legitimacy of the existing 
arrangements, or as Coakley puts it, 'the extent to which it [ i.e. the population) had had the 
opportunity of absorbing liberal democratic norms', and not a combination of legitimacy and 
effectiveness at all.59 If a state's effectiveness is bound to vaiy, as it did in most states in the
55 F. Singleton, The Economy of Finland in the Twentieth Century (Bradford,1991), p.34.
56 Ibid, p.35.
57 J. Linz, Transitions to Democracy', Washington Quarterly, (Summer 1990), p. 160.
58 See B. Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy p. 65 ; E.C. Bellquist, 'Government and Politics 
in Northern Europe: An account of recent developments' in Journal O f Politics, 1948, vol 8, no.3, p. 391.
59 Coakley, op. cit., abstract.
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1930s, then any stable state 'must be legitimate though it may or may not be effective'.60 What 
explains long-term stability in democratic countries is therefore legitimacy on its own.
The achievement of Irish political stability then cannot be explained by the economic 
performance of the Irish state after 1921. MacDonagh argues that between 1921 and 1959 the 
Irish economy grew by only one per cent.61 In 1961, just two years after the publication of 
Lipset's article, the U.N.'s annual Survey o f the World Economic Situation published a report on 
the development problems of Southern Europe and Ireland. It grouped Ireland with the peripheral 
countries of Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal
Per capita income in Ireland is roughly twice as high as in the countries of southern Europe, but still only 
one-half of that of the industrial countries of western Europe. Though climatically Ireland resembles more 
the countries of north-western Europe, it is closer to those of southern Europe in economic structure and its 
lack of economic development. In particular, as in those countries, agriculture predominates in employment, 
output and exports, and under-employment and unemployment are only partly offset by emigration.62
Despite these structural similarities, none of these Southern European countries was democratic 
whereas the Free State was. Peillon came to the paradoxical conclusion that 'Ireland displays 
major institutional features which are closely associated with advanced societies, although it 
cannot be defined as an advanced capitalist economy'. He pointed to 'striking disjunctive' 
between the processes of capitalist development and institutional development, a disjunctive 
which is more pronounced for the post-independence period than for before 1921.63
3 Minima and Maxima of Democratic Development.
For most of the last two decades the Irish case has been considered an exception to the rule that 
democracy blossoms only in modem industrial conditions. As 'a poor new nation' is serves as a 
useful test case for theories of democratic breakdown in the Third World 64 Such a view suggests 
that there is no relationship between the processes of capitalist development and institutional 
development in Ireland. Part of the reason for this belief lies in the country's self-perception as a 
post-colonial state. Part also lies in the fact that the comparisons normally made between Ireland 
and the democratic world are with the very developed world of Anglo-American democracy, and 
not with the smaller European democracies where levels of economic development before 1921
60 Barry, op. cit. ,p.66.
61 O. MacDonagh, Ireland: the Union and its Aftermath (London, 1975), p. 127.
62 United Nations, Economic Survey of Europe in 1959; with study o f Development Problems in southern 
Europe and Ireland, (Geneva: U.N., 1961), ch 7, p.l.
63 M. Peillon, Placing Ireland in Comparative Perspective', Economic and Social Review 1994, p. 193.
64 F. Munger, The Legitimacy of Opposition ; the change of government in Ireland in 1932 (Beverly Hills, 
1976), p.34.
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were comparable to Ireland's. A third reason lies in the nature of comparative indicators which 
exaggerate the discrepancies between the Irish case and the developed world. The manner in 
which this statistical fiction is maintained forms the subject of this section.
Lipset was trying to measure the shift from predominantly agrarian societies to industrialised 
societies. The key indicator of this is the size of the labour force employed in agriculture. This is 
a misleading indicator of industrialisation. For example in 1920 Finland's agricultural labour 
force was enormous by any standards, yet this should not be taken as an indication of retarded 
industrialisation because large parts of Finnish agriculture were in fact industrialised.
Socially and politically, it was of the greatest importance than the forests in Finland were owned mainly by 
peasants and fanners, since this meant that it was not only the country which was integrated into the world 
economy, but also, to a great extent, her independent farmers. Farmers in Finland, in fact, came into more 
direct and rapid contact with the capitalist market economy than the fanners in Eastern Europe, or even 
those in the eastern parts of Germany. As early as the 1870's the expansion of the sawmill industry had 
allowed the independent farmers to become comparatively rich.... In actual fact, the rapid integration of the 
farmers into the capitalist world economy provides one of the most important keys to understanding the 
political and social developments in 20th century Finland.65
Needless to say, this fundamentally important aspect of Finnish industrialisation is missed out on 
by Lipset's indicator, which a la Marx, lumps the worlds' agrarian populations into a sack of 
potatoes. The poor and rural image of Ireland is also reinforced by the use of G.N.P. per capita 
as a measure of wealth. G.N.P. per capita measures only the commercial value of goods and 
services produced. As the proportion of goods that are commercialised increases with the level of 
industrialisation this leads to the undervaluing of agricultural production.66 Fanning families' 
consumption of their own produce, family member's work on the family farm, and goods and 
service that are exchanged informally, are not included. Agricultural countries appear poorer 
than they are. Apart altogether from the fact that the question of change within the agricultural 
sector is overlooked, Lipset's indicators do not always provide reliable measurements of what they 
are supposed to measure.
Lipset's work has been criticised on other grounds, the most important of which is that his mean 
scores uphold a general relationship between development and democracy, which individual 
figures prove is not a necessary one. It has been pointed out that while the means of the two 
groups may differ
65 E. Allardt, Finnish Society; Relationship between Geopolitical Situation and the Development of Society 
(Helsinki, 1985), p. 15.
66 M. Dogan, Use and Misuse of Statistics in comparative research' in E. Dogan, and A. Kazancigil, (eds.), 
Comparing Nations (Oxford, Cambridge Mass,l994.), p.44.
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the spread in the values on almost every is so extreme that it appears that it would be very difficult to place 
a single nation in either the democratic or non-democratic category knowing, for example, only its score on 
the number of telephones. In the European and English-speaking table democracies a nation may have from 
43 to as many as 190 per 1,000. One wonders about the stable European democracies that have only 43, 60, 
0, 130, 150 or even 195 telephones. How do they manage while dictatorial European nations can at the 
same time have as many as 196 per 1,000.67
The mean difference suggests a correlation between the variables but it could be demonstrated 
that this is not a necessary one for practically all of Lipset's indicators. If, for example, 
independent Ireland's communications system was undeveloped in 1959, this is not such a 
problem, since the sheer variance in the values for each indicator suggests that democracies can 
have undeveloped communications systems and semi-developed communications systems, as well 
as developed communications systems. So Lipset's own figures do not support the argument that 
a high level of any of the four variables is a necessary condition for democracy.
The quantitative theorist who wants to clarify necessary or threshold levels of development must 
try to specify the levels of each variable at which the emergence of a democratic system becomes 
inevitable. Unfortunately attempts to do this lead to mixed results. In a review of the explanatory 
power of Lipset's theories for the interwar period, Berg- Schlosser and de Meur suggested the 
following threshold level for one indicator of each of Lipset's variables for the year 1930.
per capita G.N.P. must be $ 200 or above.
fifty per cent or more of the population must be resident in towns with a population of 20,000 or above.
seventy-five per cent of the population must be literates.
the industrial labour force must be 30% of the active population or more.68
Six countries - Belgium, the Netherlands, Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and Germany, had 
reached these levels by 1930. All of them had become democratic, even if they would not remain 
so. The negative cases which did not pass any of the levels - Greece, Portugal, Romania, Spain, 
and Italy, failed to become democratic, which would confirm the theory. However, there are 
many cases which reach the levels on some indicators but not on others. Hungary, Poland, and 
Finland passed only the literacy threshold. Austria was not industrialised enough. Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway and Ireland were cases with high levels of wealth and education, but with low 
levels of industrialisation and urbanisation. The only clear positive result from this test is that
67 P. Cutright, National Political Development', in American Sociological Review, (1963), p.5.
68 D. Berg- Schlosser and G. de Meur, 'Conditions of Democracy in Interwar Europe: A Boolean Test of 
Major Hypotheses', in Comparative Politics, (April 1994 ), pp. 253-279.
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states must have three quarters of their population literate if they are to become democratic. The 
authors conclude that
On the whole these socio-economic indicators seem to have a rather limited explanatory power. They 
discriminate relatively little between the actual instances of democratic breakdown and survival in the 
universe of cases analysed. The industrialisation variable, for example, adds very little over and above the 
differentiations already provided by the other three indicators.69
If all the aspects of the economic development model which Lipset identifies as necessary 
conditions for democracy are relevant to democratisation, then we have as many anomalous cases 
within the democratic sample as we have explained cases. If Sweden, Norway, Ireland and 
Denmark are unexplained then the theory is simply wrong. Rather the results suggest that a 
high level on two of Lipset's indicators and a moderate score on the other two may be sufficiently 
high to sustain a democracy. At the very least the evidence suggests that the relationship between 
a high level of development and democracy is not a necessary one.
If it is true that the more you test the relationship in terms of individual states, individual 
variables, and individual figures, the weaker the thesis, the more you test it in terms of a large 
universe of cases, general correlations, and multiple indicators, the stronger the thesis. After all, 
Lipset pushes the burden of proof on the fact that 'in each case, the average wealth, degree of 
industrialisation and urbanisation, and level of education is much higher for the more democratic 
countries', not on the possibility that in each democratic state the levels for each of his variables 
is higher than the levels in this or that 'less democratic state', which would be a more stringent 
test. He is also reassured by the fact that he had combined Latin America and Europe in one 
table, the differences would have been greater.70 So the sampling affects the outcome. The 
relationship between democracy and development in Europe, the English speaking world, and 
Latin America combined, is therefore stronger than the relationship between democracy and 
development only in Europe and the English speaking world.
For Ireland the consequences of the sampling are clear. I noted in section one that although Irish 
G.N.P. per capita was about average by European standards in 1913, in terms of the universal 
democratic world it was low. There is no reason why the fact that Irish levels of development 
were less than those of the more advanced countries should be held to be more significant than 
the fact that their levels were considerably higher than those of the European non-democratic 
countries. In fact the inclusion of the English-speaking democracies, who would have passed the 
thresholds chosen by Berg Schlosser and de Meur on all variables by 1930, heightens the
69 Ibid, p.257.
70 S.M. Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites for Democracy1.
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discrepancy between the democratic world and countries like Ireland,. The case of university 
education brings this out quite well. In comparison with both the more democratic and the less 
democratic sample, the Irish level of secondary and third level education were low in 1956. The 
mean figure for higher education per thousand was about one and a half times higher that the 
Irish figure. This would lead one to believe that the state failed to provide adequate higher 
educational opportunities for its citizens. If we change the more democratic sample by including 
only the European stable democracies we find that the Free State's level of higher education turns 
out to be above the European democratic average.71 In general the contrast between the Irish 
state and the European democratic sample was one of small differences rather than large 
differences.
Lipset's argument was that a high level of development would produce a strong middle class, a 
reduction in material inequalities, more fluid class-boundaries, and political moderation on 
behalf of the working class leadership. This liberal model of development assumes that 
increases in the overall wealth of a society would necessarily result in greater distribution of 
wealth within that society. G.N.P. per capita for example, does not measure the distribution of 
wealth as opposed to its national level. Lipset is making an assumption that is crucial for his 
theory. Without greater diffusion of wealth political moderation is unlikely. Consider the case of 
education. In contrast to the literacy figures, the data on educational enrolment rates do not 
unequivocally support the theory that the higher the level of education, the better the chances for 
a democratic regime. Rather, the data show that a high level of basic education may be a 
necessary, if not sufficient pre-requisite of democracy since, as with the literacy figures, there 
seems a clear difference between democracies and non-democracies in respect of primary 
education. All democracies had high levels of primary education. Most of the democracies in 
1920 are in the top half of the table and the four countries with the lowest level of primary 
education were undemocratic. Although those countries that had a high level of enrolment at all 
educational levels had become democratic by 1920, they also had high literacy and primary 
enrolment rates. There is no example of a democratic country with a high ranking in secondary 
and university education and a lower ranking in primary education. Conversely, all those 
countries that have a relatively high ranking for secondary or university education and a 
relatively lower ranking for primary education, such as Greece, Italy, Poland or Hungary, were 
either authoritarian or short-lived democracies. On the other hand, extensive primary education 
cannot be a sufficient condition, since countries like Bulgaria, Hungary and Italy, had relatively 
widespread primary education, but were not democratic. In the tables on secondary and university 
education, the ranking of the countries does not give us a clear picture of the relationship 
between democracy and educational development, since the democracies do not cluster at one end 
and the non-democracies do not cluster at the other. In short there is a random distribution of
71 See below table 2.10.
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states in these tables. Non-democracies like Greece had high rates of secondary education, while 
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, are ranked near the bottom. The third table is less 
random, but the ranking of Denmark, Norway, Ireland, Finland, and the Netherlands in the 
bottom half of the table suggests that extensive university education is not a necessary condition 
of democratic politics, while the position of Hungary and Italy suggests it's not a sufficient 
condition either for democratisation or for stable democracy.
Table 2.10. Mean figures for Higher Education per thousand for countries classified as more democratic and less democratic by Lipset 
In 1959.
All Democracies. 4.2
Non-democracies. 3.5
European Democracies 2.4
European non-democracies. 3.6
Republic o f Ireland. 2.6
Source : UNESCO, 1956, table M, 24-25.
So the pattern of educational development is a better guide to the political outcome than the 
overall levels. Why should that be ? Consider the data of university education that Lipset 
himself uses in 1959. Table 2.10. shows the paradoxical result that in the Europe of 1959 the 
higher the rate of third-level education the greater the chances for an undemocratic regime. What 
happens if advanced educational opportunities are extended to a minority before basic education 
is extended to everybody as was the case in Eastern Europe ? Or alternatively what happens 
where an elite continues to dominate higher education after the masses have already had basic 
education ?
Writers on interwar Eastern Europe have pointed out the dangers of a large underemployed class 
in societies where basic education was not widespread. This class was prone to political 
extremism and political debate was confined to this circle.72 What seems to matter is the 
educational distance between elites and masses which in turn leads to an ideological gulf between 
town and country. So economic development will only reduce the inequalities between elite and 
mass if it is accompanied by a greater distribution of the benefits of wealth. Redistribution is as 
important as development. It may be that in societies like Britain and the United States, increases 
in wealth did reduce inequalities because the societies were so affluent, but this can hardly be the 
case for poorer countries where an egalitarian pattern of development may make up for 
deficiencies in the overall level.
72 A. Polonski, The Little Dictators: the history of Eastern Europe since 1918 (London,! 975).
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Clearly the relationship between democracy and development is not a unilinear one. An increase 
in a state's overall level of development does not make a state more democratic. Some writers 
prefer to advance a threshold thesis which accepts that certain minimum levels of socio-economic 
development are necessaiy conditions for democratisation but that the subsequent performance of 
a democracy are unrelated to further increases in those levels.73 Exploring the relationship 
between development and social equality, Jackman writes that
while the initial stages of economic development may lead to a more equitable distribution of material 
rewards, a threshold is reached at moderate levels beyond which continued economic expansion and 
growth do not produce corresponding reduction in material inequality.74
The same may apply to the relationship between democracy and development. Early 
industrialisation may lead to a democratic breakthrough but it does not follow that all further 
industrialisation will be as strongly supportive of democratic institutions as the experience of 
advanced states like the Weimar Republic would suggest. 75 Conversely, a state like Ireland 
may have reached the necessary level of development during the first stages of industrialisation 
by the time it became democratic, but its failure to keep up with the rate of change after that may 
not have mattered since in those stages the relationship between the two is much weaker. The 
factors which bring a system into being are not the same as those that keep it in place.76
On the whole then, the wide divergences between the Irish state and the universal democratic 
means for socio-economic development should not lead one to see it as an anomalous case for 
developmental theory. Lipset's method exaggerates both the necessary levels of development and 
the extent to which the Irish state fails to meet these levels. Attempts at specifying minimum 
levels have led only to doubt not so much about whether there are such levels, but about the 
relevance of some of the variables themselves. There is no proof that any of these variables apart 
from literacy are necessary requisites for democracy. A combination of a high level of two 
variables with a low level of the others may be sufficient in itself. This suggests that the specific 
combination of developmental processes found in Ireland in 1920, high levels of basic education 
and urbanisation, alongside moderately high levels of wealth and industrialisation, may have 
been sufficient in itself. In other democratic states, particularly in the Nordic region, the specific 
combination was different, but the overall level of development was no higher. The evidence 
suggests that these patterns are not uniform for all successful cases.
73 D. Neubauer, 'Some conditions of democracy ,/4/wericaw Political Science Review, (1967, 61), pp. 1002- 
9.
74 R. Jackman, Political democracy and Social Equality, American Sociological Review, 39, (February, 
1974), p.32.
75 See W. Goldfrank, Pascism and the Great Transformation' in K. Polanyi-Levitt (ed.) The Life and Work 
of Karl Polanyi: A Celebration (New York,1990), pp.87-93.
76 D. A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,' Comparative Politics (1970), 2 .
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Conclusion.
To conclude, we can come to three conclusions about the Irish case. Firstly, we could argue that 
it validates the developmental theory. Irish democracy was the normal outcome of processes of 
modernisation that transformed Irish society in the second half of the nineteenth century. It was, 
in short, a normal case. We could argue in contrast, that since it remained an agrarian state 
until well after 1945, we can call it an anomalous case, which can only be explained by some 
extraordinary factor not present in other underdeveloped states. Democracy may have developed 
because of 'a syndrome of fairly unique historical factors, even though major social characteristics 
may favour another form'.77 Thirdly, we could argue that whereas there may be some 
relationship between the genesis of a democracy and economic development, there is no 
necessary relationship between the two. Independent Ireland fits into a third pattern, with only 
'mixed or temporarily favourable conditions' for stable democracy. 'Despite the limited scope of 
free choices in the process of democratisation, the strategies of political actors certainly matter, 
particularly so in transitional circumstances when social conditions do not clearly determine the 
nature of a country's political system'. The importance of these conscious strategies is greatest 
where 'social conditions are sufficiently favourable for democracy but do not yet guarantee 
democratisation’*78 Ireland could be an impressive case, or if it survived merely because the 
favourable conditions for authoritarian rule, a powerful military, a severe depression, or an 
irridentist cause, for example, were less present, it could be a lucky case.
Independent Ireland was not a normal case for developmental theory because, while its 
institutional development followed that of the advanced capitalist countries after 1900, its 
economic development was characterised by a very late shift from agraria to industria. On the 
other hand it was not an anomalous case either, since independent Ireland possessed a relatively 
high degree of socio-economic development at the outset. The fact that Ireland experienced a 
severe depression in the interwar period rules out the possibility that the Irish case could be 
simply a lucky case. Independent Ireland was therefore an impressive case. Economic conditions 
in 1922 were 'mixed or temporarily favourable' but did not guarantee the survival of a democratic 
system. The genesis of Irish democracy could have been predicted by Lipset's theory, but not 
necessarily its survival.
There is no evidence in any case that developmental theory can succeed in its attempts to specify 
conditions which are sufficient to bring about a democratic system or conditions without which
77 S.M. Lipset, 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy1, p.4.
78 T. Vanhanen (ed.), Strategies of Democratisation (Washington, 1992), p. 6.
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democracy is impossible.79 No economic model can satisfactorily explain why the fortunes of 
democracy varied so much in such broadly comparable interwar states as Czechoslovakia, 
Ireland, Finland, and Hungary. The most developed and prosperous state was Czechoslovakia but
In all, the Czech experience suggests that even with patterns of development close to those of the West, 
especially industrialisation and the existence of a native entrepreneurial class, these do not in themselves 
guarantee the evolution of a Westem-style political system'. 80
The experience of democratic breakdown in the interwar period is not explained by economic 
variables. Institutional structures, constitutional choices, and political strategies must have had 
some bearing on the outcome. Such variables cannot be reduced to economic factors.
Finally, Lipset hypothesised that in some cases democracy may survive because of 'a unique 
historical syndrome'. However in the Irish case a crucial such factor is obscured by his theory. 
About a third of the population emigrated between 1922 and 1960. Precisely because the average 
Irish person lived in an international as well as domestic labour market, social mobility was 
possible without growth at home. Polarised class conflict could never happen if the Irish working 
class was content to improve their position in other countries. Because of emigration Irish 
democracy was perfectly compatible with constant underdevelopment. This aspect of the Irish 
experience is probably unique; in the words of one economist, 'there is simply no similar 
demographic experience anywhere in the world, so far' .81
79 See A. Edwards, Democratization and Qualified explanation' in G. Parry and M. Moran, Democracy and 
Democratisation, (London, 1994), pp. 89-106.
80 G. Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, (Oxford U.K. and Cambridge Mass,1993), p.16.
81 L. Mjoset, The Irish Economy in a Comparative Institutional Perspective (Dublin, 1991), p.7.
Chapter Three : The Barrington Moore Thesis and 
Irish Political Development.
"It is better to destroy serfdom from above, than to wait until that time when it begins to destroy
itself from below".
Alexander I I 1861.
This chapter examines another influential structuralist theory of democratisation. Since its 
publication in 1966 Barrington Moore's Social Origins o f Dictatorship and Democracy has been 
regarded as a classic of modem social science,1 but Moore's neglect of smaller countries has 
been regarded as a fundamental flaw in his account of democratic development in the Western 
world.2 However his emphasis on the importance of changes in the character of agrarian class 
relations for democratisation has been shared by his detractors, as well as by his admirers. Indeed 
it is debatable whether later refinements of Moore's thesis have ever departed from the 
fundamental contention of his work: namely that democracy emerged only where the 
traditional pattern of landlord-peasant relationships had been fundamentally transformed.3 
Likewise in Ireland the significance of the land question to democracy has never been doubted. 
Yet there has been no serious attempt to assess the significance of Moore's theory for the Irish 
case, and little effort to compare the Irish case to other countries where the resolution of the land 
question has had a fundamental effect on political development.
3.1. The Barrington Moore Thesis and the transformation of the Irish land system under 
the Union.
Although primarily the work of a historical sociologist, Moore's work was also a contribution to 
modernisation theory. Rejecting prevalent assumptions which suggested that all societies would 
experience essentially the same process of modernisation, Moore described different 'routes' to 
the modem world. The social costs and achievements of these routes were explicable by the 
pattern of social class development experienced by each society. Moore took social classes as the 
basic units of analysis. This involved two assumptions. The first was that particular classes
1 B. Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modem World (Boston, 1966).
2 See S. Rokkan, Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation-building' in T. Nossiter et al 
(ed.), Imagination and Precision in the Social Sciences (London, 1972), pp 133-137; F. Castles, 
Barrington Moore's Thesis and Swedish Political Development, Government and Opposition, vol. 8, 
no.3,(Summer 1973).
3 For criticisms see J. Femia, Barrington Moore and the Preconditions of Democracy1, British Journal of 
Political Science, 1972, 2 (1) ; T Skocpol, ' A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy, Politics and Society, 1973,4, (1); J, Wiener, Review of Reviews: The Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, History and Theory, 1976, 15, (2).
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favour those political systems which enhance their economic interests. The second was that the 
switch from subsistence to commercial agriculture was the key event which shapes the 
subsequent development of class relations within societies. The manner in which this change 
affected prevalent class relations determines later political outcomes.
In particular Moore set out to
explain the varied political roles played by the landed upper class and the peasantry in the transformation 
from agrarian societies ... to modem industrial ones. Somewhat more specifically, it is an attempt to 
discover the range of historical conditions under which either of these rural groups have become important 
forces behind the emergence of Western parliamentary versions of democracy, and dictatorships of the right 
or the left, that is, fascist or communist regimes.4
Moore saw three possible routes to the modem world : 'the bourgeois revolution', 'revolution from 
above' and 'peasant revolution'. The first, the bourgeois democratic route', took place in Great 
Britain, France, and the U.S. In these countries violent social upheavals resulted in the 
destruction of the traditional landed elite. Democracy and industrialism emerged after a 
revolution in which the bourgeoisie or a bourgeois-led coalition was the leading element. The 
second route, followed by Germany and Japan, saw industrialism achieved without revolution, 
through a fascist dictatorship of landlords and industrialists. The traditional landed elite retains 
its political and economic power and thwarts popular revolution. Instead it forms a modernising 
alliance with the industrial class. The third route, followed by Russia and China, proceeds first 
through a peasant revolution which destroys landlord domination, and then through a 
Communist revolution which undermines peasant proprietorship as well, ending up with an 
industrialised but not a democratic system.
Moore identified three separate sets of preconditions leading to the emergence of democratic, 
communist, or fascist systems. The difference between them rests on the strength of the 
respective social classes and their relationship with the state apparatus. The conditions leading to 
a peasant revolution identified by Moore were the existence of a weak bourgeoisie, a powerful 
agrarian elite, and a highly centralised state, combined with high peasant revolutionary potential. 
In contrast the critical pre-condition for the emergence of a fascist dictatorship is the 
development of an alliance between large landowners, the crown (or the state apparatus), and a 
politically dependent bourgeoisie. The most important feature of the authoritarian route is that 
landlords must remain a politically powerful group into the modem era. Their dependence on 
'labour repressive' means of exploiting the peasantry makes them seek an alliance with the state 
in order to maintain the peasants in a politically subordinate position. The bourgeoisie also
4 B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, viii.
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becomes dependent on the state for different reasons. In late industrialisers the state plays a heavy 
role in encouraging industrial enterprisers and the bourgeoisie therefore loses its incentive to 
mobilise against the state.
If a society has undergone an initial stage of industrialisation and avoids peasant revolution it 
will develop in a democratic direction if it lacks the pre-conditions leading to authoritarianism. 
Moore outlined five preconditions for the democratic route : (1) the development of a balance to 
avoid too strong a crown or too independent a landed aristocracy, (2) a turn towards an 
appropriate form of commercial agriculture either on the part of the landed aristocracy or the 
peasantry, (3) the weakening of the landed aristocracy, (4) the prevention of an aristocratic- 
bourgeois coalition against the peasants and workers, (5) a revolutionary break with the past. As 
we shall see all five are relevant to the development of Irish society in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.
Moore recognises that the course of democratisation has consisted of quite different causal 
elements in the various cases analysed, and attempts to identify 'only the background conditions 
against which a variety of different configuration of forces have generated similarly different 
outcomes'.5 Nevertheless some basic causal hypothesis can be gleaned from Moore's statement, 
'No bourgeoisie no democracy'. Moore's analysis suggests that the two classes most hostile to the 
survival of bourgeois democracy, landlords and landless peasants, had been eliminated as serious 
political forces from the scene by independence. To a degree Moore's work is a powerful 
restatement of an argument also present in Lipset's theory which suggests that democracy can 
only emerge where the pyramidal structure of traditional class relations is transformed so that the 
middle class becomes the largest and most powerful political actor.
The political problems of nineteenth-century Ireland had their origins in the Cromwellian and 
Williamite land settlements of the seventeenth century. In the 1640s Cromwell had proposed 'an 
almost universal transfer of land held by Catholics' to Protestants.6 His ambition was to reduce 
the dominance of the native population, deprive it of leadership, and establish a 'decisively large 
Protestant majority on the island'.7 The land settlement which followed transferred 'nearly all 
landed wealth from Catholics to Protestants and created a new Protestant Ascendancy which 
ruled over the majority native and Old English Catholic population'.8 Within the following 
decade the Protestant share of Irish land doubled from forty to eighty per cent. Furthermore from 
the 1690s to the 1720s a succession of 'penal laws' succeeded in further reducing the area of
5 A. Edwards, Democratization and qualified explanation1 in Parry, G. and Moran, M. Democracy and 
Democratisation (London, 1994), p.96.
6 P. Corish, The Cromwellian Regime, 1650-60' in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin, and F.J. Byme (eds.)y4 
New History of Ireland vol 11 \Easrly Modem Ireland 1534-1691 (Oxford,1991),361.
7 1. Lustick, Statebuilding Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria (Berkely, 1985), p.29.
8 Ibid, p.68.
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Catholic ownership to five per cent. In Europe as a whole the seventeenth century had seen an 
intense struggle between the centralising forces of royal absolutism and the landed aristocracy. In 
general 'neither throne nor nobility triumphed. Instead an uneasy compromise between etatisme 
and administrative centralisation on the one hand, and seigniorial privilege and private 
proprietary rule on the other, worked itself out'.9 In Britain however, the century saw two 
revolutions against Crown authority succeed, one asserting the rights of a gentry-dominated 
parliament, the other establishing the Protestant succession.
Although the legislative power of the eighteenth-century Irish House of Commons was limited, 
Ireland remained a separate Kingdom controlled by a landed aristocracy. The penal laws were 
approved 'under pressure from the Protestant gentry who formed the majority of the Irish House 
of Commons and whose relish for anti-popery legislation had its grounds in a desire to avenge 
past humiliations as well as to prevent future threats to their economic and social ascendancy'.10 
The Irish House was overwhelmingly composed of the Anglo-Irish gentry or those aspiring to 
enter that class. Catholics were debarred by Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy. Local 
government, the administration of justice, and the means of defence, British militias based in 
Ireland, were also exclusively under gentry control. The bulk of the population was excluded 
from 'the nation' and from participation in its political life on specifically politico-religious 
grounds. As in Eastern Europe, the assertion of Crown authority in the seventeenth century had 
undermined the traditional communal freedoms of the poor, and concentrated seigniorial power 
over the peasantry to a degree unknown in 'the West'.11
Throughout the colonial world challenges to the power of the imperial metropole emerged in the 
late eighteenth century. The Irish aristocracy was not alone in being dissatisfied with the 
economic and legislative relationships which existed between the two islands. It drew back 
however from revolt because 'the only security by which they hold their property, the only 
security they have for the present Constitution in Church and State, is the connection of the Irish 
Crown with, and its dependence on the Crown of England'.12 This suited the English too, 
alarmed as much by the tendency of the independent parliament to go its own way, as by the 
threat then posed to her western coast by French revolutionaries. A proposed Act of Union 
between the two Kingdoms would also appeal to middle class Catholics who hoped for 
emancipation from disabling laws which the Ascendancy had denied them, as well as the 
Catholic hierarchy who were promised state support for their clergy. After the 1798 Rising 
which was inspired by the French revolution, it was decided that a union of the two kingdoms
9 J. Blum, The End of the Old Order in Europe (Princeton, 1978), p. 199.
10 J.G. Simms, Protestant Ascendancy 1691-1714' in Moody, T.W., Martin F.X., and Byrne F. J. (eds.), A 
New History o f Ireland (Oxford, 1986), pp. 205-206.
11 P. Anderson, Lineages o f the Absolutist State (London,1979).
12 R. Foster, Modem Ireland 1600-1972 (London, 1989), p.257.
under the same parliament would be the best way to strengthen the link between the two islands 
and consolidate the power of the British Empire. The island would continue to be governed 
indirectly through the Lord Lieutenant at Dublin Castle, but the Irish parliament was abolished.
The Act of Union was emblematic of a new change in the conception of Empire which occurred 
in the nineteenth century. After the American and French Revolutions which promoted the 
principles of liberty and equality, 'imperialists needed to justify their seizure of land and mastery 
of areas which were inhabited with large number of indigenes'. Old ideas of limited liability fell 
away as imperial power took responsibility for the colonial societies they now held in trust, as 
well as for the extension of the full benefits of citizenship to all regardless or race'.13 The hopes 
vested in the Act of Union by Catholics were initially disappointed. For example, Catholics were 
not emancipated until 1829, but the attempted integration of Ireland into the United Kingdom 
had profound consequences for the development of class relations within Ireland. Indeed it 
resulted precisely in the creation of a set of conditions which Moore held was most likely to 
favour democratic development.
The first of these was the creation of a balance to avoid too strong a crown or too independent a 
landed aristocracy. The Act of Union placed the whole of Ireland under the sole authority of the 
Westminster parliament. In the course of the next century the British state, responding to 
popular demands and to international pressure, took the institutions of government out of the 
hands of the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy. The militias, whose activities were previously co­
ordinated by the county gentry, were disbanded. In their place a centralised constabulary service 
under the control of Dublin Castle was introduced. The British slowly introduced a separation of 
Church and State. Catholic emancipation was introduced in 1829. Catholics were now entitled to 
hold all offices except those of regent, chancellor, and lord lieutenant although strict controls on 
the behaviour of Catholics who held public office were retained.14 In 1869, the Protestant Church 
of Ireland was disestablished, and over the following decades, religious tithes, taxes paid by 
Catholics to that Church, were eased out. As Catholic education developed and meritocratic 
reforms were introduced, more and more Catholics were recruited into the civil service itself. 
This happened slowly but was an unmistakable trend in the last decades before independence.15
Moore's argument was that a balance of power must emerge between the crown and the landed 
aristocracy. The Anglo-Irish retained their dominant position in Irish society until the late 
nineteenth century. The British aristocracy, which had close links with the Anglo-Irish landed 
elite, retained its power through the century. The House of Lords succeeded in blocking three
13 P. Clayton, Enemies and Passing Friends ; Settler Ideologies in Twentieth Century Ulster (London, 
1996), pp.2-3.
14 D. McCartney, The Dawning of Democracy; Ireland 1800-1870 (Dublin, 1987), p. 118.
15 L. McBride, The Greening of Dublin Castle ; the transformation o f bureaucratic and judicial personnel 
in Ireland 1892-1992 (Washington D.C., 1922).
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Home Rule Bills for Ireland between 1886 and 1911. As late as 1874, out of six occupational 
categories, large landowners with over 1,000 acres were the second largest group in the Irish 
parliamentary Home Rule Party. Dramatic change came about only in 1880 when the proportion 
of M.Ps from middle class and lower middle class dramatically increased.16 In Northern Ireland 
the landed elite continued to play a leading role in Ulster Unionist politics until partition in 1920. 
At the end of the century senior positions in the Irish civil service and the professions were still 
disproportionally staffed by Protestants.17 Anglo-Irish institutions such as Trinity College, the 
Bank of Ireland, and the Church of Ireland retained their importance in Irish life. It was only in 
the last two decades of the century that the demise of the Ascendancy was rapid. For the rest of 
the century a balance between the Crown and the landed elite existed.
The second pre-condition discussed by Moore was a turn towards an appropriate form o f 
commercial agriculture. By 'commercial agriculture' Moore meant the production of agricultural 
produce not for family consumption but for the market. Commercialised agriculture allows for 
capital accumulation to take place and stimulates further industrial growth. Moore's analysis of 
the English case led him to conclude that 'getting rid of agriculture as a major source of social 
activity is one pre-requisite for successful democracy1.18 However Moore also suggested that if 
the peasant is turned into a farmer producing for the market rather than for his own consumption 
or that of his landlord, small-scale proprietorship need not be incompatible with capitalist 
development. If the opportunities for market production as well as the existence of market towns, 
appropriate financial institutions, and an adequate transport system, are present, then peasants 
can become part of the democratic capitalist system. Moore accepts that this is what happened in 
Scandinavia and Switzerland where the peasantry 'have become part of the democratic system by 
taking up fairly specialised forms of commercial farming, mainly daily products, for the town 
markets.19
From Lee's study The Modernisation o f Irish Society 1948-1918 it is clear that commercial 
norms had penetrated the Irish countryside by the late nineteenth century.20 Likewise a large 
external market for the export of Irish livestock had developed in Britain alongside a network of 
market towns for the consumption of all forms of agricultural produce. The most striking 
evidence in support of the thesis that Irish agriculture was relatively commercialised in the 
second half of the nineteenth century comes from statistics concerning the size of lower 
agricultural classes in Ireland in the half-century after the Famine of 1845-1849. Lee has 
demonstrated how the Famine ushered in a rapid reduction in the size of the lower agricultural
16 C.C. O' Brien, Parnell and his Party 1890-90 (Oxford,1957), p. 15.
17 B.O' Leaiy, and J. McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism ; Understanding Northern Ireland (London and 
New Jersey, 1993), figure 2.4, p. 82.
18 B. Moore, Social Origins, p. 429.
19 Ibid, pp. 422-432.
20 J. Lee, The Modernisation of Irish Society 1948-1918 (Dublin, 1973).
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classes. Most dramatically, the years after the famine saw the virtual elimination of 'the cottier 
class', those tenants who subsisted on holdings of five acres or less. I have represented his figures 
as percentages. Below, table 3.1. shows lower agricultural classes by acres between 1845 and 
1910. What is most noticeable about this table is that over the fifty-five years after the famine it 
was the poorer agricultural peasants that declined in numbers, whereas the medium size farmers 
holding more than fifteen acres, tended to become more numerous. Alongside the overall fall in 
the proportion of agricultural labourers, Table 3.1. shows that whereas the largest occupational 
class in 1845 were the agricultural labourers, by 1910 farmers with over 15 acres had become 
the largest occupational group. While the proportion of farmers with between five and fifteen 
acres showed a slight decrease, the proportion of farmers with more than fifteen acres actually 
increased. The class which experienced the most dramatic fall in their numbers were the cottier 
class of farmers with less than five acres. Likewise in the period between 1941 and 1911, while 
the number of farmers declined by just over a quarter, the number of farm workers or agricultural 
labourers fell by nearly two-thirds.21
Table 3.1. Lower agricultural classes by acres 1845 -1910.
Labourers Cottiers Farmers Farmers
(-5acres) (5-15 acres) (15+ acres)
1845 44.1 18.9 19.5 17.4
1851 46.7 8.2 24.6 27.1
1910 36.5 7.5 18.7 37
*/• increase -7.6 -11.45 -.8 +  19.6
Source : Lee, 1973, 2 .
The statistics point to a steady consolidation of larger agricultural units. On the other hand this 
process was not exponential, since very large farms remained the exception rather than the norm. 
A report on the state of agriculture in the Free State in 1932 concluded
Farms of between fifteen and 100 acres, of which there are 194,200 in the Irish Free State comprising about 
7,000,000 statute acres, constitute the agricultural mainstay of the country. They are mostly economic, and 
many of them are well worked on a mixed system of farming. As a class they constitute more, in ratio, to 
the stable upkeep of the country than either smaller farms or those that are larger in extent22
21 D. Fitzpatrick, The disappearance of the Agricultural LabourerVm/i Economic and Social History , vol 
7(1980), p.74.
22 Irish Free State Official Handbook, (London, 1932), p. 120.
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Table 3.2 Per cent o f Irish farmers h  owner occupiers 1870-1929.
Yew V* Owner Occupiers Other
1870 3 97
1906 29.2 70.8
1911 63.9 36.1
1929 97.4 2.6
Source : Hooker, cited in Rumpf and Hepburn 1977, 227.
The weakening o f the landed aristocracy was the third pre-condition identified by Moore. A 
series of Land Acts between 1881 and 1923 undermined the system of labour-repressive 
agriculture. Independent Ireland was to benefit from one of the most extensive reforms in 
Western history. Over a period of seventy odd years, fifteen million out of a total of nineteen 
million square acres were transferred from landlord to peasant.23 The scale of these changes is 
indicated in table 3.2 which shows the shift in agricultural proprietorship between 1870 and 
1929. Whereas in 1870 only three per cent of Irish farmers owned their land by 1929 this had 
increased to ninety-seven point four per cent. By 1918 when the Irish political system was 
democratised, at least two thirds of Irish farmers would also have been proprietors. This policy 
was continued under the post-independent governments. In 1923 the first Free State government 
passed a Land Act that created up to 100,000 new holdings. Furthermore the electoral franchise 
was extended in 1850, 1868, 1884, and 1918. A reformed system of local government was 
introduced in 1898. These reforms, combined with the introduction of secret ballots and the 
abolition of rotten boroughs, meant that Ascendancy lost the ability to control local voters.
The fourth precondition was the prevention o f an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the 
peasants and workers. Once land reform was introduced the landed elite no longer required the 
state to repress a large agrarian labour force. In any case even before land reform was introduced 
an authoritarian alliance of the bourgeoisie and the landed elite would have been unlikely. From 
the beginning of the century Catholic politicians had successfully mobilised and united the 
Catholic peasants and the inchoate middle class against the Ascendancy and the British state. 
On the basis of pre-existing religious, ethnic and class-based grievances Catholic nationalist 
politicians were able to maintain the support of the Catholic masses to their political goals. Even 
where a common material interest might have brought Protestants into this alliance, as with the 
Tenant League of the 1850s, Catholic politicians were unable to recruit long- term Protestant 
support. Why did the emerging middle class Catholic political elite choose to oppose the status 
quo in Ireland ? The simple reason was that the British state in nineteenth century Ireland was
23 F.Dovring, Land and Labour in Europe in the Twentieth Century ; a comparative survey of recent 
agrarian history, 3rd ed., (The Hague, 1965), p.241.
only relatively autonomous from the Protestant interest in Ireland. Catholic emancipation came a 
quarter century after the Union and religious equality was not attained until the disestablishment 
of the Church of Ireland in 1869. The Catholic Association, the first mass organisation to 
represent Catholic interests, had emerged half a century before any significant suffrage extension 
or land reform had taken place, and almost a century before they had been completed. The 
Catholic masses were mobilised into political movements well before enfranchisement, a fact 
which structured the pattern of political mobilisation for the next century.24 From the outset both 
Catholic elites and Catholic masses faced a type of double domination, whereby the subordination 
of Ireland within the U.K. at the macro-level was reproduced at the micro-level by the 
subordination of one religion to another, of the peasantry to their landlords, and with respect to 
finance, status, and opportunities, of the Catholic elite to the Protestant elite.
On the other hand the British state was relatively autonomous from the Protestant interest in 
Ireland. Although many of the reforms were made in response to popular pressure, the state 
played a role in pioneering social reform within Ireland. This fact is particularly relevant to 
Moore's conception of the state's role in 'late industrialisers'. In the cases he discusses, state 
intervention in the economy resulted in modernisation 'from above' because the state gets drawn 
into imperialist expansionism and arms production as a result of its involvement in promoting 
economic growth. In Ireland the British state, while ostensibly concerned with maintaining its 
sovereignty, was not involved in industrialisation efforts but merely in social reform. The best 
instance of British reformism was what is known as 'Killing Home Rule by kindness', a policy 
pursued by the Conservatives after 1886. Since the British state did not sponsor industrialisation 
no sizeable Catholic bourgeoisie developed which could have allied itself with the landed elite. A 
decade after independence a constitutional lawyer reflected that 'the more wealthy classes had 
tended to oppose national aspirations, and the movement had, therefore, been in essence one in 
which the mass of the people was arrayed against a small but powerful aristocracy1.25 Whether 
the democratic attitudes of Irish Catholic politicians in the early and mid-nineteenth century were 
due to the country's status as a late developer or to the electoral logic of nationalist politics is not 
a question that can be easily answered.
It has been suggested that a factor necessarily present in any authoritarian coalition was the 
state's capacity to repress popular protest,26 but this was not totally absent in nineteenth century 
Ireland, particularly after 'the Kilmainham Treaties of 1881' when the scale of popular unrest 
greatly decreased. What was more important was that the state was relatively autonomous from 
the landed elite and had an autonomous conception of its role. No reactionary alliance between 
the state, the bourgeoisie, and the landed elite, could have emerged in Ireland. Only in Ulster did
24 See T. Garvin, The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics (Dublin, 1981).
25 E.M. Stephens, The Constitution1, Irish Free State Offical Handbook (London, 1932), p.72.
26 T. Skocpol, State and Social Revolution (Cambridge New York,1973), pp. 439-41.
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an alliance against Catholic peasants and workers develop between the Protestant bourgeoisie 
and the landed elites. Again the confessional divide in Irish society determined that the 
Protestant working class would support this alliance in the form of Ulster Unionism.27
The final pre-condition discussed by Moore was a revolutionary break with the past. This factor 
was absent in the Irish case. The fall of 'landlordism' came about through legal reform. The War 
of Independence did not significantly alter the Irish social structure, and in so far as a 
transformation of the social structure is an essential ingredient of social revolution, it was not a 
revolution at all.28 In any case most European democracies did not experience a violent break 
with the past in the modem era. Moreover the extent to which either the French or English 
revolutions or the American civil war gave rise to dramatic social transformations has been 
questioned by historians. Late twentieth century historiography has been largely revisionist on 
this score.
Moore's schema provides a useful framework for analysing changes in class relations in 
nineteenth century Ireland and suggests that the two classes most hostile to the existence of 
democracy, a landed upper class and the landless peasantry, had been removed from the scene by 
1921. It also suggests that the creation of a balance between the Crown and the landed elite in 
1801 was a fundamental pre-condition for democratisation. Having said that, a feature of the 
Irish case that is missing from Moore's account is the role of the colonial state in promoting 
these changes. As a recent theory has put it 'the transplantation of state structures' was a crucial 
aspect of democratisation in the colonial world and the same was true for Ireland.29 In Moore's 
account, for a democracy to emerge 'the monopoly of power of a small group of arbitrary rulers 
must be broken'.30In the early stages the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie must ally to prevent the 
growth of royal absolutism, but the bonds between these classes must not be so secure as to 
prevent the formation of a common front against the popular classes, since in the later stages the 
bourgeoisie must be able to turn to broader social classes for support in its' struggle for an 
extension of democratic rights. The Irish case represents a colonial variation on this theme. The 
arbitrary power of the Protestant Ascendancy was broken by a periodic alliance between the 
forces of Catholic nationalism and a reformist British state. At the same time there was no 
incentive for middle class Catholics to ally itself with the status quo, since the Crown was only 
relatively autonomous from the landed elite. The need for Catholic politicians to look for broader 
bases of support was therefore constant. In that need lies the genesis of Irish democracy.
27 F. Wright, Northern Ireland: a Comparative Analysis (New Jersey, 1987), pp. 86-112.
28 See the essays in Boyce, D.G. (ed.), The Revolution in Ireland 1879-1923 (London, 1988).
29 D. Rueschmeyer, E. Stephens, and J.D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge, 
1992), p. 280.
30 T/fiiton, The Social Origins of Liberal Democracy : the Swedish Case, American Political Science 
Review, vol.68 (1974),p.562.
3.2. The Timing of Land Reform and the Civil War.
The traditional pattern of landlord-peasant relationships in pre-democratic Ireland had been 
fundamentally transformed by independence. In order to appreciate the significance of this fact 
for the democratic development of the Free State, it is worth comparing the Irish case with the 
Finnish case where an unreformed agrarian system remained an obstacle to democratic 
stabilisation after independence. In the Finnish case there was, as a result, a strong class 
dimension to the civil war which was absent in the Irish case. This was not due to the different 
political traditions existing in the two countries, since in the Irish case, there was a stronger 
tradition of land agitation dating back at least to the late eighteenth century, whereas the Finnish 
peasantry was traditionally quiescent in the century before the civil war.
From the 1870s on Finland's economic development had been based on a thriving export-trade, 
especially in timber. It was highly important that the forests from which this timber was extracted 
were owned by the farmers and peasants.31 The sawmill industry led to the creation of a rural 
capitalist class among median-sized farmers who in turn invested their profits into the local 
banking, educational, and co-operative movements. As the distinction between these 
independent farmers and the traditional manorial farmers becoming clouded due to the increased 
wealth from timber, the gap between those that had land per se and those that didn't became 
more and more acute. This gap increased because of a number of factors, foremost among 
them being the decreasing death rate which created rural overpopulation. As the numbers of the 
rural population began to grow the practice of sub-division was not sufficient to generate 
employment for all. As a result the landless population began to increase. At this time Finland's 
industrialisation had not started so there was no industry to absorb surplus labour either. Neither 
was emigration a way out. It was concentrated in the Western province of Ostrobothnia and the 
national rate of emigration was much lower than elsewhere in the Nordic region. Over the sixty 
years before 1910 less than eight per cent of the whole population emigrated. In neighbouring 
Sweden the relevant figure was nearer 18 per cent. There was no safety valve in Finland as there 
was in Ireland.32
The rural class structure in Finland became increasingly stratified as the century wore on. 
Alapuro has provided a breakdown of the figures relating to changes in the sizes of agrarian 
social classes in the nineteenth century, part of which I have reproduced in table 3.3. It seems 
that the Finnish experience was exactly the opposite of the Irish one.
31 E. Allardt, Finland; Relationship between Geopolitical Situation and Social Development 
(Helsinki, 1985 ), pp.14-15.
32 Ibid, 19.
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Table 3.3 Agrarian Households In Finland by Class. 1815-1901.
Class 1815 1870 1901 Increase /  decrease
Landowners 57% 39% 35% -18%
Crofters a 28% 32% 17% -11%
Agricultural 15% 29% 48% +33%
Workers
a Includes other tenant farmers' too.
b In 1901 scrapholders, previously classified as crofters are now done so as labourers, thereby exaggerating the relative decline of the former and 
the relative increase of the latter.
Source : adapted from Alapuro .Table, 4,40.
The proportion of landowners between 1815 and 1901 decreased, from well over half to just 
over a third of the total number of households, while the proportion of crofters also declined. 
Agricultural labourers, who comprised only 15 per cent of agrarian households in 1815 made up 
almost half of agrarian households by 1901. By the turn of the century half of the rural 
population were landless. Alapuro has described the consequences of this overpopulation.
As the landless population expanded without being effectively absorbed into industry, it remained in the 
countryside, producing a large number of agricultural workers. In 1910 there were 2.3 agricultural workers 
and 0.5 crofters and other tenant farmers for every landowner, and in the Southwest the proportion was 
much higher, with 4.6 agricultural workers to every landowner.33
The Irish situation was very different. Table 3.4 shows the total number of persons employed in 
agriculture and the number of agricultural workers in Ireland between 1881 and 1911. Unlike in 
Finland the size of the second group in Ireland declined, falling from a total of 160,757 in 1881 
to 99,848 in 1911.
Table 3.4 Persons Engaged In Agriculture and agricultural labourers In the Future Area o f the Free State 1881-1911.
1881 1891 1901 1911
Total 684,206 643,196 606,612 554,059
Agricultural 160,757 116,239 106,069 99,848
Labourers (23.4%) (18%) (17.4%) (18%)
Source : Irish Free State. Census 1911.
33 R. Alapuro, State and Revolution in Finland (Berkely, 1989), p.47.
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In the last census year before independence, 1911, their proportion of the total agricultural 
labour force had fallen from 23.4 to 18 per cent. This means there was less than one agricultural 
labourer for every five farmers in 1911, whereas in Finland there were more than five for each 
one. Before the Famine in Ireland there had been at least two male farm workers for every 
farmer, by 1911 that was true of only four counties. Moreover farm workers who were often 
'labour occupiers' in reality, had as a class become far less distinct from the farming class after 
the Famine.34
What was the consequence of these changes for Irish political development ? Both Rumpf and 
Pyne argued that opposition to the Irish Free State during the civil war of 1922-23 was positively 
correlated with the number of agricultural workers in each county, yet this class was 
comparatively unimportant in Ireland. With respect to independent farmers, Lee's figures 
suggested that in 1906 only about a quarter of Irish farmers were owner-occupiers. This figure 
compares poorly with the Finnish case at the turn of the century where 'there were two 
comparable strata of peasant farmers in Finland - over 100,000 independent landowners and 
about the same number of tenant farmers'.35 However in Ireland, due to land reform, by 1911 the 
proportion of owner-occupiers increased to almost two thirds of the total number of farmers. In 
contrast a number of ill-conceived reforms of tenancy arrangements aggravated the tenant- 
landlord relationship in Finland without increasing the number of independent farmers. Between 
1909 and 1915, around 14 000 tenant evictions took place, according to an official enquiry.36 
The Finnish parliament had intended to pass a Land Reform improving tenancy conditions in 
the months before the war, but this proved impossible in the uncertain conditions of the time. The 
Finns paid dearly for their delay. During the civil war of 1918 both industrial workers and 
agricultural labourers were on the Red side with the independent peasantry and the upper classes 
in general supporting the Whites. Tenant farmers were found on both sides 37 The comparison 
suggests that the existence of a large rural proletariat was a cause of the Finnish civil war in 1918 
whereas in Ireland the rural class system was less stratified and the rural proletariat much 
smaller. In Moore's terms there was less revolutionary potential in the countryside.
The Socialist Republican interpretation of the Irish civil war had been that the wider conflict with 
Britain was inextricably bound up with the existence of rural class conflicts within Irish
34 D. Fitzpatrick, The Disappearance of the Irish Agricultural Labourer1, Irish Economic and Social 
History, vol 7. (1980),p.74.
35 M. Peltonen, From peasant holdings to family farms : impact of the agricultural depression of the 1880s- 
1910s on Finnish peasant farming in L. Graberg L. and J. Nikula, The Peasant State ;The State and rural 
questions in 20th century Finland (Rovaniemi, 1995), pp.32-33.
36 Ibid,pp. 34-35.
37 O. Manninen, Red, White and Blue in Finland, 1918 ; A Survey of interpretations of the civil war1 in 
Scandinavian Journal of History, 3, (1978). pp. 229-249, 1978.
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society.38 However this view has limited validity. The high tide of agrarian disorder had 
occurred between 1879 and 1881. After that it subsided. 'With the widespread establishment of 
peasant proprietorship the social base of the forces calling for change had narrowed down to 
landless men and small uneconomic smallholders', according to Rumpf.39 Agrarian strife in 
1922-1923 was still acute in some areas. Garvin argues that 'there was a marked agrarian 
radicalism hiding behind the anti-Treaty cause' on the basis that the Anti-Treaty Sinn Fein vote 
in 1923 correlated heavily with areas where agrarian outrages were perpetrated during the Land 
War of 1879-1882.40 However those areas where agrarian disorder took place during the war 
and those where militant opposition to the Free State was strongest did not coincide. Serious 
agrarian strife was actually confined to a few counties. Army reports reported serious agrarian 
trouble in Sligo, Cavan, Leitrim, Monaghan, Roscommon and Tipperary for example, but with 
the exception of Tipperary, electoral support for the Republicans was weak in all these counties 
in 1922, and military resistance to the Free State thereafter was also weak.41Militaiy opposition, 
with the exception of Mayo and Sligo was confined mainly to the south-west, more specifically 
to counties Cork, Kerry, Limerick, Tipperary, and Waterford, as well as Wexford. However these 
were not areas of great agrarian disorder, although they were areas where Anti-Treatyites fared 
reasonably well in the 1922 and 1923 elections.
Table 3.5 shows the distribution of various sizes of farms by province in the Irish Free State. It 
shows that there were two areas of relative agrarian poverty in the Free State, Connacht and the 
Border Counties, and two areas of relative agrarian prosperity, Leinster and Munster. In both 
Leinster and Munster just under fifty per cent of those engaged in agriculture were employed on 
farms of between fifty and hundred acres. In contrast well under twenty per cent of those 
employed in agriculture were employed on farms of this size in Connacht and the Border 
counties. Rather, over two thirds of all farmers were employed on farms between one and thirty 
acres in both areas. The relevant figure for Leinster and Munster was thirty-two per cent and 
thirty-seven per cent respectively. Significantly these sharp differences are not reflected by 
positions on the Treaty. In Connacht and much of Munster (Kerry, Clare, Tipperary, and Cork) 
support for Anti-Treaty candidates was strong in 1922 and 1923. Not all of this area can be 
considered poor. Moreover the border counties did not show strong support for Republican 
candidates in 1922 or 1923 and were quiet during the fighting.
38 For an extensive critique see R. English, Radicals and the Republic : Socialist Republicans in the Irish 
Free State 1925-1937 (Oxford,1994),
39 E. Rumpf, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century Ireland (Liverpool, 1977), p. 15.
40 T. Garvin, 1922;The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin,1996), p. 155.
41 Civil War ;Army Reports on General Situation and Organisation, Department of An Taoiseach, S3361, 
National Archives.
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Tahle 3.S. Percentage of those engaged in agriculture by farm size (acres')
Number 1-15 15-30 30-50 50-100 100+
Leinster 155,442 14.4 17.5 18.0 22.1 25.5
Munster 207,365 10.7 16.8 21.7 28.4 20.6
Connacht 187,384 34.9 35.6 17.1 7.5 4.1
Ulster 96,104 34.7 29.9 17.3 10.6 5.7
Saorstat 646,295 22.2 24.4 18.8 18.1 14.8
Eirearm
Source : Census of Irish Free State 1926 General Report
A close analysis of the agricultural statistics then does not support the hypothesis that opposition 
to the Free State was strongest where small farmers were more preponderant. Rather it suggests 
that Republican military opposition to the Free State was strongest in the counties of the South- 
West where medium sized farms between 50-100 acres were more numerous, while in the poorer 
areas of Connacht, the Border counties and Donegal, where small farms between 1-30 acres were 
most common, opposition to the Free State was weaker. The south-west had been the area 
where nationalist violence was at its height between 1918 and 1921 and Munster was the 
province where the Sinn Fein organisation was most extensive. Farm workers were plentiful in 
both areas but more so in the second group of counties.42 The profile of Republican resistance to 
the Free State is overwhelmingly Southerly rather than Westerly, the area in the south-west 
proving to be the stronghold of the Anti-Treatyites, as it was to remain over the next year. The 
decision of Liam Lynch Chief of Staff of the IRA in June 1922 to maintain a defensive line 
running from Waterford to Tipperary, behind which 'the Munster Republic' could exist, reflected 
this geographical reality. Indeed by the beginning of August 1922, Collins could report that 
there were only three groups of Irregulars causing any disturbance in the West of Ireland. Only 
one of these represented a serious threat43
There is thus little empirical support for the view that the Irish civil war was a veiled class war. 
Opposition to the Free State had, according to Kevin O' Higgins, consisted of three elements; 
Republican fundamentalists, Document Number Twoites, and Socialist Republicans, 44 The 
latter were only a minority element, whose aspirations were not shared by the majority of Anti- 
Treatyites. The comparison with Finland suggests that the early timing of agrarian reforms 
explains the weak class basis of the civil war. If the proportion of farm workers had not shrunk 
from over half the occupied male workers in 1841 to less than a third in 1911, the situation may
42 See Agricultural Statistics, Irish Free State,1926. Maps 13,141V111.
43 Civil War ;Army Reports on General Situation and Organisation, Department of An Taoiseach, S3361, 
National Archives.
44 O' Higgins, Kevin, Civil War and the Events which led to it (Dublin, 1926), p. 34.
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have been different. 'The survival of the class of rural labourers might well have engendered a 
social revolution still more far-reaching than that which resulted from its collapse'.45 No such 
revolution occurred and the values of a rural capitalist society survived the civil war. According 
toBew
The discontent of the small fanner population, particularly in the west, would give rise to some localised 
and sporadic 'anti rancher1 manifestations but it had neither the social depth nor geographical reach to turn 
the countryside upside down. The small farmer and landless labourer were still mesmerised by visions of 
piecemeal land acquisition which were easily assimilable by anti-rancher rhetoric that had been the stock 
and trade of Irish nationalism since the days of the land league.46
To return to Moore's thesis, the fact that land reform had preceded democratisation, eliminated 
the one social group that could have enabled a social revolution to take place during the civil war. 
Naturally there were some social revolutionaries among Irish nationalists, but the civil war did 
not reflect social divisions as in the Finnish case, which has been regarded one of the clearest 
examples of class warfare this century. Likewise the enfranchisement of a mass electorate in 
1918 did not lead to the emergence of a large socialist party in Ireland as it did in Finland in 
1906 where the Social Democrats emerged as the largest party in the Finnish Eduskunta. Again 
the early timing of land reform in Ireland helps explain this difference as well as explaining why 
democracy was more easily institutionalised in independent Ireland than in 'White Finland', 
where the Communist party remained banned until the Second World War.
3.3. Democracy and Modernity.
Moore had asked, 'what are the prerequisites for entry into the modem, industrialised, urban 
world; what changes needed to be effected in the countryside to make such revolution possible, 
and what is the necessary social cost of such a process'.47 His conclusion was that getting rid of 
agriculture as a major social activity is an essential pre-requisite of successful democracy. Either 
the landed elite or the independent peasantry adopts commercial methods of agricultural 
production or they are violently removed from the scene, by revolution as in France, or by land 
enclosures as in England. However Moore also acknowledged that 'democracy and an 
independent peasantry have not been incompatible bedfellows in France; rather it is 
modernisation and peasantry which seem to be necessarily incompatible'48
45 D. Fitzpatrick, The Disappearance of the Irish Agricultural Labourer1, p. 84.
46 P.Bew, E. Hazelkom, and H. Patterson, The Dynamics of Irish Politics, (London, 1989), p. 35.
47 L. Stone, News from everywhere', New York Review of Books ,9, (1967), p.34.
29 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
A wider purview of European rural history suggest that the relationship between democracy and 
rural society was more complicated than Moore's theory allowed for. Norway, Sweden, and 
Denmark for example, became democratic when agriculture was still the major economic 
activity. Luebbert has regrouped the cross-national data for industrialisation in western Europe 
according to the division of labour.49 I have included data both for the Free State and for the 
whole of Ireland. The figures are presented below in table 3.6. and are for the year 1900 except 
where noted. The table makes it clear that Europe can be accurately divided into three separate 
types of state : industrial, semi-industrial, and peripheral. The second group stands out on its 
own as neither a predominantly industrial nor a predominantly agricultural group. The mean 
percentage for population in agriculture for the four 'semi-industrial' democracies - Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, and Ireland, is 47.2 per cent, while for the four industrial democracies (all 
excluding Germany) it is a much smaller 23.2 per cent. The mean figure for the last group is 68.7 
per cent. In short the second group has as little in common with the industrial democracies as 
with the non-democracies. Around 1900 45 per cent of the Danish labour force was employed in 
agriculture. The figure for Norway is 41 per cent, for Sweden 51 per cent The figure for what 
became the Irish Free State is 53 per cent. All but two of the semi-industrialised states were full 
democracies by 1922 (Ireland 1918-1922, Norway 1921, Sweden 1921, Denmark 1918). France 
was a male democracy (equal suffrage came in 1946).
Table 3.6. Division of Labour In European countries around 1900 ranked according to size o f agricultural sector.
Agriculture Industry Services
Industrialised States
Britain 8 46 41
Belgium 23 37 27
Switzerland 31 44 25
Netherlands 31 32 36
Germany 38 37 25(1895)
Mean 26.2 39.2 30.8
Semi-Industrlalised States
Norway 41 27 30
France 43 30 28
Denmark 45 26 27
Ireland 47 25 27(1911)
Sweden 50 20 23
I.F.S. 53 15 31 (1926)
Mean 48.4 23.8 26.1
PeriDheral- Agricultural States
Austria 64 20 14(1910)
Hungary 68 14 18
Spain 71 17 12
Finland 72 11 9 (1910)
Mean 68.7 15.5 13.2
Source : Luebbert, 1991, 325.1 have included Irish data from Mitchelll988,148.)
Alestalo and Kuhnle point out that the Swedish and Norwegian cases, with no elimination of 
the peasantry and no violent revolution, contradict Moore’s' thesis. Only in Denmark did 
widespread commercial farming precede the incorporation of the peasantry into a modem 
democratic political system. The process whereby the Scandinavian peasantry was orientated
49 G. Luebbert, Liberal Fascism or Social Democracy (Oxford, 1991), p.325.
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toward market reform in the nineteenth century was a long-drawn out and peaceful one, and 
occurred in countries where the individualisation of agriculture had already begun. In 
Scandinavia 'the family farm became the basic production unit' before modem improvements in 
farming methods and before the growth of commercial markets for agricultural products.50The 
'Scandinavian route' to modem democracy suggests that democratic politics can thrive in states 
where individual agricultural producers form the backbone of the mral economy. An increase in 
peasant proprietorship took place throughout Scandinavia in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. In Sweden and Denmark it was the result of land enclosures. In Norway the position 
of the nobility had always been weak. These development contrast with the experience of 
Britain where enclosures eliminated the peasantry from the countryside. The Scandinavian route 
also contrasts with that of eastern Europe where landlords maintained quasi-feudal agricultural 
arrangements well into the twentieth century. In the Nordic countries, although the landowning 
nobility did not disappear altogether, 'the nobility became increasingly urban and had a strong 
position in the state’.^
The Scandinavian 'model' thus suggests that the individualisation of agriculture is a more 
important precondition for democratisation than a turn towards commercial agriculture, since it 
allows for the emergence of independent farmers as a collective actor. Moore suggested that the 
commercialisation of agriculture was necessary in order to further industrialisation. However it 
was important in Scandinavia that the independent peasantry found its political identity before 
the industrial working class was mobilised. Where this did not happen, as in Finland where the 
large Social Democratic Party gained the support of both urban and mral workers between 1907 
and 1918, violent class conflict between socialists and the agrarian middle classes ensued. Indeed 
where Social Democratic parties became involved in rural class conflicts the independent farmers 
typically opposed both democracy and socialism. Social democratic regimes in interwar Europe 
could only be consolidated if they had the support of the independent farmers. This was only 
forthcoming where socialist parties stayed out of rural class conflict. In short social democracy 
could only emerge after rural politics were dominated by independent farmers and agrarian 
parties. This in turn could only happen after the individualisation of agriculture had taken place. 
In an important region of Northern Europe therefore, the individualisation of agriculture was a 
crucial historical pre-condition for the emergence and consolidation of democracy.
The fact that the two classic urban classes, the working class and the industrial bourgeoisie, 
played little role in the Irish national revolution, has been cited as one of the peculiarities of Irish 
political development.52 However it is necessary to emphasise that these classes were not
50 M.Alestalo, and S. Kuhnle, The Scandinavian Route : Economic, Social, and Political Developments in 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, (Helsinki,1984) p. 12.
51 Ibid, 13.
52 For an analysis of the role of the lower middle class in Irish nationalist politics See T. Garvin,
Nationalist Revolutionaries in Ireland, (Oxford, 1987).
everywhere the most important ones. Rather independent farmers, either on their own, or in 
alliance with urban liberals or urban socialists, were crucial to the emergence of democracy in 
most of Northern Europe.53 The manner in which the pre-industrial cleavage between Catholics 
and Protestants affected the pattern of mass mobilisation in Ireland bears some relationship to 
the development of agrarian class relations in the Nordic region where independent farmers were 
a major political actor. In Scandinavia independent farmers formed a cornerstone of a bipolar 
class structure between the upper class in business and administration, the working class, and the 
farmers.54 Castles considers the pre-industrial cleavage between the independent farmers and the 
urban aristocratic bureaucracy, the main reason for the development of a widespread peasant 
identity in the nineteenth century and a base for rural social movements in the Scandinavian 
countryside.55Unlike in Eastern Europe, the state was not controlled by the landed nobility but 
by a combination of an emerging middle class and by a bureaucratic nobility. However this urban 
elite was usually split between liberal and conservative elements, and lacking popular support in 
the countryside, it proved unable to prevent democratic reform. The weakness of the 
Scandinavian right was thus basically connected with the cultural and economic cleavage 
between the urban elites and the rural producers. The cleavage became accentuated in the quest 
for franchise and parliamentary reforms when the urban and peripheral radicals were united to 
carry out the reforms'.56
In Northern Europe, then, the cleavage between the agrarian population and the urban elites 
weakened those classes most opposed to the introduction of democracy and led to the formation 
of urban rural-coalitions in favour of democratic reform. The role of the independent peasants in 
Scandinavia was quite similar to that in Ireland, where on the basis of pre-industrial cleavages 
between the Catholic peasantry and the Protestant Ascendancy, urban radicals were drawn into 
an alliance with the peasantry in search of political reform. The difference in Ireland was that 
such an alliance emerged before peasant proprietorship had been established. Furthermore the 
weakness of the political right in independent Ireland was also due to the existence of this 
cleavage which divided liberal Catholics from the Protestant upper class. The Irish landed 
aristocracy also became an urban elite, like its Scandinavian counterparts. After 1885 Unionist 
electoral majorities in the future area of the Free State emerged only in urban and university 
constituencies. The decline of the Anglo-Irish on the land was tempered by their dominance of 
the professions
53 The best treatment of this subject is found in Greg Luebbert's, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy 
(Oxford, 1991).
54 M. Alestalo, and S. Kuhnle, The Scandinavian Route : Economic, Social, and Political Developments in 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, (Helsinki, 1984), p. 12.
55 F. Castles, The Social Democratic Image of Society: a study of the achievements and origins of 
Scandinavian social democracy in comparative perspective (London,1978), p. 132.
56 Alestalo and Kuhnle, op. cit., 14.
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in 1926, when they were 8.4% of the population, they still accounted for 28 per cent of farmers with over 
200 acres, and 18 per cent of the entire professional class. By 1936 the Protestant proportion of Irish 
employers and business executives was 20-25 per cent; bank officials, 53% ; commercial representatives, 
39 per cent; lawyers, 38% .57
However, outside of Ulster where Unionist leaders were able to mobilise rural and working class 
support, Protestants proved unable to resist the trend toward Catholic democracy. The historical 
weakness of the right in Ireland may also explain why the victors of the civil war did not resort to 
authoritarian rule in 1922 but were content to defend the status quo within a democratic political 
framework.
In short the Irish case was not as exceptional as it seems. Even the persistence of a large 
agricultural sector, another of the alleged peculiarities of Irish social development, was perfectly 
compatible with the survival of democracy. Allardt has suggested that
there are three different patterns in the development of the structure of the agrarian population: (1) the 
Western European development, which means that industry could absorb the workforce which was released 
from farming. The modernisation of farming gave an impetus to industrialisation and facilitated its 
development. (2) The East European development meant that only farming was developed. At the same 
time, it became heavily dependent on demand in Western Europe. (3) The development in Finland, which 
represented an intermediate form and meant originally that the modernisation of farming and 
industrialisation took place almost simultaneously. The development of agriculture gave no significant 
impetus to industrialisation, which was slower than in Western Europe in general. The solution to the 
problem of the landless population was sought in turning the landless, a whole class in the society, into 
independent farmers.58
Ireland clearly belongs to the pattern typified by Finland. In both land reform was instigated to 
provide landless peasants with a stake in the social order. In Ireland it was part of a long- 
running policy of 'killing Home Rule by Kindness', whereas in Finland it was part of a 
programme of 'national reconciliation' backed by the Agrarian Union and the National 
Progressives after the civil war. In 1918 the Eduskunta passed a Crofters Act which enabled 
tenant farmers to buy their own land. Four years later, a second act, the Lex Kallio , led to the 
creation of new small-holdings for the landless population. As a result of both acts about 100,000 
new farms were created. 'There is no doubt that the reforms had significant economic
57 R. Foster, Modem Ireland 1600-1972, p.534.
58 E. Allardt, Finnish Society: relationship between Geopolitical Situation and the Development of Society 
(Helsinki, 1985), p.22.
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consequences. The population which had previously formed the agrarian proletariat in rural areas 
began to accept the existing system in the society as legitimate, and worth defending’.59
Table 3.7 Proportion of the agricultural population as a ner cent of the economically active population in Denmark. Norway. Sweden. 
Finland, and Ireland.
Country 1880 1890 1990 1910 1920 1930 1940
Denmark 50 45 (-5) 48 (+3) 43 (-5) 35 (-8) 35 30 (-5)
Norway 52 49 (-3) 41 (-8) 39 (-2) 37 (-2) 35 (-2) 30 (-5)
Sweden 66 63 (-3) 57 (-6) 50 (-7) 44 (-6) 38 (-6) 31(-7)
Finland 83 81 (-2) 78 (-3) 74 (-4) 73 (-1) 70 (-2) 64 (-6)
Ireland 1 42 43 (-1) 52 (+9) 48 (-4) 46 (-2)
I.F.S. 2 59 59 60 (+1) 56 (A) 58 (+2) 55 (+2) 53 (-2)
1 Includes those engaged in forestry and fishery. After 1910 refers only to I.F.S. Figures are for census years 1881,1911,1926,1946, in that order.
2 Refers only to males in future area of I.F.A. Same census years as 1.
Sources : Adapted from Alestalo op. ciL p.26. Figures for Ireland are from Mitchell, 1989, p26. Figures for Irish Free Stale Census Ireland 1911, 
Mitchell, 1989, pl48.
The net effect of land reform in both countries was to slow down the rate of industrialisation. 
Table 3.7 contrasts the rate of industrialisation by comparing the sizes of the agricultural 
workforce in Scandinavia with those of Ireland and Finland. Compared with Scandinavia 
Finland and Ireland took a detour into an inter-war agraria. The decennial figures for the 
Scandinavian countries show an almost constant decrease in the size of the agricultural sector. 
This reflects the existence of a growing industrial sector to absorb the surplus labour. While in 
Scandinavia, the proportion of the workforce engaged in agriculture dropped between twenty and 
thirty per cent over a sixty year period, the figure for Ireland is only six per cent. The impact of 
the massive pre-independence land reforms meant that no decrease would take place before 1920. 
After the 1920 partition, a jump of almost ten per cent is reflected in the 1926 census figures for 
the numbers employed in agriculture. In 1880 the Finnish agricultural workforce was over twenty 
per cent bigger than in the Scandinavian countries. In 1940 the gap was even bigger. The Finnish 
rates do decrease, but at a much slower rate than in Scandinavia.
59 Ibid.
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Table 3.8. Stable Democracies and agrarian structure.
Country Decade of Democratistion
/Independence
Industrial Route
U.K. 1910-1919
Belgium 1890-1899
Netherlands 1910-1920
Costa Rica 1920-1930
Semi-Industrial Route
Canada 1867-1869
France 1870-1879
New Zealand 1890-1899
Australia 1900-1910
Norway 1900-1910
Sweden 1910-1920
Denmark 1910-1920
Uruguay 1920-1930
Agrarian Route
Finland 1917-1919
Ireland 1920-1930
America 1860-1869
% of the economically active Area of family farms as a % of total
population employed in agriculture area of holdings.
07.6 20
23.1 21
38.4 26
23.0 15
63
39.1 29
36.1 46
32.2 67
41.3 77
45.6 41
42.7 44
41.4 15
70.4 34
51.3 40
59.4 60
Source :Vanhanen, 1984, Appendix pp 13-159 : Mitchell, 1983 .
However Finland and independent Ireland were not alone in being agrarian democracies. Table 
3.8 shows the social structure of interwar democracies in the decade in which they became 
democratic/independent, by comparing the figures for two variables. The first of these is the 
percentage of the economically active population employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. 
The second measures the percentage of the total agricultural area occupied by family farms, i.e. 
farms that are mainly cultivated by the holder family which employ no more than four people, 
including family workers.60 The table makes it clear that democracies emerged out of three 
different types of social base. The first, that of the U.K., an almost uniquely industrialised case, 
with a small proportion of family farms, is the industrialised route, where agriculture had been 
displaced as the biggest economic sector by the time the state became fully democratic. The 
Netherlands and Belgium also fit into this pattern. The second, exemplified by the Scandinavian 
countries, shows a moderately high agricultural population in which family farms were 
predominant. Here agriculture may well have been the biggest sector. The White Commonwealth 
Countries also fit in here. In the long run the modernisation of agriculture gave an impetus to 
industrialisation but this occurred late, compared to the British route. The third route, which 
covers the U.S. and later cases like Finland and Ireland, shows a heavily agricultural social base 
with an egalitarian property structure. Agriculture was still by far the biggest economic sector. 
With regard to Ireland and Finland the most remarkable feature of their social structure would 
be that the area covered by family farms would actually increase after independence, to 60 per 
cent in Ireland in the 1940s and to 68 per cent in Finland in the same period. In Costa Rica, this 
figure would only have increased to 20% in the 1940s, and in Uruguay would rise to 19% in the 
same decade.61 Agrarian reform, in short, slowed down the rate of industrialisation in both cases, 
but still provided an adequate social base for the survival of democratic politics.
60 T. Vanhanen, The Emergence of Democracy (Helsinki, 1984), p. 34.
61 Ibid.
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The possibility that democracy could flourish in rural conditions has long been considered by 
political theorists. Aristotle maintained that 'there is no difficulty in constructing a democracy 
where the bulk of the people live by arable and pastoral farming'.62 Travelling through America 
in the nineteenth century, de Toqueville reflected, ' Among the novel objects that attracted my 
attention during my stay in the United States, nothing struck me more forcibly than the general 
equality of condition among the people'.63 Before him Rousseau specified what he thought were 
the most ideal social conditions for a democratic system: 'a very small state, in which the people 
may be readily assembled, and in which every citizen can easily know the rest; secondly great 
simplicity of manners, which prevents a multiplicity of affairs and thorny discussions; 
next,considerable equality of rank and fortune, without which equality in rights and authority 
could not long subsist'.64 These views on the appropriate social base for democracy were not so 
different from the views adopted by the Irish state itself. In 1926 the new Fianna Fail party 
declared its commitment to 'the distribution of the land of Ireland so as to get the greatest number 
possible of Irish families rooted in the soil of Ireland'.65 Consciously or not, this affirmation of 
rural values was an Irish restatement of a familiar theme in modem European political 
propaganda where arguments advanced for land reform often tended to stress a social ideal as 
much as the practicalities of land provision.66 For example the leading ideologue of the Finnish 
Agrarian Union Santeri Alkio committed himself to the search for a 'third way1 between 
capitalism and socialism; a vision of society that would guarantee the protection of private 
property, but at the same time promote inter-class harmony through general social reform'.67 
That was almost exactly the same type of social ideal that was articulated by Eamon de Valera 
among others.
Why should democracy flourish in rural societies ? Dahl has identified two aspects of an 
egalitarian agrarian society that may sustain a democratic system.
as Tocqueville observed (among many others), the agrarian society of the United States possessed the two 
crucial features that make an MDP society favourable to polyarchy, It produced a wide dispersion of power 
and it strongly fostered democratic beliefs. In fact, ideologues of agrarian republicanism like Thomas 
Jefferson and John Taylor were so firmly convinced that an agrarian society of independent farmers was 
absolutely essential to the existence of a democratic republic that they were unable to forsee the possibility
62 T. Vanhanen, The Process of Democratisation : A Comparative Study of 147 States, 1980-1988 (New 
Tork,1990), p.37.
63 Ibid, p.38.
64 Ibid.
65 J.Lee and G. O' Tuathaigh, The Age of de Valera (Dublin, 1982), p.62.
66 F.Dovring, Land and Labour in Europe, p.345.
67 J. Mylly, Political Parties in Finland (Turku, 1984), p. 107.
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that a republic might continue to exist in the United States even after farmers became a minuscule 
minority.68
Widespread dispersal of property and the existence of strong beliefs in equality, two factors 
which are not related to the degree of industrialisation of a given society, are thus the two crucial 
components of the agrarian model of democracy. Arguably both existed in the Ireland of 1921 
and remained the basis for a stable but agrarian democratic system until the 1960s.
In summary there is little evidence to support Moore's thesis that replacing agriculture as a major 
social activity is an essential pre-requisite of democracy. Rather a change in the balance of class 
power in the countryside in favour of independent farmers is the crucial variable. Beyond that, 
getting rid of agriculture may be a threat to democracy. Without the possibility of an alignment 
with a politically committed agrarian middle class, urban liberals or urban socialists in the Third 
World are unlikely to be able to stabilise a democratic regime on their own.69 Moreover there is 
little evidence to justify the view that the costs involved in the transition to democratic capitalism 
must be borne by the peasantry per se. In Ireland they were borne by the poorer agricultural 
classes only. Indeed most European democracies have incorporated the independent family 
peasantry as a collective actor into their democratic systems.70 Furthermore democratic values 
have thrived in Free Farming communities of widely different cultural backgrounds, including 
the worlds' earliest modem democracies, the United States, France, Iceland, and Switzerland. 
This suggests that democracies can survive in pre-industrial societies and that Moore's emphasis 
on the necessary costs of the transition to modernity is a mistaken one.
Conclusion
The basic contention of this chapter is that the creation of a large class of independent farmers 
was a basic pre-condition for the emergence of a stable democratic system in Ireland. British 
liberal reformism succeeded in eliminating the two social classes, the landed aristocracy and the 
landless peasantry, who had least stake in a democratic system. Whether Moore would have 
considered the Irish revolution a modernising revolution is more open to debate. It seems just as 
likely that he would have compared it to the Indian case : democratic but unmodem. However in 
so far as fundamental changes in agrarian class relations are concerned, the Irish experience was 
more like the Nordic cases, where the individualisation of agriculture was a basic starting point 
for democratic political development. In these countries, although historical and topographical 
factors were also important, the modernisation of agriculture was also carried out by the Crown, 
often in alliance with the nobility. In the Irish case the state was a major actor too, but Moore’s
68 R. DahlJDemocracy and its Critics (New Haven and London, 1989),p.254.
69 G. Luebbert, Liberalism, Fascism or Social Democracy, p.47.
70 Ibid.
84
theory, which limits itself to the analysis of class relations, actually tells us little about why the 
state should act in this way.
Arguably the choice in independent Ireland then was not between fascism, democracy, and 
communism at all, but between democracy and social democracy. The agrarian class system did 
not fully determine which of these regimes emerged after independence, since two other 
factors, a deeply- divided middle class and a politically weak working class, added further 
elements to the equation. The former, a divided middle class, prevented a purely liberal regime 
being stabilised after independence and would have allowed for the emergence of a social 
democratic regime had there been a more radical urban socialist party to fight for it. There 
wasn't and rural assumptions about political life continued to dominate political debate thereafter. 
The new state has been described as 'a periphery-dominated centre',7 !but the alignment of the 
countryside has been a crucial factor in the emergence of most European political systems. 
European social democracies were based on an alliance between town and country, more 
specifically of Social Democratic and Agrarian parties. These regimes incorporated this 
positive evaluation of the role of the small farmer into their self-image.
On the other hand the extent to which rural society dominated political life in independent 
Ireland was probably unequalled among twentieth century democracies. Even in Finland the 
Social Democrats, the Swedish People's Party, and the liberal National Progressives, were 
important sources of ideological variety. In Ireland in contrast there were few ideological rivals to 
the former Sinn Fein elite before 1960. However it is also true that in Ireland no agrarian parties 
flourished either. The two largest parties have always been composed of rural and urban interests. 
Moreover political representatives have tended to come from the ranks of the professions and 
politics as a profession has traditionally been dominated by the middle class. The 
characteristically Irish pattern of political representation, with a middle class 'national' political 
elite representing rural constituencies developed in the nineteenth century and continues today. 
It does little to disprove Moore’s dictum 'No bourgeoisie no democracy'.
71 T. Garvin Political Cleavages, Party Politics and Urbanisation in Ireland - the Case of the Periphery- 
Dominated Centre' European Journal of Political Research, vol.ll no.4 (1974).
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Chapter four : Voluntarist theory, elite decisions, 
and the origins of the civil war.
'A coalition government is probably the most suitable method o f carrying over the period o f 
stress'.
Michael Collins, New York Herald, 2/5/22.
Democratic theory has undergone something of a paradigm shift in recent decades. Eschewing 
attempts to find structural preconditions for the emergence and stabilisation of democratic 
regimes, it concentrates on elite behaviour and elite strategies as the crucial variables in 
explaining the fate of democratic regimes. The structural characteristics of societies 'constitute a 
series of opportunities and constraints for the social and political actors, both men and 
institutions, that lead to one or another outcome'. Within those constraints elite actors have a 
number of choices that 'increase or decrease the probability of the persistence and stability of a 
democratic regime'. Whether they act to strengthen a democratic regime depends not only on the 
availability of the requisite skill and foresight, but also on their level of commitment ; 'One 
cannot ignore the actions of those who are more or less interested in the maintenance of an open 
democratic political system or those who, placing other values higher, are unwilling to defend it 
or even ready to overthrow it'.1
With this voluntaristic perspective has come a new optimism with regard to the ability of elites to 
craft democracies in areas traditionally considered inhospitable to democracy. In To Craft 
Democracies di Palma suggests that a democracy need not enjoy from birth 'rare conditions of 
legitimacy' in order to consolidate its system, nor need such legitimacy be the product of 'hard 
fought consolidation'. Instead, he stresses the rewards that democratic politics, as an open 
political game, can bring to those who play them. In his analysis of the politics of transition, he 
concentrates on 'the rales that are best suited to induce reluctant players to play,... the transitional 
coalitions that favor the adoption of those rales, and finally the tactics that assist 
democratisation'.2 The appropriate 'crafting' of the rales of the game can bring reluctant players 
into the political game and establish a democratic consensus from the outset. This consensus, 
once achieved, is sufficient reason for a stable democratic system to be institutionalised.
This chapter applies di Palma's perspective to the events leading to the Irish civil war. In that 
period the Collins-de Valera electoral pact represented a last-minute attempt to stabilise the new
1J. Linz, 'Crisis, breakdown, & reequilibration' in J. Linz and A. Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic 
Regimes (Baltimore and London,1979).
2 G. di Palma, To Craft Democracies ; An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkely, Los Angeles, 
Oxford, 1990), p .ll.
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polity by elite pact. The pact failed, as is well-known, but there has been no systematic attempt to 
unravel the reasons why it did. Some have suggested that the Pact was merely reverted to as an 
expedient which enabled an election to take place, while others suggest that it represented a 
genuine attempt to avert civil war, one which was scuppered by British intervention.3 Likewise 
some maintain civil war was a virtual certainty from the time the IRA refused to give their 
allegiance to the Provisional Government, while others argue that civil war came about only 
because of the collapse of the Pact.4 Which perspective is true ? Could civil war have been 
averted by Irish elites or was it the inevitable consequence of the Treaty split ? What part did elite 
error or elite motivation play in creating the circumstances which led to civil war ?
5.1. The Collins de Valera Pact.
The Anglo-Irish Treaty signed on December 6th 1921 made the 26 counties of Ireland a British 
Dominion. Its consitutional status within the Empire was to be analogous to that of Canada.5 
The Irish delegates had secured a large degree of practical independence but only on terms that 
left the country firmly within the British Empire. The decision to sign the Treaty resulted in an 
immediate division within the Irish cabinet. Three members opposed, while four supported the 
Treaty. De Valera, the President, was in a minority. The Cabinet nevertheless agreed to 
recommend the Treaty to the Dail. De Valera attempted to have 'Document No 2', his 
alternative to the Treaty, discussed by the Dail, but his document was unprepared. Debate on the 
Treaty continued until the Dail went into recess from December 22 to January 3. An open split 
in the Sinn Fein parliamentary party was feared. A meeting between four Pro-and four Anti- 
Treaty deputies was held on January 4 in order to find a basis for party unity. It was suggested 
that the services of de Valera should be retained as President of Dail Eireann. A majority vote on 
the Treaty would be avoided and the President would suggest abstention from the vote on the 
basis that the new Provisional Government be permitted to function by the Dail. Only members 
of the Provisional Government need sign acceptance of the Treaty.6 The proposals were agreed to 
by Griffith and Collins who had signed the Treaty, but de Valera insisted that Document No 2. 
should be accepted instead.7 The Peace Conference failed.
3 The former view is contained in T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin,1996),p.l29. For 
a different view see E. de Valera, 'Civil War 1922-24, Historical Summary by President de Valera1, The 
Catholic Bulletin, September 1936.
4 M.Hopkinson, Green Against Green ; A History of The Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), p. 272. For the 
latter interpretation see H. Lacey, There need never have been a civil war, what caused the tragedy ?' Irish 
Press 6/7/58.
5 See Appendix A.
6 Meeting between Pro-Treaty and Anti-Treaty Deputies in the House of Deputy S.T. O' Kelly, January 4 
1922', Political Disunity 1922; Pre-Election Negotiations Department of An Taoiseach, S 2942, National 
Archives.
7 Document No 2 had already been, in the form of external association, rejected by the British. It envisaged 
a Republic externally associated with the Crown for matters of common concern. See Appendix B.
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In the Dail debate on the Treaty on January 7 sixty four members supported the Treaty while 
fifty seven members rejected it. The Treaty was accepted by the Dail.8 As a result de Valera 
immediately resigned as President of the Dail, and failing to secure re-election, led his side in a 
walkout from the Dail. His place was taken by Arthur Griffith. A Dail cabinet composed entirely 
of Pro-Treaty members was elected. The anti-Treatyites would continue to attend the Dail until 
June. De Valera later remarked that this was evidence 'that we accepted the principle of majority 
rule, and the right of the people to decide finally on the question at issue'.9 The truth, however, 
was more complex. Under the terms of the Treaty a Provisional Government could only be 
elected by 'the parliament for Southern Ireland', a body which had been created by the 
Government of Ireland Act of 1920. The parliament had been boycotted by the Sinn Fein TDs, 
but now the Pro-Treaty deputies, alongside four Unionist members, attended in order to elect a 
Provisional Government. Michael Collins became Chairman of this Government and was now 
largely responsible for the direction of government policy. The authority of his Government was 
not however derived from the Dail, but from the Treaty. The anti-Treatyites refused to accept 
that the Provisional Government was the legitimate Government of the country or that the Dail 
departments which had functioned in the revolutionary period had been superseded. The Second 
Dail had been elected in 1921 as the parliament of a thirty-two -county Republic. Some 
candidates still held seats representing constituencies in Northern Ireland. It was argued by 
Republicans that the Dail had not the power to disestablish the Republic which could only be 
done by the votes of the people. Griffith was now nominally President of this Republic, and gave 
assurances that the Republic would remain in being until the Free State came into being.
The Republic could only be disestablished if the Treaty was accepted by the electorate. This was 
the view of both sides. On February 22 an Ard Fheis or general convention of the Sinn Fein 
party agreed to delay the election for three months, so that when the vote on the Treaty came, the 
public would have the constitution before it. Collins hoped to produce a constitution that would 
be acceptable to the Republicans. He was encouraged to do so by de Valera who stated that if 
Collins was to persuade the anti-Treatyites that the King was not part of the Irish constitution, 
then the best way to do so was 'to frame a constitution in which he will not be there, and then it 
may not be too difficult for us to agree with this afterwards'.10 An intermediary between the two 
Treaty sides informed him that,
8 De Valera attempted to have Document No 2 discussed by the Dail as an amendment on the motion 
approving the Treaty, but was frustrated by a technicality. Over the following months Pro-Treaty publicists 
mounted a campaign against it.
9 'Civil War 1922-24', Historical Summary by President de Valera, Department of An Taoiseach, S 9282, 
National Archives.
10 Cork Meeting, February 19 1922, 'Eamon de Valera Speeches 1921-22' Department of An Taoiseach 
S2980, National Archives.
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Unity can be won by the correct drafting of the Constitution. You could carry practically all Republicans 
with you provided the wording of the Constitution fits in with the national ideal of complete independence, 
irrespective of forms of government.11
Since late January a non-party constitutional committee chaired by Collins had been drafting a 
new constitution. It was hoped it would be available by the end of April so that 'people will be 
free to examine it in its entirety' and 'neither Mr de Valera nor anybody else will be able to 
complain that the issues are being concealed from the country1,12
At this stage, as the British decided to withdraw from the country, the attitude of the IRA to the 
Provisional Government became crucial. Army barracks were immediately occupied by local 
Brigades of the IRA, regardless of attitudes towards the Treaty. The Government, unsure ot its 
military strength, allowed this to happen, leaving a country divided between armed camps with 
most areas under the control of anti-Treaty Commanders.13 In late February leaders of the anti- 
Treaty IRA demanded that the Minister of Defence hold an Army Convention with a view to 
establishing a new Army Council. They hoped the Convention would maintain army unity and 
show the Government that the majority of the IRA were against the Treaty. Mulcahy hesitated, 
but eventually agreed, fearing that not to do so would threaten the position of the Free State. On 
March 15 however this decision was reversed by the Cabinet, Griffith's objection being that its 
purpose was to remove the army from the control of the elected government. The banned 
Convention met on 26 March with over two thirds of IRA brigades represented. It unanimously 
agreed that the army 'shall be maintained under an Executive appointed by the Convention'.14 
The IRA was no longer under the authority of the Ministry of Defence and the new Executive 
ordered that recruitment into the National Army and the Civic Guard should cease. It claimed the 
right to prevent an election taking place if the Provisional Government did not update the 1918 
register which allegedly excluded large numbers of young people. Finally, on 13 April the 
Executive occupied a number of buildings in Dublin, including the Four Courts. Asked whether 
this occupation consituted a coup d'etat, the leader of the men in the Four Courts, Rory O' 
Connor, equivocated.
There were now four rival groups competing for influence in the new state. First, there was the 
departing British state, which had begun a rapid evacuation of its troops but which remained 
anxious about the growing state of disorder in the country. Then, there was the Government of 
the Dail which had initiated the truce with the British, but which was bitterly divided over the 
Treaty. Thirdly, there was the Provisional Government itself, which was not elected by the Dail
11 P. O' Dalaigh, April 4 1922, Peace Proposal 1922 : Suggestion by Fr.McCarthy & P. Daly, Cork, 
Department of An Taoiseach S 2978, National Archives.
^Irish Times, April 19 1922.
13See M. Hopkinson, Green Against Green; A History of The Irish Civil War (Dublin, 1988), pp. 52-109.
14 Ibid, 66
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and which had little practical control over the IRA. Finally, there was the Executive set up by the 
IRA, which was composed entirely of men without previous ministerial experience. There was no 
neat overlap between these groups. On the anti-Treaty side the Four Courts men had little interest 
in de Valera's Document Number Two, and de Valera had privately opposed the setting up of the 
Executive. Collins, whose assumption of the Chairmanship of the Provisional Government was 
something of a personal coup, had a very different outlook from those of his colleagues. The 
British were anxious about the lax attitude of the Provisional Government to the IRA
Differences over the election reached a head in late April when a Conference was held at 
Dublin's Mansion House. The Government proposed that in keeping with the February 
agreement, 'a plebiscite on the issue of acceptance or rejection of the Treaty shall be taken within 
a month and a full opportunity be afforded to every adult to vote'. The plebiscite would be held on 
Sunday, and all over 21 would be entitled to vote. Voters would have to walk through gates to 
register their preferences. The Labour Party, the Church, and local government bodies would be 
entrusted with supervising voting. The anti-Treatyite delegates rejected the idea, both in 
principle and in detail', ridiculing the scheme as a 'stone age plebiscite'. In response the 
Provisional Government refused to continue with the Conference. The people were entitled to say 
yes or no to the Treaty and that right was being denied. Collins and Griffith issued a statement 
stating that the Government 'has now cast upon it the duty of seeing that the people of Ireland 
who are and must be the sovereign authority shall be free to vote their approval or disapproaval 
of the Treaty1.15
It was at this time that the idea of an 'agreed election' began to take hold. Late in March Hany 
Boland, a prominent anti-Treatyite, had met with the Minister for Defence and suggested that the 
two Dail sides should avoid further party meetings and instead cooperate on one platform on the 
basis of Collin's Ulster policy. An agreed constitution would also be produced by the Dail. As an 
afterthought, he proposed that the anti-Treatyites be guaranteed around 20 per cent of seats in the 
new Dail.16 On April 12th it was then suggested to Collins that all members be returned 
unopposed. They would be free to attend the Free State parliament but the Dail would continue to 
exist, having control of the ERA and 'all matters dealing with English relations'.17 Collins replied 
that he was 'interested' in the scheme and would, with qualifications, do his best to secure it. 
Significantly he didn't oppose the idea of an agreed election. During the Mansion House 
Conference Labour made a parallel suggestion. The army would be reunited under a stable 
executive. A Council of State would be appointed by and remain responsible to the Dail. The 
Council would take over from the Provisional Government responsibility for 'the transfer of the
15 Freeman's Journal, May 1 1923.
16 Mulcahy to Collins, March 25 1922, Richard Mulcahy Papers P7/B/192, U.C.D. Archives.
17 Suggestion by Fr. McCarthy, April 12 1922, Peace Proposal 1922 : Suggestion by Fr.McCarthy & P. 
Daly, Cork, Department of An Taoiseach S 2978, National Archives.
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administrative machinery'.18 The IRA would be responsible to the Council of State. The scheme 
was rejected by Griffith but de Valera promised to use his influence to win acceptance of the 
proposal 'not indeed as a principle of right or justice, but as a principle of peace and order'.19
On May 1st, after a series of meetings of former IRB colleagues, a document was drawn up by 
officers on both sides. It proposed ;
(1) Acceptance of the fact - admitted by all sides - that the majority of the people of Ireland are willing to 
accept the Treaty.
(2) An agreed election with a view to
(3) Forming a government which will have the confidence of the whole country.
(4) Army unification on the above basis.
The proposal was rejected by hardliners on the grounds that only the IRA Executive as a whole 
could make decisions. However on May 3rd the officers were permitted to address the Dail. A 
motion proposing that the Dail approve their statement led to immediate division over the first 
clause. However the Dail approved of their efforts and subsequently appointed a Committee of 
Ten, five from each Treaty side, to explore the possibilities of agreement. During the debate there 
was considerable support for the idea of an agreed election. After ten sessions the Peace 
Committee reported to the Dail on May 10th having failed to agree a basis for peace. The Pro- 
Treaty side of the Committee had prepared a separate report, but in deference to the other side 
did not present it to the Dail. The anti-Treaty side were also preparing their separate report. The 
two reports were presented to the Dail on May 17th. A long debate followed. There was no 
consensus on the necessity of an election. Both sides accused the other of 'haggling' for seats in 
the coalition government. An eleventh hour meeting took place the next day at University 
College Dublin between de Valera and Collins. As a result they agreed to put a united slate of 
candidates forward at the election and to form a coalition government afterwards. On May 19th 
the Dail met to consider agreement. Despite some vitriolic speeches, Boland, a member of the 
Peace Committee, stated that the coalition was still possible if Collin's constitution showed that 
'the independence of the country can be gained by parliamentary methods'.20 The following day 
the Dail approved the agreement reached by de Valera and Collins. The agreement was signed on 
May 20th and contained seven clauses:
We are agreed:
18 Freeman's Journal, 1 May 1922.
19 E. de Valera,'Civil War 1922-24, Historical Summary by President de Valera'.
20 Harry Boland, Dail Debates, 473, May 19,1922.
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(1) That a National Coalition Panel for this Third Dail, representing both parties in the Dail and in the Sinn 
Fein Organisation be sent forward, on the ground that the national position requires the entrusting of the 
Government of the country into the joint hands of those who have been the strength of the national position 
during the last few years, without prejudice to their present respective position.
(2) That this Coalition panel be sent forward as from the Sinn Fein organisation, the number of each party 
being their present strength in the Dail.
(3) That the candidates be nominated through each of their existing party Executives.
(4) That every and any interest is free to go up and contest the election equally with the National-Sinn Fein 
panel.
(5) That constituencies where an election is not held shall continue to be represented by their present 
Deputies.
(6)That after the election, the Executive shall consist of the President, elected as formerly, the Minister for 
Defence, representing the army, and nine other Ministers - five from the majority party and four from the 
minority, each party to choose its own nominees. The allocation will be in the hands of the President.
(7) That in the event of the Coalition Government finding it necessary to dissolve, a general election will be 
held as soon as possible on adult suffrage.
The agreement represented a clear victory for the Anti-Treaty side since it contained in essence 
'the terms already proposed by the Republican section of the Peace Committee and rejected by the 
pro-Treaty section'.21 Moreover the Treaty would not be an issue in the election so the vote could 
not disestablish the Republic. The people were given a chance to postpone their decision on the 
Treaty until its ramifications would be clarified. For the Pro-Treatyites the Pact was firstly a 
means by which an election could be held. In certain areas registers which had been raided 
were returned after the Pact, with the result that an election could be held in those districts. The 
Pact was also a means by which responsible figures on the Republican side could cooperate with 
the Provisional Government in their attempts to bring ordered conditions back to the country. It 
was in that spirit that de Valera publicly endorsed it on June 10th, as a means of restoring power 
to a central authority and of bringing the two sides together on the basis of a law and order 
policy 22 The Pact was approved by an Ard Fheis of the Sinn Fein organisation held on May 
23rd.
It soon became clear that Britain was not happy about the Pact. The Irish were to meet the 
British on May 27th. Their policy was to stress the fact that the pact was agreed to 'to enable the 
Provisional Government to carry out the terms of the Treaty and to restore order'.23 A 
government delegation met their British counterparts in Downing St. on May 27th. Churchill 
pointed out that Article 17 of the Treaty obliged all members of the Irish Government, in the
21 D. McArdle, The Irish Republic, ( 2nd ed., Dublin, 1951), p. 712.
22 C. Desmond Greaves, Liam Mellowes and the Irish Revolution (London, 1971).
23 Provisonal Government Minutes, May 25 1922, Department of An Taoiseach, National Archives Dublin.
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period between the elections and the establishment of the Free State, to sign a declaration of 
adherence to the Treaty. There was no requirement in the Pact that the four Republican ministers 
would sign the Treaty. Churchill stated that if Clause 17 did not go ahead the process of transfer 
of function does not go forward anymore'. On the other hand, the British did not want to be seen 
to be interfering in the internal affairs of a Dominion. Their acceptance of the Pact was subject to 
one fundamental condition. The Conference agreed that acceptance of the Pact did not prejudice 
the British Government's right 'to raise any question of non-conformity between the constitution 
and the Treaty1.24 Having gained that condition, they allowed the Pact election to go ahead.
Collin's policy came under a different pressure when he returned to Dublin. During the pre-pact 
negotiations he had dropped his party's demand for an increase in Dail representation which 
meant that his side would not hold an absolute majority of seats if the Pact failed. De Valera had 
assured him that the Third Parties could be called upon to support his government but Collins 
was not convinced. As soon as campaigning began, the third parties became subject to a range of 
intimidatory tactics. Collins warned his legal adviser that 'clause four must be absolutely adhered 
to. I cannot agree to any appeal, joint or otherwise, that is not seen by me and that does not fairly 
protect the principle contained in clause four'.25 Despite this, on the eve of the nominations for 
the election he approved a draft of a joint statement which was given to the press on June 9. It 
was also signed by de Valera and stated that 'in view of the fact that one of the most obvious aims 
of the Agreement was the avoidance of electoral contests which could not fail to engender 
bitterness and promote discord and turmoil, the signatories had hoped that the spirit of the Pact 
would have ensured that such contests would be reduced to a minimum'.26 Collins had again 
given ground to the Republican side and had gained the assent of his government colleagues to 
this appeal. In a speech at the Mansion House on June 9th he told his audience that 'practically 
there is only one party' and advised them to vote for the candidates put forward by that party.27
Collins soon had reason to revise his position. An advertisement issued by the Republican party 
Cumann na Poblachta appeared in the Dublin papers on June 12 asking voters whether they 
would play 'the enemy's game' and destroy the Pact by voting for a Dail of 'warring sections and 
interests'28 The next day Collins denounced the advert as 'not in keeping with the spirit of the 
Pact and to suggest that non-Panel candidates by contesting the election branded themselves a 
national enemy was obviously contrary to the agreement'.29 This may have been the event that
24 Conference on Ireland 10 Downing St. London, May 27 1922, Department of An Taoiseach S 2942, 
National Archives.
25 Collins to O' Shiel May 29 1922, Department of an Taoiseach, ibid
26 Leaders Appeal for Support of National Panel', Mitchell and O' Snodaigh, Irish Political Documents , 
1916-1949, p.135.
27 Collin’s Speech at Mansion House, June 9 1922, Michael Collins, Statements and Speeches',
Department of An Taoiseach, S10961, National Archives.
28 Ibid.
29 Press Statement, June 13 1922.
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sparked his decision to renounce the Pact. The next day May 14, two days before the election, 
Collins apparently renounced the Pact from an election platform in Cork stressing that *the 
country must have the representatives it wants'.30 Despite a speech moderately in support of the 
Pact the following day, the renunciation was published by the press on election day.31
Garvin suggests that the apparent renunciation represented a final explosion of Collin's 
'essentially democratic instincts' against the elitism of the IRA.32 However Collins was also 
aware of other factors undermining his attempts at mediation. On election day his new 
constitution was published. It is doubtful whether more than a handful of the voters had seen it 
before voting. Collin's original draft, intended to be short and easy to amend, had contained no 
references to the Treaty, no mention of the oath of allegiance to the Crown, and the office of 
Governor General was omitted.33 However, the British had severely amended it, and the final 
draft contained a clause stipulating that if in any respect the constitution conflicted with the 
Treaty, it would be Void and inoperative'. Republican objections to this new draft came fast and 
furious. They 'were mainly grounded on the fact that the king is to be part of the Parliament, that 
he is to have a veto on legislation and that executive authority is to be vested in him'. Rory O' 
Connor declared that' its' only merit was that it gave a holiday every four years' .34 A key part of 
Collin's strategy, that of producing a constitution acceptable to the Republicans, had already 
failed before he renounced the pact.
More importantly, behind the scenes negotiations had been going on between the Ministry of 
Defence based at Beggar's Bush and the Four Courts Executive. They had begun on May 4th 
when both sides agreed to suspend all operations except training and routine activities. A G.H.Q. 
staff memo proposed that a unified Army Council would be periodically elected by an IRA 
Convention. Eight members were proposed by Mulcahy, four from each Treaty side. The overall 
scheme of army organisation was agreed to by the Four Courts Executive on June 7th but they 
demanded that the Chief of Staff would be chosen by their Executive. It was understood that this 
would be Rory O' Connor who had been included in a non-staff capacity on the Army Council. 
The demand was accompanied two days later by a warning that negotiations could not be 
prolonged after June 12. The Executive would hold a Convention on June 18th. On June 12th 
Mulcahy replied that the original list was only a probable one, subject to overall agreement. His 
side had 'gone in this matter as far as it is possible for us to go'. He believed that five members of 
the Proposed Army Council were prepared to agree to his proposals and two of those from the 
Executive were prepared to recommend to the Convention on June 18th that army unification on
30 Cork Examiner, June 15 1922, Mitchell and O' Snodaigh, Irish Political Documents 1916-1949, p.136.
31 J.Curran, The Birth o f the Irish Free State, 1921-23 (Mobile, Alabama, 1980), p.220.
32 T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy, p. 129.
33 See Appendix C.
34 Irish Times, June 17 1922.
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the proposed lines be proceeded with. On June 17th however it was indicated that because of 
objections on the part of the members, Sean Moylan and Liam Lynch, to portions of the draft 
constitution, the proposals would not be recommended to the Convention. The next day they were 
rejected. In short, negotiations on army unification had also broken down before Collin's 
renunciation of the Pact, and irretrievably so before the election results became known.
The election on June 16th returned Pro-Treaty Sinn Fein as the largest party with fifty eight seats 
out of 128, while the anti-Treatyites got thirty-six, a loss of twenty-two seats. The Provisional 
Government interpreted the results as giving them a clear mandate to implement the Treaty. 
Against that Republicans interpreted the result as a mandate for a coalition government. The 
Treaty had not, after all, been an issue in the election. The Panel candidates had been returned in 
a majority of seventy three per cent, and the seventeen Labour candidates had also pledged to 
support the Pact. Republicans have since maintained that Republican voters gave their support to 
Pro-Treaty candidates as a means of supporting the panel. In practically all constituencies the 
Sinn Fein candidates had stood on joint platforms and there was a high degree of transfers 
between coalition candidates.35 Nevertheless the election greatly strengthened the government's 
position. According to Hopkinson, before the March Convention, 'the anti-Treaty side had been 
able to argue that the Provisional Government had undermined stability by the subterfuge of 
building up its army under the camouflage of the IRA. From the Convention onwards the anti- 
Treaty IRA got most of the blame for the worsening disorder and the increasingly apparent threat 
of civil war'.36 Now in a pattern that became more pronounced as the war unfolded, the 
Government began to project itself as the defender of law and order and majority rule as its 
opponents were gradually forced to resort to the tactics of a subversive organisation.
On June 18th a motion was put to the IRA Army Convention that unless Britain withdrew from 
the island within seventy hours, resumption of war should occur. The Convention was divided 
between those who felt that further IRB-led negotiations on army unity were futile and that peace 
moves only gave their opponents a chance to prepare for war, and the delegates of the 1st 
South Division, who followed the Chief of Staff Liam Lynch in his belief that negotiations with 
G.H.Q. should continue and that the IRB men around Collins could be trusted. Lynch had been 
one of those who had been willing to recommend the Beggar's Bush proposals to the Convention. 
In general the Four Courts men preferred to force national unity by renewing the conflict with 
Britain, while the 1st Southern men felt that unity could be based on the coalition government to 
be established on the 30th. The majority of the Executive and a slim majority of the delegates 
seemed to back war, but on a second ballot the motion was narrowly defeated. It was opposed by 
the majority of the delegates of the 1st Southern division. After that the defeated minority walked
35 M. Gallagher, The Pact General Election of 1922', Irish Historical Studies, vol. 21 (1979), p.419.
36 M. Hopkinson, Green Against Green, p.31.
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out and returned to the Four Courts.37 Lynch temporarily ceased to act as Chief of Staff while 
remaining on the Four Courts Executive 38
The decision to attack the Four Courts on the 28th was prompted by the assassination of Field 
Marshal Wilson on the 22 June and Lloyd George's subsequent demand that the sham 
government in the Four Courts no longer be tolerated. Two days later the election results were 
published. On the 26th Lloyd George warned that further tolerance would mean the Treaty 
would be 'formally violated' and the British government would resume 'liberty of action'. Griffith 
who had never favoured rapprochement with the anti-Treatyites demanded action, and following 
the kidnapping of their assistant Chief of Staff, the Government attacked on June 28. The attack 
was not simply the result of British pressure but was the culmination of months of failed efforts at 
mediating between Pro and Anti-Treaty sections of the IRA and Sinn Fein. The external factor, 
in the shape of Britain's veto on Collin's constitution, was clearly one reason why these proposals 
failed. It was not, however, the only one. Roiy O' Connor and Liam Mellowes had rejected 
Mulcahy's proposals for unity and the anti-Treaty IRA as a whole had not kept to the terms of the 
Truce which began on May 4th. Nevertheless Collins and Mulcahy had come close and the anti- 
Treatyites were still divided on whether they wanted a showdown. Unfortunately this may have 
been a reason why the Provisional Government attacked the Four Courts and in so doing 
precipitated civil war.
5.2. Elite Tactics and the failure of the Pact
Civil war having begun, to what extent was its outbreak an inevitability, or to what extent was it 
the product or elite error, elite misdeed, or elite short-sightedness ? This brings us firstly to the 
question of elite tactics. Di Palma's To Craft Democracies is an influential approach to the 
politics of democratic transition. In his view the task of democrats in transitional situations is 
that of transferring loyalties to the new democratic regime. This task requires an understanding 
of democracy's strength as a system of 'co-existence in diversity*. If, during a transitional 
situation, 'the first object is not or does not soon become co-existence, it is axiomatic that the 
democratic experiment will be short-lived'.39 Concentrating on co-existence means finding rules 
of the game that promise to preserve it. The more concerned those who craft the transition are 
with guaranteeing representation, the more attractive the rules will be to a variety of players. Di 
Palma argues that 'the essence of the democratic method is to regulate and institutionalise 
uncertainty of outcome'.40 Avoiding a situation that keeps winners always winners and losers 
always losers, is the chief merit of a competitive political system. It is also the prospective sine
37 E. Neeson, The Irish Civil War, p. 109.
38 Poblacht na h Eireann, July 4,1922, FF/ 6, Fianna Fail Archives.
39 G. di Palma, To Craft Democracies, p.27.
40 Ibid, 31.
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que non of any successful transition. 'By choosing the democratic method, political actors are 
also choosing a degree of calculated uncertainty1 .4l Democracy has two features which allows 
this uncertainty to prevail.
Institutional dispersion and the removal of politico-institutional monopolies curb institutional sources of 
uncertainty. At the same time by legalising equal access to institutional positions and by deploying them to 
countervail socio-economic positions, democracy also corrects the unequal effects of social and economic 
privilege.42
The rules of the game that are chosen must accentuate these two features of a democratic system. 
Ideally such rules should be able to balance two contradictory pressures - the desire of the 
majority to govern, and the desire of a minority to get rules that curb majority rights. In the 
latter case the task of democrats is to find rules that gain the consent of small parties to lose as a 
condition for winning later.
It stands to reason that reluctant players will be more attracted to the democratic game if the representation 
of their interests in a democratic form is a paramount concern. It stands to reason that if  some players worry 
that their interests will be disregarded or minoritarian, all players, whatever their investment in democracy, 
may be better served by rules that embrace fair and equal representation.43
The rules that satisfy these requirements are called garantista rules, rules which stress the 
competitiveness of the political market. Institutional garantismo aims 'to avoid prejudging or 
loading the future wins or losses of anyone who abides by the market’s intentionally easy rules 
for admission'.44 This can be done in two ways. One way is to choose representative institutions 
such as P.R., a multi-party system, a strong parliament, and a weak executive combined with a 
policy role for the opposition. Another way is to introduce checks and balances within the system 
or countervailing powers, such as an active constitutional court and a strong role for regional 
assemblies. Di Palma also welcomes transitional pacts in conflict-ridden situations as means by 
which parties can give a sign of a mutual commitment to democracy. In his view 'decisions can 
be embodied in pacts that will signal a firmer and clearer collective commitment'.45 At its 
simplest pacts are chosen 'to provide some orderly exit from divisive times'.46 They may be 
merely transitional coalition arrangements which enable a fledging democracy to achieve a 
measure of civil order before the development of an openly competitive political system. However 
pacts are also a means by which 'breakdown games' are avoided if recalcitrants are included in a
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid,41-42.
43 Ibid,46.
44 Ibid,55.
45 Ibid,87.
46Ibid,88.
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transitional government. In such a way political behaviour that is openly hostile to democracy, or 
merely fearful of lopsided outcomes, can be constrained. In this sense the more extensive and 
durable the pact the better.
Di Palma assumes that successful elite agreement on the rules of the game is a sufficient source 
of democratic stability. Eschewing theories which stress the need for some prior value-consensus 
among the political elite he concentrates on the continued attractions of the democratic game for 
those who commit themselves to playing it. If there is a precondition for a transition to 
democracy, it is that rules must be designed to achieve a wide and fair representation of interests. 
Without an attractive set of rules reluctant actors will not be brought within the democratic game. 
Logically, the failure of a transition must be due to one of two factors : either elites have not 
concentrated on devising appropriate rules for the political game, or elites have erred in 
choosing the rules. The failure of the transition must be due to one or other of these factors : this 
amounts to a negative version of the minimalist hypothesis.
The situation that faced the Provisional Government in the Spring of 1922 was a scenario not 
altogether different from that discussed by di Palma. Under the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
of December 1921 the Irish Free State would come into being no more than a year later than 18 
December of the following year. In the transition, the government of Ireland would be gradually 
encharged to a Provisional Government. It became agreed between the British and Irish 
representatives that an election should take place in that period, although no fixed date was 
established. The task of the Provisional Government became that of gaining the assent of their 
Republican opponents to the election. A government guaranteed majority support faced a 
recalcitrant minority that would agree to an election only if it were guaranteed a share of 
representation proportionate to its existing position in the Dail, and if it were guaranteed future 
participation in a coalition government.
By conceding the ground to the Republicans on both counts, Michael Collins created his own 
garantista solution to the problem posed by Republican opposition to an election. He also 
constructed a transitional pact which would secure the Cupertino of Republicans in the 
management of the transition after June. This was understood on both sides to mean that anti- 
Treatyites would cooperate in the maintenance of ordered conditions in the country. It was in that 
sense that de Valera welcomed the Pact. Collins for his part indicated that he thought coalition 
government 'probably the most suitable method of carrying over the period of stress'.47 From di 
Palma's perspective the Irish political elite employed the correct tactics, chose the right options, 
and found the right rules of the game to enable a transition to take place. Attention had been 
focused on securing precisely the kind of coexistence in diversity that di Palma believes is
47 Interview with New York Herald 2/5/1922, Michael Collins: Statement and Speeches', Department of 
An Taoiseach, S 10961, National Archives.
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important. No party dissented from the consensus on the desirability of these rules. Labour, soon 
to be an important minority in the Third Dail, pledged its allegiance to the Pact. This was a 
reward for Collin's insistence that 'there be no inherent thought or wish to interfere with the free 
choice of the electorate'.48 For the time being both Treaty sides had suspended their search for 
majoritarian solutions to the Treaty question. The Pro-Treaty side had sacrificed what would 
have been an absolute parliamentary majority in return for Republican cooperation in the Pact. 
The anti-Treatyites had suspended what was in effect a campaign to curb majority rights, once 
assured that the Treaty would not be an issue in the election.
As already suggested, the failure of a transition could logically be due to one of only two factors : 
elites had not concentrated on finding the right rules of the game, or they had erred in choosing 
those rules. At first glance, neither was true of the Irish case. The problem lay rather in the 
institutional basis of the Pact. As already noted, the agreement followed almost two weeks of 
failed efforts at mediation by a Peace Committee which could not bring itself to provide a united 
report. When the committee reports were presented to the Dail they gave rise to bitter debates 
about the necessity for an election. On two occasions, May 17 and May 19, it seemed that the 
Dail would abandon its efforts for peace. Certainly if the train of debate taking place in the Dail 
had been repeated in the meetings between de Valera and Collins no agreement would have taken 
place. It is significant in this regard that Griffith's motion approving the electoral pact on 
Saturday 20th did not follow a lengthy Dail debate that day. Far from renewing the authority of 
the Dail, the signing of the pact reflected the reality that only a backroom agreement between 
elites could avert civil war.
For some on the Pro-Treaty side a straight contest over the Treaty was preferable to the endless 
negotiation that attended the signing of the Pact. For O' Higgins the Treaty conferred Very great 
benefits, very great advantages, and veiy great opportunities on the Irish people and I would not 
declare off-hand that it was not worth civil war'.49 For hard-line Republicans a renewal of the 
struggle with the British would be preferable to the loss of national honour involved in accepting 
the Treaty. Some of these had a relatively exalted view of politics, denouncing each other for 
'haggling' for extra seats at the Peace Committee. Cathal Brugha declared that he was 'absolutely 
sick of politics' on May 3rd, and favoured a return to war.50 Liam Mellowes denounced the IRB 
peace scheme as a way of turning the country again 'into the mire of rotten politics'.51 Apparently 
by early May the Dail's appetite for 'politics' was getting exhausted. The spokesman for the I.R.B.
48 Meeting at University College, Report By Michael Collins', May 18 1922, Department of an Taoiseach, 
S 2967A, National Archives.
49Dail Debates,464, May 19 1922.
50Dail Debates, 429, May 17,1922.
51 Dail Debates, 361, May 3,1922.
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delegation referred to 'an atmosphere of absolute hostility1 combined with 'a sense of utter 
irresponsibility' existing in the Dail.52
How faithfully then did de Valera and Collins reflect the views of their supporters ? On Collin's 
side opposition within his cabinet was a known fact. Griffith was reportedly 'appalled' by the Pact 
when he first read it.53 Cosgrave protested that 'no party in the Dail ever has the power of the 
authority to get members returned unopposed'.54 The day before the Pact was signed, O' Higgins 
told the Dail that they had come close to 'trifling with a thing that cannot be outraged without 
serious reactions, trifling with the absolute right of the people to choose their own representatives 
and their policy in any given circumstances.55 The anti-Treatyites were basically undemocratic ; 
'We were threatened with terrible and immediate civil war if we did not ram certain gentlemen 
down the necks of their reluctant constituents.56 He believed that Collins had gone too far in his 
attempt to appease the Republicans. Griffith had always been against compromise and Cosgrave 
later claimed that the events of June persuaded him that he 'was not going to go any further to 
meet the Republicans'.57 On the other side, Cathal Brugha used the phrase 'when we take the 
field again', in the Dail debate on May 19, suggesting that peace with the British was only 
temporary. Another Republican delegate stated that civil war was 'a certainty1 if an election takes 
place. De Valera, as is known, had not been consulted when the Four Courts Executive was set 
up and had not persuaded the hard-liners to accept Document Number Two. By late June most of 
these Republicans regarded the Pact as 'a dead letter'. The hard-line Republican attitude to peace 
talks was later captured in a recollection by Ernie O' Malley 'Whatever alliance could have been 
made with Collins, civil or military, some section of the country would possibly have fought, and 
I knew that I would have joined them'.58
The legitimacy of the rules of the game is extraneous to any consideration of substantive ends, 
according to di Palma. In his view 'legitimation must come from shared institutional guarantees 
for competitiveness before coming from anything else'. This he describes as 'the democratically 
effective and correct view'. 59 Such legitimation is threatened by those who see democracy as 'a 
tool of social upheaval' or as 'a majoritarian lever of wilful social progress'.60 In particular the 
radical view, that legitimation can only come with the achievement of certain specific policy 
ends, is one that is likely to be counterproductive. The problem in Ireland was that both sides
52 Sean O' Hegarty, Dail Debates, 357, May 3, 1922.
53 T.P. Coogan, Michael Collins, (London, 1990), p.322.
54 Minute by Cosgrave, n.d. Peace Proposal by F. Daly and Fr. McCarthy, Civil War 1922-24, Peace 
Proposals, Department of An Taoiseach, S 2978, National Archives.
55Dail Debates, 464, May 19, 1922.
56Dail Debates,464, May 19,1922.
57Tnterview between the President and Donal Hannigan and M. J. Burke of Neutral I.R.A.' - February 27 
1923.
58 E. O' Malley, The Singing Flame, p.246
59 Di Palma, To Craft Democracies, p. 72.
60 Ibid,73.
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were unable to consider the rules of the game separately from a consideration of policy ends. 
There was deep divergence of opinion with regard to the purpose of an election. Churchill saw it 
as a means by which the Provisional Government would mobilise national support in defending 
its 'just and lawful position'.61 The Provisional Government saw it as a means of giving the 
public a chance to give or withhold their assent to the Treaty. Collins believed that they had a 
right to know if the people would give them a mandate for the course they were taking.62 The 
anti-Treatyites feared that an election in the 26 counties would signify the disestablishment of 
the Republic. An election, would be a misrepresentation of the free choice of the Irish people and 
give the English an opportunity of claiming that the Irish had freely chosen to remain within the 
British Empire. If the people were free to choose they claimed they would 'get for the 
independence of Ireland and a continuation of the Republic as overwhelming a vote as you got in 
1918'.63 It was against these wildly different standpoints that the Provisional Government had to 
secure an election on the Treaty.
Both sides had veiy majoritarian attitudes to the electoral process. The election would give, or 
fail to give, a mandate for a particular national policy, and was welcomed or opposed as such 
Public opinion was something to be mobilised behind a particular course of action. The 
conservative aspect to this view was that elections existed in order to return a government to 
power. As one speaker put it 'I believe in any country the one sure bulwark of stability - human 
nature is so imperfect- of peace and ordered government is that the will of the majority should 
prevail'.64 The radical side emphasised the malleability of public opinion. Since 1916 
Republicans had believed that heroic leadership would galvanise a majority behind any particular 
course of action. Left to their own devices however, the majority, to use Mary MacSwiney's 
aphorism, always choose the line of least resistance. Both radicals and conservatives tended to 
see elections as majoritarian levers for certain policy ends.
It seems natural then that the Pro-Treatyites should have interpreted the election result as a 
decisive result in favour of the Treaty. During the Peace Committee's sessions it was argued that 
an election was required to give the Dail an opportunity to renew its representative character.65 
Pro-Treatyites maintained that the outlook of the Second Dail had been more radical than that of 
the population as a whole, and the election had just returned a more representative body. A 
breakdown of the vote for the Coalition candidates seems to confirm the accuracy of this 
judgement. Table 4.1. compares the anti-Treaty and the Pro-Treaty vote in contested and
61 Churchill to Collins, May 12 1922, 'Civil War 1922-Outbreak and Immediately Preceding Events’, 
Department of An Taoiseach, SI 322 B, National Archives.
62 Dail Debates ,437, May 17,1922.
63 Eamon de Valera, Dail Debates, 427, May 17,1922.
64 Sean Milroy, Dail Debates, 422, May 17, 1922.
65 Seamus Dwyer, Memo, Dail Peace Conference, Supplementary Report by the Anti-Treaty Members, 
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uncontested constituencies. On the Pro-Treaty side forty one were elected in contested 
constituencies, and seventeen in uncontested constituencies. Of the fifty-six anti-Treaty 
candidates thirty-six were elected, seventeen from uncontested constituencies.
Table 4.1. Coalition candidates in the 1922 general election.
Contested Constituencies Uncontested Constituencies
Pro-Treatyite Anti-Treatyite Pro-Treatyite Anti-Treatyite
Number of Candidates 48 42 17 17
Number Elected 41 19 17 17
Number of these 
re-lected from Second Dail 
1
39 19 17 16
Number of these defeated 6 20 2 0 0
from Second Dail
Notes : 1. Figures refer only to Sinn Fein candidates.
2. Excludes Dan Breen who was a joint candidate.
Source: Walker 101-108.
The most striking electoral statistic is the large number of anti-Treatyite T.D.s from the Second 
Dail who failed to get re-elected when faced with opposition. ^  one hundred und eighteen 
Sinn Fein candidates went forward for re-election from the Second Dail, sixty-two endorsing 
acceptance of the Treaty, and fifty-six rejection. Of the twenty-six candidates that failed to get re­
elected, twenty one were opponents of the Treaty, o f  the forty two anti-Treaty candidates from 
the Second Dail who faced opposition, twenty-three were defeated. In contrast, only six out of 
thirty-nine Pro-Treaty Sinn Feiners from the Second Dail who faced opposition, lost their seats. 
In all, of the one hundred and twenty-eight members of the Second Dail, only nineteen members 
managed to reject the Treaty and subsequently keep their seats in a competitive election. It is not 
surprising that the result was interpreted by the government as a mandate for the Treaty.
The idea that creating appropriate rules of the game requires a prior commitment to democratic 
values on the part of political elites, or the existence of an overarching consensus on 
fundamental matters of policy, is rejected by di Palma:
democracy's rules, being a means for coexistence, need not be more than a second best for the parties that 
negotiated their adoption. Rules can be a matter of instrumental agreement worked out among competing 
leaderships, even in the absence of a popular or elite consensus on fundamentals.66
The problem in Ireland stemmed from the fact there was no consensus on fundamentals. The 
pro-Treatyites would renounce the Pact rather than jeopardise the Treaty and the anti-Treatyites
66 Ibid, 30.
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would reject an election if it meant disestablishing the Republic. The legitimacy of the rules of 
the game was not extraneous to a consideration of policy ends. Although Collins was willing to 
make concessions on numbers he was not willing to make them on principle. On the other side a 
reduction in the numbers of Republicans to be nominated to the coalition panel was resisted on 
the anti-Treaty side to avoid giving the impression that in the election *1116 Treaty issue was 
being further determined'.67 The rules of the game were less important to Republicans than the 
symbolic issues, such as the presence of the Crown in the Constitution and the oath of allegiance. 
Neither side was willing to swap concern for substantive outcomes for short-term party 
advantages. This was also true of the army negotiations, the success of which was an essential 
precondition for the continuance of the pact. Early in June Mulcahy had been warned that the 
anti-Treatyites would not accept unity 'unless by an agreed election was involved that the Dail 
continued as the Government of the Irish Republic and was solely responsible for the 
administration of the country -Ulster included'.68
The pact, if it had been buttressed by an agreement on army unity and by the continued support 
of the Southern IRA, might have delayed the outbreak of civil war. However some conflict 
between the Provisional Government and the more extreme of the IRA men seems to have been 
inevitable. The issue of the Treaty had not been resolved by the Pact. At the outset, the Dail had 
been divided by a proposal that it accept the fact that the majority of the people accepted the 
Treaty. Likewise, after eleven sessions of the Peace Committee, a similar division arose over the 
Pro-Treaty side's Preamble which recommended acceptance of the fact that a majority of the Dail 
and of the people accepted the Treaty. It was objected that the conference was not being used to 
secure peace and unity between the sides, but as an instrument for 'enforcing acceptance of the 
Treaty upon us'.69 Indeed a member of the Pro-Treaty delegation spoke of 'a very big difference' 
between the two sides' conceptions of coalition government. The Pro-Treatyite conception was 
that the coalition would work the Treaty and preserve all the advantages which the Treaty had 
brought. The Republican conception was that the Coalition government should evade the 
Treaty.70 One member threw cold water on the viability of a coalition under such circumstances. 
'If the anti-Treaty Party go in to work the Treaty a coalition is possible, but if they go in to break 
down the Treaty Government, a Coalition is not’.71 It is difficult to believe that the Republican 
section of the proposed army council would have been happy with the Treaty. In his negotiations 
with de Valera Collins stressed that nothing could be done to endanger the Treaty position and 
insisted that the policy of the House would be the policy of the majority, in short the Treaty 
position.72 De Valera replied that he envisaged that the party spirit might disappear as the
67 Dail Peace Conference, Supplementary Report by the Anti-Treaty Members, May 17 May 1922.
68 G.H.Q. Staff Memo, n.d. P7/B/100. Mulcahy Papers, U.C.D. Archives.
69 Sean MacEntee, Dail Debates, 434, May 17,1922.
70 Seamus O' Dwyer, Dail Debates, 417, May 17,1922.
71 Dr MacCartan, Dail Debates, 415, May 17,1922.
72 Report by Michael Collins, Meeting at University College', Thursday May 18 1922, D/T S 2967 A.
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benefits of the Coalition were made felt. If not Collins could rely on the support of the Third 
Parties. De Valera's reassurances notwithstanding, there was no explicit agreement that the 
Republican members of the coalition government commit themselves to protecting the Treaty. 
Likewise there was no agreement on the nature and name of the new assembly.
Republican commentators have seen in the Pact a genuine attempt at elite conflict-regulation 
which was undermined by British interference.73 In this vein de Valera pledged his support 
for the Republican side in the civil war on 29 June, stating that the Pact, if adhered to, would 
have given the Irish 'an opportunity for working for internal peace and of taking steps which 
would make this nation strong against the only enemy it has to fear - the enemy from outside'.74 
Even some non-Republican accounts of the war accept that Britain was indirectly responsible for 
the breaking of the Pact75 However it does not follow that the Pact had long-term potential as a 
peace-saving device. Britain's position could only be tested by a united government but there 
was little basis for such unity. Collins and de Valera had their own reasons to compromise but 
they didn't have the full support of their own sides in making the pact. The constitutional status 
of the IRA remained to trouble the political elite and beyond that lay the question of Northern 
Ireland. If the Pact had worked, unity may have been achieved, but if unity had been achieved, 
British military intervention might well have followed. 76
Ultimately the Pact failed because it went against the grain of Irish political traditions. From the 
decision in the cabinet to allow the Dail to decide by majority vote on the Treaty, a majoritarian 
solution to the crisis was inevitable. If de Valera was interested in a non-majoritarian solution, 
he should have accepted the offer on January 4 and avoided a Dail vote on the Treaty. Once the 
Dail had decided in favour of the Treaty, a conflict between the views of the Dail and the 
majority of the IRA was inevitable. The problem for constitutional engineers in Ireland 
derived from the fact that the Irish were majoritarian rather than pluralist democrats,77 and 
majority rule, as de Valera was soon to realise, provided the simplest base for political order.
5.3. Minimalist and Maximalist Views of Consolidation.
The analysis of the Pact and its failure requires us to ask how voluntaristic theory can be 
usefully applied when the transition to democracy and the transition to independence take place 
simultaneously. Between the signing of the Treaty and the ratification of the constitution of the
73 See D. Macardle, The Irish Republic, pp. 720-727; M. MacSwiney, The Republic o f Ireland, Pamphlet, 
Lee Press Printing Works, n.d., pp 2-25; H. Lacey, There need never have been a civil war, what caused the 
tragedy ?' Irish Press 6/7/58.
74 Mitchell and O' Snodaigh, Irish Political Documents, p. 140.
75 See J. Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State, (Mobile Alabama, 1980), p.220.
76 Ibid, 32.
77 T.Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy, p.32.
104
Irish Free State by the British parliament the following December, an Irish state existed only in 
provisional and embryonic form. As such, the Irish case is altogether different from those 
interwar polities discussed by Stepan and Linz, where the state had been consolidated well before 
the transition to democracy. Inevitably the constraints within which political elites acted were 
different from those that existed within more established polities. Moreover, where the 
establishment of governmental authority over a territory is a primary focus of elite competition, 
the motivations of political actors may differ from those with established central institutions.
In the period between the signing of the Treaty and the civil war effective diplomacy was 
conducted mainly through informal and secretive channels but there was no formal and 
routinised set of procedures for the regulation of conflict. As it turned out ad hoc agreements did 
not prove binding on pivotally situated actors and they had a provisional and informal character 
about them. This was a reflection of the institutional incoherence of the Free State in the early 
months. Another aspect of that incoherence was that the Free State lacked the basic institution of 
parliamentary democracy, an executive collectively responsible to parliament. A number of 
proposals were made that would have created an executive responsible to the Dail, but these 
were opposed by the Provisional Government itself. It had been suggested for example that the 
Dail take responsibility for producing an agreed constitution. This may have bosltered the 
authority of a Dail that had become in the words of T. Desmond Williams merely 'a showpiece 
which preserved the trappings of Republicanism'.78 It may also have provided a more robust base 
for the defence of a Republican constitution than the Provisional Government. However this idea 
was also opposed by members of the Provisional Government. The autonomous status of the ERA 
was the most dramatic aspect of the institutional incoherence of the Free State, but one that was 
not surprising. Local brigades of the IRA had never been subject to effective central control 
before the Treaty. The closest the Government had come to resolving the issue was to create an 
army council elected by a convention. However that solution was unlikely to have fully satisfied 
either the British or the Provisional Government.
It follows then that the consolidation of a democratic system required a prior process of 
institutionalisation whereby certain institutional structures become simplified, routinised and 
authoritative. Between December 1921 and June 1922 the Provisional Government existed in a 
kind of vacuum. The ambition of the Provisional Government was 'to set up a new state based on 
law and freedom within the bounds of the Treaty'.79The Dail decision to accept the Treaty on 
January 4th provided the starting point for that process. Inevitably the election victory conferred 
a great deal of legitimacy on that ambition. By late Spring asserting the authority of the
78 T. D. Williams, From Free State to Civil War1, in T.D. Williams (ed.), The Irish Struggle 1916-1926 
(London, 1966), p. 125.
79 T.D. Williams, From Free State to Civil War’, p. 124.
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government had become the chief concern for many on the Government side. As O' Higgins put 
it
If things go on as they are going I do not know who is going to govern the country. I do not know who is 
going to collect the revenue of the country. I do not see who is going to keep any ordered fabric of 
Government or even of society existing in Ireland. That is the issue that you are faced with.80
The problem was that the imperative of asserting the authority of the government cut across the 
logic of building bridges to the Republican side. Asserting the authority of the state meant 
establishing an institutional monopoly over decision-making and establishing a clear hierarchy 
within governmental institutions. Inevitably it also meant undermining those institutions that 
were associated with the Republic, the IRB, the ERA, the Republican Courts, the Second Dail, 
and later local government bodies. It also meant curtailing the secretive manoeuvrings of 
Michael Collins by insisting on a collective cabinet policy.
At what point did the imperative of asserting the authority of the Provisional Government replace 
that of seeking compromise ? From January onwards the Provisional Government was well aware 
of its military vulnerability. Early in March de Valera told the Provisional Government that 'but 
for the majority of the Dail you would not be talking as a member of the Provisional Government 
because you would be swept out of the country by the army1.81 At this stage, to paraphrase Robert 
Dahl, the cost of suppressing the IRA far exceeded the cost of tolerating it. An attempt at 
repression would have jeopardised the very existence of the Provisional Government and of the 
Treaty. On the other hand by June, with a basic military organisation established, and a 
guarantee of a continued supply of British arms, the situation had changed. Britain had left the 
Government with little room to manoeuvre over the Treaty. The truce with the IRA, dating from 
May 4th, had failed to provide stability. 'Robberies, assaults, shootings, attacks on national 
troops, commandeering of goods, raiding of houses and the taking out of prisoners, murders of 
British soldiers, bank robberies etc' had all followed, apparently with the approval of the Four 
Courts Executive.82 Rory O' Connor's ambitions put paid to any possibility of army unity, and as 
the Convention date approached, the possibility of British re-occupation was foremost in people's 
minds. At this stage the costs of toleration had become greater than the costs of suppression. O 
'Donnell and Schmitter argue that governments may choose to tolerate recalcitrant opponents up 
to a point, but if widespread violence occurs or if the existence of the opposition threatens The 
vertical command structure of the armed forces, the territorial integrity of the nation state, the 
country's position in international alliances, (or) ... the property rights underlying the capitalist
80 K. O' Higgins, Dail Debates, 417, May 17,1922.
May 17 1922, p.417.
81Eamon de Valera, Dail Debates, 156, March 1,1922.
March 1 1922.
82 R. Mulcahy, 'Army Truce May 4th', Mulcahy Papers, P7/B/192, U.C.D. Archives.
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economy' repression soon follows tolerance.83 All these factors influenced the Provisional 
Government's decision to attack the Four Courts.
Retrospective wisdom suggests that the Pact had conferred certain short-term advantages on the 
Provisional government and was renounced when it no longer served the Government's purpose. 
Garvin suggests that it was used by Collins as a ruse which 'deceived' the IRA into allowing an 
election to take place.84 This is too brusque a dismissal of the Pact. Collins had been careful to 
ensure that the Treatyites retained a plurality of Dail seats. Once the Pact had been signed 
however the anti-Treatyites could only question the legitimacy of the Government's subsequent 
actions. As already noted, Griffith had promised de Valera that Republican institutions would be 
preserved until the people in an election had pronounced upon the Treaty. Since the Treaty was 
not an issue in the election, in de Valera's view the Republic still existed. Moreover the 2nd 
Dail was never formally dissolved and the Third Dail did not meet until September. In the 
meantime 'by what can only be called an Executive coup d'etat they proceeded to change the 
established state and substitute another'.85
The civil war has been described by Coakley as a 'succession crisis'. In the wake of world war one 
the formation of several states resulted in several civil wars being fought between rival 
contenders for governmental authority. The succession process was a *typically contested one' 
with different claimants arising with regard to the exercise of governmental authority.86 The 
transition took place in confused conditions allowing a situation of 'multiple sovereignty* to 
emerge. This meant that different institutions emerged to provide rival foci for national 
sentiment: left wing and Republican elements favouring more radical institutions and right wing 
and conservatives favouring more limited and traditional models of independence. In all these 
cases the legality of the succession process was sufficiently ambiguous for the losers to deny the 
legitimacy of the new state and to claim a moral victory afterwards. Ireland was no exception to 
this pattern and the legacy of the Pact was not helpful in this regard. Despite government rhetoric 
to the contrary the Pact had not allowed a clear-cut vote on the Treaty and the subsequent actions 
of the Provisional Government seemed to suggest that it placed a higher premium on honouring 
agreements with the departing colonial power than with its domestic rivals. Republicans would 
come only slowly to accept the legitimacy of the Free State.
83 G. O' Donnell and P. Schmitter, Tenatative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies' in G. O' Donnell, 
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Di Palma's is a minimalistic theory of democratic transition. He disagrees with those who argue 
that the adoption of democratic rules must be followed by a habituation phase where political 
actors are gradually socialised into their new democratic rules. For this reason the decisive role in 
establishing democracy belongs to the agreement phase of the transition not to what people 
typically assume to be a consolidation phase which follows. By contrast, the traditionalist view of 
consolidation has three components. The first is that consolidation involves a dual process where 
the process of institution-building is complemented by the simultaneous growth of a democratic 
political culture. It is assumed that the process of institutionalisation is insufficient unless 
accompanied by a corresponding growth in favourable attitudes on behalf of political elites. The 
second component is that the process of consolidation be lengthy; a second phase of democratic 
reconstruction begins only after democratic institutions are first set up. Thirdly, it is assumed that 
the process of consolidation is almost always a difficult and decisive process. 'Rare are the new 
democracies in which consolidation is uneventful, short, and assured'.87 Di Palma, however, 
accepts none of these propositions, stressing that 'democracy can gather sufficient resistance 
before its institutions and practitioners are put to the test of performance* .88
However, in my view, di Palma's prescriptions can only be applied to situations where the basic 
authority of state institutions is not at stake. Where the authority of the state and the performance 
of its basic functions are under threat, institutional sources of uncertainty are going to be far less 
attractive to constitutional engineers than institutions that guarantee order, hierarchy, and 
continuity. For that reason majority rule was a far more attractive alternative than di Palma's 
garantista rules to the Provisional Government. Likewise di Palma's views on consolidation 
seem to be flatly contradicted by the Irish experience where an initial phase of institutionalisation 
was followed by a lengthy and dramatic phase of consolidation during which the defeated 
Republicans came to accept and transform the existing institutions of the state. Moreover, the 
process by which Republicans accepted the legitimacy of the Free State was a slow and 
problematic one. It was only after these two hurdles, those of consolidation and legitimacy, had 
been overcome, that explicit agreement on the rules of the game was secured. It did not predate 
de Valera's adoption of a constitution in 1937.
Di Palma's explanation of successful transitions was written against a background of theoretical 
pessimism with regard to the prospects of democracy in the non-western world. More specifically 
the hurdles of consolidation and legitimacy were seen as difficult and decisive experiences by 
those whose theoretical perspectives were inspired by 'the resounding and unquestionable 
democratic failures during the interwar period in Europe'.89 Since such democratic theory was 
shaped by the demise of democracy rather than its onset, it was natural to believe that
87 Ibid, 139.
88 Ibid, 140.
89 Ibid,139.
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consolidation and legitimacy were crucial in fulfilling or undermining democracy. As di Palma 
put it, the fascination with explaining demise ... accounts for the tendency to see the event, even 
retrospectively, as rooted in the very origins of the new democracies’.90 My conclusion, however, 
is that this emphasis on the origins of the new democracies and the centrality of consolidation 
and legitimacy is correct.
What Di Palma has offered is a distinct set of tactical recommendations for political elites in 
transitional situations but these tactics can only be applied successfully in certain situations. By 
and large Irish elites were sensitive to the need to find guarantees for rival political positions but 
were unable to guarantee substantial rewards for compliance. Finding the right rules of the game 
was not enough. The national aspirations of both sides had also to be protected and it was 
impossible for Collins to protect both the Treaty and anti-Treaty positions at the one time. Here 
British power was a crucial limiting factor and one that Collins tended to overlook. For his 
colleagues the need to establish an authoritative government was a more pressing concern than 
that of appeasing the Republicans, and was probably held to be worth civil war. For the 
Provisional Government, majority rule, with its winner-take-all implications, was a far more 
attractive idea than the uncertainty promised by di Palma's garantista rules. Majority rule was 
also deeply rooted in Irish political culture although it was immediately attractive because it 
served as a means through which a stable institutional order could be rapidly constructed. Its 
attractions were as much psychological as cultural.
Conclusion
For decades after the civil war impartial analysis of its origins was hampered by a paucity of 
original documents and also by the atmosphere of recrimination and bitterness which surrounded 
discussion. In the light of the available evidence is it now possible to attribute blame to 
individuals or to particular decisions that were taken in the run up to the civil war ? Voluntarist 
democratic theory assumes that elites can always have a decisive effect on political outcomes, but 
the bulk of the theory that has been built up to support this proposition has been taken from 
states which already possessed authoritative central institutions. In the Irish case the absence of 
such institutions was crucial. The fall-out from the Treaty revealed 'the lack of effective 
relations between the various nationalist institutions which prevented any controlled, disciplined 
response to the Treaty1.91
As already noted, the Provisional Government had a dual transition to handle. On the one hand 
it was a transition to self-government. On the other it was a transition to electoral democracy.
90 Ibid,140.
91 M. Hopkinson, Green Against Green, p.35.
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The first provoked the most dissension. Irish nationalists had a rather rudimentary conception of 
democratic politics and tended to view electoral politics through the prism of distinctly 
nationalist agendas. An election would either legitimise the Free State or disestablish the 
Republic. As such the June election became the crucial threshold for the establishment of a 
government under the terms of the Treaty. Irish recalcitrance was not the product of misgivings 
about the virtues of democracy, but more of a sense that the Free State represented for 
Republicans a betrayal of national ideals. The problem for moderates on both sides was that the 
political game was not an attractive option if it failed to protect positions on the national 
question. Constitutional engineers were dealing with rather refractory material when it came to 
Ireland.
Williams holds both de Valera and Collins responsible for the outbreak of civil war, the former 
for doing too little, the latter for doing too much.92 Certainly de Valera did not do too much to 
distance himself from the stance of the Four Courts men, while Collins concentrated too much 
power in himself. However Collins had not deprived the Pro-Treatyite position of majority 
support in the Dail, and had appeared to gain de Valera's consent to an agreement protecting the 
Treaty. On the other hand, de Valera had no authority over the IRA who, in his own words, had 
'taken up an independent position in this matter'.93 So de Valera's supporters would not have 
allowed him to work the Pact for long, unless the British were to allow the Treaty to be rapidly 
undermined. There was no evidence that that would happen. Certainly Collins erred in 
underestimating British determination to protect the Treaty. He had been informed quite early on 
that Britain would not be flexible on the Treaty settlement. On May 12th Churchill told him that 
'every one of us will swing round with every scrap of influence we can command against a 
Republic or any inroad upon the Treaty structure'.94 Why Collins still believed that a Republican 
constitution would still be accepted by the British is something of a mystery ? More specifically, 
why he thought the British would accept the Governor General being called the Irish President, is 
beyond comprehension.95
Collins also erred in exchanging the freedom to draft a constitution as the price of securing 
British acquiescence in the Pact. In the long run the loss of a 'free' constitution may have been 
more damaging to the cause of peace. Sean Moylan, Liam Lynch, and Harry Boland, a 
representative sample of Republican opinion, had all expressed approval of the constitutional 
idea as a valid test of Collin's stepping-stone approach to the Treaty. Furthermore, once the 
decisive phase of the civil war was over, an acceptable document might have encouraged
92 T.D. Williams, From Free State to Civil War1, p. 124.
93 Dail Debates, 368, May 3, 1922.
94 Churchill to Collins, May 12 1922 'Civil War 1922-Outbreak and Immediately Preceding Events', 
Department of An Taoiseach, SI 322 B, National Archives.
95 See Appendix C.
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moderate Republicans to attend the Dail in September when it was being amended.96 The 
claim that Collin's colleagues in the Provisional Government did not defend Collin's draft in 
conference with the British, has to be seen in the light of the agreement of May 27th, when they 
all, regardless of private opinions, defended the Pact. Rather it seems that the Pact 'frightened 
the British into inserting every unpleasant form into the new constitution' as O' Higgins later 
claimed.97
Collin's failure however only seems to confirm the validity of the argument that elites can prove 
decisive only in certain situations. In the Irish case the crucial period was the period between the 
signing of the Treaty and the Dail debate on January 7th. The initial meeting between four Pro 
and five Anti-Treaty delegates on January 4th had led to eight of the Conference accepting terms. 
After consultation with de Valera the next day however the anti-Treaty delegates' position had 
changed. It was 'immediately found that the agreement reached on the previous night did not now 
meet with the approval of the other side'98 Instead it was proposed that the Conference ask the 
Dail to give majority support to an alternative Document, probably based on Document Number 
Two, which would be submitted to the British. This was rejected by the Pro-Treaty side. De 
Valera's intervention had been decisive in preventing agreement Moreover, once he had 
attempted to rally public opinion against the Treaty he was inviting the IRA to do the same. He 
was also undermining the pivotal position of the Dail cabinet.
A united cabinet responsible to the Dail was the only way in which the split could have been 
contained within democratic politics. There was no point in de Valera attempting to reconstruct 
a united cabinet with the Pact when he had effectively destroyed it four months earlier. A 
comparison can be made with the impact of the Kilmainham Treaty of 1882 on the alliance 
between the radical Land Leaguers and the Pamellite party. The agreement seemed to close off 
for good the radical route to social change, and closely identified the Irish party with the Liberal 
Party. The split which ensued ran deep and might have been 'extremely serious in its 
results'."However the leaders of the radicals, Michael Davitt and John Dillon, loyally accepted 
the Treaty and thus helped secure Parnell's position. Forty years later the radical wing of the 
national movement quickly deserted those who had compromised and left the moderates 
identified as the agents of British policy in Ireland.
Of course the earlier Dail cabinet had been deeply-divided on personal and ideological lines and 
had not really functioned as a government during the War of Independence. For this reason I
96 At least this was the view of Gavan Duffy, 'Voice Recording made for the Bureau by the Ho. George 
Gavan Duffy1, President of the High Court, January 20 1951, 1125/15 No 17. Gavan Duffy Papers, National 
Archives.
97 K. O' Higgins, Memorandum, n.d., Department of An Taoiseach, S6695, National Archives.
98 M Hayes, Michael Hayes Papers, P53,27-30, U.C.D. Archives.
99 F.S.L. Lyons, Parnell Dublin Historical Association, Dundalk,1978, p.13.
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have stressed how important it is for a transition to benefit from a period of prior 
institutionalisation whereby decision-making structures become routinised and hierarchical. After 
that the more onerous hurdles of consolidation and legitimacy have to be overcome. Any analysis 
of the difficulties faced by Collins in his attempts to prevent civil war must come to the 
conclusion that the independence movement's adherence to conventional forms of government 
was far more apparent than real. Viewed in the light of the enormous difficulties faced by the 
elites in the Spring of 1922 di Palma's optimism and his recommendations seem rather 
unrealistic and superficial. The basic question- who was to be the sovereign authority in the 
country ? - was only answered by civil war. Before that Collins and others had attempted to 
improvise solutions to the Treaty split that reflected di Palma's suggestions. However majority 
rule was too engrained in Irish political culture and in the logic of the situation, for these tactics 
to be effective. From one point of view, that of the Provisional Government, the transition, both 
to self-government and to democracy, had been successful, and many seem to share this 
judgement.100 From another point of view the civil war raised as many questions as it resolved. 
The resolution of these issues forms the subject of the next chapters.
100 See footnote 37, chapter one.
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Chapter Five ; Durkheim's Division of Labour and 
the Social Basis of the Civil War.
Every man and every women within the nation has normally equal rights, but a man or a woman 
may forfeit his or her rights by turning recreant to the nation.
Padraig Pearse.
The impact of political culture on political behaviour has long been a central issue in empirical 
democratic theory. Particularly in the 1960s and 1970s it was argued that the crucial differences 
in political behaviour between different states were to be explained by observable differences in 
the political culture of states. In the Irish context the study and characterisation of Irish political 
culture has long been a central preoccupation of Irish political science, certainly more so than 
any other comparable area of interest.1 It has been assumed that political culture has an 
independent impact on political processes and especially on the manner in which particular 
political institutions acquire authority and legitimacy. Practically all the comparative works on 
the stabilisation of Irish democracy make this assumption, however much they differ as to the 
nature of Irish political culture.
In their 'benign' variant these political culture explanations stress how strongly democratic Irish 
political culture was in the years before independence. The long exposure to British cultural 
influence is credited with inculcating democratic norms into the Irish population. Furthermore 
the constitutional choices of the political elite and the institutional design of the fledgling state 
bear sufficient witness to the strength of British cultural influences in Irish political life after
1922. A more 'malign' view is that elite political culture must be viewed in the context of a wider 
set of Irish cultural values, which include norms not typically associated with democratic politics, 
such as authoritarianism, anti-intellectualism, and personalism. It is argued that Irish political 
culture exhibits a combination of liberal and authoritarian norms and that it is the fusion of these 
various elements that explain the stability of the state after 1922.2
This chapter concerns itself with one 'malign' diagnosis of Irish political culture. The civil war, 
Garvin argues, reflected 'the long division of the Irish mind' between two political subcultures, 
one communitarian and pre-modem, the other individualistic and modem.3 The victory of the
1 See for example, B,. Farrell, The Founding ofDailEireann (Dublin,1972); B. Chubb, The Government 
and Politics of Ireland (Oxford,1982); R.K. Carty, Party and Parish Pump: Electoral Politics in Ireland 
(Waterloo Ontario, 1981).
2 For a critique of both explanations see B. Kissane, The Not so amazing case of Irish democracy1 Irish 
Political Studies ,vol 10, 1995.
3 T. Garvin, The Long Divide of the Irish Mind', Irish Times, 28th December 1991.
latter over the former in 1922-23 was a crucial moment in the emergence of Irish democracy. The 
view that the roots of the civil war lay in the irrational and authoritarian streak in Irish political 
culture is as old as the civil war itself. In September 1922 Kevin O' Higgins demanded of the 
Dail that it 'face the big fact that the question in this strife that is proceeding, is whether the 
people shall rule in Ireland, or whether a clique of neurotics, a clique of pseudo-intellectuals, 
shall rule by the force of the revolver'.4 What follows is a critical assessment of the explanatory 
power of this political culture approach. In the first section the two poles of Irish political culture 
identified by both Garvin and Prager are related to Durkheim's work on the division of labour. 
The second section assesses the empirical basis of their arguments, while the third provides a 
critical assessment of the Durkheimian theory of Irish political development.
5.1. Durkheim's Division of Labour and Irish Political Culture.
In his work on the division of labour Durkheim distinguished between societies in which social 
solidarity is based on the existence of strongly- held moral beliefs, on a single conscience 
collective, and societies where such an all-embracing moral consensus is lacking. Such a 
conscience collective is found where strong collective beliefs are grounded in religious beliefs. 
To be sure, the new organic type of social order does not lack moral precepts entirely, but those 
precepts which exist express a different set of social relationships based upon relationships of 
exchange within a differentiated division of labour. Such a set of relationships 'creates among 
men an entire system of right and duties which link them together in a durable way'.5 The 
difference between the two forms of social solidarity can be understood in terms of the 
importance of individualism in the later type. In the mechanical division of labour the scope for 
individual freedom is limited. In these societies 'social conduct is controlled by shared values and 
beliefs: the collectivity dominates the individual, and there is only a rudimentary development of 
individual self-consciousness'.6 In the organic division of labour, social conduct is guided by 
precepts derived from a system of moral individualism. Moral norms underpin a system which 
recognises the autonomy, dignity, and freedom of the individual. The influence of collective 
beliefs is limited.
The two forms of social solidarity also differ in the character of the sanctions imposed against 
deviant behaviour.
A society with mechanical solidarity is held together mainly through normative coercion ; deviants are 
severely punished, and penal repressive law is important. With increasing division of labour, restitutive
4 K. O' Higgins, Dail Debates, September 10,1922.
5 E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (New York, 1933), p. 406.
6 A. Giddens, Durkheim (Glasgow, 1980), p.25.
law, regulating relations of exchange, comes into the foreground. The necessity to punish deviants 
diminishes, and as a consequence, men are willing to grant each other more freedom and equality.7
'Repressive sanctions' are those associated with penal law and involve the infliction of 
punishment in the form of suffering on the transgressor, such as the loss of life or liberty. 
'Restitutive sanctions' on the other hand involve the restoration of the status quo ante. The object 
is not punishment but the restoration of a balance between individuals. The existence of 
repressive laws is an index of the presence of strongly-held moral beliefs : 'the greater the 
preponderance of repressive over restitutive law, the more unified and inclusive is the conscience 
collective'.8 The conscience collective is most all-embracing in the simplest form of society where 
strongly-held collective beliefs are grounded in religion. Violation of the moral code invokes a 
religious sanction and is severely punished.
Organic solidarity is defined as the interdependence of individuals or groups in systematic 
relations of exchange with one another. The replacement of a mechanical with an organic form 
of social solidarity comes with an increase in the complexity of the division of labour. Organic 
solidarity presupposes not the similarity but the growth of differences between individuals.9 In 
primitive societies individuals are tied to one another through sameness : solidarity derives from 
a similarity of sentiment of belief. Society is merely an aggregate of individuals sharing the same 
outlooks and beliefs, rather than a system of mutually dependent elements. 'The parts of the 
whole are connected 'mechanically, rather than forming an 'organic unity* as the parts of a 
biological (and social) system do'.10 The disappearance of this type of social solidarity is 
predicated upon the disappearance of the 'segmentary form of society in which the population of 
a territory is divided into a number of internally homogeneous segments with rigid boundaries 
separating them.11 As more movement and interaction takes place between these segments, and 
the partitions dividing them become more permeable, as there is an increase in the 'moral density* 
of society, so the division of labour becomes more advanced. This follows a number of social 
changes, the most important of which are population increase, the spread of town life, and finally 
improvements in the means of communication.
Durkheim's argument about the direction of social change can be summarised as follows.
(1) that the common moral culture of mechanical societies was replaced by a more abstract collective 
conscience constituted by the reverence for the individual, liberty, democracy and justice.
7 E. Allardt, Types of Protest and Alienation' in E. Allardt and S. Rokkan (eds.) Mass Politics: Studies in 
Political Sociology (New York, 1970), p.47.
8 A. Giddens, Durkheim, p.25.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid
11 E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (London, 1981), p.220.
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(2) that organic solidarity grew out of the web of interdependent links formed in the advanced division of 
labour.
(3) that occupational groups formed the basis of a system of different moral and social milieu.12
In essence Durkheim's view is an evolutionary one. Although the transition to a society may 
involve a number of strains and conflicts, these conflicts can themselves only be resolved by 
further advancement in the division of labour.
The civil war split in Ireland has been explained in ways that reflect Durkheim's work on the 
division of labour. For Prager the inability of the nationalist elite to maintain a common front 
after the Treaty reflected a disagreement over much more than the terms of the Treaty. The split 
revealed 'the presence of sharply divergent conceptions of the meaning of the Irish nation and 
distinct understandings of who were the rightful members of that nation and of the social 
relations that ought to prevail among its members'.13 There existed two cultural traditions, the 
Irish Enlightenment, and the Gaelic Romantic tradition, both of which offered their own 
solutions to the crisis of Irish modernity which emerged after the Famine. Each had its own 
understanding of 'the proper course of affairs for the nation', and 'the appropriate relations among 
its members'.14
There was the Irish-Enlightenment tradition, deriving its original insights from the Anglo-Irish Ascendancy 
and articulating modem secular aspirations for the Irish nation. Here the objective was to construct a social 
order characterised by autonomous individuals and independent spheres of social life in which the Irish 
citizen could rationally influence the course of Irish affairs. On the other side there was a competing Gaelic 
Romantic set of thoughts and beliefs. Its aim was to promote a solidary nation without conflict and 
disharmony, imbued with a vivid sense of the past in the functioning of the present. Neither secular nor 
individualistic, this orientation expressed a yearning for a social order protective of the values and patterns 
of interaction putatively characteristic of the ancient Gaelic Ireland.15
Although these traditions can only be taken as ideal types, they reflect Durkheim's analysis of the 
types of solidarity obtaining in pre-modem and modem societies. The basis for freedom in the 
Irish Enlightenment tradition was the autonomous rational individual. The basis for freedom in 
the Gaelic Romantic tradition was a social community based on authentic traditional values. 
Although most pre-independence nationalist movements reflected an amalgam of both traditions, 
the prospect of independence raised very different expectations, according to which tradition one
12 S. Fenton, Durkheim and Modem Sociology (Cambridge,1984), p.49.
13 J. Prager, Building Democracy in Ireland (Cambridge, 1986), p.30.
14 Ibid, 31.
15 Ibid, 16.
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subscribed. For those who subscribed to the Anglo-Irish tradition, the new Ireland would be led 
by 'an elite committed to non-sectarian and urbane values'.16 Independence would mean a break 
with the provinciality and sectarianism of Irish life and would 'promote the replacement of 
traditional orientations with a new dedication to culture and learning'.17 For Gaelic Romantics, 
the prospect of independence raised very contrasting hopes. Republicanism offered a picture of 
the future that was 'far more detailed than any commitment to the free rule of individuals in an 
independent Irish community'.18 It would create a self-sufficient agricultural state in which 
Gaelic patterns of social life would re-emerge and create a community free from the evils of 
modem capitalist society.
The Gaelic-Irish conception of Ireland was that the nation ought to strive to re-create its past and resist 
those changes that seemed to challenge the basic meaning of Ireland as embodied in its traditions. Modem 
Ireland was to be celebrated as a pre-industrial nation; its identity was to be found in its rural character. 
The sanctity of the family was to be preserved, the Church was to remain a central social institution second 
only to the family, and the farm was to serve as the backbone for a healthy thriving society.19
The Gaelic Romantic tradition, in short, sought to preserve what was left of traditional Ireland, 
or reconstruct a new Ireland in accordance with the mythic patterns of the past. The new Ireland 
was to be 'a harmonious nation, communal and free from "modem" urban, British, and Anglican 
influences, from which it was currently suffering'.20It is clear that in Prager's theory 
Republicans in 1922 intended to maintain a type of primordial solidarity among the Irish 
nation that would be lost if the Treaty were accepted. For the Pro-Treatyites, as inheritors of Irish 
Enlightenment thinking, acceptance of the Treaty was a means of achieving an independent 
state composed of equal and free individuals. It was a state that would discard the mechanical 
solidarity of an undifferentiated communal order. It was this communal order that underpinned 
Irish Republicanism and the political attitudes associated with it.
The political norms that existed within the two cultural traditions, according to Prager, were also 
markedly different. The Irish Enlightenment tradition saw pariiamentarianism as the best way of 
promoting its values. Pariiamentarianism reflected more than a preference for a political method, 
but implied a normative acceptance of 'hierarchical arrangements whereby certain individuals, 
occupying particular social roles and meriting their status because of demonstrated ability, 
legitimately possess greater authority than others in determining the course of events'.21 Those 
who subscribed to Irish Enlightenment norms were firmly committed to democratic
16 Ibid, 40.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, 44.
19 Ibid, 42.
20 Ibid, 43.
21 Ibid, 41.
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individualism. Firstly, they viewed Ireland as a non-sectarian community composed of citizens, 
equal in their rights and responsibilities under the law. Secondly, they shared a belief in 
proceduralism, defined as 'a belief that the purposes of the community would be served only 
when each individual agreed to abide by the rules of conflict resolution'.22 The representative 
system had no purpose other than to promote individuals' interests as they themselves understood 
them. In contrast Gaelic Romantics were communalist in their attitude to politics. Citizenship to 
them was not a civil but an ethnic category : membership of the nation was restricted to those 
who were primordially related to the ancient Gaels. Irishness and Catholicism were virtually 
synonymous. Gaelic Romantics also considered authority and hierarchy illegitimate in the 
organisation of social relations. Gaelic Romantics supported violence against the British not 
because the British blocked the Irish demand for independence but because the British 
represented 'the most recent expression of the forces perverting the 'natural' and egalitarian 
Gaelic community'.23 Physical force came to be a central plank in the Gaelic Romantic political 
armoury. It involved a rejection of parliamentary negotiation and constitutionalism and came 
with a demonstration of the different level of political commitment of the Irish : violence was 
held to be an act of liberation in itself. Lastly, violence also served to define the relationship 
among members of the nation:
Violence in short was an essential component of the Gaelic Romantic normative commitment precisely 
because it created a moral bond demarcating Republicans from those attempting to uphold the social order. 
In so doing, it realised the goal of solidarity and common purpose that was at the heart of the Republican 
dream.24
So, Republicans held their political beliefs much in the same way as communicants hold their 
religious beliefs and responded to deviance with violent repression. The Pro-Treatyites on the 
other hand were much more concerned to regulate conflicts through the application of the proper 
procedures and were committed to the defence of individual freedom. Again reflecting 
Durkheim's ideas, it is implied that Gaelic Romantics responded with repressive sanctions when 
the moral consensus underpinning Republican beliefs was threatened, while the Pro-Treatyites 
response to deviance was to re-assert the established legal framework on the society.
For Garvin the civil war is also understood in ways that echo Durkheim's theory of the division of 
labour. The split 'tended to follow a divide that separated those who saw the Republic as a moral 
and transcendental entity analogous to the Church of Christ, an entity whose citizens were duly 
bound to defend it with their purses and their lives, from those who saw the Republic as a 
bargaining device in achieving rational legal self-government for as much of Ireland as possible,
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid,
24 Ibid,46.
regardless of formal political labels'.25 The victory of the Free State in the civil war was thus a 
crucial moment in the creation of a democratic political order in Ireland. Garvin suggests that the 
cultural orientations of the anti-Treatyites were pre-modem and anti-individualistic. The anti- 
treatyites were aiming to establish a moral community rather than ’a nation state of citizens 
whose individual moral state, was subject to minimal legal restraints, a private rather than a 
public matter'.26 They preferred an ethnic definition of citizenship, refusing to allow Northern 
Unionists to opt out of the Free State, while the Free State government recognised the right of 
Ulster Unionists to do so. Garvin suggests that this ethnic sentiment was stronger 'because it taps 
into apparently perennial human desires for solidarity and comradeship against the outside world 
and is psychologically similar to kinship or tribalism in the relationships it poses between 
people'.27
Table 5.1. Garvin’s Political subcultures.
Political Style
Policy Stances
Social Bases
Republican
Moralism
Nationalist Pragmatism
Communalism Individualism
Moralism Legalism
Fundamentalism Pragmatism
General Will Will of all
Moral Elitism Voter rule
Romantic Classical
Transformist Empirical
Ethnic Nationalist Civic Nationalist
Neo-Gaelic Neo-Gaelic
Subsistence Economy Commercialism
Protectionism Free Trade
Isolationism Commonwealth
Zero Sum Economics Non-zero sum economics
Dirigisms Laissez Faire
Gemeinschaft Gesellschaft
Peasants, small farmers Commercial farmers
Unskilled worker Skilled worker
Petty bourgeoisie Bourgeoisie
Public sector Private Sector
Rural Urban
Source : Garvin,! 996, 146.
The civil war division was between Republican moralists and nationalist pragmatists. The 
former went hand in hand with an inability to handle differences of opinion and a tendency to 
view opposing political stances as motivated by unworthy considerations. The instincts of 
Republicans were then essentially undemocratic. Pragmatists had a cooler political outlook. 
They saw politics as 'a process by which large numbers of people settled their differences non­
25 T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1996), p. 143.
26 T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy, p. 145.
27 Ibid,144.
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violently, rather than a process by which human beings became better people'.28 Garvin provides 
a table outlining the main differences between the two contending subcultures in 1922. I have 
adapted it in table 5.1. He suggests that these subcultures are ideal types but ones that reflect 
deep-rooted tendencies in Irish life. The Republican moralist subculture derived from the type of 
puritanical Catholicism that was established in post-Famine Ireland, while the nationalist- 
pragmatist approach had its roots in the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Garvin describes 
Irish society at the time as essentially a peasant society although it was becoming 'a classic 
western free farmer society'.29 A belief in communalism, in the family as the central unit of 
society, and in the preservation of rural life in the face of the forces of commercialisation, were 
typical of peasant societies everywhere.30
In summary, for both Prager and Garvin the civil war was a reflection of the value strains 
experienced by a society that was undergoing the throes of modernisation. From a Durkheimian 
perspective the civil war can be seen as a conflict caused by the strains inherent in the transition 
from a society based on mechanical to organic solidarity. Republicans had a 'mechanical' highly 
normative understanding of political order, while the Pro-Treatyites defended an 'organic' or 
legalistic conception of political order. Democratic mechanisms for forging agreement were 
rejected by Republicans because they didn't reflect traditional understandings of the public realm. 
As a result democracy had to be imposed on the anti-Treatyites by the Provisional Government in 
1922-23.
5.2. Uniformity and Diversity within Irish Nationalism.
A tension between the two forms of social solidarity is common in developing societies. As 
Durkheim put it, advancement in the division of labour is due to the stronger pressures exerted by 
social units on one another which leads them to develop in more or less divergent directions. 
However 'at every moment this pressure is neutralised by a reverse pressure that the common 
consciousness exerts upon every individual consciousness'.31 In societies where the nation- 
building process it in its active stage, the tension between the two tendencies is increased. In 
order for different societies to be differentiated from one another 'they must be attracted or 
grouped together through the similarities that they display'.32 The need for each social segment 
to highlight its distinctiveness inhibits the development of organic solidarity.
28 Ibid,145.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid,152.
31 E.Durkheim, Division of Labour in Society (London, 1981), p.226.
32 Ibid,219.
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What draws men together are mechanical forces and instinctive forces such as the affinity of blood, 
attachment to the same soil, the cult of their ancestors, a communality of habits, etc. It is only when the 
group has been formed on these bases that co-operation becomes organised.33
The presence of mechanical solidarity is explained not just by the low division of labour, but also 
by this pressure towards uniformity. In a new nation it is to be expected that this pressure is all 
the greater. Conversely the greater the amount of exchange between individuals and the less the 
uniformity, the greater the degree of organic solidarity. 'Instead of saying as Durkheim does that 
mechanical solidarity is based on similarity and organic solidarity is based on the division of 
labour, we can assume that there are two separate variables that can be used together to explain 
both types of solidarity1.34
Table 5.2. Allardt's Typology of Solidarity Inducing and Solidarity Thwarting Situations.
Division of 
Low
Labour
High
Pressure
Toward
Uniformity
Strong
1. Strong solidarity, 
situation of mechanical 
solidarity
3. Weak solidarity.
Weak
2. Weak solidarity. 4. Strong solidarity, 
situation of organic 
solidarity.
Source : Allardt ,1970,48.
Allardt derives four propositions from this choice of variables 35 The first is that the less 
developed the division o f labour and the stronger the pressure towards uniformity, the less the 
likelihood o f legitimacy conflicts. In this situation a state of mechanical solidarity obtains, which 
can only happen in undeveloped societies. The second is that the less developed the division o f 
labour and the weaker the pressure toward uniformity, the greater the likelihood o f legitimacy 
conflicts. Such conflicts may exist in pre-industrial societies that are weakened by religious 
schism as in seventeenth century Britain. The third is that the more developed the division o f 
labour and the stronger the pressure toward uniformity, the greater the likelihood o f legitimacy 
conflicts. This situation I argue existed in Ireland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
33 Ibid,219.
34 E. Allardt,Types of Protest and Alienation', p. 47.
35 Ibid, 48.
centuries. Lastly, the more developed the division o f labour and the weaker the pressure toward 
uniformity, the less the likelihood o f legitimacy conflicts. In such a state a situation of organic 
solidarity prevails. Allardt provides a typology, reproduced above, which shows how two 
situations of weak solidarity may arise from combinations of his two variables.
Independent Ireland was in situation three in 1922, where a relatively high division of labour 
co-existed with strong pressures towards uniformity. A detailed picture of the Irish social
structure can be found in Vanhanen's work.36 He tries to explain the emergence of a competitive
political system in terms of the widening distribution of intellectual, organizational, and 
economic power resources in society. Two of his variables are related to the division of labour. 
The percentage of the population living in urban areas of twenty thousand people or more, and 
the size of the non-agricultural population are interrelated and are combined to form an index of 
occupational diversity ( I.O.D.). Vanhanen hypothesised that the threshold level of occupational 
diversity for democratic countries will be between the 30-50 per cent level.37
Table 5.3 Index for Occupational Diversity 1920-1930
Index of Occupational Diversity
Irish Free State 33.5
Democratic Mean 47.8
Undemocratic Mean 26.5
Source: Vanhanen, 1984, 144-45.
Table 5.3. compares the Irish figures with the European democratic and non-democratic 
countries in the 1920s. It shows that the Irish degree of occupational diversity is above the 
democratic threshold level, although the index of occupational diversity for the 1920s is only 
33.5, which is closer to the undemocratic mean figure of 26.5 than to the democratic mean figure 
of 47.8. This suggests that the division of labour was relatively high in the 1920's even if it was 
less so than in most advanced democracies.
On the other hand, a number of factors ensured that strong pressures towards uniformity also 
existed in Irish society. Strong pressures towards uniformity tend to emerge where 'lower class 
individuals are hindered by class barriers to indulge in social exchange. Inequalities of an 
economic nature, thus, are subsumed under factors, which make for a strong pressure toward 
uniformity'.38 In Ireland a chief source of pressure towards uniformity was the historical
36 T. Vanhanen The Emergence of Democracy (Helsinki, 1984).
37 Ibid, 123.
38 E. Allardt, Types of Protest and Alientation', p.49.
religious cleavage, 'the cultural division of labour,' between Protestants and Catholics, to borrow 
Hechter's terms, which left Catholic nationalists as a homogeneous minority community within 
the U.K. Social mobility for Catholics was blocked by the existence of religious discrimination 
and lack of higher educational opportunities. As a result the Catholic community remained less 
sociologically differentiated than its Protestant counterparts. Moreover since industrialisation 
took place mainly in the North-East, nationalist Ireland did not develop an urban industrial 
enclave separate from its rural surroundings. As Hechter suggests the lack of enclave hinterland 
differences in southern Ireland permitted the development of a solidary and broad-based political 
party capable of effecting independence'.39 It prevented the nationalist community from being 
divided by urban-rural divisions.
Table 5.4. Tenure Structure in selected countries, per cent distribution of the number of farms.
Country Year Owner-Operated Rented
Irish Free State 1929 98 2
Bulgaria 1934 92 8
Sweden 1932 80 20
Czechoslovakia 1930 80 20
Greece 1929 79 6
Italy 1930 69 16
Source : Dovring, 1964, 169.
Land reform was another factor reinforcing the pressure towards uniformity in the Irish 
countryside. Adam Smith and J.S. Mill had hoped that the process of economic specialisation 
would be checked in the agricultural sector 'seeing in it the last refuge of small scale 
ownership'.40 Garvin argues that what he calls 'Republican moralism' in Ireland resembled the 
conformist and puritanical cultures that 'owner occupier free farmers seem to create whenever 
they form a dominant social group1.41 Table 5.4. compares the tenure structure of Irish 
agriculture with a sample of European states in the interwar period. It shows the extent to which 
owner-occupier farms completely dominated the Irish rural landscape by 1930. Practically all 
Irish farms were owner-operated by the end of the 1920s.
For Durkheim the development of organic solidarity could come only with specialisation in 
economic production. The two historical pre-conditions for this were, (a) the separation of 
productive tasks from family obligations, and (b), the concentration of legitimate authority in a 
single agency. Neither of these tasks was completed in Ireland by 1920. Land reform had
39 M. Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 
(Berkely and Los Angeles, 1975), p.293.
40 E. Durkheim, Division of Labour in Society, op. cit., p. 17.
41 T. Garvin, 1922: The Birth of Irish Democracy, p. 147, my emphasis.
ensured that the family survived as an economic unit. On the other hand, while nationalists 
continually challenged the authority of the British state, the Irish nationalist community 
represented itself as a solidary community of equals and not as an entity that contained different 
interests. In the majoritarian political system under the Union, it was always to the advantage of 
nationalists to emphasise the homogeneity of Irish society and the existence of strong solidary 
bonds between its members. This was to counter the claim that Ireland was composed of two 
nations and that Ireland’s right to self-rule was based on the majority rule principle.
Table 5.S. Contested Parliamentary Elections by Region 1885-1917.
Region No. or Elections. No. of elections contested Percentage o f Elections
Contested
Centre 75 41 54.6
N.E. Ulster 239 147 61.5
Heartland 338 121 35.7
Border Periphery 154 60 38.96
Western Periphery 154 55 35.7
Source: Walker, 1978,325-383.
That there were strong political pressures towards uniformity can be seen from the electoral 
history of Irish constituencies under the Union. In large areas of Ireland, reflecting the 
dominance of the nationalist Home Rule Party, parliamentary seats went uncontested in as many 
as half of the elections that took place. In a constituency like Donegal West, none of the ten 
parliamentary elections which took place between 1885 and 1917 were contested. In contrast, six 
of the eight parliamentary elections which took place in neighbouring Donegal East, a 
religiously mixed constituency, were contested. The monopoly of the Nationalist Party on 
political representation was only challenged in highly urbanised constituencies, or in areas which 
were religiously mixed. The only constituencies in Ireland where all the parliamentary elections 
which took place between 1885 and 1917 were contested, were Dublin St. Stephen's Green, and 
Tyrone East. Adapting Garvin's regional classification of Ireland, table 5.5. shows the number 
of contested elections by region between 1885 and 1917.42 It suggests that the nationalist party's 
electoral dominance reflected a socio-cultural divide separating the North-East from the more 
traditional rural constituencies of the South and West. In the future area of the Free State only in 
the Centre was there a robust tradition of contested elections and this was still low, scoring just 
over fifty per cent. In the heartland, and in the border and Western peripheries, uncontested 
elections were the norm.
42 See T. Garvin The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics (Dublin,! 981), p. 11.
It is important to realise that the new Sinn Fein party inherited this position of electoral 
monopoly in 1918, when the party won over two thirds of the seats in Nationalist Ireland. In 
addition 25 out of the 72 seats in the area of the future Free State were uncontested.43 This 
situation was even more dramatic in 1921 when all seats, bar those for the National University, 
were uncontested in Southern Ireland. The peculiar history of Irish representation can only be 
understood by appreciating that Ireland was what Therbom terms 'a national mobilisation 
democracy1 where democratisation is seized upon as a means of nationalist mobilisation.44 In 
such democracies, where political elites use electoral contests as means of demonstrating the 
national will, they have a vested interest in downplaying the significance of social divisions 
among their supporters and in stressing the homogeneity of outlook among them. The 1918 
election, the first democratic election to take place in Ireland, was thus seen as a national 
plebiscite, not as an election giving different sectors of Irish society a chance to represent 
themselves. The founding fathers of the Irish state believed that politics were there to serve the 
interests of the nation, not of discrete social groups. As Pearse put it, 'a government of 
capitalists or a government of clerics, or a government of lawyers, or a government of tinkers or a 
government of red-headed men, or a government of men bom on a Tuesday does not represent 
the people and cannot bind the people'45 The Treaty split brought into the open the conflict 
between this conditional acceptance of electoral democracy and the reality that the nation was 
composed of different elements, each with their own agendas and interests.
In the Spring of 1922, having delayed the election until June 1922, the Sinn Fein organisation 
then decided that it would field a joint panel of Pro and Anti- Treaty candidates for the election. 
Contests between Sinn Fein candidates would be kept to a minimum and the Treaty issue would 
not be discussed. A joint Government would be formed afterwards. The Labour Party refused to 
be part of this government on the grounds that it was an independent party. Clause four of this 
electoral pact had allowed 'that every and any interest is free to go up and contest the election 
equally with the National Sinn Fein panel'. However advertisements shortly appeared in the Press 
stating that the national interest would be best served by voting for the Joint Panel candidates.46 
Furthermore, it was later alleged in the Dail by a Labour candidate that 'many of the members 
sitting in these benches had revolvers and guns used against them by people who were party to 
that pact'.47 On the one hand, the Pact had seemed the only way of preventing the political 
division over the Treaty culminating in civil war and of enabling an election to take place at all. 
On the other Labour later complained that it was an agreement designed to make sure that 'the
43 J. Coakley, The Election that made the first Dail1 in B. Farrell (ed.), The Creation of the Dail (Dublin, 
1994), pp. 31-47.
44 G. Therbom, The Rule of Capital and the rise of Democracy1 in New Left Review, 103 (1977).
45 P. Pearse, The Sovereign People', The Complete Works of Padraig Pearse; Political Writings and 
Political Speeches, (Dublin,n.d.),p. 341.
46 Mitchell and O' Snodaigh, Irish Political Documents (Dublin, 1985), p. 135.
47 Deputy Davin, Dail Debates, vol 1 col 101, September 11, 1922.
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people would be given no opportunity of expressing any view except to return to power the two 
wings of the old party1.48 In retrospect the Pact fell apart because it brought into the open the 
conflict between the two conceptions of democracy which existed in Ireland, one seeing elections 
as a means of demonstrating the national will, the other seeing them as a means of registering 
the preferences of a pluralist society. The conflict was rendered all the more dramatic since the 
third parties that emerged to contest the election were clearly two self-consciously interest- 
orientated parties, the Labour Party and the Farmers Party.
Table 5.6. Changes in Dail representation in constituencies where Third Party or Independent 
candidates won seats in the Pact Election.
Constituency 1920 1922 + -
Treaty Rep 3rd Treaty Rep 3rd Treaty Rep 3rd
Carlow Kilkenny 2 2 0 2 0 2 _ -2 +2
Cork Borough 2 2 0 2 1 1 - -1 +1
Cork East and North East 0 3 0 0 1 2 - -2 +2
Cork Mid, North, South, 
South East and West
4 4 0 3 2 3 -1 -2 +3
Dublin Mid 1 3 0 1 1 2 - -2 +2
Dublin South 2 2 0 2 0 2 -2 +2
Dublin Co. 4 1 1 2 0 3 -2 -1 +2
Galway 4 3 0 4 2 1 - -1 +1
Kildare Wicklow 1 4 0 1 1 3 - -3 +3
Leix Offaly 4 0 0 3 0 1 -1 - +1
Longford Westmeath 3 1 0 2 1 1 -1 - +1
Louth Meath 4 1 0 3 1 1 -1 - +1
National University 2 2 0 2 1 1 -1 +1
Tipperary, Mid, North 
and South
1 3 0 1 2 1 - -1 +1
Waterford-Tipperary East 1 3 1 1 1 3 -2 +2
Wexford 0 3 1 0 1 3 - -2 +2
Source: Walker, 101-108.
It was also the more dramatic because a multi-party system represented far more of a threat to 
the anti-Treatyites than it did to the Pro-Treaty candidates. It has often been suggested that the 
Pact collapsed because the anti-Treatyites reneged on the promises to respect freedom of speech 
they made when signing the Pact. Clearly the anti-Treatyites stood to lose more from a fair 
election than the Pro-Treatyites. During negotiations over the Pact it was Pro-Treatyite delegates 
that argued that the country needed an election to renew the representative character of the Dail 
and not merely to ratify the Treaty. It was significant that this argument originated on the Pro- 
Treaty side since they proved to have least to fear from a free election. Table 5.6. shows the 
changes in Dail representation between 1921 and 1922 in those constituencies where 'third 
parties' or independents won seats. The losers were usually anti-Treaty candidates. All in all, in 
the sixteen constituencies in which Third Parties won seats, the Republican side lost seats in
48 Deputy O’ Brien, Dail Debates, vol 1 col 159, January 12,1922.
thirteen, while the Pro-Treatyites lost seats only in five. In total the Republicans lost twenty-two 
seats while the Pro-Treatyites lost six. The majority of Republican seats were lost to the Labour 
party. Indeed Labour topped the poll in first preference votes in three constituencies. Independent 
candidates topped the poll in two constituencies, while Farmers' candidates topped the poll in 
Cork East and North East. In none of the sixteen constituencies did a Republican candidate top 
the poll. The results in these constituencies are very important because Republicans would later 
claim that support for Pro-Treaty candidates should be interpreted as support for the Joint Panel. 
However the analysis offered here suggests that when offered a choice, the voters systematically 
voted against Republican Panel candidates and not against Pro-Treaty Panel Candidates. The 
Republican position was thus undermined by the forces of electoral competition.
There was a clear geographical pattern to these results. Independent candidates won seats in the 
urban constituencies of Cork and Dublin, as well as in the National University constituency, but 
not in rural constituencies. Farmer's Party victories were recorded in Carlow-Kilkenny, Cork 
Mid, North, South, South East and West, County Dublin, Kildare-Wicklow, Waterford-Tipperaiy 
East, and Wexford. Overall they didn't contest seats in the West of Ireland. Labour won sixteen 
seats overall, six in the urban constituencies of Cork, Dublin and Galway, a total of five in the 
South Eastern constituencies of Carlow-Kilkenny, Waterford-Tipperary East and Wexford, a total 
of five in the midlands constituencies of Kildare-Wicklow, Leix-Offaly, Longford Westmeath, 
and Louth-Meath. Labour's support base was both heavily eastern and urbanised, largely 
confined to the centre and heartland regions of Ireland. On the basis of this analysis it seems 
reasonable to argue that the degree of electoral competitiveness in 1922 was positively related to 
the degree of urbanisation. The Republicans were strong mainly in backward Western 
constituencies which were politically underdeveloped. Again this analysis reinforces the 
hypothesis that Republicanism was strongest in areas which were least developed sociologically. 
This analysis also reinforces the hypothesis that the presence of a relatively high division of 
labour in Irish society combined with very strong pressures towards uniformity lay behind the 
civil war conflict in 1922.
Allardt suggests that the existence of strong pressure towards uniformity has two necessary 
preconditions : (a) existing norms are specific and related to strong sanctions that are applied 
with great consistency, and (b) there are no or very few conflicts between norms'.49 Between 
1918 and 1921 both of these conditions were in place. There was little overt disagreement 
among nationalists about the aims of the nationalist movement, and in 1919 all elected Deputies 
were obliged to swear an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Moreover most of the major interest 
groups in Irish society supported the War of Independence, particularly when British counter­
insurgency measures had the effect of alienating public opinion in the later stages of the war. The
49 E. Allardt, Types of Protest and Alientation1, p. 47.
Second Dail, which was elected in an uncontested election, contained a large number of 
fundamentalist Republicans as a consequence. After 1921, however, there was a split between the 
military and civilian wings of the Sinn Fein movement, the Church and the Press now backed the 
Treaty, and the third parties that contested the 1922 election also recommended abandoning the 
goal of the Republic, at least as an immediate goal. The reaction of the anti-Treaty IRA to these 
developments was to take refuge in the application of the same repressive sanctions that had 
galvanised public opinion in the war against the British. For that reason supporters of the anti- 
Treatyites smashed newspaper officers, prevented public meetings taking place, and intimidated 
opponents in the run up to the 1922 election. The anti-Treatyites rejected majority rule by 
appealing to a theory of the electorate's expressed will being irrelevant and intimidated by various 
tyrannies, in particular, the apparatuses of thought control represented by the journalists and the 
clergy.50
It was only a matter of time before the Pro-Treatyites began to see the Republican campaign as an 
attack on 'the people's rights'. Once the anti-Treaty IRA had seceded from the Ministry of 
Defence they became dependent on raids and mutineering in order to finance themselves. This 
had a knock-on effect.
The Wild West atmosphere was spread about by the gunmen at the bidding of leaders more culpable and a 
lot more foolish then themselves, and as a result of this the bonds of restraint common to civilised 
communities were tom asunder. Widespread brigandage made its appearance. Banks were robbed. Post 
Offices were raided. It was open to everyman to take what he could. Some took houses and land. Others 
more modest, only took motor cars.51
After the defeat of the anti-Treatyite forces in conventional hostilities in August, they switched to 
terrorist tactics designed to make the country ungovernable. The government's perception of 
events had always had a social dimension to it. The shift to terrorist tactics only confirmed the 
veracity of this interpretation, at least for those on the Government benches. Cosgrave, who had 
succeeded Griffith as President of the Executive Council, also declared 'that there is a state of 
woeful moral degradation abroad'.52 The issues at stake were no longer purely political.
What has got to be asserted in this country is not the mere term, the supremacy of parliament. It is the 
supremacy of the people's right to live their lives in peace, to possess whatever little they may have, to own 
a security that is the security of a free people, without any interruption by any armed despot with a revolver 
in his pocket or a bomb in his hand.53
50 T. Garvin, 1922;The Birth of Irish Democracy, p.127.
51 Deputy Sears, Dail Debates, 140, January 12,1922.
52 See footnote 83 below.
53 W. Cosgrave, Dail Debates, vol 1 col 195 , September 12,1922.
The actions that had been taken to restore order were not for 'the mere formula of the supremacy 
of parliament' but 'a formula for the security of the people, or the security of their lives, and the 
value of their money in the country'.54 It was a formula in other words for the preservation of 
moral individualism, parliamentarianism, and with it of the capitalist system.
As Garvin remarks, the possibility that the forces of the Free State Army actually 'liberated' 
Southern Ireland from the despotism of the anti-Treatyite IRA has never been discussed in Irish 
schoolbooks, principally because the losers in the civil war eventually ended up as the dominant 
political party in the state.55 The Free State Army often saw itself as a liberator. An army report 
from Cavan for February 1923 reported little of note, 'if exception be made of the sack of the 
little town of Ballyconnell, the facts of which are now known all over the world - the defenceless 
people of which were robbed and murdered by the liberty-loving Irregular forces'.56 Where the 
army was unable to establish its authority, anarchic conditions soon set in. For example the 
evacuation of the military barracks in Tullow, Borris, and Bagnalstown, in County Carlow, was 
soon followed by 'the activities of armed robbers who looted on a large scale, destroyed bridges, 
and felled trees across the roads'.57 The urgent task for the military and the civic guard was thus 
the establishment of posts throughout the country and the demonstration that crimes would be 
met with resolute action. The army were in no doubt that such policies would meet with public 
approval even in areas, such as Cork East, where Republican sympathies were strong:
The situation may be summed up by saying that where the military and civic guard are in active occupation, 
matters are well and improve day by day - there follows first the passive attitude of the people, to be 
succeeded by the interested and helpful attitude. This is noticeable in small things - their obedience to the 
law as regards the Licensing Acts etc., and further by the assistance given the guards in their enquiries and 
prosecution in other cases.58
It follows, then, that the Free State authorities believed public support for the anti-Treaty cause 
was, to a considerable degree, the product of coercion. From the outset Collins had held that the 
military defeat of his opponents, in the areas in which they were strong, was less important than 
the 'establishing of our forces in certain principal parts of that area with a view to shaking the 
domination held over the ordinary people by the Irregulars'. The people would thus be freed from 
their present 'cowed' position.59 This type of analysis was extended to the Irregular rank and file,
54 Ibid.
55 T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy, p. 127.
56 'Monthly Report for February11923, March 20 1923, Civil War Army Reports, Department of An 
Taoiseach, S 3361, National Archives.
57 Monthly Report for February1, 1923, March 20 1923, ibid.
58 Report on Cork East, Monthly Report for February, March 20 1923, ibid.
59 Memo from Commander in Chief to Acting Chairman, G.H.Q., August 5 1922, ibid.
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whom the Free State authorities believed had been 'duped' by their leaders. Speaking in the Dail, 
the Minister of Defence remarked that the Irregulars were composed of three elements, 'people 
who maybe classed as politicians ; people who may be classed as honest soldiers, and people who 
may be classed as criminals'. In Mulcahy's view the 'honest soldiers' had been 'misled' and were 
'waiting for a word from the politicians that they are travelling the wrong road'.60 Even in those 
areas where hostility to the Free State was strongest such as in Kerry, the Free State authorities 
still believed that the rank and file had been duped by their leaders. One officer who visited 
Tralee Jail in late March 1923 remarked that the prisoners were 'mostly men who had been led 
astray and who really did not know what they were doing'.61 Out in the field, the rank and file 
were generally 'sick of the business' and were 'held together only either by the personality and or 
intimidatory methods of their leaders.62 Although public opinion in Kerry was reportedly hostile 
to the Army, this could be explained by the fact that the Irregulars had been able to shape 
perceptions of what was taking place outside Kerry. One Army Report described the malleability 
of public opinion in this way :
On coming into actual contact with them the impression of hostility immediately evaporates, in fact the first 
impression was one of general friendliness - people seemed glad to have troops in their locality and treated 
them in most cases without reserve or suspicion... The actual feeling everywhere seemed to be a sense of 
genuine relief. The people had been living in complete isolation for months - their connection with the 
outside world had been cut off and their feelings of isolation had accentuated their fear of the Irregulars, 
and when our troops began to appear they were genuinely relieved... Inside this area the people lived 
completely at the mercy of the Irregulars, unaware of outside happenings, and depended on the Irregulars 
for information of outside events.63
It is difficult to judge the validity of this interpretation of public opinion during the civil war. The 
best indicator of public support for the anti-Treatyites would be the support level for Republican 
candidates in the 1922 election, but this suffers from two obvious flaws. Firstly, many of the 
victorious Republican candidates in 1922 were returned in uncontested constituencies. Secondly, 
as argued by authors sympathetic to the Republican position, some of the support for the Pro- 
Treaty candidates can actually be interpreted as support for the Joint Panel, and not as an 
endorsement of the Treaty position at all. However when you compare the results of the 1922 and 
the 1923 elections the distribution of support for Republican candidates follows a clear pattern. 
Support for Republican candidates was high in 1923 in many of the same constituencies that
60 R. Mulchay, Dail Debates, vol 1 col 174 , September 12,1922.
61 Report on Operations carried out in the West Cork and South Kerry Area', April 1923 Civil War 1922-23 
Army Reports on Situation and Organisation., Department of an Taoiseach, S 3361, National Archives
62 Report of the Military Situation, March 31 1923', ibid.
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returned unopposed Republican deputies in 1922. Moreover, support for Republican candidates 
reflects a clear regional pattern.
I have again adapted Garvin's fourfold regional divisions of Irish society in the presentation of 
the electoral statistics in table 5.7 The regional means for the anti-Treaty share of the vote show 
clearly that their support base was strongest furthest away from Dublin, in the peripheral areas of 
Ireland. In the centre of Ireland anti-Treaty support in 1922 averaged at around 12 per cent. In 
the heartland areas it just exceeded a quarter of all first preferences. In the border periphery 
anti-Treaty support averaged just under a third of all first preferences, while in the Western 
periphery's one contested seat the anti-Treaty vote was just under a third. In 1923 the regional 
picture is rather similar, with the difference that the anti-Treaty mean in the Western periphery 
rises to 40.26 per cent of the vote. Again this suggests that had the Western seats been contested 
in 1922 the anti-Treaty vote would have been higher than elsewhere.
Table 5.7. Mean Percentage Sunnort for anti-Treaty candidates in contested constituencies bv region 1922-23.
Region 1 1922 2 1923 3 + -
Centre 4 12.17 17.43 +5.26
Heartland 25.39 24.00 -1.39
Border Periphery 32.81 28.06 -4.75
Western Periphery 32.3 40.26 +7.96
N otes:
1. Since some constituencies were changed in 1923 and since regional boundaries and constituency 
boundaries do not always overlap. I have adopted the following categorisation. Centre includes all Dublin 
Constituencies plus Dublin University for both elections. Heartland includes Carlow-Kilkenny, all Cork 
constituencies , Kildare-Wicklow, Lei-Offaly, Limerick City-Limerick East, Louth-Meath, Tipperary Mid, 
North and South, Waterford-Tipperary East and Wexford for 1921; Carlow-Kilkenny, all Cork 
constituencies, Kildare, Leix-Offaly, Limerick, Meath, Tipperary, Waterford, Wexford and Wicklow for 
1923. Border Periphery includes Cavan, Donegal, Longford-Westmeath and Monaghan for both elections ; 
Leitrim-Roscommon North, and Sligo-Mayo East for 1922; Roscommon, Leitrim-Sligo and Louth for 1923. 
Western Periphery includes Clare and Galway for both elections; Kerry Limerick West, and Mayo North 
and West for 1922:, Kerry, Mayo South and Mayo North for 1923.
2. The following constituencies were uncontested in 1922; Dublin University, Limerick City Limerick East, 
Donegal, Leitrim Roscommon North, Clare, Kerry Limerick West, Mayo North and West.
3. Only the seats for Dublin University were uncontested in 1923.
4 .1 have not included figures for the National University.
Source: Gallagher 1993.
What about the figures for individual constituencies ? Firstly, in the centre of Dublin, support 
for anti-Treatyite candidates was relatively low in both elections, seldom exceeding twenty per 
cent of first preferences. Excluding the National University as a Dublin constituency, support for 
anti-Treaty candidates varied between 0 to 19.5 per cent in 1922, and between 13.6 to 21.2 per 
cent in 1923. In the heartland of Ireland support for anti-Treaty Republicans was higher, 
amounting to a quarter of the first preference vote in many constituencies, and reaching over 
forty per cent in areas of Cork and Tipperary in 1922. On the whole, support was higher in the 
Southern agricultural countries than in the midlands, but no clear pattern predominates. Support 
for anti-Treaty candidates varied from 0 to 49.5 per cent in 1922 and from 16.9 to 30.7 in 1923. 
In the border periphery there is quite an amount of variation, but support for Republican 
candidates seems to average off around the quarter mark. In 1922 it varied from 0 to 24.6 per 
cent and from 18.3 to 36.5 per cent in 1923. Lastly in the western periphery support for anti- 
Treaty candidates was high. Many of these constituencies were uncontested in 1922 but in 1923 it 
ranged from 33.5 to 45 per cent. It was uniformly higher than practically anywhere else in 
Ireland in 1923, and anti-Treatyites gained a third of the total first preference vote in practically 
all the Westerly constituencies in 1923. Only in this region did support for anti-Treaty candidates 
rival that for Government candidates.
A number of conclusions can be derived from this analysis. Firstly, support for anti-Treaty 
candidates was nowhere negligible. Its national average of 20 per cent was a respectable figure 
for an anti-system party, if not for a party claiming to be the legitimate government of the 
country. If an exclusionary threshold of 10 per cent had existed at the constituency level, as it 
often does for small parties at the national level, then Republican candidates in both elections 
would have exceeded this threshold in every single constituency that they contested. This 
suggests that their cause had a residue of hard-core support throughout the country. There was 
very little dramatic variation, at the constituency level, in the level of support for the anti- 
Treatyites between the two elections, even if their national first preference vote increased in
1923. Secondly, strong anti-Treaty support existed in two areas, in the West of Ireland, and in 
the Southern 'Golden Vale' areas of North and East Cork, Tipperary and Waterford. This 
distribution correlates very well with areas where military opposition to the Free State was 
strongest during the civil war, suggesting that the IRA had popular support in these areas. 
Lastly, the figures for 1923 do little to reinforce the Provisional Government's claim that the 
public in the South and West was 'cowed' into an anti-Treaty attitude by the authoritarian tactics 
of the IRA. Overall support for the anti-Treatyites was stronger in the 1923 election, a time when 
the IRA was disbanded, than in 1922. Furthermore the anti-Treaty vote had less of a regional 
profile in 1923 and had to some degree become standardised throughout the country. In all the 
regions outside Dublin it averaged more than 23 per cent, a remarkable figure considering that a 
great number of anti-Treaty candidates were in prison or on the run.
Table 5.8. Numbers per thousand employed in Agricultural Occupations In 1926 bv Countv.
Centre Border PeriDherv
Dublin Co. Borough 533 Cavan 749
Dublin Co. 10 Donegal 709
Heartland Monaghan 685
Carlow 334 Leitrim 812
Kilkenny 448 Longford 634
Cork Co. Borough 11 Sligo 705
Cork Co East 433 Western PeriDherv
Cork Co. West 672 Galway 747
Kildare 127 Kerry 656
Wicklow 557 Clare 683
Laois 578 Mayo 801
Offaly 599 Roscommon 796
Limerick Co Borough 20
Limerick CO. 623
Louth 733
Meath 361
Tipperary Co NR 613
Tipperary Co S.R. 534
Westmeath 613
Waterford Co Borough 25
Waterford Co 579
Wexford 563
Source : Irish Free State Official Census 1926 Table 3(a) 13
It is more likely that popular support for anti-Treaty candidates can be explained by social 
variables rather than by the intimidatory presence of the IRA. The agricultural gradient running 
from the North West to the South East of the country is obviously the most relevant It was to the 
left of this line that opposition to the Free State was strong, while to the right of the line 
opposition to the Free State was weak. Garvin suggests that anti-Treaty support was strong in 
'poorer and more remote areas' in 1923.64 Table 4.5 below shows the number of people 
employed in agricultural occupations per thousand by county in 1926. Again a simple analysis of 
these figures suggests that Republican support was strongest in the Western periphery where the 
vast number of people were involved in agriculture. In contrast their support was weak where the 
economic structure was more diversified, as in most of the heartland of Ireland. Pyne notes that
64 T. Garvin, 1922; The Birth of Irish Democracy, p. 135
in 1923, 41 per cent of the third Sinn Fein party's seats came from the Western area of the 
country, compared to 30 per cent of the Government's seats. Sinn Fein succeeded in getting a 
third or more of the poll in the five Connacht constituencies and in Kerry and Clare. In all these 
areas the percentage of people living in urban areas was well below the national average. The 
party's share of the vote in the four counties with cities of 20,000 or more was below its national 
average.65 In contrast Cumann na nGaedheal did well in urban constituencies, especially in 
Dublin. There seems to be some connection between the rurality of the constituency and anti- 
Treaty support.
This analysis supports the hypothesis that support for the Free State was strongest in areas 
where the division of labour was highest, while support for the anti-Treaty sides was strongest in 
areas where the division of labour was lowest. In addition, we have seen that support for anti- 
Treaty candidates was stronger in areas where the level of political competitiveness was low, and 
weak where it was high. In short the Treaty split reflects differences in the division of labour 
throughout Irish society. In the East, South-East, and Midlands there was a high division of 
labour, combined with little pressure toward uniformity, whereas in the West and South West a 
low division of labour was combined with still strong pressures towards uniformity. Both Treaty 
positions then can be related to the type of social solidarity prevailing in different regions.
In summary there is evidence that the civil war reflected the tension inherent in a society with a 
high division of labour, in which there were also strong pressures towards uniformity. The 
elements of conformism and authoritarianism in Irish culture were at odds with the tendency 
towards social diversification inherent in the modernisation process. There has been a tendency 
to explain the civil war in terms of a conflict between two conceptions of independence, but in 
many ways the really significant electoral contest in 1922 was between the Republicans and the 
third parties. By and large the third parties came out the better in that conflict, at least in 1922, 
and may have inflicted further damage on the Republicans if they had contested more seats in 
1922. Were it not for the existence of uncontested constituencies and the confusing circumstances 
of the time, the scale of the Republican defeat could have been greater. That may not have 
affected the overall outcome but it might have made that conflict more apparent to outsiders.
5.3. Solidarity, Democracy, and the State.
Although Garvin, like Prager, is essentially concerned with Irish political culture, the political 
orientations described by them clearly belong to wider traditions of thinking about the state in 
Europe. Berki outlines what he sees as the 'two opposed philosophies of man as a member of a
65 P. Pyne, The Third Sinn Fein party, 1923-1926', Economic and Social Review, vol 1 (1969-70), p.236.
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human community1.66 Transcendentalism rests on the belief that man belongs primarily to a 
moral community which is ontologically prior to its members. Individuals are united together in 
pursuit of common and moral goals. The association of individuals has a public character to it 
which 'expresses more than the aggregate of the interests of its members'.67 The public interest 
delimits and defines the proper pursuits of individuals who form part of the community. Law is 
seen as the expression of the collective reason and moral purpose of the community. 
Instrumentalism in contrast assumes that man belongs primarily to an interest community. 
Association with a collectivity is accepted as a means of furthering individual interests and not 
primarily as an expression of moral feelings and aims. Membership of the community is 
conditional and based on consent. The association which results from the free association of 
members has no moral as opposed to legal personality : the collectivity is simply the sum of 
individual interests. 'Consequently the 'authority1 of the association derives solely from the rights 
of its members'.68 Law is not seen as an expression of collective will but as a means of 
maintaining rational agreement among the membership of the community.
Berki's distinction helps us to locate the Irish traditions in their proper European context. As an 
unheroic realistic philosophy of political behaviour instrumentalism tends to be limited in its 
aspirations about human beings. In Ireland acceptance of the Treaty was endorsed precisely in 
instrumental terms, even when acceptance meant a modification of previously held ambitions. 
Such a turnabout was justified in the name of the people's rights 'to regulate its development in 
accordance with hard military, economic, and political facts'.69 Taken to extremes the 
transcendental approach to politics will involve attempts to radically alter society since it assumes 
individuals will be moulded by collective purposes. It will not recognise the binding nature of the 
facts O' Higgins refers to, but assumes that societies can be transformed by collective endeavour. 
This was reflected in the classic Republican belief that the deaths of Republicans in the civil war 
would reverse majority opinion on the Treaty and 'inspire the vast majority of our countrymen to 
fight until independence is achieved'.70 In contrast, the instrumental approach will tend to 
reflect established social patterns and seek to protect the existing social fabric from disruption.
As each principle accepts that authority comes from the people, both can be considered 
democratic principles of statehood. The former sees democracy as a means of demonstrating the 
people's collective sovereignty, while the latter sees popular sovereignty not as the expression of 
a unified will, but as the result of a process of mutual readjustment between a collection of
66 R.N. Berki,'State and Society; An Antithesis of Modem Political Thought' in Jack Hayward & R.N. Berki 
(eds.), State and Society in Contemporary Europe (Oxford, 1979), pp. 1-18.
67 Ibid, 3.
68 Ibid,
69 K. O' Higgins, Civil War and the Events which led to it (Dublin, 1926), p.l.
70 R. Barton, July 1 1922, Memorandum of Ambulance Work & efforts for Peace', Peace Proposal J.F. 
Homan-Clontarf, Department of An Taoiseach, S8138, National Archives.
morally self-sufficient individuals. ‘Transcendentalism, in other words, places more emphasis on 
'sovereignty1, whereas instrumentalism accentuates the 'contractual' basis of government’.71 
Analogously in Ireland the Pro-Treaties defended the Treaty as the choice of the majority, or as 
Garvin puts it of 'the will of all', whereas for Republicans such acceptance meant denying the 
sovereignty of the people, the general will, which under less constrained conditions would have 
resulted in a vote for a Republic. The clash can be seen then as a conflict between two 
conceptions of democracy, one rooted in differing conceptions of popular sovereignty.
Berki suggests that the development of modem Europe has 'assumed an enduring pattern where 
variation can be usefully explained by the relative strength of state and society as institutions and 
as expressed through the relative position of predominance afforded to either of the two basic 
principles'.72 Independent Ireland could be said to represent a case in which the predominance 
of society over state, to adopt Berki's terms, was not the product of social evolution per se, but of 
a civil war in 1922. On the other hand, the manner in which the civil war involved an assertion 
of central state power in Ireland raises some questions about the validity of such a judgement. 
From the very beginning of the civil war the assertion of centralised authority over society was 
seen as the chief priority of the Provisional Government. As the war progressed, attitudes 
hardened. Warning his colleagues of the tough times ahead Hugh Kennedy, a government legal 
adviser, pointed out the lesson of recent political history which was that practically every 
challenge against central authority 'has been overcome by prompt, effective, vigorous, and utterly 
ruthless action'. Specifically comparing the Irish situation with that of Russia in 1917 and 
Germany in 1918, he concluded that revolution succeeded where 'the hand that ruled was either 
unwilling or unable to strike at the challenge hard enough and effectively enough'. In what 
seems a curious choice, he believed the Provisional Government should model itself on the Red 
Government whose 'worldly power' he admired, and the German Social Democrats, who like the 
Provisional Government vis a vis the Dail Departments, had been forced to crack down on the 
Worker's Councils by an external power. In Russia Kerensky fell because he neglected the 
importance of propaganda, intelligence, and the army.73
Durkheim's conception of the role of the state in a democratic system was an ambiguous one. On 
the one hand he accepted that the power of the state tended to increase as it became 'a prime 
institution concerned with the implementation and furtherance of individual rights'.74 However 
Durkheim thought that the power of the state could be curtailed by the existence of secondary 
groups in society which intervene between the individual and the state. 'Thus that which makes 
the central power more or less absolute is the more or less radical absence of any countervailing
71 Berki, op.cit.,p.4.
72 Ibid, p. 5.
73 Memo, n.d., Richard Mulcahy Papers, U.C.D. Archives.
74 A.Giddens, Durkheim, p. 3.
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force that is systematically organised with the intention of moderating that power'.75 On the other 
hand when faced with serious challenge to the social order the state had to react in a vigorous 
way, 'it is impossible for offences against the most fundamental collective sentiments to be 
tolerated without the disintegration of society, and it is necessary to combat them with the aid of 
the particularly energetic reaction which attaches to moral rules'.76 In less developed societies 
such crime is interpreted as a religious transgression. This enables the 'absolutist' state to 
appropriate the religious quality of the moral reaction to legitimate the use of coercive power: 
'offences against the state are treated as sacrilegious and hence to be violently repressed'.77 The 
possibility that this moral reaction could also be true of states in advanced societies was not 
discussed by Durkheim, or by Prager and Garvin.
Certainly the ability of intermediary groups to limit the power of the state in the Irish civil war 
was very limited. For the first months of the civil war the Irish parliament was suspended, later 
rigorous censorship was in operation, and mass internment was introduced. The abuses of state 
power were numerous:
Too many stories are coming to us from too many places to discount utterly the truth about the brutal 
treatment of prisoners ; about the methods of terrorism and intimidation that are being carried out by the 
Government on the authority of the Government in the pursuit of their intention to vindicate the authority of 
parliament.78
This draconian reaction on the Government's part raised two questions. In the first place, it led to 
the suspicion, articulated by Labour, that the government was far more concerned with the 
protection of property rights than of rights per se,19 and that a crucial aspect of any democracy, 
the rights of individuals to be protected from the state, did not in fact survive the civil war. 
Secondly, the Free State position was a statist one. The actions of the state may have been taken 
to defend a system of moral individualism but they involved an extension of state power. For 
Cosgrave the 'supreme duty' of the Government was to provide the conditions in which people 
could live in peace and in which social progress was possible. 'An ordered state existence, respect 
for the laws of God and all authority derived from Him, come first among these conditions'.80 
For Durkheim too, a strong state was not antithetical to individual freedom, 'our moral
75 E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, (London, 1982), p. 166.
76 Durkheim, ibid. p. 397.
77 A. Giddens, Durkheim, p. 3.
78 T. Johnson, Dail Debates, vol 1 col 184 , September 11,1922.
79 C. O' Shannon, Dail Debates, vol 1 col 8, September 11,1922
80 W. Cosgrave, Dail Debates, vol XL col 48, October 4,1931.
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individuality far from being antagonistic to the state, has on the contrary been the product of it' 
si
The reaction of the Free State government to the anti-Treatyite campaign was distinctly one of 
moral outrage. When asked to reconsider a modified version of the electoral pact in April 1923 
Cosgrave retorted
That means that you are asking that the people who want to burst up the present social fabric - the 
Communists - are to be allowed to get a constitutional position in the State. That the people who roast 
children, burst watermains, murder our men, will have to get a constitutional position in the state.82
In the Dail debate on the necessity of civil war in September, O' Higgins quoted a letter from a 
Republican prisoner that had been intercepted by the Free State authorities. In it the prisoner 
looked forward with relish to the abduction of bank officials and railway clerks. This drew the 
comment, 'in that single document you have embodied the disintegration that is at present 
proceeding apace in the country, the moral disintegration'.83 Another deputy suggested that the 
anti-Treaty campaign had 'extinguished the very moral principles that should be the basis of 
civilised society1.84 This analysis was shared by Cosgrave who saw a country beset with
a moral desolation nor merely in the ordinary acceptance of the term in which people think of dishonesty 
and disregard of individual rights, of reckless murder and general insecurity, but also the moral desolation 
in a blindly dishonest outlook and attitude towards the national position and the effect of the nation's Treaty 
of Peace.85
Clearly the government saw the civil war as a moral crisis and was itself not above impugning 
the motives of their opponents. An army report commented that the anti-Treatyites were 
supported by people who had in certain areas materially gained from the reign of the 'irregulars’, 
and from those who were enabled to 'evade' their 'civic responsibilities' by the irregular 
campaign, such as railway employees, post-office officials, and teachers.86
This reaction suggests that the distinction in Durkheim's work, between a society based on 
mechanical solidarity where social conformity is the result of a pervasive conscience collective 
and a society based on organic solidarity were such a conscience is assumed to be lacking, is to
81 Quoted in A. Giddens, Durkheim, p.59.
82 W. Cosgrave, Interview between the President and Donal Hannigan and M.J. Burke of Neutral I.R.A. 
February 27 1923', Peace Proposals of Old I.R.A', Department of An Taoiseach, S 8139, National Archives.
83 Ibid.
84 Kevin O’ Higgins, Dail Debates, vol 1 col 98, September 11,1922 
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85 W. Cosgrave, 'Oration at Grave of President Arthur Griffith', Department of An Taoiseach, S 5983/1, 
National Archives.
86 Chief of Staff to Minister of Defence, September 20 1923 Civil War Army Reports On Situation and 
Organisation, Department of An Taoiseach, S 3361.
some extent a false one. The existence of organic solidarity and of restitutive law 'cannot become 
wholly detached from the influence of the conscience collective1.87 When defending the 
government's decision to introduce repressive legislation in 1931, Cosgrave stated that 'the 
whole work of this state is held up by a crowd of people who posture as nationalists, who pose as 
patriots, and who act in contravention of the law of the state, the law of God, and every law 
which any democratic State would set up'.88 The only bulwarks against chaos were the Church 
and State, and Republicanism in the late 1920s aimed at 'the destruction of both'.89 In order to 
defend a system of moral individualism, or what Cosgrave later termed, 'freedom without 
licence', the government felt that: (a) a realisation by individuals of their responsibility to the 
state and ; (b) adherence to Christian teaching, were both necessary.
Clearly in Cosgrave's thinking 'a residuum of repressive law must continue to exist, regulating 
the moral codes necessary for the fulfilment of contracts, which is centred upon respect for the 
autonomy, dignity and freedom of the individual, i.e., moral individualism'.90 An alliance 
between Church and state was thus necessary to counteract the moral decay in society. That need 
prompted Kevin O' Shiel a senior legal adviser to suggest
that Cumann na nGaedheal link up therefore with some of the great class interests such as the Church or 
agriculture, that it should become in fact a Christian people's party to defend religion against the Atheist 
and the Freemason and property against the Bolshevik.91
This outlook formed the basis of the Cumann na Gaedheal 'law and order' position throughout 
the 1920's, and was the official reflection of the austere version of Catholicism that developed 
after the Famine.
The manner in which restitutive law comes to replace repressive law is not a unilinear process. 
Durkheim recognised that there were certain administrative and governmental functions 'where 
certain relationships are regulated by repressive law because of the special character marking the 
organ of the common consciousness and everything appertaining to it'.92 When the authority of 
the state itself comes under attack, punishment takes on a symbolic aspect, and is intended to 
bolster the authority of the central institutions. Thompson, who argues that primitive societies 
were not characterised by repressive law in the first place, suggests that the relationship between 
social development and the preponderance of restitutive law is a curvilinear one. He sees
87 A. Giddens, Durkheim, p. 29.
88 'Enforcement of Article 2A'. D 29/36, Department of Justice, National Archives.
89 W. Cosgrave, Dail Debates vol XL col 49, October 14,1931.
90 A. Giddens, Durkheim, p.29.
91 K. O' Shiel to Cosgrave, February 2 1923, Mulchay Papers P7/8/100, U.C.D. Archives.
92 E. Durkheim, Division of Labour in Society, (London, 1981), pp.82-83.
a move from restitutive law in the most simple societies to repressive law in the early stages of the 
establishment of the state as it attempts to get a monopoly of the legitimate use of coercion, followed by a 
return to restitutive law when the State has become established and secure. Civil and restitutive law can 
predominate when there is a high degree of social solidarity and value integration, and criminal law can 
predominate when the emerging State has still to establish ideological hegemony.93
The Irish case seems to confirm the truth of this hypothesis. Indeed after the civil war the small 
parties that had been so important in the spring of 1922 declined in importance. Local 
government was greatly weakened. Overall the society became even more reliant on strong 
central institutions, the state, the Catholic Church, and the Gaelic Athletic Association, for the 
supply of social and moral cohesion.94 An individualist and plural social order would not emerge 
until well after the Second World War. The conflict which was at the heart of the 1922 election, 
that between nationalist conceptions of the state and the reality of pluralist politics was not 
resolved by the civil war, but merely postponed.
In short, the extent to which a transition from a society based on mechanical solidarity to one 
based on organic solidarity involved a change in the character of the moral codes regulating 
individual behaviour should not be overstated. In Ireland the philosophical basis for moral 
individualism lay in ultramontane Catholicism. The civil war gave expression to the two poles of 
catholic political culture* but it appears that both Garvin and Prager have made the Cumann na 
nGaedheal - Fine Gael tradition appear more liberal, more secular, and more enlightened than it 
was. Moreover, one has to question the proposition that Irish society in 1922 was suffering from 
a deep-seated cultural division. Certainly there was much more common ground among the Sinn 
Fein elite than Prager is willing to admit. It was, according to Cosgrave, the objective of his 
government, not just to reassert the authority of the Courts and confirm the supremacy of 
parliament, but to 'resuscitate the Gaelic spirit and the Gaelic civilisation for which we have been 
fighting through the ages and all but lost'.95 Holy Ireland, the view of Ireland as a moral 
community, transcended the Treaty split. Because of this it is difficult to accept the view that the 
civil war rescued the Irish body politic from the influence of the pervasive authoritarianism that 
set in Post-Famine Ireland.
Conclusion.
In his discussion of recent transitions to democracy Fishkin has pointed out the difficulties 
involved in 'double transitions' where the transition to democracy and to a free market economy
93 K. Thompson, Emile Durkheim, (London,1982), p.91.
94 T. Garvin, The Aftermath', lecture given on seminar on Irish Civil War 1922-23, Cathal Brugha 
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are attempted together.96 This chapter highlights the fact that what was at stake in Ireland in 
1922 was not merely the construction of a new democratic political order, but also the 
maintenance of a social system premised upon the principles of moral individualism. In that 
sense the Irish case has been a forerunner of many transitions in Europe this side of the Second 
World War. One of the merits of the Durkheimian interpretation is to bring into focus the social 
dimension of the civil war, one that has tended to be obscured in conventional historiography. 
To the participants, at least on the Government side, the conflict was about much more than the 
issue of Treaty versus Republic, but one that raised questions about the proper basis for an 
ordered society itself.
A second merit of the Durkheimian approach is to relate the conflict to the existence of rival and 
deep-seated conceptions of the state in Ireland which had developed in the century or so before 
independence. There are problems with the account of these conceptions, particularly that given 
by Prager, but they help dispel the illusion that Irish nationalism was somehow predicated on a 
monolithical set of philosophical assumptions about political life. If anything there were, behind 
all the rhetoric, strongly contrasting conceptions of the democratic state in Ireland which 
continued to affect political life long after 1922. This was not simply an opposition between 
proponents of a nation-state proper versus those of a civic order composed of free and 
autonomous individuals, it was also a conflict between those that saw the state principally in 
terms of political legitimacy and those that saw it as the basis for social order. Not enough has 
been written about this subject but the works cited here are steps in the right direction.
Thirdly, there is considerable empirical evidence to support the proposition that the civil war 
conflict 'expresses the incomplete realisation of organic solidarity in the newly developing 
industrial order'.97 However, a society based on organic solidarity was not secured by the victory 
of the Pro-Treaty forces in 1922. As Durkheim himself would have supposed, the tensions 
between the two forms of solidarity would not be resolved until further advancement in the 
division of labour allowed them to be. Arguably such a society did not emerge until well after the 
Second World War. To some extent the civil war made that project more difficult. In so far as it 
gave expression for the first time to the two poles of Irish Catholic political culture, the conflict 
was a crucial moment in the democratic development of Ireland, but surely it was one that 
seriously impaired Irish elite political culture. The effect of the conflict may have been to 
accentuate the authoritarian tendencies on both sides.
The relationship between democracy, social solidarity and the state, was not adequately dealt 
with by Durkheim and is not sufficiently addressed by either Garvin or Prager. Both 'Staters' and
96 J. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions in Democratic Reform' (New Haven and 
London, 1991).
97 A. Giddens, Durkheim, p. 31.
Republicans came to preside over the most centralised democratic state in Europe, but the 
phenomenon of the state has not been seriously addressed by Irish social science. As late as 1941 
it was remarked that there was 'a different conception of civic duty and civic responsibility* on the 
two sides of the Irish political spectrum.98 We have today no clear idea of what these differences 
were based upon and where they originated. Clearly the manner in which the state established its 
authority over Irish society forms a basic part in our understanding of the development of the 
Irish political system. It is also relevant to our understanding of the role of the Catholic Church 
in the Irish political system. Unless we have some answers to these question it is not likely that 
we will come to any real understanding of the nature of Irish democracy in the interwar era.
98 W. Cosgrave, Dail Debates, vol 84 col 1320, July 9,1941.
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Chapter Six : Reshaping the Free State : De Valera 
and the Rise of Constitutional Republicanism
'Fianna Fail was perhaps slightly constitutional, but only in the way that a woman two or three months into 
a pregnancy is slightly pregnant'.
Declan Kiberd 1996.
It was once a standard observation of political science that democratic regimes require strong 
leaders for the solution of particularly intractable political problems. The Italian Marxist Antonio 
Gramsci analysed situations in which 'Caesarist' political strategies are employed by political 
leaders to transform conflict-ridden situations into situations where the basic authority of the 
central government is not contested. Caesarsim 'always expresses the particular solution in 
which a great personality is entrusted with the task of "arbitration" over a historico-political 
situation characterised by an equilibrium of forces headed toward catastrophe'.1 Such a 
personality bases his claim to absolute authority on successful appeals for national salvation or 
unity . 'Caesarist' political strategies, and the patterns of authority associated with them, may not 
be confined to liberal democratic states, but they are employed to transform situations that 
fundamentally threaten regime stability, where civil conflict between the rival parties cannot 
result in the victory of one or the other antagonists, into situations where normal political 
competition within the rules of the game can take place.
The analysis put forward in this chapter is based on the premise that the consolidation of a 
democratic system in interwar Ireland was a classic case of democratic 're-equilibration'. Indeed 
since the protagonists in the Irish case had only recently been involved in a civil war, the Irish 
case may be the classic case of democratic re-equilibration in this century. Re-equilibration is 
defined by Linz 'as a political process that, after a crisis that has seriously threatened the 
continuity and stability of the basic democratic political mechanisms, results in their continued 
existence at the same or higher levels of democratic legitimacy, efficacy or effectiveness'.2 The 
argument here is that de Valera's transformation of the Free State regime of the 1920s into the 
essentially Republican regime of the late 1930s resulted in a political system with a higher 
degree of legitimacy and effectiveness than that under Cosgrave, without ever departing from 
democratic rules and methods. Re-equilibration involves a profound transformation of the 
existing regime, but not of democratic institutions.3
1 A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (ed.) and translated by Q. Hoare and 
G.N. Smith (New York, 1971).
2 J. Linz, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, p. 87.
3 Ibid.
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The factors allowing re-equilibration to take place, depend, according to Linz, on a 'unique 
constellation of factors'.4 Inevitably since the process of re-equilibration involves a dynamic 
rearrangement of the patterns of elite competition it is necessary to concentrate on elite political 
strategies as the main variable in the re-equilibration process. Accordingly this chapter is divided 
into three sections. The first analyses the ideal-typical conditions under which re-equilibration 
takes place. The second section outlines the impact of de Valera's Fianna Fail party on the Free 
State. The third ends with a consideration of the political strategies de Valera employed to 
achieve a re-equilibration of the Free State.
6.1. The Re-equilibration Model.
Linz's account of the preconditions for democratic re-equilibration is based on his analysis of de 
Gaulle's role in the transition from the French Fourth to Fifth Republic. In his view re­
equilibration originates in a leadership outside a regime but acceptable to many within the 
regime. At the same time this new leadership is capable of bringing into the regime many of its 
erstwhile challengers and isolating its most extreme opponents. For re-equilibration to occur, this 
new leadership must be committed to legitimising the regime by democratic means and to 
preserving democratic institutions once in power. Finally, re-equilibration occurs in the presence 
of an electorate that is willing to approve of and trust in the new leadership's capacity to solve the 
initial insoluble problem of the regime. Democratic change is approved of by the electorate, 
passively or actively.5
Linz identifies six basic conditions which enable a re-equilibration to take place. First, is the 
existence of a leadership uncompromised by the loss of legitimacy and efficacy of the existing 
regime in crisis and committed to the creation of a new regime with new institutions to be 
legitimated by democratic means. Second, that leadership must be able to gain the acceptance of 
those loyal to the existing regime as well as those who choose 'disloyalty in crisis' and were 
therefore potential supporters of a non-democratic regime. Thirdly, the leadership of the regime 
that has lost power, efficacy and legitimacy must be able to accept that fact 'and facilitate rather 
than oppose the transfer of power'.6 Fourth, and closely related, is the willingness of the former 
leadership to subordinate the realisation of its policy goals in order to save the substance of 
democracy. This willingness and ability naturally presupposes some confidence in the democratic 
commitments of those to whom power is to be transferred. Fifth, Linz suggests that 'a certain 
level of indifference and passivity in the bulk of the population must exist in the final 
denouement of the crisis'.7 Stated differently, large sectors of the population are unavailable for
4 Ibid, p .8 8 .
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
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mobilisation by disloyal oppositions. Sixthly, Linz suggests that re-equilibration is only possible 
when the semi-loyal opposition is capable of controlling the disloyal opposition that is hostile not 
just to a particular regime, but to democracy itself. Re-equilibration, is a game in which the semi- 
loyal actors in the regime consciously deceive the disloyal political forces whose challenge may 
have precipitated the breakdown and brought them to power'.8
We shall see that all these conditions were present in large measure in the Irish experience of re­
equilibration. Re-equilibration ought to be conceived of as a game involving strategic interactions 
between three types of political actor, those loyal to the regime, those semi-loyal to it, and those 
disloyal to the regime. For it to succeed those loyal to the regime have to be satisfied that an 
attitude of semi-loyalty to the regime is sufficient reason to tolerate the semi-loyal opposition, 
while those who are semi-loyal to the regime have be more powerful or more pivotal in the 
system than those that will remain disloyal. The 'responsible' opposition has to reposition itself. 
Its task is not that different from that of democratic opposition parties in authoritarian regimes : 
its task 'is to change the relations among all the component parts of the non-democratic regime in 
such a way as to weaken the regime while simultaneously improving the conditions not just for 
regime change but specifically for democratisation'.9 Only then can a changeover take place. The 
role of the semiloyal opposition is thus the independent variable : the manner in which it 
consciously alters perceptions of what is feasible in a political system creates the possibility for 
re-equilibration and thus for a consolidation based on changeover. For this reason the bulk of this 
chapter is concerned with the repositioning of the Republican opposition to the Free State.
6.2. The Rise of Constitutional Republicanism
During the civil war opposition to the Free State had consisted of four overlapping elements. 
First, there was the rank and file of the IRA, who remained largely loyal both to the Second Dail 
and to their own Executive. Second, were the elected Anti-Treaty TDs who regarded the 
existence of the Free State parliament as a usurpation and supported the Republican government 
established in October 1922. After the war, a Republican Dail, Comhairle na dTeachtai, was 
formed to assist this government in its work. Third, were those elements of Irish civil society that 
were Republican in sympathy, but which refused to take sides in the civil war. The most 
important such group was the Neutral IRA Association which claimed a membership of over 
25,000. As the war wore on, its leaders became alienated from the Cosgrave government and 
ultimately considered forming their own party in the Spring of 1923. Finally, there was that 
section of the electorate that supported the Anti-Treaty side. While effective military opposition
8 Ibid.
9 A. Stepan, Democratic Opposition and Democratisation Theory1 in Government and Opposition, vol 32, 
no 4, (Autumn 1997), p.662.
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to the Free State was concentrated geographically, the Anti-Treatyites retained a hard core of 
electoral support throughout the country.
The fact that the Republicans lacked the support of the majority of the people was recognised by 
de Valera as their chief weakness:
If the Republicans stand aside and let the Treaty come into force, it means acquiescence in the 
abandonment of the national sovereignty and in the partition of the country - a surrender of the ideals for 
which the sacrifices of the past few years were deliberately made and the sufferings of these years 
consciously endured. It the Republicans do not stand aside, and they must resist, and resistance means just 
this civil war and armed opposition to what is, as I have said, the desire of the majority of the people. For 
Republicans the choice is therefore between a heartbreaking surrender of what they have repeatedly proved 
was dearer to them than life and the repudiation of what they recognise to be the basis of all order in 
government and the keystone of democracy - majority rule.10
The way out of this dilemma was to get majority support for the Republican position. From 
August 1922 onwards de Valera was keen to organise the civilian wing of the Anti-Treatyite 
movement. To this end the Republican government was established by the Army Executive in 
October 1922, to provide a rallying point and a centre of direction to co-ordinate the efforts in 
various fields'.11 The marginalisation of the Republican position in 1922 was attributed to the 
fact that during the War of Independence Republicans had lost control of their political party 
Sinn Fein.
If members of the IRA, who were also members of Sinn Fein clubs had remained active members and kept 
the organisation imbued with the proper Republican spirit and outlook, the present struggle would probably 
never be taking place. It was because the rank and file of the organisation fell into weak hands, and so the 
way was prepared for the events which led to civil war.12
The reform of Sinn Fein into an effective electoral machine accordingly became de Valera's 
most pressing ambition once the Republican government was established. What practical steps 
would achieve the twin objective of hamassing militant opposition to the Free State behind a 
party that would be sufficiently broad to appeal to a wide strand of nationalist opinion ? In the 
first place the name Sinn Fein was retained. Attempts to have the party rename itself the Irish
10 de Valera to Joseph Me Garrity, September 10 1922, McGarrity Papers, MS 17,440, National Library of 
Ireland.
11 Memo, from Eamon de Valera to Chief of Staff and Members of Executive, October 12 1922, Ms. 
31,528, Richard Mulcahy Papers, U.C.D. Archives.
12 Reorganisation of Sinn Fein', Dept A/C to O/C All Divisions and Independent Bodies, January 18 1923, 
Sinn Fein; de Valera papers relating to the organisation of Sinn Fein 1922-23, Department of An Taoiseach 
S 1297, National Archives.
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Republican Political Organisation were resisted by de Valera who insisted that 'we wish to 
organise not merely Republican opinion strictly so-called, but what might be called "Nationalist" 
or "Independence" opinion in general'.13 Secondly, members would have to declare their 
allegiance to the constitution adopted at the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis of 1917, so as to exclude those 
who stood for something less than the original demand for complete independence, as well as 
those who were willing to take the oath of allegiance to the Crown.14 Thirdly, IRA units were 
instructed to actively assist in the efforts at reorganising the party. Officers were to oversee the 
formation of Sinn Fein clubs in brigade areas and to encourage civilian supporters to join. It was 
stressed that the poor showing of the Anti-Treaty side in the civil war was due to the fact 'that our 
civilian supporters were not organised to assist us'.15 Lastly, a particular stress was put on 
electoral organisation. In this the demobilised IRA was to play a central role. Company o/c’s 
were instructed to furnish reports on the state of local electoral registers as a means of estimating 
the likely first preference support for Republican candidates in the next election, and as a means 
of ensuring that the registers were sufficiently up to date.16
The 1923 election presented the Free State with an opportunity to win public approval for its 
prosecution of the civil war and every effort was made to ensure that the election was contested. 
A highly militarised atmosphere continued to prevail and the authorities continued to harass 
Republican candidates. As many Sinn Fein candidates were imprisoned or on the run, 64 of the 
party's 85 candidates were unable to address their constituents during the campaign.17 Sinn 
Fein's level of electoral organisation was rudimentary.
In Cork Maire Comerford was given the whole country to organise on her own with only a bicycle for 
transport. She had been released from prison a few weeks before, weakened by a 27-day hunger strike and a 
leg wound received when she was shot during a prison protest. Her election machine consisted of young 
boys and girls. The only Sinn Fein T.D. not in prison was so deep in hiding that she had difficulty 
contacting him. The story was similar elsewhere. Sinn Fein was a party of pensioners, children and 
fugitives.18
However the anti-Treatyites received approximately a quarter of all first preference votes in the 
general election. This was an indication that 'the sympathy of a strong minority of the population' 
remained with the anti-Treatyites.19
13 To the Organising Committee from E. de Valera, May 31 1923, Sinn Fein 1094/1/11, National Archives.
14 Ibid.
15 Dept A/G to O.C.s of Divisions and Independent Brigades, May 28 1923, Sinn Fein; de Valera papers 
relating to the organisation of Sinn Fein 1922-23, Department of An Taoiseach, S 1297, National Archives.
16 To O/C Divisions and Independent Brigades, July 27 1923, Moss Twomey Papers, P 69, 74, 2, U.C.D. 
Archives.
17 M. Manning, Irish Political Parties; An Introduction (Dublin, 1972), p.l 1.
18 C. Foley, Legions o f the Rearguard: The I.RA. and the Modem Irish State (London, 1992), 35.
19 E. Neeson, The Civil War 1922-23 (Dublin, 1995), p.295.
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Republican government in October, 1922, was again divided into a political and a military 
wing1.23 At the first meeting of the new Army Council it was decided
That no Members of the Army Council or GHQ Staff shall hold himself free to enter the parliament of 
’Northern' or 'Southern' Ireland, or advocate the entrance of these bodies with or without the Oath of 
allegiance. Individual volunteers, as citizens, are free to express their views on political questions, provided 
that no such issues shall arise at Parades or staff or Council Meetings.24
On the other hand there was increased debate about the wisdom of the abstentionist policy among 
the politicians. In a series of newspaper articles between September 1925 and January 1926 Sean 
Lemass, Minister of Defence within the Republican Government, argued the case for a 
fundamental reappraisal of Sinn Fein's policy. In particular he stressed the need to concentrate on 
a single achievable political objective, such as the abolition of the oath of allegiance. The articles 
caused considerable debate within the movement.25 An Intelligence Report on an 'Irregular' 
Convention held in June 1925 suggested that the majority of the Republican TDs favoured 
entering the Dail and would mount a publicity campaign against the oath to that end.26This 
internal debate was intensified by the furore caused by the Free State's acceptance of the 
findings of the British Government's Boundary Commission, signed on December 3rd 1925. It 
had initially been hoped that the Commission would redraw the boundaries of the state to the 
advantage of Irish nationalists. However the Report actually recommended that the Free State 
cede some of its territory in Donegal to the Northern parliament. The Boundary crisis led to 
Clann Eireann, a splinter group, emerging from within the government's ranks. Labour tried to 
persuade Sinn Fein to take their seats in the Dail for the vote on the Commission but was 
unsuccessful. A combined opposition including Sinn Fein would have been able to outvote the 
governing party, but with Sinn Fein outside the Dail, there was little hope of that happening. In 
the long run however, the boundary crisis 'impressed upon de Valera and his associates the 
urgency of arriving at a decision, one way or the other, on the subject of a new policy1.27
On January 6th 1926 de Valera publicly announced his willingness to enter the Free State 
parliament if the oath of allegiance were removed. The previous ambitions of the party had been 
"too high and too sweeping'. He hoped to renew the fortunes of Sinn Fein by forcing a 
confrontation with the government on the question of the oath. The oath was' a definite objective 
within reasonable striking distance' and if he could move the people to smash it, 'I shall have 
them on the march again, and once moving, and having tasted victory, further advances will be
23 Pyne, op. cit., p.43.
24 'Evolution of Fianna Fail and new Sinn Fein Party1, S F 880 Department of An Taoiseach, National 
Archives.
25 Pyne, op.cit., p.44.
26 Civil War; Army Report 1925' S 4527, Department of An Taoiseach, National Archives.
27 Ibid, p.45.
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possible'.28 A resolution was circulated to all the branches of Sinn Fein proposing that if the 
admission oaths to the Southern and Northern parliaments were removed, 'it becomes a question 
not of principle but of policy whether or not Republican representatives should attend these 
assemblies'29 The resolution was debated by an Ard Fheis of the Sinn Fein party held in Dublin 
on March 9th 1926. A rival resolution, declaring that to attend any 'usurping legislature' would 
be inconsistent with 'the fundamental principles of Sinn Fein', was carried by a vote of 223 to 
218. On March 11th de Valera resigned as President of Sinn Fein. His policy also divided the 
Republican Dail which met on March 28th to discuss de Valera's policy. The body split into two 
halves of equal sides. Defeated by a majority of one, de Valera tendered his resignation 'as 
President of the Republic'.30 After a joint Committee failed to resolve the differences between the 
two sides over the abstentionist issue, the two wings of Sinn Fein agreed to split. Those delegates 
that supported de Valera's motion, a large minority, became part of Fianna Fail, the Republican 
Party.
Fianna Fail was founded on May 16 1926 at La Scala Theatre Dublin. Its programme was:
1. Securing the political independence of a united Ireland as a republic.
2. The restoration of the Irish language and the development of a native Irish culture.
3. The development of a social system in which, as far as possible, equal opportunity will be afforded to 
every Irish citizen to live a noble and useful Christian life.
4. The distribution of the land of Ireland so as to get the greatest number possible of Irish families rooted in 
the soil of Ireland.
5. The making of Ireland an economic unit, as self-contained and self-sufficient as possible - with a proper 
balance between agriculture and the other essential industries.31
There was nothing exceptionable about this programme, but the more immediate question was 
whether Fianna Fail would take their seats in the Dail. De Valera hoped that by concentrating his 
attack on the oath he would expose 'England's ultimate control' of the situation and smash the 
Treaty at the next election.32 These words were picked up upon by the Press to suggest that de 
Valera wished 'to obtain power to smash the Treaty and plunge the country into war with
28 De Valera to McGarrity, March 13 1926, Joseph McGarrity Papers, MS 174 41, National Library of 
Ireland.
29 Quoted in Pyne, op. cit, p. 45.
30 Comhairle na d Teachtai was a Repubican assembly of anti-Treaty candidates elected since 1922 which 
met to decide practical issues of Governmental policy in lieu of the Second Dail. In this and in subsequent 
discussions, de Valera farcically denied that he had been President of the Republic since 1922 which meant 
that his successor Art O' Connor could not succeed him as President of the Republic rather than of 
Comhairle na dTeachtai. See Two Docmnents 'A' and rB' found by the Police on the 10th of April 1928, 
during the course of a search of the premises, 27 Dawson Street, Dublin, Department of an Taoiseach, S 
5880, National Archives.
31 Quoted in J. Lee and G O' Tuathaigh, The Age o f de Valera (Dublin, 1982), pp. 62-63.
32 Ibid, p.63.
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England', but de Valera restated that Fianna Fail was out to use 'none but constitutional means to 
reassert the sovereign independence of Ireland'. He substituted the word 'rescind' for 'smash' and 
argued that his policy of 'rescinding' the Treaty, 'complete or in its vital objectionable clauses', 
was in keeping with either a true Republican or an 'honest' Free State outlook.33 Fianna Fail's 
actual intention was spelt out by Frank Aiken, former Chief of Staff of the IRA. Their policy was 
'to use the powers possessed by the Free State so-called Parliament' to build up the Irish nation 
'without in any way recognising the British King's authority in Ireland or recognising the right of 
any county or counties to secede from the nation'. For Aiken this clearly meant experimenting 
with purely constitutional methods.
For myself, I would much rather, if I had the choice, win our freedom in this way, peacefully and with the 
great majority of the people enthusiastically partaking in the struggle, than to obtain a victory by a minority 
with arms, even though the latter were comparatively short and easy.34
In the run up to the June 1927 election, representations were made by the Army Council of the 
IRA proposing co-operation between 'all Republican bodies' for the purpose of defeating 
Cosgrave.35 They were based on the assumption that Sinn Fein would not 'insist on the 
immediate proclamation of the Republic should a majority be secured' and Fianna Fail would 
agree 'not to enter the Free State legislature as a minority party*. The IRA proposed that a 
National Board be established to approve candidates and election addresses. In the event of a 
Fianna Fail victory the Free State army would be disbanded and disarmed while the Army 
Council of the ERA would become the Army Council of the Minister of Defence.36 In the 
discussions which took place on April 26th 1927 Fianna Fail were *unwilling to agree that its 
candidates would guarantee not to enter if returned in a minority, even it the oath were 
removed'.37 After being unanimously rejected by the National Executive of Fianna Fail, de 
Valera was approached personally, but replied that he was in complete agreement with the views 
of his Executive.38 Fianna Fail would fight the election alone and were committed to ending their 
absentionist policy.
In the election Fianna Fail came close to equalling the government's share of seats, gaining 44 
as opposed to Cumann na nGaedheal's 47 seats. On June 23 Fianna Fail arrived at the Dail to 
take their seats, but were prevented from doing so as long as they refused to take the oath. De 
Valera then turned to article 48 of the 1922 constitution which allowed for referenda on
33 Letter to Press, February 24 1927, P 69/48 (201) Moss Twomey Papers, U.C.D. Archives.
34 'A Call to Unity', June 19 1926, FF 22, Fianna Fail Archives.,
35 Secretary, Army Council to Eamon de Valera May 11 1927, P69/48/30 Moss Twomey Papers.
36 Memorandum of suggested basis for co-operation between Republican bodies for General Election and 
after if  a majority of Republicans are elected', ibid, P69/48/35.
37 Meeting of Representative Individuals of Republican Bodies to Consider Army Council Proposals for 
Co-ordination for General Election 26 April 1927 ibid.
38 To Secretary, Army Council, from Eamon de Valera, 13 May 1927, p69/48/29 Moss Twomey Papers.
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constitutional amendments if a petition signed by not fewer than 75,000 signatures were 
presented to the government. 'There was very little likelihood of the Irish public voting to retain a 
vote of allegiance to the British Crown', as Coogan remarks.39 However the assassination of a 
government Minister, Kevin O' Higgins, on July 10, led to a dramatic change in government 
policy. The government introduced a bill requiring electoral candidates to promise in advance to 
comply with the oath. At a stroke the whole basis of the abstentionist policy was destroyed. De 
Valera had not believed that the oath would be removed from within the Free State parliament 
unless the Irish people gave 'an unequivocal mandate for its abolition'. Only then would the other 
parties refuse to take it.40 Moreover he had rejected the idea that he would pledge himself 'in 
terms that appear to me to have no meaning'41 Nevertheless Fianna Fail decided to enter the 
Dail, take the oath, (albeit as an 'empty formula'), and became the largest opposition party in the 
House.
The impact of Fianna Fail's entry into the Dail on Sinn Fein proved to be devastating. Those 
who had left to form Fianna Fail initially continued to attend the Republican Dail, although de 
Valera had resigned as President of the Republic. After entering the Free State parliament, their 
continued attendance became impossible. Sinn Fein had only been able to put forward 15 
candidates for the June 1927 election as opposed to Fianna Fail's 87.42 Only five were elected. 
Sinn Fein were unable to put any candidates forward for the election that took place in 
September 1927. When the Republican Dail met on December 11 1927, only half of those who 
had attended the previous year were invited to attend, as the other half had attended the Free 
State parliament. Indeed the Republican Dail was reduced from its original strength of 128 in 
1922 to a mere twenty. There seemed little future for the organisation. According to its new 
President Art O' Connor,
we are in a very difficult position since the Army decided to withdraw its allegiance in November 1925 - so 
that as a Government we were left without the physical force to carry out any orders or decrees we might be 
seeking to enforce with a strong hand, and with the departure of Fianna Fail from the Dail as a moral force 
we are greatly weakened, and the fact that a great many people who call themselves Republicans do not 
give us any allegiance or support of any description is undoubtedly a great source of moral weakness to
39 T. P. Coogan, De Valera; Long Fellow, Long Shadow (London, 1993), p.400.
40 Press Statement, 18 April 1926, FF22, Fianna Fail Archives.
41 Interview with special correspondent of the Irish World, 21 August 1926, ibid.
42 Ibid, p.398.
43 Report of Meeting of Dail Eireaim', December 10, 1927, Department of Justice, S 1/23 'Sinn Fein Ard 
Fheis1 etc, National Archives.
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The number of affiliated Sinn Fein Cumainn in 1927 was 87 compared to a figure of 232 for the 
year 1926.44 The attitude towards the Fianna Fail organisation was one of considerable 
bitterness. One speaker demanded that Fianna Fail candidates return the Sinn Fein election 
deposits that helped get them elected 45 However it was difficult to stop members participating in 
elections on behalf of the Fianna Fail organisation. Sinn Feiners still invited Fianna Failers to 
speak on the same platforms. Many Sinn Fein members and supporters who initially remained 
loyal to the party later joined Fianna Fail, 'attracted by its dynamism and the political acumen of 
its leaders'46 So great was this tendency to drift, that it was proposed at the party's Ard Fheis in 
December 1930 that Sinn Fein members be forbidden to have contact 'for any purposes 
whatsoever' with those who had taken an oath of allegiance 47
Fianna Fail were more than ever caught up in the logic of electoral politics. The results of the 
general election of June 1927 had left the balance of power in the hands of the smaller parties. 
Cosgrave formed a minority administration. A coalition of Labour, the National League, and the 
Fanner's Party, with Fianna Fail support, was proposed during the summer. De Valera indicated 
that if the recent Public Safety Bill were overturned, and the oath removed, Fianna Fail would not 
make an issue of constitutional questions during the life of the next Dail.48 With Labour and the 
National League sharing a policy of appeasement towards the Republican opposition, an 
alternative to the Cosgrave administration existed. However on August 10th 1927 Cosgrave 
survived a narrow no-confidence vote in the Dail. Nevertheless Fianna Fail's performance at the 
resulting snap election of September 1927 when it lost not a single seat, and increased its share 
from 44 to 57 proved a vindication of 'the new departure'.49
While Fianna Fail's commitment to the political process was strong, its attitude to the Free State 
was not free of ambiguity. From Republicans it drew the criticism that their entry into the Free 
State parliament 'would stabilise British rule in Ireland'.50 From their opponents they drew the 
criticism that they secretly wanted to destroy the Free State. De Valera told his opponents on the 
Government benches:
I still hold that your right to be regarded as the legitimate government of this countiy is faulty, that this 
House itself is faulty. You have secured a de facto position. Very well, there must be somebody in charge to
44 Cunnta an Runaidhe Onoraigh, Department of Justice, S 1/23 'Sinn Fein Ard Fheis' etc, National 
Archives.
45 Garda Report on Sinn Fein Ard Fheis held at the Rotunda House December 11 1927, December 15 
1927,Department of Justice, S 1/23 'Sinn Fein Ard Fheis' etc, National Archives.
46 Pyne, op. cit., p. 47.
47 Irish Independent, December 1 1930.
48 Speech by E. de Valera, Burgh Quay, July 27 1927, Thomas Johnson Papers, Ms 17169, National 
Library.
49 R. Fanning, Independent Ireland (Dublin, 1983), p.99.
50 M, MacSwiney to J. McGarrity, 12/4/26.
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keep order in the community and by virtue of your de facto position you are the only people who are in a 
position to do it. But as to whether you have come by that position legitimately or not, I say you have not 
come to that position legitimately. You brought off a coup d'etat in the summer of 1922.51
However de Valera said he hoped to 'broaden and widen' the parliament so that it would become 
'the sovereign national assembly of the Irish nation'. In addition, a Fianna Fail government would 
not stand for a policy of removing Free State officials from positions of authority, but would 
assume that 'those who took service in the Free State did it believing they were right'.52 Such 
steps as Fianna Fail would take to undermine the Treaty settlement would only be taken in 
consultation with Irish public opinion. On that line on May 1928 de Valera again attempted to 
force the government to hold a referendum on the oath, but was prevented from doing so when 
the Cosgrave government removed the provision for referenda from the constitution.53 The 
government's use of their right to amend the constitution by ordinary legislation over a 
prescribed period emphasised again the necessity of undermining the Treaty settlement with the 
machinery of the state at their disposal rather than from the opposition benches.
On the other hand the years in opposition allowed the party to develop a detailed range of 
policies they could offer as an alternative to the Cosgrave government. Where the Cosgrave 
governments were sparing in their attitude to public expenditure, Fianna Fail were early 
Keynsians in their attitude to state intervention in the economy. Where Cumann na nGaedheal 
were in favour of free trade, Fianna Fail believed in economic protectionism. Where Cumann na 
nGaedheal were exponents of tough law and order policies, Fianna Fail were critical of attempts 
to force Republicans into allegiance to the Free State. Indeed Fianna Fail saw themselves as 
spokesmen for the whole Republican opposition, including the IRA.54 In power they would set 
aside forever the government's proposed Public Safety Bill, which if passed, 'would one day 
deluge Ireland with the blood of some of its noblest men' according to one Fianna Fail 
spokesman.55 Fianna Fail then, remained critical of attempts to force Republicans into a position 
of allegiance to the Free State, which they argued only led to an increase in violent opposition. 
As de Valera said,
If you deny people who are animated with honest motives, peaceful ways of doing it, you are throwing them 
back upon violent ways of doing it. Once they are denied the peaceful way they will get support for the
51 Quoted in The Earl of Longford and T.P. O' Neill, Eamon de Valera (Dublin, 1970), p.263.
52 Ibid, pp.260-261.
53 Ibid, p.266.
54 Ibid, p.263.
55 Report of Meeting at Findlater Place' Fianna Fail; Meetings, Speeches, 1929, Department of An 
Taoiseach, S 5962, National Archives.
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violent way that they would never get otherwise. There is no use in my preaching that doctrine to the 
Executive Council. The Executive Council only know one way -the way of the big stick.56
What added to the normal process of political polarisation these divergences gave rise to, was 
the government's perception that the Fianna Fail programme was part of 'a widely organised 
conspiracy to over throw by force the government of the state'.57 Two politically motivated 
murders took place in 1929, three in 1931. A new left wing organisation Saor Eire was 
established in 1931, which, government sources anticipated, would supersede that of Sinn Fein 
in winning the allegiance of the IRA.58 This led the government to introduce amendment 
seventeen to the constitution on October 17 1931. This amendment allowed for the establishment 
of a five-man military tribunal with sweeping powers including the death penalty. The Executive 
Council or cabinet was also empowered to declare organisations unlawful. On October 20 1931 
the IRA and ten other organisations were declared unlawful. Of the radical organisations in the 
State, only Sinn Fein remained legal.59 Five 'seditious' publications were declared illegal by the 
Military Tribunal.60
As part of its electoral strategy for the 1932 election the Cosgrave government choose to associate 
the Fianna Fail party with this conspiracy by suggesting that a Fianna Fail government would not 
be able to control the gunmen. It emphasised the 'crypto-socialist' and 'slightly constitutional' 
character of Fianna Fail.61 Some believed that by acting as the constitutional spokesman for 
radical movements Fianna Fail was undermining the loyalty of the average voter to the 
government:
The plain man in the street is unable to see wherein those who have elected to continue the war are less 
justified than those who elected after a time to abandon it and are now not unlikely to secure no less 
unquestionable a tribute of public approval than that of being entrusted with the government of the 
country.62
56 Dail Debates , Vol XL, Col 56, October 14,1931.
57 Dail Debates, Vol XL, Col 32, October 14,1931.
58 Garda Report on Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 1931, October 10 1931, Department of Justice, S 1/23 'Sinn Fein 
Ard Fheis' etc, National Archives.
59 R. Fanning, Independent Ireland, 104. The proscribed organisations were Saor Eire, the Irish 
Republican Army, Fianna Eireann, Cumman na mBan, Friends of Soviet Russia, The Irish Labour Defence 
League, The Worker's Defence Corps, The Women's Prisoners Defence League, The Worker's 
Revolutionary Party, The Irish Tribute League, The Irish Working Farmer's Association, and the Worker’s 
Research Bureau.
60 These were Irish World, An Phoblacht, Worker's Voice, Irish Worker, and Republican File.
61 D. Keogh, De Valera, the Catholic Church, and the Red Scare', 1931-1932' in J.P. O' Carroll and J.A. 
Murphy (eds.) de Valera and his Times (Cork, 1983), p. 144.
62 General O' Duffy, Memo Implenting the proposed Treasonable Offences Act' October 7 1931, 
Department of Justice, B.22/35, National Archives.
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While denying the allegations, Fianna Fail opposed the government's introduction of the Public 
Safety Act in 1931 and demanded that Republican prisoners be released from Irish jails. They 
also sought a majority mandate from the people to remove the oath. In both these policies Fianna 
Fail undoubtedly received the support of local brigades of the IRA as well as the grudging 
approval of other Republican associations. An IRA directive, taken just before the 1932 election, 
allowed IRA members to work and vote in elections and many did so in support of Fianna Fail. 
The Army Council denied that this was part of a deliberate change of policy but arose from the 
fact that hatred against the Coercionist regime was so intense the Volunteers could not be 
restrained from working against their candidates'.63 The results of the 1932 election did little to 
vindicate the government's scare tactics. As Fanning remarks, the 'red scare' was far less 
effective in 1932, after Fianna Fail had spent a full term in the Dail as the main opposition party, 
than it would have been in 1927.64 In the election Fianna Fail emerged as the largest party, 
securing 44.5 per cent of the first preference support, higher than Cumann na nGaedheal ever 
achieved, even in 1923.65 All the other parties lost support. Fianna Fail was enabled to form a 
minority government with the support of the Labour Party, which was promised that some of its 
own policies would be introduced by Fianna Fail. Since 1927 Labour and Fianna Fail had been 
competing for much of the same support, especially in Dublin working class areas, where the 
government had 'shirked the responsibility of providing them with work or a living wage'.66 
From 1927 on the socio-economic policies of both parties were rather similar.
For some Republicans it was an article of faith that nationalist objectives could not be achieved 
by constitutional means. Accordingly, they had a vested interest in downplaying the significance 
of de Valera's achievements. According to one critic,
There are few, if any, Republicans who do not sincerely rejoice that the gaols are empty of political 
prisoners for the first time in ten years (there are still Republican prisoners in the Six County Area); that 
the Irish people have not merited lasting disgrace by putting back into power the authors of the most 
infamous Coercion Act Ireland has ever known; that the men who accounted it a bond of honour to fasten 
England's yoke more tightly on Ireland, have at last, been driven out of office - never again, it is to be 
hoped, to get control- but while recognising that these things are good, it is necessary to emphasise that the 
Irish Free State is still a British Institution - not Irish- not Free- not a state in any real sense - and that until 
the whole Treaty is repudiated, every line and word of it, that British institution is usurping the place of the 
lawful Government of the Republic.67
63 Army Council Dispatch no 189, May 7 1932, Moss Twomey Papers, P 69/185/ 269.
64 R  Fanning, op. cit., p. 107.
65 Ibid.
66 T. Derrig, Report of Meeting at Findlater Place' Fianna Fail; Meetings, Speeches, 1929, Department of 
An Taoiseach, S 5962, National Archives.
67 M. MacSwiney, The Irish Republic (Cork, n.d.), p.36.
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However overt hostility to the de Valera government from the IRA was initially abated by the 
fact that de Valera precipitated an 'economic war' with Britain by his refusal to pay land 
annuities to Britain. Land annuities were paid by tenant farmers who had borrowed money to 
purchase their farms under the land reform schemes of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Under the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 these annuities were to form part of the 
income of the two governments, North and South. Nevertheless, since the Treaty, Irish 
governments had been handing over an annual sum of almost 3,000,000 to the British 
Exchequer. This arrangement was formalised by a meeting between Irish and British officials in 
March 1926. According to de Valera's official biographers 'the total annual payment being made 
to Britain was over £ 5,000 ,000, or about one fifth of the total revenue of the Irish 
government'.68 Now de Valera was refusing to pay the annuities to the British, who in turn 
imposed tariff duties on Irish imports. A tariff war ensued which badly affected Irish exports.
The IRA were quick to see in the 'economic war* a chance to cement their alliance with Fianna 
Fail. Immediately after the election however Fianna Fail refused an offer of IRA co-operation. 
Instead they proposed that the IRA accept de Valera's 'Dump Arms' order of April 1923 which 
required that both the Free State Army and the IRA decommission their arms. Fianna Fail asked:
(1) Whether the Irish Republican Army of today will on its part accept these proposals (Cease Fire 
Proposals) if a Fianna Fail government does so ?
(2) May I take it that on a removal of the oath and the acceptance publicly of the "Cease Fire" proposals by 
a Fianna Fail government, the IRA will place their arms at the disposal of the elected representative of the 
people ?
Each battalion of the IRA was offered these terms for discussion by the Army Council and all 
turned them down. The ERA committed itself to its continued existence as a distinct organisation 
with all arms and equipment under its control. The government refused to go into conference 
with the Army Council to discuss their alternative interpretation of de Valera's 'Dump Arms 
order'. No meetings between the two sides took place from February onwards. Later in the 
summer however, with the tariff war in full swing, Fianna Fail were again anxious for IRA 
support. However on July 18 1932 further attempts, instigated by the IRA Army Council, to draw 
Fianna Fail into an alliance came to nothing. Fianna Fail again rejected proposals for a joint 
policy on the grounds 'that the situation which had arisen had been created solely by Fianna Fail, 
with no aid from us (i.e. the IRA), and that the direction and control must continue absolutely to 
be vested in the Fianna Fail government'.69 Moreover Fianna Fail were keen to avoid giving the
68 Lord Longford and T.P. O' Neill, Eamon de Valera, p.262.
69 P 69/185/269 Moss Twomey Papers.
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impression of 'a government inside a government' and suggested instead that the IRA confine 
themselves to organising shows of public support for the policies of the government. Indeed the 
possibility of bringing the existence of the IRA to an end was again raised by the government. 
This did not unduly disturb the IRA but some of its more perceptive members realised that the 
writing was on the wall. One senior figure said he believed that 'practically all the Republican 
and anti-Free State feeling is pro-DeV and that Fianna Fail are going to hold the fort for a long 
time to come'.70
The temporary alliance of two organisations united in a desire to oust the Cosgrave government 
was coming to a close. The IRA had decided to support Fianna Fail at the polls in 1932 without 
having had a discussion with them. After the election their overtures to the government were 
rejected. The government did not suspend Article 2A from the constitution although military 
trials were halted. The hated Criminal Intelligence Department, responsible for counter­
insurgency, remained in existence. Moreover a former Cumann na nGaedhealer had been chosen 
as Minister of Justice, one who attended an inspection of Civic Guards accompanied by the head 
of the C.I.D. David Neligan, who in the opinion of Republicans was 'directly responsible for the 
murder of many Republicans, while indirectly responsible for the murder of many others'71 Frank 
Aiken, former Chief of Staff of the IRA attended functions at the Curragh Army Barracks in his 
capacity of Minister of Defence accompanied by the Chief of Staff of the Irish Army. The 
Government invited their former foes such as Ernest Blythe and Desmond Fitzgerald to the 
annual Republican commemoration ceremony at Arbour Hill. A cynic remarked that it was 
difficult to tell which side would have been more uncomfortable! Other aspects of Fianna Fail 
policy rankled with extreme Republicans too. De Valera attended the Imperial Commonwealth 
Conference at Ottawa and declared that he was willing to see the annuities issue decided by 
arbitration, an indefensible position for Republicans. On a more humorous note, 'the order issued 
by the Fianna Fail party prohibiting its members from associating with Cosgrave's friends at the 
bar of Leinster House has been completely disregarded and the inevitable fraternal spirit has 
already been established'.72
However with the tariff war in full swing and strong domestic opposition to Fianna Fail 
emerging, the IRA leadership were reluctant to withdraw their support fully from the Fianna Fail 
organisation. Again they assured de Valera of their informal support during the snap election of 
January 1933 on the grounds that 'such an outcome would least jeopardise the National position 
and the economic development of the country*73 Afterwards the position of the IRA was one of 
critical, tactical, and temporary support:
70 Gilmore to Twomey, n.d. P 69/53/368, Moss Twomey Papers.
71 Claim na Gael Circular, June 10, 1932, P69/185/288, Moss Twomey Papers.
72 Ibid.
73 Moss Twomey, unpublished notes, n.d., P69/186/1.
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What everybody both in the U.S. and here too is reluctant to admit is that the advent to power of the Fianna 
Fail party has made a difference, not fundamentally, but in regard to the tactics which must be followed. 
While they stand in the same relation to the Republic so far, as the Cosgrave regime, they have not taken 
any positive action detrimental to the Republican cause; theirs are sins of omission. We all realise that they 
are trying, through propagandist statements, to represent themselves as standing for far more than they are 
taking any active measures to accomplish, in time, if they will shirk action, they too will be exposed. But 
against the traitorous Imperialist parties, there should be little doubt as to where we should stand. A time 
may come when it may be immaterial to us which Treaty party is in office but that time is not yet. Our 
policy ought to be to take advantages of the very atmosphere they are keen on creating, namely that they are 
not antagonistic to Republican ideals or Republican organisations. If we avail of this opportunity we will be 
in a position later on to fight off any attack when directly made against us.74
On the other side of the political spectrum the hardship caused by the 'economic war' to powerful 
Irish agricultural interests helps explain how a small 'Army Comrades Organisation', founded 
in 1931 to protect the interests of Irish ex-servicemen, became, under a variety of different 
names, the vehicle for a widespread protest movement against the policies of Fianna Fail.75 The 
movement became particularly strong after de Valera had been returned with an absolute 
majority in the general election of 1933. 'The Blueshirts' as they were known, became a partner 
in the new Fine Gael organisation in 1933 and were accordingly impossible to suppress fully. 
Under the leadership of Eoin O' Duffy they committed themselves to a revitalisation of an 
opposition demoralised by successive defeats at the polls, to the protection of free speech for Fine 
Gael politicians, and ultimately to the prevention of annuity payments to the government. Their 
actions were represented by the government as constituting collusion with an outside power 
against the national interest, but the Blueshirts were largely the product of domestic misgivings 
about the Fianna Fail government.76
Various failed attempts by the government to suppress the Blueshirts led to the re-introduction of 
trial by military tribunal. As is shown below in table 7.1. the mid-thirties saw the re-emergence 
of seriously disordered conditions in the country with a systematic attempt being made to prevent 
the collection of rates and land annuities. Paradoxically for an organisation that was considered 
Fascist by their opponents, in their opposition to Fianna Fail policy the Blueshirts were resorting 
to tactics more reminiscent of the agrarian agitations of the nineteenth century. In this vein they 
were referred to as 'our left wingers' by James Dillon, a member of the Fine Gael party.77 
However because their tactics placed them outside the law, the Cumann na nGaedheal element
74 To Secretary Clan na Gael from Moss Twomey, February 13 1933, P69/185/95.
75 See M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics (Dublin, 1997), pp 135.-167.
76 For a full account see Cronin, ibid.
77 J. Dillon to F. MacDermott September 15 1934, Frank MacDermott Papers, 1056/2/2, National 
Archives.
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within the Fine Gael party precipitated O' Duffy's resignation as President of Fine Gael in 
September 1934. From then on the radical element within Fine Gael was marginalised. As can 
be seen from table 6 .1., which divides the politically motivated offences committed between 
August 1 1934 and August 16 1935 into two periods, the signing of an Anglo-Irish coal-cattle 
Pact in December 1935 was a turning point in the decline of right-wing political violence. 
Certainly the high point of serious disorder had been reached by the end of 1934. With the end of 
the econmomic war the Blueshirt's agitation quickly died down.
Table 6.1. Politically Motivated Outrages Committed between 1/7/1934 and 31/5/1935 divided into 
two periods.
1/7/34 - 31/5/35 1/7/34-16/1/35 16/1/35 - 31/5/35
No. of outrages reported
718 604 114
Detection made 205 184 21
Persons arrested 570 536 34
Persons convicted 469 453 16
Source : Malicious Damage to Property ; Cutting of Telegraph and Telephone Wires, Blocking of Roads, 
Felling of Trees -period from August 1st 1934 to 16th July 1935'. Department of Justice D. 28/34 National 
Archives, Dublin.
It may be, as Fanning speculates, that the long-term significance of the Blueshirts was merely to 
delay the confrontation between de Valera and the IRA.78 Certainly in 1933 and 1934, 
confrontation with an IRA operating under the slogan "No Free Speech for Traitors', was the 
preserve of the Blueshirt organisation. Shortly before his resignation O' Duffy told a group of his 
supporters in Tipperary that 'they must break the skull of anyone who said they were traitors'.79 
Yet after 1934, with the Blueshirts in rapid decline, confrontation with the IRA became the 
preserve of the official law enforcement agencies of the state. That there would be a confrontation 
was apparent from a radical change in IRA policy introduced by the General Army Convention 
held on 17th and 18th March 1933. Among the new charges being brought against the Fianna 
Fail government was that they represented 'the struggle of Irish capitalism for increased freedom 
from British Imperialism'.80 The IRA were no longer behind Fianna Fail's economic war and 
rescinded its resolution, carried at the Army Convention of 1932, to adopt a supportive attitude 
towards the government. It would now 'pursue its policy irrespective of its reactions on the policy
78 R  Fanning, The Rule of Order1: Eamon de Valera and the I.RA., 1934-1940', n J.P. O' Carroll and JA. 
Murphy (eds.) de Valera and his Times (Cork, 1983), p.163.
79 J. Dillon to F. MacDermott, September 25 1934, Frank MacDermott Papers, 1065/2/4, p.6.
80 Peadar O' Donnell, General Army Convention, March 17 1933, P 69/186(1), Moss Twomey Papers.
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of the Free State Government and other political parties'.81 A new hardline attitude reasserted 
itself. One speaker, Sean Mac Bride, soon to replace Twomey as Chief of Staff, declared that 
'until the Republic for the 32 counties is established, my attitude remains unchanged'.82
De Valera's main political opponent however remained the British government. If he was to 
vindicate his strategy of achieving Republican objectives by constitutional means, tangible gains 
in Anglo-Irish relations must be made. The Removal of the Oath Bill, which became law on May 
3 1933 went some way towards fulfilling the government's ambition of establishing a government 
based on democratic principles 'and the complete absence of political barriers or tests of 
conscience of any kind'.83 On the other hand, the reintroduction of military tribunals represented 
a failure of de Valera's ambition to achieve 'internal peace without coercive legislation'.84 The 
Fianna Fail party was unhappy with its position as a Republican government which repressed 
militant Republicanism. It was composed of people 'who have given sufficient proof of their 
attachment to the Republican ideal who are now held up to obloquy as the 'instruments of British 
oppression'.85 This quandary pressed upon de Valera the need to accelerate the more positive 
part of his campaign. Government pensions were introduced for members of the anti-Treaty IRA. 
Former IRA men were recruited into the new ancillary Police Force, the Broy Harriers. The 
government had also shown a certain amount of leniency towards the organisation in its conflicts 
with the Blueshirts, to the dismay of Fine Gael politicians.86 By the second half of 1935 the 
Gardai believed the IRA to be in decline. Aside from the effects of coercive legislation, 
government measures were forcing the IRA into a constitutional position. To further this process 
a Garda document suggested de Valera look to 'legislative acts directed towards the political and 
economic emancipation of our country. In particular a new constitution 'will, I feel certain 
succeed in demilitarising the IRA, and remove the organisation as a serious menace to 
democratic government'.87 In 1932 the IRA Army Council had stated that 'only a constitution in 
which are enshrined the Rights and Principles the (1916) Proclamation so fearlessly set forth can 
claim the allegiance of the Irish people'.88
The creation of a new constitution was only one of a broad range of changes in Anglo-Irish 
relations that were introduced by de Valera between 1933 and 1938. These changes are 
summarised in table 7.3. Taken together they undermined those aspects of Anglo-Irish relations
81 Resolution No. 25 carried at General Army Convention, March 17 1933, P 69/186(1), Moss Twomey 
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83 S 2445, Department of An Taoiseach, National Archives.
84 R. Fanning, The Rule of Order1: Eamon de Valera and the I.R.A, 1934-1940', in J.P. O' Carroll and J.A. 
Murphy (eds.) de Valera and his Times (Cork, 1983), p. 163.
85 N.d.,S 2445, Department of An Taoiseach, National Archives.
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87 Garda Document, Detective Branch H.Q., October 23 1935, S 2454 Department of An Taoiseach, 
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that were considered incompatible with Irish sovereignty over the twenty six counties. 
Amendment 27 of the constitution completed the emasculation of the office of Governor General. 
The amendment also removed the King from the constitution, thus overturning the chief 
Republican criticism of the 1922 constitution. The passing of the External Relations Bill in 1936 
provided for the continuance of all existing relations, but the Act was a simple statute repealable 
by ordinary legislation and not part of the constitution. Thus de Valera believed that 'we have in 
this state, internally a Republic, and so long as we have an act of parliament associating us in 
certain respects with the states of the British commonwealth we will have that association, and 
no longer'.89 Thus de Valera's Document No. 2, which formulated the idea of External 
Association in 1922, bore fruit after all. De Valera's constitution, unlike that of 1922, was passed 
by a referendum, with 685,105 voters approving, and 526,945 opposing. It was an unequivocal 
assertion of Irish sovereignty over the twenty six counties, article 5 stating that 'Ireland' was 'a 
sovereign, independent, democratic state'. Finally, according to de Valera, the return of the ports 
to the Irish authorities in 1938 'recognises and establishes Irish sovereignty over the twenty-six 
counties and the territorial seas'.90
Table 6.2. Changes in the Treaty 1933-1938.
Date Title Content
3rd May 1933 Constitutional Act Removal of Oath of Allegiance from Constitution.
11 December Act 57. All Mention of King and Crown's Representative deleted
1936 from constitution.
12 December 
1936
1 July 1937
1938
External Relations Bill Provision made for the exercise by the King of certain 
functions in external matters as and when so advised by 
the Executive Council.
Constitution Bill.
Anglo-Irish
Agreement.
Introduction of new constitution to replace that of 1937. 
Control of Irish ports handed over to Irish authorities.
By 1938 then, de Valera had clearly established Irish sovereignty over the twenty-six counties. 
The state was a Republic in all but name. The Treaty settlement no longer dictated the terms of 
Anglo-Irish relations as it had done between 1922 and 1932. Over the previous sixteen years de 
Valera had succeeded in making mainstream Republicanism a purely constitutional form of 
politics as well as vindicating Collin's 'stepping stone' approach to the Treaty. Significantly the 
Republican Dail met for the last time in 1938. Although de Valera's achievements proved to be of 
immense practical significance in the coming war, their main importance resided in the fact that 
they proved to doubters that Republican aspirations and the employment of democratic methods
89 Quoted in R. Fanning, Independent Ireland, p.l 19.
90 Ibid, p. 120.
162
were not incompatible. Although this achievement has tended to be taken for granted by a later 
generation, it occurred against a backdrop of conservative as well as radical scepticism with 
regard to the prospects of Fianna Fail in power.
6.3 De Valera's Political Strategy.
Between 1922 and 1932 the political life of the Free State was polarised over the question of the 
Treaty. It was opposition to the Treaty, more specifically the oath, that led the Sinn Fein party to 
abstain from the Dail, and to deny the legitimacy of the Free State. The insufficiently nationalist 
policy of Cumann na nGaedheal twice led to splinter parties emerging from within its ranks, and 
left the Fianna Fail party in the position of being a semi-loyal party that seemed to share more 
with the disloyal IRA than with those parties that supported the political regime. Cumann na 
nGaedheal's policy over the Treaty seemed to be to ignore the issue altogether, and hope that 
improvements in Commonwealth relations would compensate for their lack of unilateral action 
over the Treaty. The Treaty was what Linz calls 'an insoluble problem', since the instability 
associated with it could not be alleviated by any coalition of forces for whom loyalty to the Free 
State took precedence over their preferred solutions to the problem. Moreover the Treaty issue 
was a regime-threatening one : since the parties supporting the regime could not compromise on 
a solution, the possibility existed that one of them would attempt a solution with the support of 
the forces that were perceived as disloyal by the other parties, thus leading to a polarisation of 
the overall political situation. Again the essence of an insoluble political problem is that a 
solution acceptable to a majority of the regime-supporting parties cannot be found.91
However, in the Irish case a very different scenario unfolded once Fianna Fail split from Sinn 
Fein and committed themselves to ending their abstentionist policy. Instead of attempting to 
mobilise opposition to the Free State by relying on the promise of direct action by the IRA Fianna 
Fail almost managed to form a reformist alliance with the other small parties that were hostile to 
the government's coercive policies. In the summer of 1927 a potential majority of the parties was 
committed to an alternative solution to the Treaty issue without relying on the support of the 
disloyal opposition. The insoluble problem had suddenly become soluble. This was an indication 
that the middle ground in the Irish political system was surprisingly malleable. As it was the 
coalition government failed to materialise: if it had, it would surely have altered the subsequent 
pattern of Irish political development. A realigning coalition where 'one or more segments on one 
side of the political divide become convinced that a different set of alliances, with groups on the 
other side, would be a more efficacious route to their distinctive objectives' is one of four ways
91 J. Linz, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, p.50.
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identified by Lustick which allow insoluble issues to be overcome.92 As it was, pure chance 
determined that it would not be tried in the Irish case.
A second way is what Lustick calls 'decomposing' the problem by breaking the regime - 
threatening issue down into its component parts and thus minimising the possibility of the M l 
weight of the combined opposition being mobilised. Rather than declaring that once in power 
they would dissolve all existing relationships with the United Kingdom, Fianna Fail limited their 
ambitions to the removal of the oath, and then to the oath issue, combined with the non-payment 
of annuities. The word Republic did not feature in their 1932 election campaign. As Huntington 
remarks, 'the problem of the reformer is not to overwhelm a single opponent with an exhaustive 
set of demands, but to minimise his opposition by an apparently limited set of demands'.93 To do 
this Fianna Fail performed what Lustick calls a 'decomposition' of a regime-threatening 
problem into its constituent parts by focusing on those aspects of the Cumann na nGaedheal 
regime that the other parties were not supportive of, such as their reliance on coercive legislation 
and their insistence on the oath of allegiance.94 This had the advantage of attracting the smaller 
parties to them in the summer of 1927 and breaking-up any would be coalition of interests 
against them. It also ensured the support of the Labour Party, which proved crucial in 1932 when 
Labour offered their support provided Fianna Fail did not go beyond their manifesto 
commitments when in office. It also helped reassure their opponents that the changeover would 
not have drastic consequences.
Fianna Fail also consciously distanced themselves from the disloyal opposition. After the split 
such co-operation that took place did so on an ad hoc and informal basis and Fianna Fail rejected 
proposals from the IRA for a common policy. Fianna Fail were also careM to make sure the 
party's public pronouncements left the opposition in no doubt that they were committed to a 
reformist path. In their 1932 election manifesto Fianna Fail felt it was necessary to allay certain 
suspicions that had been raised with regard to their prospects in power. Under a new government, 
the electorate was assured,
All citizens shall be treated as equal before the law, and the individual will be protected in his person and 
his property with all the resources at the government's command. Ordinarily such promises would not be 
necessary. Apprehensions, however, have been aroused and it is necessary to allay them. We may add that 
we have no leanings towards Communism and no belief in Communist doctrines.95
92 I. Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands (Ithaca and London,1993), pp.305-308.
93 S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London, 1968), p. 347.
941. Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed Lands (Ithaca and London, 1993), p. 305.
95 C. Foley, Legion of the Rearguard: The I.RA. and the Modem Irish State (London, 1992,101).
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On top of this Fianna Fail T.D.s were encouraged to adopt a constructive attitude towards the 
Free State parliament. Fianna Fail T.D.s were encouraged not to oppose the government merely 
for opposition's sake, but to do so only when the party had constructive criticism to make. The 
obstructionist policies of the past were not to be repeated. De Valera told the delegates at the 
party's Third Ard Fheis to
Please remember that we are not in the same position as Parnell and his Party were. Over there in England, 
to disrupt the whole machinery was the obvious tactics; but in our case there would be reactions by the 
people which we could not face.96
As it was the changeover still occurred in an atmosphere of considerable conflict and instability. 
The Irish experience between 1927 and 1932 does little to reinforce conservative democratic 
theory's argument that a successful transition can only take place in the absence of popular 
mobilisation. Rather it supports the alternative view, put forward by Bermeo, that
pivotal elites opt for democratisation because they have been unable to control extremism themselves and 
are no longer willing to pay the high price of failing to provide political order. They forecast that democratic 
elections will be won by nonextremists and that ceding control to moderate actors in an electoral democracy 
is less risky than continuing with the status quo.97
In the Irish case Cosgrave had entertained the idea that his government might lose power 
through the ballot box as early as 1926.98 Resuming power in 1927 he told the Dail that he had 
'no intention of accepting office in the mere capacity of a super-policeman to maintain law and 
order while allowing the country to drift along, economically, nationally and internationally'.99 A 
series of bye-election losses in the run-up to the 1932 general election must have convinced him 
that he had little prospect of regaining power. Even before the election he had informed the Irish 
High Commissioner in London that it was his opinion 'that from all points of view it would be 
most unwise for the British government to adopt too aggressive an attitude or iron hand methods 
towards a government made up of the Fianna Fail party1.100 For the time being at least Fianna 
Fail had gained the confidence of the leader of the government party.
96 FF 22, Fianna Fail Archives. On the party's concern with internal discipline see E. O' Halpin, 
Parliamentary party discipline and tactics : the Fianna Fail archives, 1926-32' Irish Historical Studies, xxx, 
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Comparative Politics, vol 29, no.3, April 1997, p.316.
98 See his comments in 'Amendment to the Constitution Committee’, S 4650, Department of An Taoiseach, 
National Archives.
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The attitude was reinforced by de Valera's refusal to allow the expulsion of public officials 
formally loyal to the Cosgrave regime. De Valera was satisfied with the existing system of 
government and told the heads of the various departments he had no intention of replacing 
them.101 Not everyone was satisfied with this approach. One of the immediate acts of the new 
government was to suspend the operations of the military tribunal and to free seventeen IRA 
prisoners from jail. This was not enough for doctrinaire Republicans. As early as March 1931, 
An Phoblacht had warned that the Treaty could not be overthrown by 'mere votes' and that the 
leaders of Fianna Fail must be prepared to shoot 'not the IRA but those who stand for English 
rule in Ireland'.102 In power de Valera came under pressure to use his position to oust former 
enemies in the Free State administration and replace them with Republicans suffering from 
straitenened economic circumstances. In particular, the continuance of Eoin O' Duffy Chief of 
Police, and David Neligan, head of C.I.D., in public service, caused unease both among the IRA 
and among Fianna Fail. The Kerry contingent of the parliamentary party were reportedly *up in 
arms' at the continuance of Neligan in the Police Force, since he had been allegedly involved in 
the 'murders at Kerry' in the latter stages of the civil war.103 The advantages of an alliance with 
the IRA were spelt out by a confidante. The IRA 'paying no heed to public clamour' could do 
things the government could not accept responsibility for publicly, and an alliance would cement 
support for de Valera in the U.S.104 De Valera rejected the alliance saying it would lead to 
'disaster' and contradict the whole direction of his political strategy since 1923.105 He was later 
content merely to transfer Neligan and O' Duffy to uncontroversial posts and there is no recorded 
case of victimisation. De Valera's policy made perfect sense. As it was, in the troubled thirties the 
Government could not fully rely on the Gardai to enforce order, particularly against the 
Blueshirts, who were led by a former Chief of Police. A policy of retribution, even a small-scale 
one, would have seriously compromised the party's ability to maintain law and order in the years 
following their ascent to power.
If 'decomposing the problem' served Fianna Fail well in opposition, in power, Fianna Fail's 
strategy, particularly after 1933, was a combination of what Huntington calls a Fabian strategy, 
where issues are isolated from one another in order to minimise the opposition which the 
reformer confronts at any one time, and what he calls a Blitzkrieg strategy, where any number of 
reforms are put through before the opposition has time to mount sustained opposition.106 Fianna 
Fail's lumping together of the Oath and the Annuities issues certainly had the effect of mobilising 
a combined opposition against them in 1933. Over the next two years a return to civil war 
conditions did not seem too far-fetched.
101 R. Fanning, op. cit. p. 109.
102 Cited in Cosgrave Dail Debates , Vol XL, Col 35, October 14,1931.
103 P 69/185 (21), Moss Twomey Papers, U.C.D. Archives.
104 J. McGarrity to E. de Valera, October 2 1933. MS 174 41 Joseph McGarrity Papers, National Library
105 De Valera to McGarrity, January 31 1934, ibid.
106 S. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and London, 1968), p.346.
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Table 6.3. Party Political Spectrum 1933.
Pro-Commonwealth
Centre Party
Fine Gael
National Guard 
Right
Left
IRA
Fianna Fail
Labour
Republican
As is shown above in table 6.3. Fianna Fail was cast in the role of governmental arbiter between 
left and right-wing paramilitary groups. In this period the two cleavages that divided the Irish 
parties, the constitutional and the economic issues, reinforced each other, and left a political 
system divided into two camps, with an extra-parliamentary organisation on each side. In such a 
context asserting the authority of the centre and not seeming to be reliant on the disloyal 
opposition to the left became the main concern of the government. Between 1933 and 1934 
opposition spokesmen claimed that the government spent more time curtailing the activities of 
the Blueshirts than the IRA but after 1934, the police force, including the Broy Harriers who had 
been recruited mainly from the ranks of the anti-Treaty IRA, turned their attentions more to the 
IRA. The signs were that by the middle of 1935 Republican organisations were beginning to 
disintegrate.
An analysis of the Department of Justice figures on convictions by military tribunal between 1933 
and 1936, reproduced in table 6.4., suggests that government policy became impartial as the 
Blueshirt agitation died down. It shows that after 1934 trial by military tribunals led to more 
convictions of IRA men than Blueshirts. Whereas in 1934, 347 Blueshirts were convicted as 
opposed to 102 IRA men, in 1935 the proportions had changed. In 1935 116 IRA men were 
convicted by Tribunal as opposed to only 76 Blueshirts. These figures reflect two factors. Firstly, 
violent Blueshirt activity reached a peak in the second half of 1934, a time when O' Duffy was, 
according to Dillon, 'on the rampage', but died down dramatically in the first half of 1935.107
107 J. Dillon to F. MacDermott, October 17 1934, Frank MacDermott Papers, National Archives.
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Secondly, the number of IRA offences actually increased in the first half of 1935, although the 
number declined thereafter.
Table 6.4. Number of Convictions by Military Tribunal 1933-1936.
Year Blueshirts IRA Others
1933 11 34
1934 347 102 4
1935 76 116 9
1936 (to 31/7/36) 109 1
31/7 to 3/11 14 3
Total 434 361 14
Source : Military Tribunal Statistics', Department of Justice, D 29/36, National Archives Dublin.
The demise of the Blueshirts had allowed de Valera to identify the IRA as the main danger to the 
good order of the Irish state, and he showed himself no less ruthless in their suppression than his 
predecessors had been. This, undoubtedly helped repair relations with his political opponents, 
who had hoped that the departure of O' Duffy would enable the 'saner elements within Fianna 
Fail' to persuade de Valera to be more reasonable.108 It also helped ensure a greater degree of 
middle class support for the Fianna Fail party who seemed the only ones capable of restoring 
order.
The shift was only the prelude to the employment of the third mechanism which Lustick suggests 
allows regime-threatening issues to be handled within the rules of the game, which he calls 
'regime-recomposition'. This occurs when the balance of power between forces in opposition to 
each other is 'intractable' and when trust must be placed in a particularly strong leader 'to achieve 
a crisis ending solution to the previously "unsolvable problem".109 The crises raised by the 
economic war allowed de Valera to assert the authority of the centre in 1935. Then from the mid­
thirties on, particularly after the Abdication Crisis in 1936, Fianna Fail made demands of the 
British government on a wide variety of fronts, a resumption of Blitzkrieg tactics, but could do so 
knowing that the British government would not meet its demands with punitive sanctions. Since 
1935 British policy towards 'the restless dominion' was strictly one of appeasement, as was 
revealed in a letter from Sir Haldane Porter, a British civil servant, to Cosgrave,
108 J. Dillon to F. MacDermott, September 25 1934, Frank MacDermott Papers, 1065/2/4, p.7.
1091. Lustick, Unsettled States Disputed Lands (Ithaca and London, 1993), p.306.
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As to what the attitude of the British Government is or will be towards the new Constitution, I cannot say ; 
but they will probable take the line of least resistance, because I cannot suppose that in the present 
conditions of Europe they will do anything to precipitate a controversy with the Irish Free State : but one 
thing I do know and deplore is that, so far as my knowledge of the British public goes, they no longer take 
any interest in Irish affairs.110
As a result of British appeasement, the domestic consequences of Fianna Fail radicalism were no 
longer as threatening as they had been, and opposition to the changes they introduced, was 
conducted on parliamentary lines. De Valera's abolition of the Senate in 1936, his introduction of 
the External Relations Bill which removed the Crown from the Irish Constitution in the same 
year, and his introduction of a new constitution, in which the authority of his own office was 
increased, signalled a decomposition of the Irish regime. As Lustick writes of such a strategy,
The theoretical basis of such a strategy is the reconstitution of authority relations. By centralising authority 
to make crucial choices and substantially restricting access to the decision process, such a reconstitution can 
broader the range of policies capable of being endorsed by state institutions. Whether officially 
acknowledged as a change of regime or not, the stalemate produced by the domination of negative 
majorities can thereby be overcome. Meanwhile, risks of extra-legal challenges may be more easily 
managed due to whatever enhanced loyalty and expectation of success the Caesarist leader can elicit, and to 
the mobilisation of residual support among those whose fear of regime collapse or destabilisation exceeds 
their displeasure over decisions.111
By 1937 the popularity of the Fianna Fail programme was forcing a rethink on the opposition 
benches. Fine Gael, who were initially a pro-Commonwealth Party, were beginning to show signs 
of a change of attitude. In 1937 they actually abstained from the Dail debate on retaining a link 
with the Commonwealth in the new constitution. The wheel had come full circle and the progress 
towards the Republic had become a normal issue of party political competition. This was a sign 
that the political system had become stabilised or re-equilibrated.
All the features of Linz's model were present in the Irish case. First, was the availability of a 
committed and talented political elite which offered a clear alternative to the Cosgrave regime. 
Secondly, through a process of internal reform the Fianna Fail party proved able to gain the 
allegiance of some of those who were loyal to the Free State as well as to maintain, for a time, the 
allegiance of those who were hostile to the Free State. This strategy certainly involved the party 
in some verbal gymnastics but it was crucial for the future stability of the system that the party
110 Irish Independent, June 28 1937.
1111. Lustick, op. cit.
169
move an alienated section of the electorate from a position of total hostility to one of grudging 
acceptance of Free State institutions. As one of its leaders Sean Lemass afterwards recalled.
Our political problem of that time was to take a group of people who had fought in the civil war and were 
still bitter in their defeat and to make them feel that political action would help them achieve what they had 
not achieved during the civil war. So all the time we had to appear not to be reactionary - to constantly 
move these people away from the idea that their political objectives could be achieved only by physical 
force.112
Thirdly, was the ability, indeed willingness, of the Cosgrave government to accept the 
changeover and trust in the democratic credentials of their opponents. While insufficient 
evidence exists to suggest that the policy of the Cosgrave government was one of co-opting their 
opponents, there is evidence that Cosgrave hoped that Fianna Fail would develop into a fully - 
fledged constitutional party.113 Fourthly, the Cosgrave government were willing to allow their 
own policy commitments to be overturned in order to preserve the substance of Free State 
democracy. It may be, as I suggest elsewhere, that this was because of the existence of some 
common ground between the two, but the formation of Fianna Fail governments in 1932 and 
more particularly in 1933 did result in great discontinuity in terms of economic and Anglo-Irish 
policy. Nevertheless the constitutional section of the Fine Gael party quickly became alienated 
from the Blueshirts. Fifthly, the Irish case also vindicates the view that re-equilibration can only 
work when the electorate cannot easily be mobilised by extremist appeals since Irish electorates 
did not reward anti-system parties or parties with close links with anti-system parties. However, 
the conservative assumption that this requires that the electorate be passive or indifferent is 
disproved by the Irish experience. Part of Fianna Fail's success in re-equilibrating Irish 
democracy lay in the fact that they were able to legitimate the changes they introduced by gaining 
a higher percentage of first preference votes practically each time they contested an election. 
Indeed from 1932 onwards the public seemed to be rewarding their strategy and the party was 
able to mobilise a much higher level of electoral support than their predecessors. Mass 
mobilisation was not inconsistent with re-equilibration. Finally, once in power the Fianna Fail 
governments showed themselves capable of controlling and neutralising those who were most 
hostile to the regime. By a mixture of straightforward coercion and Republican reformism the 
IRA was isolated within the political system to a greater degree than was the case in the 1920s 
when 'the police thuggery and ecclesiastical fire and brimstone of the Cosgrave regime' forced all
112 Quoted in J. Horgan, 'Arms Dumps and the I.R.A. 1923-32' History Today, vol 48. (2), February 1998, 
pl6.
113 The playwright Ulick O' Connor remembers a conversation he had with Padraig O' Caoimh who was the 
clerk in the Dail on the day when Fianna Fail first took the oath. When asked why the party was allowed to 
enter after clearly violating the spirit of the oath, he replied that the Boss' i.e. Cosgrave told his to let them 
i n h e  wanted them in at any cost'.
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Republican organisations into a de facto alliance.114 The changed attitude of Sean MacBride, a 
leading member of the IRA, is illustrative of the impact of Fianna Fail on the organisation. In the 
early thirties he predicted that if Fianna Fail succeeded in removing the oath and the office of 
Governor General the IRA would be in a serious position.115 By 1937 he had become convinced 
that the IRA had no real role to play in Southern politics and ceased to be active in the 
organisation soon after. Whether de Valera and his colleagues had actually 'deceived' the IRA 
into thinking that the aims of the two organisations were identical is debatable. It seems more 
likely that at times circumstances determined a common outlook but that once these temporary 
circumstances were removed, it became clear that the initial split had signalled a fundamental 
difference in outlook in the Republican ranks.
Conclusion.
The model of the re-equilibration process put forward by Linz provides a useful model for 
analysing the manner in which Irish democracy became consolidated after the civil war. What is 
less clear is the causal weight that should be attributed to various factors in the re-equilibration 
process. At first glance, the emphasis put here on elite strategies and elite relationships suggest 
that a high politics approach is the most convenient one for the analysis of this case. On the other 
hand de Valera's policies were ratified by popular assent, so the Irish case represents a perhaps 
unusual case of an elitist process being accompanied by waves of popular mobilisation. Another 
interesting question is raised by the role of the British government's appeasement policy in 
enabling de Valera to transform the constitutional basis of Free State politics. Historical analysis 
suggests that Collins was unable to bridge the gap between the two sides in 1922 precisely 
because of British obstructionism. De Valera's difficulties in the 1930's would surely have been 
compounded if the British government had been decidedly interventionist. As it was the Blueshirt 
movement, which was considered a potential 'White Army1 by some British elites, enjoyed few 
known links with the external power.116
A basic pre-condition for the re-equilibration process nevertheless lies in the commitment of the 
new leadership to finding democratic methods for the resolution of particularly intractable 
political problems. This desire no doubt goes right back to the experience of civil war which was 
a personal catastrophe for de Valera. As Fanning suggests de Valera's commitment to the 
majority rule principle was more or less constant from this date onwards.117 In this sense the 
Irish case can be said to vindicate the 'dynamic' model of democratic stabilisation put forward by 
Rustow. The first pre-requisite of a democratic transition, according to Rustow, is the
114 George Gilmore, quoted in C. Foley, Legion of the Rearguard: the LILA. and the Modem Irish State 
(London, 1992), p. 106.
115 General Army Convention, March 17-18 1933, P 69/187 (92), Moss Twomey Papers, U.C.D. Archives.
116 See M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics (Dublin, 1997).
117 R. Fanning, The Rule of Order1: Eamon de Valera and the I.RA., 1934-1940', n J.P. O' Carroll and J.A. 
Murphy (eds.) de Valera and his Times (Cork, 1983).
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achievement of a sense of national unity. Only when there is agreement on the boundaries of the 
state and the composition of the citizen body can democratic change take place. After that the 
new political system goes through a transitional period' which is marked by a deep political 
struggle by well-entrenched social forces. The types of conflict which mark this phase may vary, 
but all will lead to the emergence of serious divisions within the political elite. What begins the 
third 'decision phase' of the transition is 'a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to 
accept the existence of diversity in unity and to institutionalise some crucial aspect of democratic 
procedures'.118 This decision will not be shared by all sections of opinion, but the acceptance of 
democratic methods by key elites is decisive. In the fourth 'habituation phase' these elites 
experience the competitive aspect of democracy which 'helps rationalise their commitment to it'. 
In this period the ability of previously recalcitrant elites to solve problems by democratic 
methods leads them to place greater trust in those rules.
Paradoxically, the civil war may have been the wellspring for the democratic strategies employed 
by the anti-Treatyites afterwards. While a clear commitment to the constitutional path did not 
emerge until the Sinn Fein split of 1926 there is considerable evidence to suggest that de Valera 
saw in the defeat of the anti-Treatyites in the civil war an opportunity to reassert his control over 
the forces of militant Republicanism.119 Had he been successful, the reform of Sinn Fein into a 
primarily electoral party would have been the analogue to a similar process on the other side 
which took place after Collin's death. The relationship between Republicanism and democracy 
will long be a subject of controversy in Irish political science, but de Valera and the Fianna Fail 
party proved that many Republican aspirations could be achieved by constitutional methods 
which was a considerable achievement at the time. Whether he could have done so had British 
policy been less generous is more questionable. Had the Free State gone into the Second World 
War with the ports under British control Irish democracy might have undergone another major 
crisis in the 1940s.
118Dankwart Rustow, Transitions to Democracy, Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970); pp.337-63.
119 See below chapter eight.
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Chapter Seven : 'Majority Rule' and the 
Stabilisation of Irish Democracy 1922-1937.
The problem o f democracy in Ireland was that most Irish people, whether Protestant or Catholic, 
were majoritarian rather than pluralist democrats.
Tom Garvin 1996.
On May 23 1954 Sean MacBride, leader of the small opposition party, Clann na Poblachta, wrote 
to the then Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera, proposing the formation of 'a nationally representative 
government'. Such a government would help 'minimise the embittered play of party politics' and 
lead the political elite to co-operate in the serving of the common good. In MacBride's view, the 
Irish state had not known 'normal political development' since 1922 and Irish Government had 
suffered from the want of 'constructive' and 'consecutive' policies as a consequence. The British 
'party system of government' was unsuited to Irish needs, because *the factors which made the 
system a relative success in England had no application here'. The Free State would have been 
better advised 'to follow the political pattern of a smaller and more successful democracy such as 
Switzerland'.1
Although the state had begun its life with elements of such a 'consensual' political system, - a 
written constitution, a P.R. electoral system, a second house with some powers, and provisions 
for direct democracy on fundamental matters, - by 1937 the situation had changed. The 1922 
constitution, amended by ordinary legislation over the previous fifteen years, was now as flexible 
as the unwritten British constitution. The Senate had been abolished the previous year, and the 
new state had grown used to constant single-party government despite the use of S.T.V. for 
elections. MacBride's view contrasts with the orthodox view of constitutional development in the 
interwar era, which is that such changes were not only a 'relative success' but an absolute 
necessity. Indeed it has been argued that the various crises which beset the state between 1922 
and 1937 would not have arisen at all had Irish institutions been modelled more closely on the 
British model in the first place.2
In the wider debate on the relationship between political stability and institutional design in the 
interwar era, the Irish case has been cited in support of the thesis that a combination of single­
party government and a two-party system are conducive to political stability.3 The Irish case
1 Sean MacBride to Eamon de Valera, May 23, 1954, Department of An Taoiseach, S 15655, National 
Archives.
2 J. Hogan, Election and Representation (Cork, 1945).
3 F. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy ; A Study of Proportional Representation (New York, London, 
1972); L. Karvonen, Political Organisation and the Interwar Crisis in Europe (Boulder, 1993).
173
vindicates the Westminster model of democratic stability in other words, and is one of a 
number of cases whose achievement of political stability can be explained by its British 
institutional legacy. This assumption, alongside the view that the Westminsterisation of the Irish 
political system after 1922 was a necessary accompaniment of the stabilisation process, has never 
been critically assessed. In this chapter I suggest in contrast that stable coalition governments 
could have been formed in the period and that multi-party competition was a source of political 
stability in the context of post-civil war politics. Irish democracy could have been stabilised 
under majoritarian or consensual institutions. 'Majority rule', which requires that single-party 
governments are formed by the largest parliamentary party, emerged as an operative principle of 
the Irish system because the dominant Sinn Fein elite were majoritarians, at least with regard to 
the process of government formation.4
7.1 The Emergence of Majority Rule.
Events themselves suggested that the relationship between majority rule and the stabilisation of 
democracy was a close one. The results of the 1922 general election had enabled the Provisional 
Government to claim that the majority of the people had supported the Treaty. The anti- 
Treatyites claimed in converse that the rights of the majority did not extend to the surrender of 
Irish national independence. From the outset the fundamental issue at stake in the Free State was 
the right of the elected majority to have its decisions taken as authoritative. When the anti- 
Treatyites offered to negotiate peace terms after ten months of civil war, the government replied 
that in future, 'all political issues... shall be decided by the majority vote of the elected 
representatives of the people'.5 In 1927, after the assassination of the Minister for Home Affairs, 
Kevin O' Higgins, the government passed legislation forcing candidates to declare their 
willingness to take their seats if elected. As a result Fianna Fail were forced to abandon their 
abstentionist policy, a move that had been on the cards for at least two years. Later the provisions 
for referenda were removed from the constitution. At the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis in 1926, when de 
Valera and a large minority of the delegates left to form Fianna Fail, de Valera had declared that 
'the majority of the people were going to shape the future'.6 Although it had been predicted that if 
Fianna Fail got a majority of the seats in the Dail an attempt would be made to precipitate a coup 
d'etat, Cosgrave's government stood down after the 1932 general election, when Fianna Fail 
emerged as the largest party. After gaining a majority of seats in 1933 de Valera gradually
4 Naturally the retention of S.T. V. meant that in some regards Irish politicians were not strict majoritarians. 
Here article I am referring to majority rule both as a decision rule structuring executive-legislative 
relations, sometimes more accurately called plurality rule, and to the majoritarian system of government 
outlined by Lijphart, of which the Westminster system is the best-known example. This model consists of a 
number of elements all of which had become pronounced features of the Irish system by 1937, bar the 
electoral system.
5 M. Valiulis, General Richard Mulcahy and the Founding of the Irish Free State (Dublin, 1992), p. 189.
6 R. Fanning, Independent Ireland (Dublin, 1983),p. 10.
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revised the Treaty on the basis of his parliamentary majority. His enactment of a Republican 
constitution in 1937 'completed the reconciliation of majority rule with popular sovereignty*.7
Table 7.1. Irish Governments 1922-1938
Date of 
Appointment
1922
1922
1923
1927
1927
1932
1933 
1937
Government
Provisional
Government
Provisional
Government
Cumannna
nGaedheal
Cumannna
nGaedheal
Cumannna
nGaedheal
Fianna Fail
Fianna Fail 
Fianna Fail
Prime Minister
Michael Collins
William Cosgrave
William
Cosgrave
William
Cosgrave
William
Cosgrave
Eamon 
de Valera
Eamon 
de Valera 
Eamon 
de Valera
Single Party 
Majority
9 Months
11 months 
3 years, 10 months
Single Party 
Minority
4 years, 4 months
2 months
4 years,
3 months
10 months
10 months
1938 Fianna Fail Eamon de Valera 4 years
Source : Chubb 1970, table 6.5., 163.
Nevertheless a majoritarian system was not a foregone conclusion. Under S.T. V. it had not been 
envisaged that single-party government would be possible, and for the most part Irish elections 
did not return clear parliamentary majorities. Between 1922 and 1938 there were nine Irish 
governments. These are shown in table 7.1. The first was a Provisional Government and did not 
have full legislative powers. The second lasted for less than a year. The third (1923-27), like the 
second, would not have had a majority of its own supporters in the Dail, if Sinn Fein, the largest 
opposition party, had taken their seats. The fourth, a minority government, lasted only a few 
months. The last Cumann na nGaedheal Government (1927-1932) was also a minority 
government. Between 1932 and 1933 the first Fianna Fail government was dependent on Labour 
support. There was only one proper majority government before 1938, Fianna Fail, between 
1933-1937, and its share of the vote was still less than half, at 49.7%. Again in 1937 it became a 
minority government, but this situation lasted only one year, until the 1938 general election 
returned a majority Fianna Fail government to power.
7 B. Fairell, From first Dail through Free State' in B. Farrell (ed.) de Valera's Constitution and Ours 
(Dublin,1988), pp. 117-119.
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If Irish elections did not return majority winners how then did single-party government become 
the norm ? One answer is that the continued dominance of the Treaty issue in political life 
reinforced the bipolar logic of political competition. The relationship between voting preference 
and party choice has been neatly captured by the 'directional model' of party choice.8 This model 
suggests that once a basic line of division is established in a political system, voters tend to vote 
in terms of what side of the divide they are on, not in terms of how closely their opinions match 
those of the parties themselves. In this respect voting is not rational but directional, and the 
parties that situate themselves most clearly on either side of the middle ground tend to attract 
most votes. In the Irish case, despite strong support for 'neutral' candidates in 1922, once two 
parties emerged representing the two sides of the civil war split, Cumann na nGaedheal and 
Sinn Fein in Spring 1923, the nature of voting was bound to be directional rather than rational. 
As a result the smaller parties' share of the vote dropped over time, falling from over 35 per cent 
in 1922 to 11.6 per cent in 1938.
However even with 'directional voting' the largest parties did not achieve enough support to form 
single-party governments. To do that they also had to take advantage of a basic flaw in the 1922 
constitution which did not outline the conditions under which a Dail could be dissolved, except to 
say that 'Dail Eireann may not at any time be dissolved except on the advice of the Executive 
Council'. The first extraordinary dissolution occurred in 1927 when the Attorney General John 
A. Costello advised Cosgrave's minority government which had done badly in the June election 
that the Constitution did not prevent the Executive Council from dissolving the Dail without its 
consent.9 This ruling was to prove of great benefit to the largest two parties. After each regular 
election held once a four year period had elapsed, the Executive Council called another snap 
election in order to convert their initial plurality of seats in the Dail into a majority. Table two 
shows the effects of these 'snap elections' on the smaller parties. Each time the governing party 
dissolved the Dail, they gained an increase in seats which enabled them to form a single-party 
government. Except once, in 1933, each time they did this, the smaller parties’ share of the seats 
declined. The civil war parties' share of the seats, which was less than 65 per cent in 1922, 
reached over 88 per cent by 1938.
8 P. Dunleavy, The Political Parties' in P. Dunleavy (ed.) Developments in British Politics Four (London, 
1995), pp.150-152.
9 C. O' Leary, Irish Elections 1918-1977, Parties, Voters, and Proportional Representation (Dublin, 1979), 
p.24.
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Table 7.2. Results of each nair of General Elections 1922-1938
Year Cumannna Sinn Fein - Total No. of No. required Civil
nGaedheal Fianna Fail Dail Seats. for majority Parties
War Others % 
% share of the 
share of the vote, 
vote
1922
1923
1927
1927
1932
1933
1937
1938
58
63
46
61
56
48
48
45
35
44
44
57
72
76
68
76
128
153
153
153
153
153
138
138
59.74 
66.37
53.67
73.86
79.75 
80.17
80.05
85.25
40.26
33.63
46.33
26.14
20.25
19.83
19.95
14.75
Sources: C. O'Leary 1979 , Gallagher 1993.
Political practice would not have been reflected in constitutional law, were it not for the 
extraordinary ability of Irish governments to amend the constitution by ordinary legislation. This 
meant that the constitutional basis of the state itself also became strongly majoritarian. In 1934 
Mansergh wrote that 'it is becoming increasingly evident that in certain aspects the government 
of the Irish Free State stands in sharp distinction to its constitution'.10 This disparity increased 
up to 1937. The relationship between this process and the bipolar thrust of party competition was 
systemic.
with two large parties competing for majority support, that parliament moved even closer to its Westminster 
origins. Many of the experimental and continental features of the Irish Free State were abandoned virtually 
without trial. Few of the 'extern' Ministers were ever appointed; all were staunch party men. Neither the 
referendum nor the initiative were ever used to ascertain the people's opinion; both were abolished when de 
Valera tried to invoke these constitutional provisions to jettison the Oath. The elaborate schemes to give the 
Senate some power and purpose were gradually modified. The constitution itself, although it was the 
fundamental law for fifteen years, remained throughout its life, like the British constitution, wholly flexible 
and subject to amendment simply by act of parliament.11
In total there were twenty-seven constitutional amendments, roughly shared between the two 
parties. By 1936 forty-eight out of a total of eighty-three articles had been amended. All the 
amendments pointed in one direction: to the emergence of a political system based on what 
Farrell calls the three key elements of British constitutional arrangements; 'parliamentary 
sovereignty untrammelled by reference to any higher law, a cabinet sustained by its
10 N. Mansergh, The Irish Free State; its Government and Politics (London, 1934, p.331.
11 B. Farrell, From first Dail through Free State' in B. Farrell (ed.) De Valera's Constitution and Ours 
(Dublin, 1988), p.219.
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parliamentary support, and a constitution as flexible as ordinary statute law'.12 Between them, 
both Cosgrave and de Valera had succeeded in whittling down the 1922 constitution to the 
essence of the British system, the 'fusion of the executive and the legislature in a single 
parliamentary chamber'.13
7.2 Majority Rule and Political Stability.
By 1937 then the majoritarian stamp of Irish political life was clearly established. The 
Westminsterisation of the political system reflected the increasingly bipolar pattern of party 
competition in Ireland. The question remains how the evolution of this system affected the 
stabilisation process? On the one hand one it has been argued that the Irish experience supports 
the hypothesis that a non-proportional electoral system will lead to a two-party system which in 
turn will lead to cabinet stability.14 Although S.T.V. was in theory a proportional system, in 
practise the relationship between votes and seats was not proportional. This has been attributed to 
the fact that Irish constituencies often had less than five seats, the minimum size at which 
proportionality is guaranteed.15 Up to 1937 around forty per cent of Irish constituencies were less 
than this size.16 Moreover one might add that the effect of dissolutions was to penalise the 
smaller parties further, since they left choice of government the key issue in the second election. 
In this sense the Irish electoral system was rather like the French system for Presidential elections 
which forces the electorate to choose between the best two candidates the second time round.
From a comparative perspective the Irish system seems to conform fully to the model of political 
stability outlined by Hermens. Firstly, the electoral system was not proportional but 'more in the 
nature of a compromise between the majority system and P.R. than of a clear P.R. system'.17 
Secondly, by 1939 the Irish state 'had one of the most concentrated party systems of all European 
democracies'.18 Thirdly, Irish cabinet stability was unparalleled in the rest of interwar Europe. 
According to Karvonen, 'one may say that there were only two different cabinets in the period 
until the second world war'.19 Such a system hinged on the fact that S.T.V. did not produce
12 Ibid, p.219.
13 A. Ward, The Irish Constitutional Tradition ; Responsible Government and Modem Ireland (Dublin,
1993), p. 238.
14 F. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy : A Study in Proportional Representation (New York, London, 
1972).
15 J. Hogan, Election and Representation (Cork, 1945).
16 An alternative view of the relationship between vote size and proportionality is found in Taagepera and 
Shugart (1989). Unfortunately it seems that Hermen's view that five was the minimum constituency size at 
which proportionality could be guaranteed was shared by Irish politicians at the time.
17 F. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy: A Study in Proportional Representation (New York, London, 
1972). p.315.
18 L. Karvonen, Political Organisation and the Interwar Crisis in Europe (Boulder, 1993), p.88.
19 Ibid,
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proportional outcomes. If it had, Hermens suggests that there would probably have been no 
majority since 1927, and as a result 'no stable government leadership1.20
Some Irish authors also suggest that single-party government and two-party competition were 
necessary pre-conditions of political stability. According to Hogan the Treaty split made the need 
for clear parliamentary majorities paramount. 'Under full P.R., parliamentary democracy would 
have been unable to weather the storm between 1927-1932, and again between the 1932 and 
1933 election, parliamentary institutions would have been in grave danger of floundering'.21 
Lyons suggests that the fact that in 1927 'two deeply-divided parties faced each other across the 
Dail 'could only serve to reduce the margin of constitutional experimentation'.22 The abolition of 
referenda from the constitution logically followed:
What mattered most was not that some delicately balanced lever should be pulled to elicit a free vote in the 
country on the Oireachtas on this issue or that, but that a government should either rule on the basis of a 
well organised majority in the Dail or get out and make way for another that could.23
Since single party government was the sine qua non of political stability, those provisions of the 
constitution that blocked the emergence of a political system based on a majority government and 
a responsible opposition were expendable.
The assumption made is that coalition government could not have provided a basis for political 
stability. Yet since the smaller parties were at times willing to support minority governments, 
durable coalition governments were also feasible. If the Farmer's Party were willing to support 
Cumann na nGaedheal between 1927 and 1932, and, in the form of the Centre Party, 
amalgamate with them in 1933, a coalition of the two was possible. Likewise Labour were 
willing to discuss entering into a coalition with Fianna Fail in 1927, supported Fianna Fail in 
office between 1932 and 1933, and Fianna Fail reportedly remained dependent on Labour support 
between 1933 and 1937.24 Table 7.3. below provides an ideological map of the political 
spectrum in 1927. Two lines of cleavage separated the parties, one over the Treaty, the other 
over economic policy. The fact that Fianna Fail were the only party in the Dail to oppose the 
Treaty initially ruled them out of any coalitioa According to the Labour leader, Fianna Fail's 
desire to remove the oath of allegiance from the Constitution was not 'to enable them to work the 
Treaty and Constitution with a clear conscience but to enable them to use their position as law­
makers and makers of the Government to break the Treaty and make an entirely new
20 Hermens, op. cit, p.326.
21 J. Hogan, Election and Representation (Cork, 1945), pp.23-25.
22 F.S.L. Lyons, Ireland Since the Famine (Glasgow, 1983), p.479.
23 Ibid.
24 F. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy, p.315.
179
constitution'.25 As a result Labour were unwilling to join a Fianna Fail coalition early in the 
summer of 1927.26 The two parties, however, both stood to the left on the economic cleavage. 
Johnson declared that 'Fianna Fail has published an economic programme the greater part of 
which is similar to the programme of the Labour Party. If the Fianna Fail Deputies enter the 
Dail, Labour will join with them in getting their programme translated into actual force'. 
However Johnson believed that Fianna Fail's attitude to the oath had to change.27
Table 7.3. Party Political Spectrum in 1927.
Pro-Treaty
Labour
Left
Farmer's Party 
National League
Cumann na nGaedheal
Right
Fianna Fail
Sinn Fein
Anti-Treaty
Naturally, a coalition of the other parties on an economically conservative Pro-Treaty position 
was possible, but because of Fianna Fail's absence from the Dail, such a government was 
unnecessary before 1927. By then however the smaller parties had begun to oppose what they 
considered the repressive politics of the Cosgrave government and favoured a policy of 
appeasement towards the Republican opposition. Between June and September 1922 discussions 
were based on the possibility of a minority coalition being formed between the Labour Party, the 
National League and the Farmers Party, with the support of Fianna Fail backbenchers. However 
Labour objected to the National League's desire for extra-representation. Conversely, the National 
League defended their demands on the grounds that financial and business interests were 
apprehensive at the idea of a Labour-controlled government. Moreover they required guarantees 
that the new government was not be 'Labour in the saddle or Fianna Fail in effective control or 
pulling the strings'.28 Despite their differences, the party leaders agreed to support a motion of 
no-confidence in the Cosgrave government introduced on August 10th. De Valera had promised 
that if Cosgrave's Public Safety Bill was overturned and if the oath issue was overcome, Fianna
25 Thomas Johnson, Irish Labour Party's Views on the Oath of Allegiance' MS 17 159, Thomas Johnson 
Papers, National Library of Ireland.
26 'Statement by Thomas Johnson re coalition between Fianna Fail and Labour Parties', 22 August, 1927, 
MS 17 166, ibid.
27 Two Speeches by Thomas Johnson 1926,1927', MS 17 164, ibid.
28 'Correspondence between T. Johnson and Wm. Redmond of National Party August 192T, MS 17 165, 
ibid.
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Fail 'would not force the issue on constitutional questions during the normal life of the present 
Dail'.29 Only the freak abstention of a National League deputy from Sligo prevented the 
government from being toppled.
Coalition government was a distinct possibility as early as 1927 and remained so until 1933. 
Would such a multi-party government have been stable ? If Labour had insisted on radical 
economic measures the Farmers Party and the National League would been in an uncomfortable 
position. On the other hand Fianna Fail had promised its support, providing the oath issue was 
overcome. Johnson had committed himself to revising the oath but not to abolishing it,30 while 
Labour were split on the question of annuity payments.31 Significant ideological differences still 
divided the would-be partners. However between 1927 and 1932, Labour moved downwards 
into the anti-Treaty camp on the constitutional question, while Fianna Fail continued to move 
leftwards on economic issues. Leadership changes : Johnson was replaced by William Norton, as 
well as the deepening economic recession, led the Labour party to change its position on the 
Treaty. By 1932 the outlook of the two parties was not so different. In 1932 all of Labour's 
parliamentary deputies supported de Valera's Removal of the Oath Bill, which the Labour leader 
Norton termed, like de Valera, 'a relic of feudalism'32
The figures on voting transfers support the view that by 1933 two distinct 1)1008' had emerged 
within the system, one left-wing and Republican in outlook, the other conservative and pro- 
Commonwealth. Whereas in 1927 only 17.6 per cent of Labour transfers went to Fianna Fail 
candidates in situations where there was no Labour candidate available to receive them, in 1933 
this figure had risen to 72.7. per cent. Conversely in 1927 only 14.9 per cent of Fianna Fail 
transfers went to Labour candidates when there was no Fianna Fail candidate available to receive 
them. In 1933 this figure had risen to 47.1 per cent. On the other side in 1927, in situations 
where there was no Cumann na nGaedheal candidate available to receive them, 25.1 per cent of 
the party's transfers went to Farmer's Party candidates and only 4.9 per cent to the National 
League. In 1933 the Centre Party received 37.3 per cent of the party's transfers in similar 
situations. In 1927 Cumann na nGaedheal received 29.3 per cent of the Farmer's Party transfers 
in situations where there was no Farmer's candidate to receive them. In the same election the 
party received 25.5 per cent of the National Leagues transfers where there was no National 
League candidate available to receive them. In 1933, in similar situations, Cumann na nGaedheal 
received 53.6 per cent of the Centre Party's transfers.33 According to Gallagher the pattern of 
transfers 'demonstrated emphatically that the party system consisted of two blocs, one composed
29 De Valera Speech at Burgh Quay, July 27th, 1927, MS 17 169, ibid.
30 Speech by Johnson, July-September 1927, Ms 17 167, ibid.
31 E. McKay, 'Changing with the tide : the Irish Labour Party, 1927-1933', Saothar, 11,1986, pp.27-39.
32 Ibid, p.28.
33 All figures from M.Gallagher, Irish Elections 1922-1944: Results and Analysis, Sources for the Study of  
Irish Politics 1, (Limerick,! 993).
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of Fianna Fail and Labour and the other of Cumann na nGaedheal and the National Centre 
Party'34.
That Irish single-party governments were durable does not prove that coalition governments 
would have been unstable. In the interwar period coalition governments were formed in interwar 
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, the Netherlands the five Nordic countries, and in the U.K. 
without disastrous consequences. The number of parties and the number of issues dividing the 
parties were far greater in these systems, with the obvious exception of the U.K. Certainly, on 
the basis of policy issues and voting transfers, stable coalition governments could have been 
formed between 1932 and 1933. Before that they were more feasible to the right of the political 
spectrum. A crucial question - whether a stable 'rainbow' coalition could have emerged from the 
vote of no confidence in August 1922? - can never be definitively answered.
Nor does the fact that single-party governments proved to be durable prove that cabinet stability 
was the decisive factor in ensuring the stability of the Irish system. An alternative approach is to 
argue that cabinet stability was one source of stability, but that a bi-polar pattern of political 
competition was a source of instability. The two-party system that emerged took shape in 
conditions of repeated political polarisation. According to MacDonagh there were three distinct 
periods of political crisis in the interwar period: the civil war period 1922-1923, the depression 
period 1927-1932, and lastly 1933-1937, Fianna Fail's first period in office.35 Put bluntly, these 
crises were caused first by the anti-Treatyites rejection of the majority verdict on the Treaty, then 
by their acceptance of majority rule as a means of revising it, and lastly by their use of majority 
rule, which drove some of the Pro-Treaty side temporarily into the arms of the Blueshirts. A 
majoritarian political system is compatible with political stability when the main line of division 
is not a zero sum issue; otherwise it could exacerbate divisions and encourage the opposition to 
be disloyal. This happened over the Treaty in 1922 and again in 1933, when the emergence of the 
Blueshirts was partially caused by fears of what Fianna Fail would do when it came to office 36 
Majority rule, combined with a British type electoral system, could have enabled Fianna Fail 
form a single party government in 1927, only four years after the end of the civil war.37 The 
Labour leader outlined one possible consequence:
Suppose the impossible were to happen and the whole 101 candidates of Fianna Fail and Sinn Fein were 
elected. The remaining 51 members of other parties, though lacking moral authority, would still have the 
legal right and power to elect a government and the Government so elected, and no other, would have the 
legal authority to govern the country. An attempt to set up a rival authority would probably cause division in
34 Ibid, p. 157.
35 O. MacDonagh, Ireland Since the Union (London, 1977), pp. 105-113.
36 M. Manning, The Blueshirts 2nd. ed., (Dublin, 1987), p.245.
37 D. Gwynn, The Irish Free State 1922-1927 (London, 1928), p. 147.
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the ranks of the Executive forces between those who would only obey the constitutional government and 
those who would follow the party elected as a majority by the votes of the people. Irrespective of the rights 
and wrongs of the question such a position must inevitably cause a constitutional crisis.38
Those that endorsed a majoritarian system when in office naturally became wary of it in 
opposition and vice versa. When de Valera re-established military tribunals to try political crimes 
a former Cumann na nGaedheal Minister asked, 'Will the President say that there is any 
movement of violence in this country that can equal the Fianna Fail party in practically wiping 
out the courts and wiping out the Seanad, and imposing against the widespread opinion of the 
country, burdens that they are not able to bear'39 In his comparative analysis of constitutional 
choices in the interwar period Karvonen suggests that 'the strengthening of executive power as an 
ongoing process of polarisation is a risky manoeuvre in a parliamentary system'.40In 1929 an 
observer sympathetic to the Cosgrave government wrote that if de Valera assumed office 'he 
could plunge the country into chaos without being unconstitutional or doing anything 
unprecedented'. This situation would never have arisen 'had the spirit and the letter of the 
constitution been adhered to rigidly’.41 By 1937 the constitutional amendments had given de 
Valera the power to make whatever changes he wanted to: in Farrell's words 'it was a classic 
opportunity to establish a dictatorship’.42 The opposition remained unsure of his intentions, 
alleging that the 1937 constitution which created the office of the President, would allow him to 
establish a dictatorship.43
On the surface at least the relationship between majority rule and political stability was actually 
negative. After all, why should a system in which the civil war parties predominate become a 
source of stability? None of the smaller parlies were involved in the civil war and the two threats 
to elected government, the IRA, and the Blueshirts, were actually led by members of the civil war 
political elite. From an elitist perspective stable democracy requires only the consent of those 
groups without whose consent the system would be unable to function. In Ireland after 1922 the 
stability of the system was dependent first on its ability to gain the support of the Republican 
opposition, and then on its ability to maintain the loyalty of the Pro-Treatyites. The normative 
paradoxes of this process are revealed in Mac Donagh's account of the 1932 changeover. After 
first telling us that in 1932 'Fianna Fail secured the support of the militarists both at the polls 
and, more important perhaps, to intimidate their opponents and election meetings' he concludes:
38 Thomas Johnson, Two Speeches by Thomas Johnson 1926,1927, MS 17164 ,Thomas Johnson Papers, 
National Library of Ireland).
39 Richard Mulcahy, Dail Debates, September 27-29,1935.
40 L. Karvonen, Political Organisation and the interwar Crisis in Europe (Boulder,1993),p.164.
41 A.E. Malone, Party Government in the Irish Free State' Political Science Quarterly, 44, 1929, no.3, 
p.378.
42 B. Farrell, Prom first Dail through Free State', p.31.
43 M. Smith, The title An Taoiseach in the 1937 Constitution', Irish Political Studies, vol. 10, 1995, 
pp.179-185.
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De Valera's attainment of office, confirmed in the following year when he sought and achieved an overall 
parliamentary majority ended the second crisis of Irish democracy. The principle of responsible opposition 
had been vindicated and the forces of potential violence had been marshalled behind the parliamentary 
victors.44
Clearly those whose consent was most important in the stabilisation of the system were also those 
who seemed to jeopardise democratic freedoms.
Linz argues that states which find themselves polarised into two camps can avoid further 
polarisation by adopting a multi-party system which might create sources of cross-cutting 
cleavages. In contrast a two-party system would aggravate differences and maximise the 
ideological distance between the parties. Multi-party systems will only have a disintegrating 
effect where smaller parties act as disloyal oppositions and when the major parties follow them 45 
The smaller parties in Ireland could not be accused of disloyalty 46 In contrast Cumann na 
nGaedheal suspended the Dail in the first two months of the civil war, abolished hundreds of 
local councils in the years following the civil war, denied the public an opportunity to adjudicate 
on the oath in 1928 by removing the referendum from the constitution, and between 1933 and 
1934 encouraged the growth of an extra-parliamentary opposition to the elected government. 
Sinn Fein and Fianna Fail had close links with the IRA, and when in power proved willing to 
restrict constitutional liberties through a variety of constitutional revisions, including the 
abolition of the Senate, the gerrymandering of electoral constituencies, and the abolition of local 
government councils. Adversarial competition between these parties was not conducive to 
political stability.
It is often argued that in multi-party systems parties tend to stick to rigid principles and compete 
for an ideologically fixed section of the electorate while in two-party systems pressures of 
political competition mean that parties' policy preferences tend to move towards the centre as 
they compete for the available middle ground of the electorate. This is known as the median voter 
theory of party competition. It contrasts with the 'radical elitist' model of party competition which 
argues that internal divisions within the larger parties in a bipolar political system will move 
these parties' policy positions closer to those of the party activists than to the centre ground.47
44 O. MacDonagh, Ireland Since the Union, (London, 1977), p. 111.
45 J. Linz, 'Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration' in J. Linz and A. Stepan (eds.) The Breakdown of  
Democratic Regimes (Baltimore and London, 1978), pp.24-27.
46 The term loyalty refers to attitudes towards the existing constitutional arrangements not to liberal 
democracy per se. As I suggest in the next section the smaller parties were far more loyal to the 1922 
constitution than the larger parties which imposed their own majoritarian preferences on the working of the 
system.
47 P. Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice : Economic Explanations in Political Science 
(Hemel Hampstead,! 991), p. 117.
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Clearly in a situation where the two larger parties emerge out of a civil war and where they are 
divided between hard-line and conciliatory elements, two-party competition would not 
automatically lead to any convergence on the centre ground. In the Irish case such convergence 
emerged only when the two opposing blocs split. Fianna Fail split from the fundamentalist 
Republican party, Sinn Fein, in 1926 and Fine Gael distanced themselves from the right wing 
Blueshirt movement in late 1934, whose leader had actually been the first President of Fine Gael. 
If there was a source of moderation it lay in the fact that the larger opposition parties needed 
some coalition potential under S.T.V..48 Notably in 1927 Fianna Fail took its economic policies 
from Labour and agreed to limit its demands for constitutional change in return for concessions 
on the 1927 Public Safety Act by the would-be coalition. A similar agreement was made in 1932 
in return for Labour support. On the other side Cumann na nGaedheal had to amalgamate with 
the Centre Party in 1933 once Fianna Fail had shown that it could sustain single-party 
government. After the demise of the Blueshirts, Fine Gael was 'Cumann na nGaedheal all over 
again, without being very much inclined to extremism'.49
In summary there is no reason to believe that multi-party competition was a source of political 
instability in the Irish case. Garvin describes the stabilisation of Irish democracy as a process of 
political 'deradicalisation'.50 The real question for Irish democratic theory is whether 
deradicalisation was achieved (a) primarily through processes of internal reform within two 
ideologically opposed camps; (b) primarily through processes of electoral competition in which 
the civil war parties competed for the votes of a newly-enfranchised electorate or (c) through a 
combination of (a) and (b). I have already demonstrated the weakness of the first of these 
theories. From the other two perspectives, the existence of multi-party politics and of S.T.V. were 
key variables.
7.3 Majority Rule and the Values of the Sinn Fein elite.
Neither the development of a two-party system or the existence of single- party government 
ought to be considered necessary pre-conditions of democratic stabilisation in independent 
Ireland. Multi-party competition was compatible with democratic stabilisation, while stable 
coalition governments could also have been formed given the requisite commitment on the part 
of political elites. If Irish democracy could have been stabilised under 'consensual' as well as 
'majoritarian' institutions the state's institutional design cannot be the decisive factor in 
explaining the state's democratic stability.
481 am indebted to Professor Brendan O' Leary for this observation.
49 M. Tierney to F. MacDermot, September 27 1934, 1065/4/4, Frank MacDermott Papers, National 
Archives.
50 T. Garvin, Nationalist Elites, Irish Voters, and Irish Political Development: A Comparative Perspective' 
Economic and Social Review, vol 8 ,, no. 3, April 1977, p. 165.
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Much the same general conclusion has been reached by Karvonen in his analysis of the 
relationship between institutional design and democratic stability in interwar Europe.51 He found 
that both consensual and majoritarian systems proved compatible with democratic stability, but 
that attitudes to constitutions were decisive in explaining the fate of democracies in interwar 
Europe. In countries where the initial constitution-making was participated in by all sides, the 
political system enjoyed a sufficient amount of loyalty on the part of political elites to overcome 
later periods of instability. In states like Austria, Germany, Estonia, and Latvia on the other 
hand, those that eventually came to office had been excluded from this process and subsequently 
rejected the constitution in toto. In the process of reshaping the constitutions non-socialist parties 
invariably strengthened the degree of executive power, ultimately facilitating the emergence of 
authoritarian regimes. In states such as France, overall loyalty to the institutions of the Republic 
helped the state overcome its political crises. In this regard the long established democracies had 
a definite advantage over the newly-established ones, as is evidenced from the fact that few new 
states retained parliamentary institutions in the period.
If attitudes to constitutions were the decisive factor in each case, at first glance, the relevance of 
the Irish case to Karvonen's theory seems clear. The anti-Treatyites did not participate in the 
process of constitution-making and subsequently rejected the 1922 constitution. They thus 
contributed to the emergence of an executive-dominated system of government and to the 
political instability that came with those changes. However in Ireland the constitution was 
amended in equal proportion by both sides, which suggests that the Irish case was different to the 
successor states. According to Sean Lemass,
Neither the Cumann na nGaedheal Party nor we are prepared to regard that Constitution apparently as 
anything but so much paper. It is only the Labour Party whose one desire is to be respectable in all things 
that attaches any importance to it.52
As is suggested by Ward, the nature of the constitutional changes suggests that both sides had an 
alternative model of how democracy worked in mind.53 The Sinn Fein elite were convinced 
majoritarians. Majority rule had formed a central plank in the propaganda campaign of Sinn 
Fein between 1918-1921 which sought to convince public opinion in the U.S. of the 
overwhelming majority mandate for a thirty-two county Republic. In 1919 Sinn Fein declared 
that once independence was achieved the public had a right to decide what form it should take. 
The Pro-Treatyites then legitimised the disestablishment of the Republic declared in 1919 by a 
parliamentary and then by an electoral majority. According to Collins the Treaty would stand
51 L. Karvonen, Political Organisation and the Interwar Crisis in Europe (Boulder, 1993).
52 Dail Debates , vol 34 col 313-14, April 2 1930.
53 A. Ward, The Irish Constitutional Tradition : Responsible Government and Modem Ireland (Dublin,
1994), p. 238.
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'unless in the whirl of politics', the anti-Treatyites 'became a majority in the country1.54 This 
possibility formed the basis of the opposition position from 1926 onwards.
A purely majoritarian system also proved acceptable to the larger parties because both were 
hostile to 'sectional' interests. The signatories to the electoral pact in 1922 had stated that the 
national position necessitated the entrusting of government 'to those who had been the strength 
of the national situation during the last few years'.55 Collins feared that 'the big businessmen and 
the politicians will come forward when peace was established and perhaps after some years gain 
control. Their interests will never demand a renewal of war'.56 On the other hand de Valera's 
reorganisation of the Sinn Fein organisation in 1923 was prompted by his fear that the national 
interest as a whole will be submerged in the clashing of rival economic groups'.57 De Valera also 
had a shrewd appreciation of the strategic benefits of a single-party government, predicting in 
1932 that the British would never negotiate with a government they expected to fall.58 Cosgrave 
also fought the June 1927 election on the issue of coalition government, a newspaper 
advertisement warning voters that by voting for Independents, Farmers or Labour they were 
voting for 'a weak government with no stated policy1.59 Kevin O' Higgins was characteristically 
dismissive of smaller parties too, remarking that 'all these wretched little parties vigorously 
sawing the bough they are sitting on is a sight to make angels weep and devils grin'.60
Majority rule was also attractive for a mundane reason. According to Dahl the stronger the 
expectation among the members of a political minority that they will be tomorrow's majority, the 
more acceptable majority rule will be to them, the less they will feel the need for such special 
guarantees as a minority veto and the more likely they are to see themselves as impediments to 
their own future prospects as participants in a majority government'.61 In 1923 many anti-Treaty 
candidates were on the run or in prison but their vote was still impressive considering they had 
just lost a civil war. Fianna Fail came very close to defeating Cosgrave in 1927. De Valera had 
always anticipated that his side would mobilise a majority against the Free State. This may help 
explain why he was happy to accept in 1926 that in future all decisions will be made according 
to the wishes of the majority of the Irish people. De Valera may also have been aware that the 
constitutional amendments being introduced by Cosgrave were laying the grounds for his assault 
on the Treaty. In 1928 Cosgrave went against the spirit of the constitution by preventing the
54 'Memorandum of Ambulance Work & Efforts for Peace', Civil War 1922-24, Peace Proposal - J.F. 
Homan/Clontarf, S 8138, Department of An Taoiseach, National Archives.
55 M. Gallagher, The Pact General Election of 1922' Irish Historical Studies, 1977, vol. 21, pp. 405-406.
56 R. Fanning, Independent Ireland (Dublin, 1983), p. 13.
57 De Valera Memo, 16 May 1923, Sinn Fein 1094/8/1, National Archives.
58 R. Fanning, op. cit., p.l 14.
59 C. O' Leary, Irish Elections 1918-1977, Parties Voters and Proportional Representation (Dublin, 1970), 
p.24.
60 O' Higgins to MacDermot, May 18 1927, 1065/1/1 Frank MacDermott Papers, National Archives.
61 R. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven, 1989), p.161.
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referendum of the oath. Several years later de Valera would do the same, when rejecting the 
Senate's proposal that he refer the Abolition of the Oath Bill to a referendum.
Dahl argues that majority rule ' is more likely to be accepted by a minority if they are confident 
that collective decisions will never fundamentally endanger the basic elements of their way of 
life'.62 In the Irish case there was a great deal of ideological common ground between the two 
Treaty sides. In terms of their view of society as 'a moral community1, a wider consensus existed 
between the two sides. As Whyte put it 'Mr. Cosgrave refused to legalise divorce; Mr. de Valera 
made it unconstitutional. Mr Cosgrave's government forbade propaganda for the use of 
contraceptives ; Mr de Valera's banned their sale or import'.63 Both sides were committed to 
Gaelidsation, land reform, and to improving upon the Treaty settlement. A winner-take-all 
system could be accepted because the basic values of the larger parties would not be threatened by 
a change of office. Experience of office narrowed the gap further. In 1935 a Fianna Fail cabinet 
paper lamented 'the lack of a civic spirit’ in Ireland and denounces the Blueshirt's anarchical 
spirit. Quite ironically in view of previous attitudes, this was defined as the 'right of a minority to 
impose its will on the Irish people by force'.64
Another reason for the efficacy of majority rule in the Free State lay in the number of political 
issues that were at stake. Table 7.4. adopts Lijphart's schema for classifying partisan issues and 
shows the issue-dimensions separating the parties in the Irish Free State. At first glance
Table 7.4. Issue Dimensions of the Irish Party System 1922-1937.
Socio- Religious Cultural Urban-rural Regime Foreign Post- Number.
Economic -Ethnic Support Policy Materialist
Irish
Free H H H 3
State
Note : H signifies a dimension of High salience.
Source: Lijphart, 1984, Table 8.1., 130.
only two dimensions, those of regime support, and foreign policy can be considered of high 
intensity. However Dunphy suggests that economic issues formed a distinct cleavage in the
62 Ibid.
63 Quoted in Fanning, Independent Ireland (Dublin, 1983), p. 161.
64 S 2454 Department of An Taoiseach, National Archives.
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political system.65 Arguments have also been made to the effect that there was also a significant 
core-periphery divide behind the Treaty division. However, the empirical basis of such 
arguments has been shown to be weak. The Fianna Fail party became a national rather than a 
peripheral party quite early on. 66 In essence there were two lines of political cleavage in the 
Irish case. The foreign policy and the regime support issue can be considered the same issue, 
while the division over economic policy though part of the overall division on Anglo-Irish 
relations, was sufficiently great, particularly between 1933 and 1935, for it to be considered an 
issue of high intensity.67 One contention of 'the competitive elitist model' of democracy is that a 
highly adversarial system can only be stable when elites compete over a narrow range of issues.68 
The Irish experience between the wars confirms the validity of this judgement. The efficacy of 
majority rule derived from the fact that it allowed one overarching issue, that of the Treaty to be 
resolved in a democratic way after 1923. The main issues were put to the electorate who decided 
by plurality or majority vote who was to govern and therefore what the direction of government 
policy would be. Arguably majority rule encouraged the institutionalisation of the Treaty-split 
into party politics. Differences over the Treaty were recognised as legitimate, communities of 
interest emerged, and over time the protagonists became capable of compromise.
A final reason for the legitimacy and efficacy of majority rale lay in the ethnic makeup of the 
society. Asking why a government that defeated de Valera in the field later allowed him to 
triumph through the ballot box, Munger points out that the two sides originated within the same 
party. He asks us to imagine an opposite possibility, where 'one of the parties had been a Sinn 
Fein party of the Republican tradition and the other a Unionist party with a past record of 
opposition to Irish nationalism. Northern Ireland comes inevitably to mind. It is difficult to 
believe that the transition should have been so smooth'.69 Dahl suggests that the more 
homogeneous a country 'the less likely it is that the majority will support policies that are 
harmful to a minority and the more likely it is that a broad consensus on the desirability of 
majority rale will exist'.70 The Protestant minority, amounted to much less than 10 per cent of 
the population and separated from the large Unionist population in the North, were not large 
enough to challenge the consensus on the desirability of majority rale by themselves. Majority 
rule could only have been challenged by an alliance between this privileged minority and Labour, 
but there was no obvious sympathy between the two.
65 R. Dunphy, The Making of Fianna Fail Power in Ireland 1922-1948 (Oxford, 1995).
66 See R. Sinnott, Irish Voters Decide ; Voting Behaviour in elections and referendums since 1918 
(Manchester, 1995).
67 See M. Cronin, The Blueshirts and Irish Politics (Dublin, 1997), pp. 135-168.
68 D. Held, Models of Democracy (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 143-184.
69 F. Munger, The Legitimacy of Opposition (Beverly Hills, 1976), p.25.
70 R. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven, 1989), p. 161.
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As in the longer established cases the Irish benefited from the fact that political practice could be 
based on a well-established constitutional tradition. Despite the innovations of the 1922 
constitution majority rule formed the basis of an unspoken constitutional consensus between the 
two sides. This is implied by Hogan who argues that Cumann na nGaedheal's loss of a majority 
in 1927 threatened to overturn 'the entire constitutional edifice' on which the state was built. The 
crisis was then averted 'in a constitutional way1 when the second election 'returned the Treaty 
party in sufficient strength to guarantee the continuance of stable constitutional government'.71 In 
this context majoritarian norms are equated with constitutional norms.
Farrell argues similarly that respect for parliamentary majorities provided a secure base for 
democracy, because it was a reflection of the 'British style liberal-conservatism of the Irish rebel'. 
He explains the divergent fates of the Westminster system in Ireland in terms of two Westminster 
traditions, one prevalent in the North, the other in the South. The Conservative variant, or 'the 
Whitehall model' stems from experience of government, whereas the liberal model reflects 'the 
experience of men who have spent more time in opposition than in government'.72 Table 7.5. 
contrasts their core values. Farrell's contention is that 'the Unionist Party's bland assurance that 
its 'natural' majority gave it a right to rule in perpetuity;... its entrenched resistance to any 
attempt to attenuate the powers of its own executive... is intelligible within the conservative 
version of the British parliamentary model'73 This may be so but between 1922 and 1937 the 
former Sinn Fein elite also progressively stripped their constitution of anything that limited 
executive power. Civil liberties were encroached upon by Public Safety Acts which suspended 
haebus corpus, introduced internment without trial, and trial by military tribunal. Under the 
terms of the seventeenth amendment to the constitution in 1931, a military tribunal was 
empowered to give the death penalty for political crimes, the only right of appeal being to the 
executive council ! The need for governments to ratify constitutional amendments by referenda 
was circumvented by legislation extending the period in which it could amend the constitution by 
ordinary legislation. The Governor General, having expressed doubts as to whether he could 
legally sign a bill deleting article 47, which gave both houses the right to refer bills to the people, 
was told he could only act on the advice of the executive council!
71 J. Hogan, Election and Representation (Cork, 1945), pp.23-25.
72 B. Farrell, From first Dail through Free State' in B. Farrell De Valera's Constitution and Ours 
(Dublin,1988), p.213.
73 Ibid, p.214.
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Table 7.5. Two Variants of the Westminster Model.
Core Values o f the Core Values of the
Whitehall Model Liberal Model
Executive-decision making Control of government
the binding force of law the need for consent
preservation o f order a stress on answerability
strong government representative government
Source : Farrell, 1972, ch 16.
It would be more true to say that the Sinn Fein elite were 'Peelite' in their attitudes to the 
workings of the British system, 'Peelites' traditionally see parliamentary control as an unstable 
basis for government and believe that the executive not the parliament, or through it, the people, 
are responsible for public policy, A necessary condition for good government is that liberal or 
'Whig' mechanisms for enforcing governmental responsiveness are curtailed or simply 
ineffective.74 The whole of Irish constitutional development up to 1937 can be summed up by 
saying that the mechanisms for ensuring responsible government on the liberal model were 
undermined in order that strong government could exist. This is not to say that Irish governments 
lacked legitimacy : Irish politicians could and did successfully claim to be representing the 
interests of the nation above those of sectional or subversive elements within the state. However 
their actions are consistent with the view that the British legacy was essentially a conservative 
one.
The fact that the evolution of the system caused considerable controversy suggests that the 
smaller parties did not share this view of government and were more committed to the existing 
constitution. For example in 1926 a committee proposed wholesale changes to the constitution. 
The reforms, involving as they did the abolition of the referendum, did not just repair some fault 
in the existing constitution, as was claimed, but instead 'radically altered the constitution by 
abandoning one of the principle accepted in 1922 by the entire Constituent Assembly'.75 It was 
objected by the leader of the National League that the abolition Violated the spirit of the 
Constitution under which any eligible candidate could appeal to the electors on any programme 
whatsoever'.76 Fianna Fail's use of parliamentary majorities was not free of controversy either. 
The constitution prescribed 'the principles of proportional representation' but did not define what
74 A. Beattie, 'Ministerial Responsibility and the Theory of the British State' in R.A.W. Rhodes and P. 
Dunleavy, Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive (London, 1995),p. 172.
75 P. Fay, The Amendments to the Constitution Committee 1926' Administration, vol 26, 1978,p.348.
76 Quoted in D. Gwynn, The Irish Free State 1922-1927 (London, 1928), p. 142.
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those principles were. This proved significant when the government altered the electoral 
boundaries in 1935, resulting in changes to twenty of the thirty existing constituencies. The 
guiding principle of the reform was supposedly demographic, to alter the boundaries in line with 
recent population changes. However if one of the principles of proportional representation is to 
achieve proportionality between seats and votes, then the size of constituency becomes an 
important factor since the larger the constituency the more proportional the relationship between 
votes and seats. If a five-seater is the minimum size at which proportionality is guaranteed, then 
in 1933 eighteen out of thirty, or sixty-six per cent of constituencies did not disadvantage small 
parties, whereas in 1937 only a third, or ten constituencies were large enough to ensure a 
proportional relationship between the number of votes gained and the number of seats won. In 
the Senate it was objected that these changes were inconsistent with earlier pledges guaranteeing 
minority representation that had been made to the Southern Unionists.77 An alternative reform, 
which would have reduced the number of T.Ds to 138, but made the number elected from 
constituencies of less than five seats 36 rather than the planned 77, was proposed. The scheme 
was not debated.78
Certainly during the process of stabilisation the smaller parties and the Independents were 
marginalised. However P.R. was retained in 1937. 'Civil war politics' would only continue if the 
old guard remained electorally competitive. The role of S.T.V. in countering the authoritarian 
tendencies of the period is an aspect of Irish political development curiously obscured by 
historical judgement.79 The adoption of P.R. across Europe has been explained as a rational 
bargain struck between smaller parties whose future existence seems threatened by universal 
suffrage and a potentially dominant party which is anxious to gain a foothold in the system.80 
This perspective is relevant to Ireland in the 1920s and 1930s since although single-party 
government led to a centralisation of power, the retention of S.T.V. meant that the basic 
existence of other parties was assured. A characteristic of S.T.V. is that while it limits tendencies 
towards fragmentation it also limits the potential for single-party dominance.81 In terms of their 
freedom to introduce legislation and their length of time in office, both Cumann na nGaedheal 
and Fianna Fail were dominant parties, but their electoral position was always vulnerable.
77 D. O' Sullivan, The Irish Free State and its Senate : A study in contemporary politics (London, 1940), 
p.364.
78 Ibid, pp.414-417.
79 Although see D. Gwynn, The Irish Free State 1922-1927 (London, 1928), pp. 143-149 ; N. Mansergh, 
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2nd. ed. (Limerick,1993), p. 254.
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The fact that the Irish constitutional development up to 1937 led to an extreme concentration of 
power meant that the 1937 constitution was an important part in the process of stabilisation. At 
first glance it merely copperfastened the majoritarian thrust of Irish constitutional development, 
but in other respects it was a reassertion of the constitutional liberalism of 1922, albeit with a 
greater cognisance of party interests. Firstly, in the 1937 debates de Valera argued that 
fundamental rights couldn't be changed by the Dail except by a specified majority or an approval 
by the people by way of referendum' and ensured that the constitution could no longer be 
amended by ordinary statute law.82 Secondly, the 1937 constitution prescribed not just the 
principles of P.R. but the S.T.V. system. When asked why the clause did not allow for a more 
flexible choice de Valera replied that electoral arrangements were too fundamental to be left to 
the mercies of party politics. Thirdly, the power to dissolve the Dail no longer rested with the 
Cabinet but with the President who was to take into account the wishes of Dail Eireann. The 
1937 constitution in short achieved some harmony between majoritarian and liberal principles of 
government
Conclusion.
Garvin has described Irish political culture as a rather distinctive blend of liberal and 
authoritarian elements.83 The institutional basis of that culture was rather distinctive too. By and 
large the comparative literature on the relationship between institutional design and political 
stability stresses the merits of one model versus another, but the Irish case was really an 
intermediary case where a mixture of majority rule and S.T.V. provided an effective institutional 
arena in which democracy could be stabilised. Indentifying the ingredients of that mixture has 
been the task of this chapter.
Ultimately any decision rule will be judged by the decisions taken under it. In Lee's review of the 
performances of Irish governments since independence he singles out the first Cosgrave and de 
Valera governments for praise.84 The civil war elite succeeded in demilitarising politics, 
enhancing the legitimacy of the state, and creating new rules of the game in which political 
conflicts could be resolved. However even enthusiasts for majority rule, such as Locke or 
Rousseau, felt that though the decisions of the majority should be binding once a state was 
established, the original contract which established a state should require something closer to 
unanimity.85 In Ireland the initiatives which attempted to preserve Sinn Fein's unity after the 
Treaty split failed to lead to a national cabinet commanding the allegiance of both sides. This 
introduced a source of weakness that was common to contemporaneous cases of democratic
82 Quoted in D. O' Sullivan, The Irish Free State and its Senate (London, 1940), p.365.
83 T. Garvin, 1922;The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1996), pp. 123-156.
84 J. Lee, Ireland: 1912-1985 (Cambridge, 1989).
85 R. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven, 1989), p. 135.
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breakdown. The initial decisions on the Treaty and constitution were made without the 
participation of the anti-Treatyites and were legitimised by majority rule. On the other hand the 
Free State did not suffer from Karvonen's 'double discontinuity' whereby 'the constitutions had 
next to no roots in earlier political structures and the governing coalitions were not those that had 
introduced the constitution’.86 Majority rule, which was the unwritten constitution in the Irish 
case, harked back to the Dail constitution of 1919 and beyond. In this sense the conventional 
emphasis on the advantage of constitutional continuity in Ireland is correct.
Whether majority rule, and with it single-party government, was a necessary or sufficient 
condition for democratic stabilisation is doubtful. My conclusion is that the Irish case confirms 
the standard hypothesis that majority rule may work in societies that are not deeply-divided on 
ethnic lines. Needless to say the experience of Northern Ireland confirms the converse. The threat 
posed by coalition government to political stability in the Free State lay more in the possibility 
that it could expose the latent conflict between nationalist conceptions of the state and the 
realities of pluralist politics than in the possibility that small parties could be extremist. On the 
other hand any stable socio-economic order must establish a balance between specific interests 
and wider collective solidarities.87 Such conflicts affect states with a legacy of strong centralised 
authority, but the Irish case overcame them rather quickly, partly because it didn't have to 
accommodate the preferences of a million Unionists, partly because of the willingness of the 
smaller parties to allow the national question to take precedence, and partly because the 
institutional design of the state allowed a balance between the two pressures to be preserved.
86 L. Karvonen, Political Organisation and the Interwar Crisis (Boulder,1993), p.173.
87 E. Allardt, Types of Protest and Alienation1 in E. Allardt and S. Rokkan (eds.) Mass Politics: Studies in 
Political Sociology (New York, 1970), pp.45-64.
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Chapter Eight: Unenthusiastic Democrats ? ; 
Collins, de Valera, and the Civil War.
It's for the freedom of Ireland1 says Diarmuid. ‘That same freedom has me deafened and I don't know what 
it means,' says Seamaisin. We have to have our own King here and the connection with England to be 
broken," Diarmaid answers. 1 understand now,' says Seamaisin. 'One crowned King of England and 
another crowned King of Ireland- that's something you'll never see, Diarmaid, so long as the sun is in the 
sky. If there is a crown on a King in Ireland it will be England's crown he will have to wear.' 1 hope you're 
proved wrong!' says Diarmaid Ban.
Thomas O' Crohan, 1986.
This final chapter is concerned with reputations, more particularly, with democratic reputations. 
Since the Irish national revolution was inspired by what is often considered an unpopular rising 
in 1916, the democratic credentials of Irish nationalists have perhaps been more suspect than 
later generations have cared to admit. The majority of the future elite of the Free State entered 
politics through organisations such as the Volunteers or the Gaelic League, that had little to do 
with the workings of parliamentary democracy. They became politicians by accident' in other 
words.1 Moreover some had a conditional attitude to the workings of electoral democracy. 
Prior ideological commitments to the goal of a Republic; to the creation of a socialist state, or to 
some other vision of a free Ireland, overrode their commitment to democratic procedures. They 
were 'unenthusiastic democrats' according to Tom Garvin.2
The democratic reputations of the two most prominent leaders at the time, of Michael Collins and 
of Eamon de Valera, have not survived the descent of Ireland into civil war in 1922. De Valera 
has been blamed for causing the civil war, and worse: Sir Hamar Greenwood once remarked that 
he belongs to a race of treacherous murderers and he has inculcated Ireland into the murderous 
treachery of his race'.3 Collin's actions between January and August 1922 have been seen as 
evidence of a conspiratorial and authoritarian personality at the head of the Provisional 
Government. Coogan's recent portrait of him occupying a 'dual role' as 'head of a democratically 
elected Government, and as head of a secret society regarding itself as a Government within a 
government', has done little to reverse this view.4 More recently still, Collins has been omitted
1 L. Skinner, Politicians by Accident (Dublin, 1946).
2 T. Garvin, Unenthusiastic Democrats : the Emergence of Irish Democracy1 in R. Hill and M. Marsh (eds.) 
Modem Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1993), pp.9-24.
3 Weekly Summary1 February 4 1921, Gavan Duffy Papers 1125/29/4, National Archives.
4 T.P. Coogan, Michael Collins (London, 1990), p.426.
from the small but talented Pro-Treaty elite that are credited with the establishment of Free State 
democracy by Tom Garvin.5
While the democratic reputation of the nationalist elite as a whole may have survived the regime- 
change, history has been less kind to Collins and to de Valera. To what extent are these 
accusations true and to what extent did the civil war crisis reveal the undemocratic propensities 
of two of the most popular and able figures in Irish nationalist politics ? What follows is an 
attempt to answer these questions. This involves a comparison of the manner in which they 
responded to the civil war crisis. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses 
the strategy of the Sinn Fein movement after the 1918 general election. The second compares 
Collin's and de Valera's views on the Treaty split. The third describes their reaction to the civil 
war conflict.
The 1918 General Election and after.
In order to understand the positions taken by Collins and de Valera in the Treaty debates and 
their aftermath it is first necessary to recount the background to the Treaty split. Since 1918 the 
Sinn Fein party had been seeking recognition of Ireland as an independent sovereign Republic. 
They argued that on the basis of the 1918 general election results Ireland was entitled to full 
national-self-determination and its case should be heard at Versailles. They moved forward on 
two fronts. On the external front Sinn Fein propaganda stressed the 'almost complete political 
unanimity' behind the demand for a Republic as allegedly evidenced by the voting patterns of 
1918.6 On the internal front Sinn Fein put forward a more practical argument. Having 
established an actually functioning government in Ireland which was gradually replacing that of 
the British, Sinn Fein argued that not to recognise that government would be to infringe the 
principles of government by the consent of the people.
The 1918 election was a watershed in Irish political development. It saw the victory of the Sinn 
Fein party at the polls for the first time in Irish politics. It crystallised the already-existing 
division between two opposing electoral 'blocs' in Ireland, one separatist and one Unionist, 
which presaged the partition of the country two years later. In party political terms, the most 
obvious effect of the election was to make the Sinn Fein party the dominant party in Irish 
nationalist politics. That place had been held by the constitutional-nationalist Home Rule Party 
which traditionally campaigned behind a policy of Home Rule for Ireland and which customarily
5 T. Garvin, The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1996),p.l94.
6 Ireland's Request to the Government of the United States of America for Recognition as a Sovereign 
Independent State (Dublin, 1919), pp. 12-13.
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won between 80 and 85 of Ireland's 103 seats at Westminster. After the landslide victory of Sinn 
Fein in 1918 the party's representation was reduced to six seats as opposed to 73 for Sinn Fein.7
A number of factors have been cited to explain the Sinn Fein party's extraordinary performance. 
The fact that the majority of voters were voting for the first time undoubtedly meant that their 
loyalty to the traditionally dominant Home Rule party was weaker than it might have been. As 
the election was held under the British 'first-past-the-post system', the electoral victory for Sinn 
Fein was also exaggerated. 'Under the existing 'first-past-the -post' system, Sinn Fein was able to 
win 94 per cent of the contested seats in the 26 counties with only 65 per cent of the vote'.8 
Thirdly, the fact that the Home Rule party was associated with a policy that had manifestly failed 
to gain legislative autonomy for Ireland, dampened public enthusiasm for the nationalist party. 
On top of that Britain's recent attempt to impose conscription on Ireland and Sinn Fein's ability 
to place itself at the head of the anti-conscription campaign meant that the party benefited from 
the widespread hostility towards conscription which existed throughout the island. Added to that 
hostility was the alienation felt by the public after the execution of the leaders of the 1916 Rising
Sinn Fein had won an overall majority of the Irish seats and their tendency was to emphasise the 
absolute nature of their victory and the majority mandate they had achieved. Mansergh has noted 
how the triangular logic of decolonising situations often leads the majority party which favours 
rapid decolonisation to ignore the reality of minority opposition in its desire to convince the 
departing power of the homogenous nature of public opinion in the colonial territory.9 This 
stance certainly characterised the Sinn Fein movement between 1918 and 1920 which remained 
publicly opposed to any suggestions that Ireland was composed of two nations. Rather than the 
Irish Question' being essentially a religious one, it was represented by Sinn Fein as the struggle 
of Irish nationality against British Imperialism. Moreover the political efforts of the nationalists 
were very much focused on pressurising the departing power to leave, rather than coming to 
terms with internal opposition. Conversely, the loyal minority and the departing power had a 
vested interest in delaying the process of decolonisation and were more likely to deal with each 
other before coming to terms with the secessionist movement. Such a situation was typical of 
Ireland between 1918 and 1920, just as much as it was of India after the Second World War.
The policy the Sinn Fein party sought a mandate for was a radical one and consisted of four 
points. Firstly, its elected representatives would refuse to take their seats in the British 
parliament. Secondly, the party would use 'any and every means available' to counteract British
7 See J. Coakley, The Election that made the first Dail' in B. Farrell (ed.) The Creation o f the Dail 
(Dublin, 1994).
8 Ibid, p.36.
9 N. Mansergh, The Prelude to Partition : Concepts and Aims in Ireland and India' in D. Mansergh (ed.), 
Nationalism and Independence: Selected Essays and Papers (Cork,1997), pp. 32-63.
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rule. Thirdly, Sinn Fein would convene the Irish M.P.s as a constituent assembly with supreme 
decision- making power. Fourthly, it would appeal to the Peace Conference that was soon to 
assemble at Versailles for 'the establishment of Ireland as an Independent nation'. The policy of 
the party was thus a revolutionary one. It would end the decades old Nationalist Party tradition of 
attending the Westminster parliament and would resort to civil disobedience instead in order to 
pressurise London into conceding nationalist demands. It would establish its own sovereign 
assembly in Ireland and seek international recognition as an independent sovereign nation.
This programme was certainly the product of the revolutionary exuberance which affected 
nationalist Ireland in the aftermath of the 1916 Rising. There were however points on which the 
Sinn Fein leadership was equivocal. In the first place, the decision to adopt a 32-county Republic 
as the goal of the Sinn Fein movement had come rather late in the party's evolution. It was only 
in October 1917, when de Valera replaced Griffith as head of the party, that the latter's 
preference for a dual monarchy linking Ireland with Britain was discarded. For Griffith 
legislative autonomy, not the de jure status of the state, had always been synonymous with 
independence and this remained at the heart of his political vision. As Laffan remarks, some 
other Sinn Feiners understood the goal of a Republic in the literal sense, their mission was to 
make real the Republic declared in 1916. For others however 'Republican' status was 'no more 
than a synonym for independence'.10 Indeed despite the party's rejection of Griffith's programme, 
the programme of the party was still ambiguous. Its election manifesto in 1918 had spoken of 
seeking recognition as a sovereign independent Republic. It went on to add however that, having 
achieved that status, the Irish people could via referendum freely chose their own form of 
government.
Hancock suggests that the ambiguity of the Sinn Fein programme was due to the existence of two 
rival conceptions of independence which had existed within Irish nationalist politics for decades:
On the one side was the dogma of the undying republic, won by the blood of the martyrs, living in its own 
right, needing no ratification by popular vote, but needing only resolution and arms. For this living Republic 
Sinn Fein was trustee, claiming full loyalty and obedience. Here in germ was the party state. But on the 
other side was nationalistic democracy, equally resolute for Irish independence, but admitting the right of 
the Irish people to choose the symbolism and forms of government in which that independence would 
express itself. This theory subjected Sinn Fein itself to the suffrage of the people.11
10 M. Laffan, 'Sinn Fein from Dual Monarchy to the First Dail' in B. Farrell (ed.) The Creation o f the Dail 
(Dublin, 1994), p.25.
11 K. Hancock, 'Problems of Nationality 1918-1936' in Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, vol 1, (London, 
New York, and Toronto, 1937),p.l04.
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Thus there were two long-standing conceptions of independence in Ireland. The oldest was what 
was known as 'the sister Kingdom Theory' which asserted the rights of the Irish people to be 
bound only by the laws enacted by his Majesty and the Parliament of that Kingdom. Eighteenth 
century in origin, 'it conceived of a state free to legislate for its own internal affairs and owing 
subjection and allegiance only to the King's sacred majesty'.12 This claim to independence did 
not derive from any a priori theory of political rights but was based on a traditional claim and a 
traditional model of government. From this model derived Arthur Griffith's policy of 
withdrawing from Westminster and re-establishing an Irish parliament in Dublin which would 
continue to recognise the Crown under a Dual Monarchy. The Dual Monarchy idea 'represented 
not so much a constitutional dogma as a working method of achieving national freedom: it was 
the product of a practical temper aware of the limitations inherent in changing circumstances and 
unwilling to fix any abstract label on the national struggle and turn that label into a test for 
patriots'.13 Since it aimed at independence by restoring the legislative rights of the Irish 
parliament under an ancient constitution, it did not involve the break-up of the existing state and 
could not be considered secessionist. On the other hand there was a radical Jacobin conception of 
independence which foresaw 'a separate Irish government which could claim immediate 
authority, and the immediate form and symbolism could be none other than Republican'.14 This 
form and this symbolism would however be provisional, since once established, the people would 
be free to 'clothe the established national state in whatever form and symbolism it might deem 
expedient'.15 Such a conception, based as it was on the doctrine of popular sovereignty asserted 
the exclusive rights of the people to decide their own form of government free from outside 
interference. It proposed independence by secession, the creation of a new and separate state 
which would be called a Republic, to emphasise both its complete independence and its severance 
from the older state.
One could add that this divide reflected a difference over the meaning given to the term national 
self-determination by the Sinn Fein leadership, since one tradition stressed the importance of 
achieving true independence as a Republic while the other was more concerned with establishing 
a government with the consent of the people. Put another way, the split in the Sinn Fein 
movement revealed a universal tension between the proponents of 'external' and 'internal' self 
determination. A basic division often surfaces in nationalist movements between those who insist 
on 'grand' self-determination 'whose object is true internationally recognised sovereignty* and 
'small' self-determination, which is concerned with the internal structure and politics of the 
state.16 Such a division lay behind the Treaty split of 1922.
12 Ibid, p. 101.
13 Ibid, p. 104.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 B. Neuberger, 'National Self-Determination: Dilemmas of a Concept1 Nations and Nationalism, vol 1. no 
3, 1995, p.299.
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The particular mixture of nationalism and democracy that characterised the Sinn Fein movement 
after 1918 had explosive potential. Did the public give a mandate for the establishment of an 
externally recognised Republic in 1918 or merely to a government reflecting the will of the 
people ? This was one issue and it had not been resolved before 1921. Another dilemma facing 
the movement referred to the 'self implied in the concept of 'self-determination'. Did it extend a 
priori to the whole of the Irish people or merely to those areas where a majority voted for the 
Sinn Fein movement in 1918? For Republicans national self-determination meant the self- 
determination of the whole Irish people, which voted by a majority on the island for secession. 
For more pragmatic nationalists it was only in those areas where nationalist candidates received 
a majority that Sinn Fein could demand self-determination. Although Sinn Fein was loath in its 
public statements to admit that Unionists had, on the basis of the 1918 election results, a right to 
opt out of the independent state, privately many had conceded before 1921 that the Unionists 
could not be coerced into an independent Ireland.
Sinn Fein's political programme was carried forward from early 1919 onwards. Its diplomatic 
efforts were aimed at securing a hearing for Ireland at the soon-to-be convened Peace Conference 
at Versailles. The concept of self-determination had already played a large part in its propaganda 
efforts. Candidates for the 1918 election such as Gavan Duffy, Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
the revolutionary Dail government between 1919-1921, told his electorate that 'the fundamental 
question in this General Election is whether this ancient and honourable people, alone of the 
white race, is to forgo its claims to self-determination'.17 Sinn Fein demanded that the victors 
of the World War hear Ireland's claim to the right of national-self-determination at the Paris 
Peace Conference. America in particular should insist that Britain be bound by 'the general moral 
law' of self-determination.18 They were supplied with electoral data showing how extensive the 
demand was for a 32-county Irish Republic in the recent election.19 If the Peace Congress 
ignored Ireland's case, and removed its hope of redress through the Peace Conference, violent 
conflict could ensue.20
On the other hand the aim of the Sinn Fein organisation was to establish a working government 
in Ireland to make real Ireland's claim to self-determination. This government would gradually 
usurp the powers of Dublin Castle in Ireland. To this end a Cabinet and a number of government 
departments were established. They included Departments of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Local
17 To the Electors of South County Dublin', December 6 1918, Gavan Duffy Papers, 1125/29/1 National 
Archives.
18 G. Duffy, 'An Urgent Preliminary Note for the Information of the President of the United States of 
America with regard to Ireland and the Peace Conference, December 28 1918, Gavan Duffy Papers, 
1125/15/2, National Archives.
19 Sinn Fein, Ireland's Request to the Government of the United States of America for recognition as a 
sovereign independent state (Dublin, 1919).
20 Gavan Duffy, 'An Urgent Preliminary Note' op. cit.
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Government, and of Education as well as Directorates for more prosaic areas such as Trade and 
Commerce. Throughout the country the party assumed responsibility for the administration of 
justice and for a variety of tasks, including the arbitration of land disputes. Meanwhile, the 
official agencies of the British state in Ireland were either ignored or subverted. The Sinn Fein 
government would become the sole legitimate authority in the country and this would 
demonstrate the nation's capacity for self-rule. While some of the Dail government's departments 
were never to function effectively, in other areas, such as Justice for example, the claim that they 
were establishing a rival governmental structure in Ireland was matched by practical activity. 
This enabled the party to claim that the government of the Republic was functioning and claimed 
recognition 'not only because it is the legitimate and rightful government of the Irish people - the 
only government with the democratic sanction of the consent of the governed, but also because it 
is also the actual government in Ireland'.21
The Sinn Fein movement thus possessed two separate but interlocked elements. On the one hand, 
on the basis of democratic and nationalist principles it was putting forward a normative case for 
recognition as a sovereign independent Republic. On the other hand, it was making good its 
claim for recognition in the practical sphere. It was significant even at this early stage in the 
movement that the organisation of the Department of Finance was entrusted to Michael Collins, 
while the main work of de Valera lay in the field of propaganda, more specifically in persuading 
American public opinion of the justice of Ireland's claim. The different emphases involved in 
these activities, the one concerned with practical realities, and the other with normative 
arguments, were to influence how both responded to the Treaty signed in December 1921.
What is important to recognise was that the tension between the two emphases in the Sinn Fein 
movement, the one concerned with achieving external recognition as a sovereign independent 
state, and the other with establishing an actually existing government in Ireland, did not emerge 
while the movement was struggling to achieve both against the force of British resistance. By 
1921 it was clear that the effort to gain recognition for the Republic had failed, but in other 
respects the Sinn Fein movement had succeeded in establishing a functioning government in 
many areas of Ireland. It remained to be seen what would happen if negotiations with the British 
would result in the nationalist elite being offered the substance of practical freedom, but denied 
what I have termed external recognition as a sovereign state, which to many was synonymous 
with Republican status.
8.2. The Treaty Split.
21 Sinn Fein, Ireland's Request to the Government of the United States o f America for recognition as a 
sovereign independent state (Dublin, 1919), p. 15.
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The Treaty was signed on December 6th 1921 after months of negotiation and diplomatic 
wrangling. The Anglo-Irish war had reached its most intense phase during 1921 and both sides 
were anxious for a negotiated peace. With a divided delegation however, and unclear lines of 
authority to the Dail cabinet, some of whom remained at home, the decision of the 
plenipotentiaries to sign the Treaty was bound to be controversial. The delegates did not report 
back to Dublin before signing the final document although they were aware that the Treaty would 
be met with hostility in certain quarters. De Valera, despite pleas to the contrary, was not part of 
the delegation and remained in Dublin awaiting news of the negotiations. He was well aware that 
the British would not concede the Irish demand for a 32-county Republic but had not instructed 
the delegates to accept less. When news of the Treaty returned to Dublin he was furious.
The delegates to the negotiations had accepted a document that left the Irish state within the 
Empire but on terms that gave it equality of status with the other White Dominions.22 The 
precise constitutional relationship between the new Irish Free State and the Imperial Parliament 
would be analogous to that existing between Westminster and the Dominion of Canada. A 
Governor General, to be the Crown's representative within Ireland, would be appointed after the 
manner existing in Canada. The members of the Irish parliament would take the following oath.
I... do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law 
established and that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V., his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of 
the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of 
nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.
The Irish would assume responsibility for the payment of a proportion of Britain's public debt and 
of the war pensions of the United Kingdom. The British would assume responsibility for the 
coastal defence of the Irish Free State until such time as an arrangement has been made between 
the British and Irish Governments whereby the Irish undertook their own defence. The Irish 
would allow, in time of peace, the use of a specified number of Irish ports, and in time of 
international crisis, 'such harbour and other facilities as the British Government may require for 
the purpose of such defence as aforesaid'. The Free State army would not exceed in size the 
proportion of the military establishments maintained in Great Britain 'as that which the 
population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain'. Northern Ireland would be given 
the option of opting out of the Free State but should it do so, a Commission of three, one to be 
appointed by the Irish government, one by the government of Northern Ireland, and one, to be 
Chairman, by the British Government, would be entrusted with determining the boundaries 
between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland 'in accordance with the wishes of the 
inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic conditions'.
22 See Appendix A.
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Met with immediate hostility on his arrival back to Dublin, Collins was quick to refute charges 
that he had acted in an indefensible way in signing the Treaty. He argued that it was the 
acceptance of the invitation to negotiate, not the Treaty itself, that had formed the compromise 
with Britain. The delegates had accepted an invitation 'to ascertain how the association of Ireland 
with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish 
national aspirations'. Those who accepted their role as negotiators 'all knew that we could never 
bring back all that Ireland wanted and deserved to have and we therefore knew that more or less 
opprobrium would be the best reward we could hope to win'.23 He believed that the British move 
to negotiate was made because further British repression would not be countenanced by world 
opinion, but a rejection of a generous settlement by the Republicans would allow Britain to 
represent them as irreconcilables' and thereby renew their mandate to restore "law and order' in a 
country that would not accept responsibility for doing so itself.24 Collins had believed that 
military and economic resistance to British rule had reached its high water mark the previous 
July. As such the realisation that the IRA could not drive the British forces out of Ireland was the 
premise for the acceptance of the Truce. In short, even before they went to London the 
plenipotentiaries had 'abandoned for the time being, the hope of achieving the ideal of 
independence under a Republican form'.25
Moreover, according to Collins, at no stage in the negotiations had the delegates demanded the 
Republic as their ultimate demand. Precisely because a settlement outside the Empire was not 
envisaged, de Valera had instructed the delegates on their first visit back to Dublin to put the case 
for his Document No. 2 instead. This proposed that Ireland would be a Republic in so far as 
internal matters were concerned but would recognise the Crown for external purposes only 26 
Unfortunately Document No. 2. was rejected, even with amendments, three times by the British. 
The acceptance of Dominion status followed from the rejection of Document No. 2. The 
alternative was the failure of talks. As Collins had put it 'if our national aspirations could only 
have been expressed by the full Republican ideal, then they were not and never could be, 
reconciled with what was understood by "association with the group of nations known as the 
British Empire"!.27
Lastly, Collins accepted that there was an element of 'duress' in the decision to accept the Treaty. 
It was said that Robert Barton, who later opposed the Treaty, had signed the Treaty because of 
Lloyd George's threat of 'terrible and immediate war'. Collins denied that the threat was ever
23 M. Collins, 'Article on Treaty Negotiations' (Lifford, 1931), p. 31.
24 Ibid,p. 31.
25 Ibid, p.87
26 See Appendix B.
27 M. Collins, The Path to Freedom (Dublin,!996), p.94.
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made, as did the British, but he believed that 'duress' had existed from the outset and was 
independent of the course of negotiations: 'Our acceptance of the truce, our consenting to 
negotiate, yes and in the same sense the signing of the Treaty - all these proved that there existed 
an element of duress'.28 He did not actually sign the Treaty under duress 'except in the sense that 
the position as between Ireland and England, historically, and because of superior forces on the 
part of England, has always been one of duress'.29
In 1937 Frank O' Connor wrote that it was 'as a realist that Collins will be remembered' and his 
acceptance of the Treaty is usually seen as an example of 'his natural bent for realism'.30 Lyons 
argues that 'it is probably true to say that the majority of those who ultimately came down on the 
Treaty side did so on less than idealistic grounds' and Collins, whose endorsement of the Treaty 
is inevitably associated with the phrase that it gave 'not the ultimate freedom that all nations 
aspire and develop to but the freedom to achieve it', seems to personify that position perfectly.31 
Collin's endorsement of the Treaty agreement was not only pragmatic, he believed that the final 
steps in the march towards full independence would be achieved within his lifetime.
The Treaty does not put a bar to the onward inarch of the Irish nation. It is unthinkable that this generation 
will not carry Irish aspirations further forward. And this onward march will unquestionably be continued by 
Irishmen until the Gaelic Irish nation is fully restored again.32
Although head of the I.R.B., Collins publicly declared that the Irish nationalist tradition had 
always been a pragmatic one which struggled for freedom from English domination, not for 
freedom with any particular label attached to it:
What we fought for at any particular time was the greatest measure of freedom attainable at that time, and it 
depended upon our strength whether the claim was greater than at another time or lesser than at another 
time.33
At the very least, the Treaty ensured that after a lapse of seven hundred and fifty years, the Free 
State would be left 'with a parliament to make laws for the Peace order and good government of 
Ireland and with it an Executive responsible for that parliament'.34 Regardless of the question of
28 M. Collins, 'Article on Treaty Negotiations' (Lifford, 1931), p.87.
29 Collins,The Path to Freedom (Dublin, 1996), p.26.
30 F. O' Connor, The Big Fellow (Dublin, 1996), p. 10.
31 F.S.L. Lyons, 'from Treaty to Civil War in Ireland. Three essays on the Treaty Debate' in B. Farrell (ed.) 
The Irish Parliamentary Tradition (Dublin,1973), p.247.
32 New York Herald, May 5 1922, Michael Collins: Statements and Speeches', Department of An 
Taoiseach, S 10961, National Archives.
33 M. Collins, The Path fo Freedom'(Dublin,1996), p.28.
34 M. Collins, 'Article on treaty Negotiations' People's Press, 1 November 1931.
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status, the Treaty had achieved the practical essence of freedom. This was more important than 
the question of status:
If the impossible had happened, and the Rising had succeeded and the English had surrendered and 
evacuated the country, we would then have been free, and we could then have adopted the Republican form 
of government, or any other form we wished. But the Rising did not succeed as a military venture. And if it 
had succeeded it would have been the surrender and the evacuation which would have been the proof of our 
success, not the name for, nor the form of, the government we would have chosen. If we had still a 
descendant of our Irish Kings left, we would be as free, under a limited monarchy, with the British gone, as 
undo: a Republic.35
Collins denied that de Valera's Document No.2, which would have allowed for a Republic within 
the Commonwealth, represented a superior alternative to the Treaty. He was quick to see in 
Document No. 2 the hand of an Englishman, Erskine Childers: 'dominionism tinged every line' 
of the Document, according to Collins, to the extent that it belittled Ireland's true status as 'a 
Mother Country' with 'the duties and responsibilities and feelings and devotions' of a mother 
country.36 This fact signified more to Collins 'than all the arguments about Dominion status, or 
all the arguments basing the claim of out historic nation on any new-found idea'. To him Irish 
nationhood sprang from the Irish people 'and not from any equality -inherent or acquired-with 
any other people'.37This was a definite rejection of the idea of external self-determination as a 
sort of litmus test of true independence.
The difference between Collins and de Valera reflected the long standing tension in the 
nationalist movement between proponents of external and internal self-determination. De 
Valera, however much Document No 2. deviated from the ideal of 'the isolated Republic', 
believed that any close association with Britain put a limit on Irish national aspirations. For 
example, Collins welcomed the constitutional status of Canada as a guarantee of future freedom 
for the Irish state.
Our immunity can never be challenged without challenging the immunity of Canada, having the same 
constitutional status as Canada, a violation of our freedom would be a challenge to the freedom of Canada. 
It gives us a security which we ought not lightly to despise. No such security would have been reached by 
the external association aimed at in Document No 2.38
35 M. Collins, The Path to Freedom, (Dublin,1996), p.54.
36 Ibid, p.37.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid p.92.
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De Valera however saw no such guarantee in the Canadian analogy. He informed a Professor of 
Law at Trinity College Dublin that the main problem he and Childers had with the Treaty lay in 
the King's right to veto domestic legislation. Once economic legislation passed by an Irish 
parliament affects English commercial interests *you will see that British Ministers will advise 
the King and he will veto the bill'. He added significantly however, that if the constitutional 
practice of the Free State did follow that of Canada, as prescribed in the Treaty, then de Valera 
would alter his attitude toward the Treaty.39 This was in line with de Valera's view that the 
Treaty was not a stepping stone but a barrier to the full realisation of Irish national aspirations.
It is not a stepping stone, but a barrier in the way to complete independence. If this Treaty be completed 
and the British Act resulting from it accepted by Ireland, it will certainly be maintained by a solemn 
binding contract has been voluntarily entered into by the Irish people, and Britain will seek to hold us to 
that contract. It will be cited against the claim for independence of every future Irish leader.40
De Valera's immediate response to his loss of the Cabinet vote on the Treaty was to attempt to 
have Document No 2. replace the Treaty as the basis for public discussion. He failed but 
continued to argue for its merits thereafter. De Valera's motives in opposing the Treaty have been 
interpreted in different ways. Fanning suggests he opposed the Treaty 'not because it was a 
compromise, but because it was not his compromise'.41 De Valera, in a fit of pique at being left 
out of the final decision on the Treaty, may have rejected the Treaty for egotistical reasons. The 
charge was also made by Michael Collins, who suggested de Valera thought he had only so say 'I 
won't have it' and all Ireland would re-echo 'we will not have it*. That 'miscalculation' according 
to Collins 'was the cause of all the trouble'.42 As Hopkinson says, this interpretation ignores the 
sincerity and consistency of de Valera's views on the Treaty,43 and the validity of Document No. 
2 as an alternative. The most obvious difference between the two lay in the absence of an oath 
and a Governor General in the latter. Article one of Document No. 2, declared that the 
legislative, executive, and judicial authority of Ireland shall be derived solely from the people of 
Ireland*. Ireland would be associated with the States of the British Commonwealth only 'for 
purposes of common concern' and would recognise the British King as head of the association as 
part of its membership of the Commonwealth. This formula, known as 'external association' 
would have left Ireland free in internal affairs while in external matters its policy would be 
jointly determined with the other states of the Commonwealth. In short Document No. 2 rectified 
the democratic deficit de Valera feared was present in the Treaty settlement. The other articles 
were rather similar to the Treaty, save for article 16 on the transfer of powers, which required
39 See Peace Proposals: E. Culverwell’, Department of An Taoiseach, S 8141, National Archives.
40 Quoted in T.P. Coogan, De Valera : Long Fellow, Long Shadow (London,1993),p.304.
41 R Fanning, Independent Ireland (Dublin,1983), p.3.
42 Sunday Express April 23 1922.
43 M Hopkinson, Green Against Green (Dublin,! 988), p.39.
206
that a transitional government be elected by the Dail elected in 1920, and not by the parliament 
of Southern Ireland. This was also a democratic improvement on the Treaty, since the Sinn Fein 
elite as a whole had boycotted the parliament for Southern Ireland and continued to attend Dail 
Eireann, which had been the legitimate parliament in Southern Ireland since 1919.
De Valera's actions in opposing the Treaty have been interpreted as those of an autocrat denying 
the right of the majority of the Irish people to decide on the Treaty settlement. Aside from 
creating publicity for Document No. 2, de Valera also started a new political party, Cumann na 
Poblachta, composed of the fifty seven deputies who had voted against the Treaty on January 5th. 
This group was behind an attempt to have de Valera re-elected as President of the Dail, which 
narrowly failed, by 60 votes to 58. De Valera had already rejected a suggestion by Michael 
Collins that a Committee of Public Safety be formed consisting of both supporters and opponents 
of the Treaty, as he had earlier rejected, before the Dail vote on the Treaty, the proposal that he 
remain President, but agree to allow the Provisional Government to function. Instead he wished 
to have a cabinet that was 'composed, for the time being, of those who stood definitely by the 
Republic'. His actions in then seeking to have himself re-elected as President were criticised by 
Cosgrave as a perversion of constitutional practice, requiring 'that the minority in an assembly... 
form the government'.44
This was the first in a long list of allegations concerning de Valera's behaviour in the period 
between the signing of the Treaty and the outbreak of civil war. We have already seen how de 
Valera rejected the proposal for a plebiscite on the acceptance or rejection of the Treaty, thus 
convincing the Provisional Government that it was up to them to safeguard the democratic rights 
of the Irish people.45 However de Valera's reaction to the Mansion House Conference was 
somewhat more complicated than Provisional Government propaganda would allow. There was 
nothing in the Treaty that demanded that an election take place before the following December. 
The Labour Party had proposed that, rather than holding an immediate election, a stable 
executive be set up, its membership drawn from both the Treaty sides. The Army would be united 
under this government, and the election would be delayed for six months. In that time a 
constitution would be introduced. De Valera promised that he would, if Griffith agreed, use 
whatever influence he possessed with the anti-Treaty party and with the army 'to win acceptance 
for the proposal, not indeed as a principle of right or of justice, but as a principle of peace and 
order'. However the proposal was opposed by Griffith and came to nothing. An immediate 
election, which was demanded by the British Parliament's Irish Free State Act, was the policy of 
the Provisional Government.
44 R. Fanning, Independent Ireland (Dublin,1983), p.7.
45 See Chapter 5.
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De Valera has also been accused of courting extremist support after the Dail vote on the 
Treaty,46 and more damagingly still, of inciting civil war in a series of speeches which he 
maintains were intended as warnings of the possibility of civil war.47 The most infamous of those 
speeches is worth quoting at length:
If they accepted the Treaty, and if the Volunteers of the future tried to complete the work the Volunteers of 
the last four years had been attempting, they would have to complete it, not over the bodies of foreign 
soldiers, but over the dead bodies of their own countrymen. They would have to wade through, perhaps, the 
blood of some of the members of the Government in order to get Irish freedom.
In self-defence, de Valera claimed that the newspaper reports of these speeches were 
misrepresentations which had on their readers precisely the same effect 'as if the inciting words 
were really mine'. De Valera's self justification, which appeared in the Irish Independent on 
March 23, is worth quoting in full:
My argument was an answer to those who said that the London Agreement gave us Freedom to achieve 
freedom’. I showed that instead of opening the way, it erected in the nation's path two almost impassable 
barriers; (1) the nation's own pledged word, and (2), a native government bound to act in accordance with 
and to secure, even by force, respect for that pledged word. The constitutional way was barred and the way 
of force barred - the latter by the horror of civil war. The Irish Volunteers of the future, if they persevered in 
the cause of Independence, would have to fight not an alien English government merely but a native Irish 
government, not English troops but Irish troops, the forces of their own government - their own fellow 
countrymen. That was the barrier of Irish flesh and blood which those who advocated the acceptance of the 
so-called Treaty would erect, even whilst they shouted that they were securing 'freedom to achieve 
freedom'.48
Whether the letter dispelled suspicions that de Valera was inciting civil war is debatable, but his 
choice of words was certainly unfortunate. What is remarkable were the two assumptions that de 
Valera made in his letter. The first was that the IRA would continue to have a political role. The 
second was that further independence could not be achieved by a native government set up under 
the Treaty. This may not have been incitement to civil war, but it was a statement that some kind 
of conflict was inevitable, and in the highly-charged atmosphere of the time, represented at least 
a reckless streak in de Valera.
Assessing the validity of the anti-de Valera critique, one has to be careful not to confuse 
opposition to the Treaty with opposition to liberal democracy itself. De Valera was free, and in
46 T.P. Coogan, de Valera, Long Fellow, Long Shadow (London, 1993), pp.300-321.
47 Ibid, pp.310-312.
48 Irish Independent, March 23 1923.
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the light of his convictions, honour-bound, to oppose the Treaty if he felt that Irish democracy 
could not develop under its confines. Whether he opposed a democratic resolution to the Treaty 
conflict is another question. On the strength of the available evidence there seems no doubt that 
de Valera was 'an unenthusiastic democrat' in the first half of 1922. Coogan quotes an interview 
with an American correspondent where de Valera refers to a 'well-known weakness of 
democracy1, its lack of effective checks and balances against sudden changes of opinion and 
poorly thought-out actions. In the Irish context there were no such brakes so 'the Army sees in 
itself the only brake at the present time and is using its strength as such'.49 De Valera was not 
slow to provide a justification for the army's position:
Republicans maintain that the proposed Treaty1 which involved the abandonment of the Republic and the 
acceptance of the British Crown and the British Empire, should not be put to the people whilst England's 
threat of war prevents the free will of the people from being truly expressed. They maintain further, that 
there are rights which a minority may justly uphold, even by arms, against a majority, and that such a right 
is that of defending and preserving for themselves and for all those who come after them, the precious 
heritage of belonging to a nation that can never be said to have voluntarily surrendered its territory or its 
independence.50
After the majority of the Dail had accepted the Treaty de Valera could only mobilise opinion in 
the Army against the Treaty. It was only when Collins offered him an alternative through the 
Pact that de Valera returned to a purely political way of finding a brake on the disestablishment 
of the Republic.
Collins’ willingness to sign the Pact when the majority of his cabinet were against it, can also 
be taken as evidence of the undemocratic propensities of a man who was willing to go further to 
appease his opponents than his colleagues would contemplate. The Pact was denounced by 
Churchill as a deal 'whereby a handful of men who possess lethal weapons deliberately disposed 
of the political rights of the electors by a deal across the table'.51 However, even if the Pact 
effectively denied the right of the electorate to decide on the Treaty settlement, such elite pacts 
are often devised by elites in deeply-divided societies as ways of stabilising the political situation. 
By definition, pacts remove certain areas of public policy from the realms of majority rule, but 
are justified by the fact that the choice is not between majoritarian and non-majoritarian 
democracy, but non-majoritarian democracy or no democracy at all.52 In the Irish context, the 
alternative to the Pact was not a fully competitive election but probably no election at all. It was
49 Coogan op. cit.,p.316.
50 FF 22, Fianna Fail Archives.
51 Coogan, op. cit., p.317.
52 See A  Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies : A Comparative Exploration (New Haven and London, 
1977).
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in this spirit that Collins defended the agreement: 'It must be remembered that the country is still 
in a transition stage and that to act as if a stable condition had been reached is impossible and in 
the national interest unsound1.53
Moreover the Pact did not prevent other parties going forward to contest the election and there is 
some evidence that Collins was keen to protect their right which was spelt out in clause four of 
the agreement. On May 29th he telegraphed his legal adviser Kevin O' Shiel to say that he could 
not agree to any joint appeal made with the Anti-Treatyites that he had not seen 'and that does 
not fairly protect the principle contained in clause four'.54Although it is impossible to prove, the 
Anti-Treatyites’ publication of an appeal to the electorate not in keeping with clause four, in the 
Dublin papers on June 12, may have been one reason why Collins issued the statement he did on 
June 14, which has been taken to be a renunciation of the Pact. On 13 June, the day after the 
advertisement appeared in the press, Collins published a press statement stating that the Anti- 
Treatyite statement 'was not in keeping with the spirit of the Pact, and to suggest that no non- 
Pact candidates by contesting the elections, branded themselves a national enemy was obviously 
contrary to the agreement signed by him and by Mr de Valera'.55
Collin's behaviour during the run-up to the election nevertheless exposes him to the charge that 
this political outlook was a mixture of inconsistency and insincerity. The joint press statement 
made with de Valera on June 9, which expresses the view that electoral contests between pact 
candidates and third parties should be kept to a minimum, was signed after Collin's telegram to 
O' Shiel, which expressed a completely different outlook. Likewise, in the days before the 
election, Collins could be heard to be recommending the pact and recommending to the voters 
that they vote for whomsoever they wish. Later, after the pact had collapsed, and the civil war 
begun, Collins wrote that 'Labour will be free to take its rightful place as an element in the life of 
the nation'.56 At the same time he was recommending to his cabinet colleagues that the Dail 
should not be allowed to meet until the decisive battles in the civil war had been won. This was to 
avoid the possibility that Labour, the largest of the third parties, would prove critical of the 
government's civil war policy:
I consider that if parliament did not meet until the 24th - our military position would be very favourable. 
We would have occupied sufficient additional posts in the South to dominate entirely the position there and 
would be able to indicate so definitely our ability to deal with the military problem there that no
parliamentary criticism of any kind could seriously interfere with that ability.57
53 Provisional Government Minute June 6 1922.
54 Collins to O' Shiel, May 29 1922, Department of An Taoiseach, S 2939 A.
55 Statement to Press, June 13 1922, ibid.
56 'Notes by General Michael Collins' August 1922, Path to Freedom, p. 19
57 To Acting Chairman from Chief of Staff, August 5 1922, 'Civil War 1922-23-Army Reports on situation 
and organisation’, Department of an Taoiseach, S 3361, National Archives.
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Not only was Collin's attitude to the Labour Party inconsistent: once the civil war had begun, he 
insisted that the terms under which he had agreed the Pact with de Valera had changed. Earlier 
he had been asked by a journalist whether it might be possible 'to have something in the nature of 
a coalition government, as to let some of the leaders of the opposition to act as unofficial advisers 
to the Cabinet'?58 Collins replied in the affirmative. Once the civil war had started however his 
attitude changed.
Q. Will Mr. de Valera be excluded from the Cabinet if he persists in his refusal to adhere to the conditions 
that a Cabinet position involves ?
A  I have only to suppose that acceptance of the Treaty by members of the Provisional Government is a 
clause of the Treaty.59
Such acceptance was not part of the agreement Collins personally made with de Valera on May 
20th.
In short it is difficult to rescue Collins from the charge that his instincts were not 'essentially 
democratic', as has been claimed by Garvin.60 Rather his instincts seem essentially manipulative 
and his attitude to political questions a mixture of inconsistency and insincerity. An even more 
damaging charge concerns the Northern policy Collins carried out in the months before the civil 
war. While his cabinet colleagues were aware of the fact that Collins was orchestrating schemes 
of non-co-operation with the Northern Ireland government, and were asked to support them, they 
were kept in the dark about the involvement of the IRA in Collins’ schemes and the fact that this 
involvement led to killings, kidnappings and raids of various descriptions.61 The phase is well 
documented by Coogan under the title 'Setting up the Six', and reveals again the difficulty in 
coming to a definitive assessment of Collin's political ideas and his vision of the future. Under 
the Treaty the Northern Ireland parliament had been given the option of opting out of the Free 
State. If it were to do so, the Boundary Commission would be charged with redrawing the 
boundaries of North and South, probably to the advantage of nationalists. If Collins and his 
colleagues were to stick by the Treaty there seems no doubt that Irish unity could only have come 
about with the consent of Northern Unionists. This implied a peaceful and co-operative policy on 
the North, precisely what Collins was not pursuing. Yet publicly Collins seemed to indicate that 
his policy was essentially in line with the Treaty. He initiated a series of agreements for the 
protection of Northern Catholics with Sir James Craig which would have suggested that his
58 Interview with New York Herald n.d., Michael Collins : Statements and Speeches' Department of An 
Taoiseach'S 10961, National Archives.
59 Interview with Sunday Express, n.d., ibid.
60 T. Garvin, 1922, The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin,1996),p. 129.
61 This area is fully documented in T.P. Coogan Michael Collins (London,! 990), pp.334-385.
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policy was one of co-operation. In early February he told a confidant that the accepted policy for 
the moment is peace and we must give peace a chance'. 62At the same time, however, officers 
under his own command were, with his knowledge, conspiring to kidnap one hundred 
Orangemen in the North in order to force the release of some prominent IRA men from jail in 
Derry.63 According to Hopkinson the peace policy was 'a mere public front'.64
Collins told a correspondent that regular 'intercourse' between Northern and Southern leaders 
would have the effect of dissolving differences between the two.
This intercourse will inevitably bring our views before the supporters of the others. Agreement will be 
reached or even disagreements, and again people will wonder why they cannot agree on bigger things, and 
if  they disagree they will note how small the differences will often be. It is understood that the process will 
take a little time, but after all, if we have the common end clearly in view this extension of time is not a 
point of substance.65
At the same time he let it be known that he placed little faith in the Boundary Commission and 
therefore in the possibility of attracting a truncated Northern Ireland by 'intercourse' rather than 
force. Indeed Coogan's view is that had he lived, and obtained ordered conditions in the South, 
he fully intended to achieve the goal of a 32-county United Ireland by military means, if 
necessary.66 In the pursuit of that policy, Collins seemed perfectly happy to ignore the views of 
his colleagues in the Provisional Government. Indeed the Collins-sponsored military campaign to 
destabilise Northern Ireland, which took place in May and June 1922, continued after the date 
the Provisional Government decided to adopt a policy of 'peaceful obstruction' towards the 
Belfast Government.67
Collins Janus-faced Northern policy did not survive his death, much to the disappointment of the 
Northern IRA, some of whom subsequently lamented the absence of a 'definite' policy on the part 
of the Provisional Government under Cosgrave.68 What the policy does reveal however, is that 
Collins, as is claimed of de Valera in the same period, had a tendency to keep his intellect private 
and his rhetoric public. In public he appeared as the defender of the Treatyite position, in private 
he was impatient with the confines of the Treaty settlement. To those whose opinions were
62 Collins to Louis Walsh, February 1 1922, Correspondance with L.J. Walsh Derry, Department of An 
Taoiseach, S 9241, National Archives..
63 See Coogan, Michael Collins, (London, 1990), pp.343-344.
64 M. Hopkinson, The Craig-Collins pacts of 1922 : two attempted reforms of the Northern Ireland 
government1, Irish Historical Studies, xxvii, no 106 (NOvember 1990),p.l49.
65 Collins to Walsh, February 2 1922, op. cit.
66 T.P. Coogan, De Valera: Long Fellow Long Shadow (London,1993), p.317.
67 Provisional Government Minute, June 3 1922.
68 See the quote from Seamus Woods, O/C of the Third Northern Division, in R. Fanning, Independent 
Ireland (Dublin,! 983), p.37.
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conservative, the conservative Collins appeared, to those who were Republican, the radical 
Collins appeared. To some he indicated that he was content with the Treaty settlement and 
'would do it all over again, in exactly the same way, in the same circumstances'.69 To others he 
said that 'we should have refused to negotiate a Peace until that Act of Usurpation (i.e. The 
Government of Ireland Act) had been written off. But it is easy to be wise after the event'.70 This 
inconsistency in Collins outlook had important practical consequences. In the private sessions of 
the Dail, Collins, alongside several senior IRA figures, made much of the argument that the 
alternative to the Treaty was a probably unsuccessful renewal of war with the British. This 
argument may have swayed a decisive number of waverers to accept the Treaty on pragmatic 
grounds.71 Publicly however, Collins was quick to refute the Republican claim that the Treaty 
had been accepted under the threat of 'terrible and immediate war'. Collins claimed that the 
British had three alternatives: (1) To dissolve Parliament and put their proposals before the 
people ; (2) to resume the war by courting breakages of the truce, (3) to blockade Ireland and to 
encourage internal conflict. In his view, Britain would have preferred the first course of action, 
which would be more damaging if electoral support for the British, in Britain or in Ireland, were 
strong.72 War would ensue sooner or later, but one wonders what the outcome might have been 
in the Dail debate on the Treaty if Collins, and his IRA colleagues, had expressed the same 
opinion in the Dail debate on the Treaty ?
Collin's relationship with the military wing of the Sinn Fein movement was not free of 
ambiguity. He was more interested in keeping the military side of the nationalist movement 
united and tended to blame the Anti-Treaty politicians for politicising the army. How far was 
Collins willing to go in his efforts to secure army unity? When Collins was initially approached 
with the idea of a Pact election he poured scorn on the idea that the military would be 
independent of civilian control.
The difficulty that I see in your proposal is that no Government in the world could exist unless its 
Executive controlled the Army. It does not matter what the form of Government is. This is a rule which 
applies to all countries where ordered conditions prevail.73
However a few months later, as part of the army negotiations going on behind the scenes, 
Collins, with Mulcahy, was to offer the Four Courts Executive a set of proposals which would 
have completely undermined the possibility of civilian control of the army. They stipulated that a
69 Collins to J.J. Walsh February 1st 1922, op. cit.
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periodic Convention of the IRA would elect an Army Council of seven, and that the Minister of 
Defence and the Chief of Staff in the joint government 'shall require the approval by majority 
vote of the army council'.74 Whether such an arrangement, with de Valera as Minister of Defence 
and a pro-Treatyite officer as Chief of Staff, could have worked is impossible to know, but it 
clearly contravened democratic conventions.
From another point of view, Collin's co-operation with the men in the Four Courts in carrying 
out his Northern policy did little to legitimise the position he took after June 28. Rory O' Connor, 
the officer in charge of the Four Courts, claimed that after the Pact was signed Collins and 
Mulcahy consented to the Republicans remaining in the Four Courts, while the latter made a 
secret alliance with O' Connor against the Northern government. Apparently Mulcahys reason 
for allowing the Republicans remain was that while they remained there, the actions in the 
North of Ireland would be attributed to the Anti-Treatyites alone. As O' Connor was later to 
recall,
The lies and hypocrisy of the Free State leaders are astounding, especially by those who took part in the 
army negotiations for Unity and know the whole inner history of these negotiations. We were never 
requested to evacuate the Four Courts, on the contrary, at one meeting of the Coalition army council, at 
which Mulcahy, O' Duffy, Mellowes, Lynch, and myself were present, we were only asked to evacuate the 
Ballast Office, Kildare Street Club, the Masonic Hall, and Lever Bros. At that stage we actually discussed 
co-ordinated military action against N.E. Ulster and had agreed on an Officer who would command both 
Republican and Free State troops in that area. We were also to send from the South some hundreds of our 
rifles for use in that area. The reason given was that it would never do if rifles which had been handed to 
the 'Government' for use against the Republic, and which, of course, could be identified- were found in use 
against Craig. It should be remembered that at this time the 'Government' was publicly declaring that it was 
the ’mutineer' section of the army which was fighting the Ulster people.75
Again the public image the Provisional Government was putting forward belied a much more 
complex strategy behind the scenes. It was for this reason that the Republicans were able to 
maintain that theirs was a defensive position in the civil war.
In short, Collins’ machinations suggest that he too was an 'unenthusiastic democrat', particularly 
when it came to the conventions of cabinet government. For this reason Lee has suggested, that, 
had he survived, it is not too fanciful to imagine him as a plebiscitary president, at the very 
least.76 Yet under the conventions of the Westminster system, a Presidential Prime Minister is 
not as outlandish as one might think, and there is no reason to believe that Collins would have
74 G.H. Q. Staff Memo, Richard Mulcahy Papers P7/B/192, U.C.D. Archives.
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wholly dispensed with the trappings of parliamentary democracy. Moreover Collins was 
operating in a field where true democrats were in short supply, and where the conventional 
channels of diplomacy led to inaction as much as anything else. Collin's political legacy from this 
period seems tainted with failure: the constitution, the Craig-Collins Pact, and the Collins-de 
Valera Pact, were all failed initiatives, but at least Collins had initiated something, whereas 
others may have been tempted towards inaction. Ireland in this phase was in transition mode, and 
its political leadership had yet, I suspect, to find their true vocations.
8.3 The Civil War.
The civil war began on June 28th 1922. Neither Collins nor de Valera could have welcomed the 
war but it elicited very different responses from the two of them. Collins ceased to act as 
Chairman of the Provisional Government and became instead Commander in Chief of the new 
Irish Army. In that role he had definite ideas about the military and political strategy of the 
Provisional Government and remained a dominant figure on the Pro-treaty side until his death. 
De Valera had played an insignificant role in the events leading to the outbreak of war, and 
decided to enrol in the Irregular forces as a private after the fighting had begun. Whereas Collins 
remained at the centre of events while he lived, de Valera was rather a marginal figure in the 
Republican leadership. It was not until the Anti-Treatyite leadership allowed him to establish a 
Republican Government in the autumn that he regained some of his former stature, but even then 
he had little influence on the course of events.
Collins had long been aware that civil war was a possibility and had given some indication of his 
intentions in a series of press interviews he gave in the Spring of 1922. He likened the new Irish 
state to other countries which had gone through a violent revolution, and saw the problems of the 
new Irish state as symptomatic of the period of transition that all countries went through after a 
violent revolution. Collins himself had no doubts that the Irish state would be more than able to 
surmount these difficulties:
Even under the happiest circumstances a period of transition in every country is invariably accompanied by 
eruption of disorder and spasmodic turbulence. There are many recent examples of this truism, hi Poland, 
Germany, Estonia, Finland, and in practically all the European countries that underwent change as the 
result of the European war, there were many months of fierce civil war which was only put down after 
vigorous fighting and appalling loss of life. Our transitional period is not being attended by scenes anything 
like as bad as that, nor is it at all likely to be. We may be depended upon to deal with the disorder in our 
midst just as effectively, and just as thoroughly, as those several Governments dealt with it in their sphere. 
Our methods may be different but the results will be equally satisfactory.77
77 Interview given April 28 1922, 'Michael Collins: Statements and Speeches', Department of An Taoiseach 
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Inevitably, once the war began, the Provisional Government was quick to place the blame for the 
starting of the war on the Anti-Treatyites, particularly those in the Four Courts. Collins, 
somewhat disengenuously, shared this attitude, following the Provisional Government's policy of 
referring to their opponents as 'armed bands':
Having given them one last opportunity to accept the situation, to obey the people's will, when the offer was 
rejected the Government took the necessary measures to protect the rights and property of the people and to 
disperse the armed bands which had outlawed themselves and were preying upon the nation.78
Collins was quick to dismiss any hope that he would prove soft on the Anti-Treatyites he had 
recently been so keen to appease. In an interview with J.F. Homan, an ambulance man who had 
taken on the role of peace intermediary during the battle for Dublin, Collins demanded that the 
Anti-Treatyites surrender their arms before any cease-fire could be contemplated. This would be 
the Provisional Government's policy right throughout the war. He agreed to deliver a conciliatory 
message to his former comrades but only one that included his main demand. On Saturday 
August 1st he told Homan:
Tell these men that neither I, nor any member of the Government, nor any officer in the army ... not one of 
us wished to hurt a single one of them, or even to humiliate them in any way that can be avoided. They are 
at liberty to march out and go to their homes unmolested if only they will ... I do not use the word 
surrender... if  only they will deposit their arms in the national armoury, there to remain until and unless in 
the whirl of politics these men become a majority in the country, in which case they will themselves have 
control of them.79
Once the fighting had begun in earnest, Collins outlook was not so different from his colleagues 
in the Provisional Government. The government had decided to prorogue the meeting of the Free 
State parliament until July 15th and found it necessary to do so again. Collins was fully behind 
this policy, fearing that if the parliament would meet it would be highly critical of his 
government. His policy was to wait until the military situation, particularly in the South, had 
been cleared up, and then allow the Dail to meet. Again Collins was not much concerned with 
the democratic propriety of this policy and concentrated instead on winning the military and 
propaganda battle against the Anti-Treatyites. Effective propaganda was an essential weapon in 
this task. He advised that the government be unsparing in their expenditure on propaganda and 
seemed to be sceptical about the direction of public opinion. Like his colleagues, when faced with 
the immense task of Irish statebuilding, his reaction was one of considerable insecurity:
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I think that it is not disputed that we are in for as hot a time as any young government could possibly be in 
for. The Dail chamber will resound with much verbal thunder against us, and everything will be done by 
opponents there to undermine our influence in the country and endeavour to make us look despicable. No 
doubt there will be much sympathy from the bold heroes in Mountjoy and Kilmainham from those who are 
happy in their heart of hearts that they would not be successful.80
Collin's recommendations for propaganda were plentiful, and included pictures of dead national 
soldiers 'who were shot in maintaining the people's supremacy1, stressing General Sean Mac 
Eoin's 'common' background as a blacksmith, and showing the public the economic cost of the 
Anti-Treatyite campaign .81
The Provisional Government's decision not to convene the Dail drew the complaint from the 
National Executive of the Irish Labour Party and trade Union Congress that
In every country which pretended to rely upon Constitutional sanctions, when a national crisis arose the 
practice has been to call the people's Deputies together immediately. In Ireland it appears that we are to 
follow the opposite course, namely, in times of crisis to prevent a meeting of the National Assembly, even 
though it has been newly-elected and the Government has not received any authority from the Parliament.82
The TExecutive Coup d ‘Etat1 thesis was de Valera's ultimate self-justification faced with the 
charge that he had helped cause the civil war. Immediately after the Treaty had been accepted by 
the Dail cabinet in December he declared that 'the great test of our people has come' and urged 
that that there was 'a definite constitutional way of solving our political differences'.83 Although 
the Treaty may be accepted by the Dail it was not within the competence of the Dail to 
disestablish the Republic which could only be done by the votes of the people. In this vein 
Griffith had promised that Republican institutions would be preserved intact until the people in 
an election had pronounced upon the Treaty. According to de Valera 'our presence in the Dail 
during the whole of the period up to June is evidence that we accepted the principle of majority 
rule and the right of the people to decide finally on the question at issue'.84 At the Sinn Fein Ard 
Fheis in February it was agreed to delay the election for three months so that when the electors 
went to the polls to decide between the Free State and the Republic they would have the 
constitution before them. In the meantime the electoral register should be reformed to include
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large numbers of young people who were excluded. At the Mansion House Conference it was 
suggested that the army be united, a strong stable executive be set up, and that there be six 
months delay before the election took place. De Valera promised to use his influence 'to win 
acceptance of the proposal, not indeed as a principle of right or justice, but as a principle of peace 
and order'85 Then on May 20th the Pact with Collins was signed which remained effective until 
polling day and which ensured that 'the Treaty as such was not an issue in the election*. Without 
warning the constitution was not published until the morning of the election. Apparently, after 
the election had taken place De Valera still expected the coalition government to be set up. 
Instead the Provisional Government, under British pressure, attacked the Four Courts, postponed 
the meeting of the Second Dail, and failed to convene the Third Dail. In effect *by what can only 
be called an Executive coup d'etat they proceeded to change the established state and substitute 
another'.86
The Free State parliament did not meet until September 12th, after the decisive battles of the civil 
war had been won, and after Collins had been replaced by Cosgrave as head of the Provisional 
Government. Collin's early death absolves him of guilt for the excesses that were to follow once 
the war descended into guerrilla war. To what extent was Collins guilty, with his colleagues, of 
carrying out 'an executive coup d'etat between June and September, as de Valera claimed ?.87 
Certainly there is clear evidence that Collins wanted to avoid a meeting of the parliament before 
the military task in the South was completed. Firstly, he wanted to avoid the public criticism this 
would entail. Secondly, he felt that the political effect of another postponement in early August 
would be positive.
It would confirm to the general public our determination to clear up this matter definitely and it will have 
the important effect of preventing the Irregulars in the South feeling that as soon as we came definitely up 
against them, we hesitated to face them boldly and turned aside from the job, and called parliament. To risk 
any such idea arising in the minds of the Southern Irregulars with the resultant rise in morale on their part 
would be a serious matter.88
It is clear however that Collins intended that the parliament would meet : the question was - 
when was it opportune ? In the 'Notes' he prepared in August, which were only published 
posthumously in The Path to Freedom, and which were possibly intended to be delivered to the 
Dail, he wrote that 'this parliament is now the controlling body' which suggests that he envisaged 
it meeting quite soon.89 His untimely death prevents us making a definite prognosis on his
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potential as a parliamentarian. What the charges do reveal however is that the Provisional 
Government, and Collins among them, were more intent on shaping public opinion rather than 
reflecting i t  If Collins intended delivering his 'Notes' to the Dail, then it is clear that he was 
concealing his real sense of Irish public opinion, just as he had earlier concealed his true feelings 
about the Treaty. He wrote,
That being so, the Government believes it will have the whole force of public opinion behind it in dealing 
sternly with all unlawful acts of every kind, no matter under what name of political or patriotic, or any other 
policy that may be carried out.90
His private fears of Irish public opinion were altogether different. Moreover Collins was guilty of 
considerable sharp practice in allowing the constitution to be published only at a time when a 
minority of the electorate would have had time to examine it. The delay made a mockery of the 
whole thrust of his political strategy since February. Again his actions during the Irish civil war 
do little to refute the charge that he was an unenthusiastic democrat.
De Valera's role during the civil war is more difficult to assess, particularly as he was not in a 
position of power on the Anti-Treaty side. Certainly as President of the Republican Government, 
he was in an important symbolic role, but he was still unable to influence the course of events. 
There is evidence that de Valera was acutely sensitive to the criticism that the stance of the Anti- 
Treatyites during the civil war was an essentially undemocratic one. As early as February 1923 
de Valera was attempting to formulate a democratic Anti-Treaty position, and establish a set of 
principles according to which the civil war might be peacefully concluded. In essence these 
principles were those which were later offered Cosgrave in May as a basis of 'a peace by 
understanding' between the two sides. De Valera's 'fundamental principles' included an 
acceptance that 'the supreme court of appeal for deciding all disputed questions of national policy 
is the people of Ireland - the judgement being by majority vote'. They also included a recognition 
that 'the 'military forces of the nation' must be 'under the control of the National Assembly 
elected by the people'. This seems an unequivocal shift from the position he adopted in the Spring 
of 1922. However de Valera claimed that the Anti-Treaty Republicans were not opposing these 
principles by force in the civil war. Instead he argued that
political opponents have striven to make it appear that Republicans are trying to defeat these principles by 
force and are the aggressors in the present civil war. That is not the truth. For me, forms of government, as 
compared with these principles, are but mere lifeless machinery, and I am convinced, as I am that I have 
written out the above, that were it possible for any representative Republican assembly, civil or military, to
90 Ibid, p. 18.
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meet freely tomorrow, these principles would be subscribed to, if not unanimously, certainly by an 
overwhelming majority.91
Either way the principles were to form the basis of de Valera's unsuccessful attempt to conclude 
the civil war by negotiation some months later.
There is no doubt that de Valera was preparing for the period of post-civil war politics when the 
Anti-Treaty position would be articulated in a democratic way. This can best be shown if we 
concentrate on his attempt to reform the political side of the Anti-Treaty movement in the latter 
stages of the civil war. De Valera saw in the Pro-Treatyite's decision, in December 1922, to form 
their own political party, Cumann na nGaedheal, an opportunity to relaunch Sinn Fein as a party 
which would fulfil the need for 'a broadly national organisation which will embrace all who put 
the cause of national independence and general national interests above all sectional or party 
interests'92 'Purely Republican' needs were already catered for by the existence of such 
organisations as the IRA, Cumann na mBan, and Cumann na Poblachta. As such, Republicans 
would have a guarantee that their views would be represented which they did not have after 1916, 
when Sinn Fein was transformed into what was essentially a coalition of people with disparate 
views. De Valera saw in the concentration of Anti-Treatyite prisoners in jails and camps 'a 
wonderful opportunity for political discussion and reorganisation'.93 However, he wanted to 
exclude those who were closely involved with the military movement from his reorganising 
committee. This might serve as a pretext for harassment, but it 'might also frighten off those we 
wish to attract into the organisation'94 Cumann na Poblachta would remain in existence for 
those who would think that a revamped Sinn Fein party would be too broad' for them, and who 
would *prefer accordingly to stick to the word Republic'.95De Valera's own vision for the future of 
the party however was quite clear. Sinn Fein was attractive because
it gave an opportunity for coming back to many who may now wish to do so. We must not close the door on 
these. Our aim is not to make a close preserve for ourselves, but to win the majority of the people again. I 
understand the difficulties but we must teach our people to be broad in this matter.96
Inevitably, the question arose as to whether the new party would regard the Free State parliament 
as a legitimate institution. De Valera appeared ambiguous about this, but signalled a clear 
preference for a policy of recognition:
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It may be advisable to regard the Second Dail as still the legitimate Government of the country, though we 
have to face the fact that our opponents are now functioning as a de facto government. A definite decision 
on the question can not be taken until the Second Dail has an opportunity of meeting... My own opinion is 
that more rapid progress will be made by constituting ourselves as free as possible from anything in the past 
that would entangle us and prevent us from facing the situation exactly as it is.97
The outlines of what was to become the Fianna Fail party are apparent from de Valera's 
attempted reorganisation of the Sinn Party at the end of the civil war. Ideological pragmatism 
combined with Republican rhetoric, a concentration on socio-economic issues, and electoral 
efficiency - an internal memo stated that there should be no duds in this regard but appointment 
by ability -could all be said to date from this period.98 They indicate that de Valera was intent on 
moving the military struggle onto the constitutional plane and that the fundamentalist 
Republicanism of the ERA Executive of the time was to be discarded for something more 
pragmatic.
It was after the civil war that de Valera would come into his own as a democrat but this brief 
account of his attitude during the latter stages of the war is sufficient to indicate that his desire 
was for a constitutional path for the Anti-Treatyites. De Valera may have behaved as an 
unenthusiastic democrat in the run-up to the civil war but his reputation after that is without 
major blemishes. Unfortunately Collin's early death deprived him of the opportunity to 
demonstrate what Garvin calls his 'essentially democratic instincts' and the image remains that of 
someone who was impatient with the confines of democratic conventions.99 Had he lived to see 
victory in the civil war his personal prestige would have been greatly increased and the question 
of his democratic pedigree would have become far more crucial to the politics of the new state 
than it was during the civil war.
Conclusion
The manner in which any violent revolution ends and is contained within a peaceful competitive 
political system is bound to be a complex one. As Garvin has suggested, the manner in which the 
Irish nationalist elite came to embrace purely democratic politics involved 'a painful confusing 
metamorphosis' for many people.100 Nowhere was the confusion greater than in the cases of de 
Valera and Collins. Both of them were alike in that they stood at the faultline between the two
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tendencies in the Irish nationalist movement to independence : on the one hand that of 
revolutionary Republicanism, on the other, that of peaceful pragmatic nationalism. Inevitably, 
this meant that at times the positions they adopted seemed undemocratic. At the very least their 
enthusiasm for democratic procedures was inconstant.
However this applies only to their conduct during the civil war crisis. In peacetime de Valera at 
least was an enthusiastic democrat. Collins did not live to be tested in the light of more mundane 
experience. Indeed the democratic credentials of either man can only be assessed in the light of 
the fact that during the civil war period democrats were not necessarily in the ascendant. 
Although Garvin left Collins out of the small elite that he credits with the establishment of Free 
State democracy, surely it is the case that the Free State, and with it the Treaty, had no chance of 
success were it not for Collins ? On the other side, de Valera was outflanked by men who were 
definitely unenthusiastic democrats, men whose political outlook may well have passed into 
infamy were it not for the retrospective respectability passed on to them by the success of Fianna 
Fail decades later. The charge that de Valera actually caused the civil war has never been 
convincing. As one contemporary said *you may as well blame a rainy day on the weather 
forecaster as blame de Valera for the civil war'.101
It is just as likely, had Collins lived, that he would have thrived in post-civil war politics, 
surrounded by men whose democratic instincts were unquestionable. The question would not 
have been whether Collins was a democratic or not, but whether the progressive brand of Pro- 
Treatyite politics he espoused would have outweighed the reactionary tendencies that were 
present in the Cumann na nGaedheal party.102 Undoubtedly Collin's personal prestige would 
have been unequalled had he survived the civil war, and the temptation may have been for him to 
convert himself into an Irish Ben Gurion, with the border areas of Northern Ireland his chief 
concern. Like many other questions concerning Collins the answer can only be speculative.
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Chapter 9: Conclusion.
Independent Ireland has been a democracy for over seventy five years. While the early years of 
independence proved a testing time for the new democracy, the degree of stability subsequently 
enjoyed by the Irish state has been exceptional. Not even the existence of civil conflict in 
Northern Ireland over the past decades has seriously rocked the highly stable state of affairs 
south of the border. Neither is there any evidence that this state of almost complete political 
stability is about to be overturned in the near future. Irish institutions are recognised as being 
legitimate by the vast majority of the population, and Irish political elites conduct their political 
lives within a set of rules that have changed little since 1937. De Valera's constitution, while it 
has proven to be controversial in many respects, has provided a remarkably stable framework for 
the conduct of peaceful political competition. It would have been difficult to believe that this was 
possible in 1937 : certainly those who saw in the constitution the possibility of a personalised 
dictatorship have proved veiy wide of the mark!
It may be, as Dr. Garrett FitzGerald suggests, that the achievement of stable democracy is proof 
that the Irish 'have not been as unfortunate in the quality of the political leadership provided by 
all parties as these same citizens have been prone to assert'.1 Certainly the story of Irish 
democracy in the interwar years does little to prove that a capable national political elite cannot 
emerge from the type of electoral political competition encouraged by S.T.V. But to credit the 
political elite alone with the creation of a robust democratic system is to resort to the sort of 
theoretical simplification that social science is designed to avoid. A systematic answer to the 
question of why democracy has fared so well in independent Ireland involves much more than the 
automatic conclusion that democracy has thrived because Irish elites have enabled it to thrive. 
The level of economic development, class-preconditions, and the nature of Irish political culture, 
are also important sources of democratic stability.
Naturally, if Irish society was backward and underdeveloped in 1921, if the political elite were 
confronted with a 'still semi-feudal and pre-political populace', then the consolidation of a stable 
democratic system can be attributed to the skills and values of an exceptional political elite.2 
However my analysis of Lipset's theory in chapter two did not lead to such a conclusion. Rather it 
suggested that Irish democracy emerged out of a society that was relatively modem and 
developed, and it was this which distinguished it from many of the states where democracy 
collapsed in the interwar period. As such the Irish case can not be considered an exception to the 
rule that democracy emerges only in modem well-developed societies. What cannot be concluded 
from the analysis of Lipset's theory however, is that Irish democracy was stabilised because of the
1 G. FitzGerald, Days of doubt long gone as State reaches 75th birthday1, Irish Times, 6 December, 1977.
2 T. Garvin, The enigma of Dev - the man from God knows where', The Irish Times, April 10 1998.
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state's successful economic performance after independence. The genesis of Irish democracy was 
no surprise : it's survival cannot be explained by economic variables.
Moreover, my analysis of Barrington Moore's theory in chapter three led me to conclude that the 
class pre-conditions for the emergence of a democratic system were very much in place by 1920. 
Irish society had benefited from half a century of land reform, it's agrarian class structure was 
relatively egalitarian, and it had much in common with other Northern European cases where 
independent farmers remained a pivotal political actor into the modem world. The fact that the 
Irish political revolution was preceded by a social revolution explains, more than any other 
factor, I suggest, why the polity and society that emerged from that revolution were essentially 
conservative. Independent Ireland's experience of a civil war in 1922-23, in which the element of 
social class conflict was relatively minor, again suggests that the class-pre-conditions for the 
emergence of a democratic system were very much in place in 1921.
From the perspective of either Lipset's or Barrington Moore's theory, then, the genesis of Irish 
democracy was no surprise. Moreover the manner in which the new state disintegrated into civil 
war, approximately seven months after independence, does little to support the voluntarist view 
that elites can prove decisive in every situation. I have traced the process that led to civil war and 
shown that Irish elites were unable to prevent the slide towards civil war despite their efforts to 
the contrary. The nature of elite political culture, a critical variable in any transitional stage, 
takes part of the blame for this. Garvin has placed the blame for the war solely on the nature of 
Irish republican culture but I have suggested the elite political culture as a whole was adversarial 
and majoritarian. For this reason it was difficult to improvise solutions which were non- 
majoritarian in character. Of course the actual starting of the civil war, came down, in the end, to 
British pressure, which left the Provisional Government with no choice in the matter. Some elite 
decisions may have made the outcome more rather than less likely, but on the whole the drift 
towards civil war has been represented as inexorable. Irish democracy could not be stabilised by 
elite pacts because the objective conditions which allow such pacts to be successful did not exist.
What role then did Irish elites play in the creation of a stable democratic system? Garvin has 
suggested that the establishment of a democratic system was due to the actions of the small pro- 
Treatyite elite during the civil war.3 In chapter five I agreed that the war reflected a tension in 
the division of labour throughout Irish society, but disagreed with the suggestion that the modem 
state was characterised by restitutive rather than repressive violence. Rather, the reaction of the 
Provisional Government to the civil war suggested that the distinction in Durkheim's work 
between different types of social solidarity, one pre-modem and collectivist, the other modem 
and individualistic, was to some extent a false one, since the modem state cannot, when it comes
3 T. Garvin, 1922: The Birth of Irish Democracy (Dublin, 1996).
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under pressure, dispense with the type of repressive sanctions that are present in traditional 
political culture. Indeed the modem state must appropriate these sanctions if it is to survive 
challenges to its legitimacy. In short the latent authoritarianism of Irish political culture was 
accentuated, not diminished by, the experience of civil war, and the pro-Treatyite political elite 
was also responsible for this.
In contrast to Garvin, I credit de Valera and the Fianna Fail party with the consolidation of Irish 
democracy. The Irish case was considered to be a positive example of Linz's model of democratic 
re-equilibration. All of the many pre-conditions of the model were present in the Irish case. 
However I disagreed with the elitist implications of Linz's view on the grounds that in Ireland 
the stabilisation process was endorsed, at each step, by the electorate. Nevertheless the 
combination of theory and historical analysis I put forward, does suggest that de Valera 
succeeded in consolidating Free State democracy much in the same way that de Gaulle stabilised 
French democracy during the Algerian crisis. In the Irish case, this did not lead to regime-change 
in the literal sense, but to a 'reshaping' of the Free State whereby all those features of the Free 
State constitution that were not compatible with Irish sovereignty were removed and replaced. In 
that process de Valera showed a great deal of political skill, but benefited from an international 
environment that was favourable to reformers.
The possibility that the constitutional choices of the political elite, the state's institutional design, 
explains the survival of democracy after 1922, was examined in chapter seven, which took its cue 
from Hermen's well-known diatribe against the effects of P.R. in the interwar period. I dismissed 
the view that the institutional design of the state was in itself a decisive factor, and suggested 
instead that the fact that the Free State had an 'unspoken' majoritarian constitution was more 
important. The Irish political elite, or more specifically, the civil war political elite, were strongly 
attached to majoritarian forms of government and adversarial forms of politics which were not in 
themselves conducive to democratic politics, but which could work in a society with relatively 
few political cleavages. The fact that the Free State had 'a constitutional tradition' was in itself a 
definite advantage , however much that tradition was traduced by the manner in which it took 
shape in post-civil war conditions.4
The final chapter was concerned with democratic reputations, more particularly with the 
democratic reputations of de Valera and Collins. Both were judged to have been *unenthusiastic 
democrats' at some phase in the civil war period, but the doubts about Collins democratic 
credentials were certainly stronger than those about de Valera. Collins, brilliant expositor of the 
Pro-Treaty position though he was, was something of a one-man band who overcentralised power 
in himself. De Valera was increasingly marginalised throughout the civil war crisis but
4 A.J. Ward, The Irish Constitutional Tradition; Responsible Government in Modem Ireland (Dublin, 
1993).
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paradoxically emerged from the conflict more enthusiastic about democracy than he had entered 
it. The extent to which this characterised the anti-Treatyites as a whole can only be guessed at.
In summary there is little reason to believe that the stability of Irish democracy after 1921 was 
primarily due to the nature of Irish elite political culture. The Irish entered their period of 
democratic state-building with many advantages over their Eastern and Central European 
counterparts. Democratisation in independent Ireland can be likened to the progress of a train, 
that travelling over an ostensibly straight line after 1918, finds itself derailed in 1922 as the line 
turns sharply to the left, but finds itself back on the train as the railway track completes a full 
semi-circle and then straightens out. The political elite proved unable to prevent their particular 
train going off the tracks in 1922 but were able to find their way back again. Fundamental 
changes in British policy towards Ireland were an important reason why the re-equilibration of 
Irish democracy proved to be so successful in the 1930s, just as it was British policy which led to 
the civil war in 1922.
If the Irish case does not vindicate the reputation of Irish elite political culture, it does suggest 
that a process of state centralisation is probably an inevitable concomitant of a violent transition. 
The type of democracy that emerges as part of such a process need not be the most suitable one 
for the society, but is more likely to be the one that reflects the interests of the dominant elites. In 
the Irish case the Sinn Fein political elite succeeded in imposing their preferences on the political 
system but left behind them a controversial constitutional legacy. Strictly speaking, many of the 
choices they made could be considered unconstitutional. Indeed in three ways they can be accused 
of majority tyranny.5 Constitutionally, all three commitments made by Arthur Griffith to the 
Southern Unionists were reneged upon by 1937 : the use of P.R. for Dail elections no longer 
ensured minority representation after the 1935 Electoral Reform; the Second Chamber was 
abolished, and finally university representation, which meant that the Protestant Trinity College 
constituency returned three Dail deputies, was also abolished. Electorally, majority rule was 
imposed against the majority principle, which dictates that if an election failed to produce a clear 
winner, then coalition government should be accepted rather than have recourse to a second 
election, which meant that all those who didn't vote for the eventual winner in the first election, 
had wasted their vote. Socially, in terms of the relationship of the individual to society it can be 
argued that a spiritual tyranny emerged, dominated by the norms of the Catholic Church and the 
Gaelgoir movement. Majoritarian rules were responsible for the ease with which legislation 
reflecting these values could be brought in and for the marginalisation of alternative ideological 
perspectives.6
5 See G. Sartori, Democratic Theory (London, 1958), pp98-99.
6 B. O' Leary and J. McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism (London, 1994), p. 149.
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Majority tyranny has been defined as *the choice of a policy that imposes severe deprivation 
when an alternative policy could have been chosen that would have imposed no severe 
restrictions on anyone'.7 Along these lines de Valera argued that there was no alternative to the 
abolition of the Senate. Prior to its abolition it had blocked de Valera's Bill abolishing the oath, a 
stance which de Valera claimed 'stood in the way of national unity and willing obedience to the 
law, and that government by coercion had been the result of the preceding government in 
imposing the obligation'.8 However the full range of possibilities had not been exhausted by de 
Valera before the decision to abolish the Senate. In particular de Valera had refused to submit 
the oath to the referendum, a stance which contrasts oddly with his declaration in 1926 that
For my part I am convinced that the oath will not be removed by any group or party acting within the Free 
State assembly. It will be removed only when the Irish people give an unequivocal mandate for its abolition, 
and when those who are elected will consequently refuse to take it. Then it will go and very soon afterwards 
in its train the other contrivances by which the English government make good their claim to interfere in 
our affairs.9
By 1933 however, in possession of a parliamentary majority, de Valera's attitude to plebiscites 
had changed. As with other aspects of Irish constitutional development in the interwar era, 
majority rule served as an expedient decision-making rule for decisions that were in themselves 
highly controversial. For this reason I have emphasised how important it was that de Valera's 
constitution later reached some balance between majoritarian and liberal principles of 
government. De Valera 'the maker of the modem Irish polity in its mature form',10 left behind 
him a constitution that has proven remarkably adept at protecting the public from the despotism 
of elected majorities. The current 'liberal' critique of his constitution has missed out on this aspect 
of the constitution entirely, but it is one of its main achievements.
It was also important, if the Sinn Fein elite stand accused of majority tyranny, that the minority 
in question was a materially privileged one, and its views were increasingly identified with Fine 
Gael. The decline in minority representation which occurred between 1927 and 1933 was also 
due to the larger parties absorbing smaller organisations and their policies. Fianna Fail absorbed 
existing Sinn Fein Cumainn, IRA personnel, Labour Party policies and from 1932 onwards, 
members of the Sinn Fein party came back with their tails between their legs. Fine Gael was an 
amalgamation of Cumann na nGaedheal, the Centre Party, and the Blueshirts. Its leaders were at 
pains to stress that it was much more than a revamped version of Cumann na nGaedheal and had
7 J. Fishkin, Democracy and Deliberation New Haven and London,, 1991),p.35.
8 D. O' Sullivan, Irish Free State, p.474.
9 Press Statement April 18,1926. FF/ 22, Fianna Fail Archives.
10 T. Garvin, The enigma of Dev - the man from God knows where', The Irish Times, April 10 1998.
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absorbed a variety of distinct ideological influences from the other parties.11 Catch-all parties are 
not necessarily incompatible with minority representation. Arguably the political system became 
more democratic as the civil war parties ceased to be single-issue rump parties of Sinn Fein, 
absorbed other influences, and competed over more policy dimensions. Some have suggested that 
the system took on a left-right cleavage, others that the split reflected deep cultural divisions 
within society.12 These divisions made the party system more responsive, even if they reinforced 
the Treaty cleavage.
The Irish case, I suggest, represents a form of 'democratic elitism' whereby a dominant political 
elite proves able to absorb a variety of influences while at the same time maintaining their 
pivotal position within the system. For this reason future work on the Irish case might 
concentrate on the role of S.T.V. in shaping the political behaviour of the dominant political 
elite. Certainly from the 1922 election onwards S.T.V. has had a fundamental effect on political 
competition in Ireland and it is as a combination of the Westminster system with S.T.V. that the 
Irish system is best understood in this period. Future work might also study the role of Irish sub­
elites in the stabilisation process. The role of the civil war political elite and their commitment to 
constitutional forms of government can be overestimated. There was a great deal of insecurity at 
the top and democracy was stabilised in a society where the sub-elites - the media, the judiciary, 
and the army for example - were themselves generally supportive of democratic practices. The 
relationship between these sub-elites and the dominant political elite ought to be a subject for 
further research. More generally there lias been little or no work on Irish civil society and its 
relationship to the democratic process. What role had organisations like the Gaelic Athletic 
Association in Irish political development, or did they survive the civil war only as depoliticised 
remnants of their former selves ? Was Irish civil society fundamentally retarded by the 
experience of civil war or did it survive to shape the manner in which Irish politics subsequently 
developed ?
Whatever the answers to these questions, the experience of Irish democracy after 1922 which I 
have traced in chapter seven suggests that the model of democracy operating in the Irish Free 
State was what Held describes as 'the competitive elitist model' of democracy, a model that was 
capable of solving questions of political leadership and authority but not necessarily of social 
progress and political freedom.13 In this respect the Sinn Fein legacy was highly ambiguous. It
11 See the report on the Fine Gael Ard Fheis in Irish Independent, March 22 1935.
12 On the economic divide see R. Dunphy, The Making of Fianna Fail Power in Ireland 1923-1948 
(Oxford,1995); P. Mair, The Changing Irish Party System: Organisation, Ideology and Electoral 
Competition (London, 1987); E. Rumpf and A.C. Hepburn, Nationalism and Socialism in Twentieth Century 
Ireland (Liverpool, 1977). On culture see T. Garvin, Political Cleavages, Party Politics and Urbanisation in 
Ireland - the case of the Periphery-Dominated Centre, European Journal of Political Research, vol 11, no.4 
(1974); J. Prager, Building Democracy in Ireland .Political Order and Cultural Integration in a Newly 
Independent Nation (Cambridge, 1986).
13 D. Held, Models of Democracy* (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 143-184.
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provided leadership on issues of national freedom but Sinn Fein had not developed a powerful 
critique of the state or of the market economy. This was due, I suggest, to the state's provenance 
as 'a national mobilisation democracy' whereby democracy was seized upon as a means of 
mobilising for national freedom but not necessarily for individual or class freedom.
As an example of a successful democratic transition, the Irish case holds some, perhaps unusual, 
lessons for the comparative literature on democratic transitions. In the first place, it shows that a 
democracy can be stabilised without reaching explicit agreement on the rules of the game 
between the major political actors. Certainly, there was an implicit consensus of sorts between the 
civil war parties, but such a consensus was never made explicit. Neither the 1922 constitution nor 
the 1937 constitution, for all their merits, were supported by both sides of the civil war divide. 
The moral is that the efficacy of a constitution depends as much on its merits as on the process by 
which it came into being. Secondly, the Irish case proves that democracy can survive the 
experience of bitter adversarial conflict. The two leaders of the civil war sides, and the two men 
most likely to be credited with the establishment of a democratic system, Cosgrave and de Valera, 
did not meet socially until after the Second World War. Bitter attitudes did not mean that either 
were uncommitted to the democratic system. The current emphasis on democratic theory is on 
forming pro-democratic coalitions and elite pacts, but there are situations in which such tactics 
are impossible to employ. Rather the Irish experience suggests that democracy can be stabilised 
by a successful changeover, if elites are willing to take the risks that such a process involves. 
Thirdly, the Irish case suggests that the employment of the correct democratic strategies is a 
necessary feature of the democratic process. Some of the strategies employed by de Valera have 
been identified by Lustick, but on the whole de Valera's very deliberate reshaping of the Free 
State finds few parallels in comparative politics.14 Finally, the Irish case suggests that elite 
commitment is a crucial variable in the stabilisation process. It was de Valera's determination to 
reform the Free State in a democratic way that led to the stabilisation of Irish democracy in the 
1930s. Such an outcome could not have happened if de Valera had not employed a consciously 
democratic strategy from the outset.
Overall, the experience of civil war in Ireland and the longevity of 'civil war politics' suggests 
that the point of departure in each transition is crucial. The Irish case is unlike most of the cases 
that are analysed in recent comparative politics which have been peaceful transitions from 
authoritarian regimes. The Irish attempt to form a democratic system was accompanied by a 
violent revolution in a country which did not have developed indigenous central political 
institutions. For that reason it was necessary to go through a period of institutionalisation first, 
whereby central state institutions become effective and authoritative. After that the hurdles of 
consolidation and legitimacy can be tackled. Particular problems are posed for democrats when
14 I. Lustick, Unsettled States Disputed Lands; Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the 
West Bank-Gaza (Ithaca and London, 1993), pp.305-308.
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the establishment of central state institutions and the establishment of democracy go hand in 
hand. There are few parallels in history for this and most of the comparable colonial cases have 
ended in failure. The best comparable cases are probably Finland and Israel, but detailed 
comparisons have yet to be made.
To conclude, the fortunes of Irish democracy after 1921 were inseparable from the manner in 
which the civil war conflict worked itself out in peaceful party politics. The Cumann na 
nGaedheal elite managed to create a stable institutional base for the fledgling democracy, but 
their regime had all the hallmarks of an unconsolidated regime : it was based, rather like Italian 
democracy after 1945, on the exclusion of the largest opposition party. De Valera's ability to 
counteract the exclusionary attitude of his opponents and reform the Free State in a Republican 
direction has been identified as the chief source of democratic stability in independent Ireland. 
On the other hand I have been at pains to point out that the social pre-conditions for the 
establishment of a stable democracy in Ireland were already in place by 1921. The survival of 
Irish democracy, however much it depended on the appropriate elite decisions, was no surprise.
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APPENDIX A 
THE ANGLO-IRISH TREATY 1921
1. Ireland shall have the same constitutional status in the Community of Nations known as the British 
Empire as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and 
the Union of South Africa, with a parliament having powers to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of Ireland and an Executive responsible to that Parliament, and shall be styled and known as 
the Irish Free State.
2. Subject to the provisions hereinafter set out the position of the Irish Free State in relation to the Imperial 
Parliament and Government and otherwise shall be that of the Dominion of Canada, and the law, practice 
and constitutional usage governing the relationship of the Crown or the representative of the Crown and of 
the Imperial Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free State.
3. The representative of the Crown in Ireland shall be appointed in like manner as the Governor-General of 
Canada and in accordance with the practice observed in the making of such appointments.
4. The oath to be taken by Members of the Parliament of the Irish Free State shall be in the following form:
I ... do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law 
established and that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V, his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of 
the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of 
nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.
5. The Irish Free State shall assume liability for the service of the Public Debt of the United Kingdom as 
existing at the date hereof and towards the payment of war pensions as existing at that date in such 
proportion as may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just claims on the part of Ireland by way of 
set-off or counter-claim, the amount of such sums being determined in default of agreement by the 
arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of the British Empire.
6. Until an arrangement has been made between the British and Irish Governments whereby the Irish Free 
State undertakes her own coastal defence, the defence by sea of Great Britain and Ireland shall be 
undertaken by his Majesty's Imperial Forces. But this shall not prevent the construction or maintenance by 
the Government of the Irish Free State of such vessels as are necessary for the protection of the Revenue or 
the Fisheries.
The foregoing provisions of the Article shall be reviewed at a Conference of 
Representatives of the British and Irish Government to be held at the expiration of five years from the date 
hereof with a view to the undertaking by Ireland of a share in her own coastal defence.
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7. The Government of the Irish Free State shall afford to his Majesty's Imperial Forces: (a) In time of peace 
such harbour and other facilities as are indicated in the Annex hereto, or such other facilities as may from 
time to time be agreed between the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State; and (b) 
In time of war or of strained relations with a Foreign Power such harbour and other facilities as the British 
Government may require for the purposes of such defence as aforesaid.
8. With a view of securing the observance of the principle of international limitation of armaments, if  the 
Government of the Irish Free State establishes and maintains a military defence force, the establishments 
thereof shall not exceed in size such proportion of the military establishments maintained in Great Britain 
as that which the population of Ireland bears to the population of Great Britain.
9. The ports of Great Britain and the Irish Free State shall be freely open to the ships of the other country 
on payment of the customary port and other dues.
10. The Government of the Irish Free State agrees to pay fair compensation on terms no less favourable 
than those accorded by the Act of 1920 to judges, officials, members of Police Forces and other Public 
Servants who are discharged by it or who retire in consequence of the change of Government effected in 
pursuance hereof.
Provided that this
agreement shall not apply to members of the Auxiliary Police Force or to persons recruited in Great Britain 
for the Royal Irish Constabulary during the two years next preceding the date hereof. The British 
Government will assume responsibility for such compensation or pensions as may be payable to any of 
these excepted persons.
11. Until the expiration of one month from the passing of the Act of Parliament for the ratification of this 
instrument, the powers of the Parliament and the Government of the Irish Free State shall not be 
excercisable as respects Northern Ireland and the provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, shall 
so far as they relate to Northern Ireland remain of full force and effect, and no election shall be held for the 
return of members to serve in the Parliament of the Irish Free State for constituencies in Northern Ireland, 
unless a resolution is passed by both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland in favour of the holding 
of such election before the end of the said month.
12. If before the expiration of the said month, an address is presented to His Majesty by both Houses of the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland to that effect, the powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free 
State shall no longer extend to Northern Ireland, and the Provisions of the Government of Ireland Act, 1920 
(including those relating to the Council of Ireland) shall, so far as they relate to Northern Ireland, continue 
to be of full force and effect, and this instrument shall have effect subject to the necessary modifications.
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Provided that if such an address is so presented a Commission consisting of three persons, one to 
be appointed by the Government of the Irish Free State, one to be appointed by the Government of Northern 
Ireland and one who shall be Chairman to be appointed by the British Government shall determine in 
accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants, so far as may be compatible with economic and geographic 
conditions, the boundaries between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland, and for the purposes of the 
Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of this instrument, the boundary of Northern Ireland shall be such as 
may be determined by such Commission.
13. For the purpose of the last foregoing article, the powers of the Parliament of Southern Ireland under the 
Government of Ireland Act, 1920, to elect members of the Council of Ireland shall after the Parliament of 
the Irish Free State is constituted be exercised by that Parliament.
14. After the expiration of the said month, if no such address as is mentioned in Article 12 hereof is 
presented, the Parliament and Government of Northern Ireland shall continue to exercise as respects 
Northern Ireland the powers conferred on them by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, but the Parliament 
and Government of the Irish Free State shall in Northern Ireland have in relation to matters in respect of 
which the Parliament of Northern Ireland had not power to make laws under that Act (including matters 
which under the said Act are within the jurisdiction of the Council of Ireland) the same powers as in the 
rest of Ireland, subject to such other provisions as may be agreed in manner hereinafter appearing.
15. At any time after the date hereof the Government of Northern Ireland and the provisional Government 
of Southern Ireland hereinafter constituted may meet for the purpose of discussing the provisions subject to 
which the last foregoing article is to operate in the event of no such address as is therein mentioned being 
presented and those provisions may include :
(a) Safeguards with regard to patronage in Northern Ireland.
(b) Safeguards with regard to the collection of revenue in Northern Ireland.
(c) Safeguards with regard to import and export duties affecting the trade or industry of Northern Ireland;
(d) Safeguards for minorities in Northern Ireland.
(e) The settlement of the financial relations between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State.
(f) The establishment and powers of a local militia in Northern Ireland and the relation of the Defence 
Forces of the Irish Free State and of Northern Ireland respectively;
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and if  at any such meeting provisions are agreed to, the same shall have effect as if they were included 
amongst the provisions subject to which the Powers of the Parliament and Government of the Irish Free 
State are to be excercisable in Northern Ireland under Article 14 hereof.
16. Neither the Parliament of the Irish Free State nor the Parliament of Northern Ireland shall make any law 
so as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof or 
give any preference or impose any disability on account of religious belief or religious status or affect 
prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious 
instruction at the school or make any discrimination as respects state aid between schools under the 
management of different religious denomination or any educational institution any of its property except for 
public utility purposes and on payment of compensation.
17. By way of provisional arrangement for the administration of Southern Ireland during the interval which 
must elapse between the date hereof and the constitution of a parliament and Government of the Irish Free 
State in accordance therewith, steps shall be taken forthwith for summoning a meeting of members of 
Parliament elected for constituencies in Southern Ireland since the passing of the Government of Ireland 
Act, 1920, and for constituting a Provisional Government, and the British Government shall take the steps 
necessary to transfer to such Provisional Government the powers and machinery requisite for the discharge 
of its duties, provided that every member of such Provisional Government shall have signified in writing his 
or her acceptance of this instrument. But this arrangement shall not continue in force beyond the expiration 
of twelve months from the date hereof.
18. This instrument shall be submitted forthwith by His Majesty's Government for the approval of 
Parliament and by the Irish signatories to a meeting summoned for the purpose of the members elected to 
sit in the House of Commons of Southern Ireland, and if approved shall be ratified by the necessary 
legislation.
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APPENDIX B 
DOCUMENT NUMBER TWO
1. That the legislative, executive, and judicial authority of Ireland shall be derived solely from the people of 
Ireland.
2. That, for purposes of common concern, Ireland shall be associated with the States of the British 
Commonwealth, viz. The Kingdom of Great Britain, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of 
Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa.
3. That when acting as an associate the rights, status, and privileges of Ireland shall be in no respect less 
than those enjoyed by any of the component States of the British Commonwealth.
4. That the matters of 'common concern' shall include Defence, Peace and War, Political Treaties, and all 
matters now treated as of common concern, amongst the States of the British Commonwealth, and in these 
matters there shall be between Ireland and the States of the British Commonwealth 'such concerted action 
founded on consultation as the several Governments may determine'.
5. That in virtue of this association of Ireland with the States of the British Commonwealth, citizens of 
Ireland in any of these States shall not be subject to any disabilities which a citizen of one of the component 
States of the British Commonwealth would not be subject to, and reciprocally for citizens of these States in 
Ireland.
6. That, for purposes of the Association, Ireland shall recognise His Britannic Majesty as head of the 
Association.
7. That, so far as her resources permit, Ireland shall provide for her own defence by sea, land and air, and 
shall repel by force any attempt of a foreign power to violate the integrity of her soil and territorial waters, 
or to use them for any purpose hostile to Great Britain and the other associated States.
8. That for five years, pending the establishment of Irish coastal defence forces, or for such other period as 
the Governments of the two countries may later agree upon, facilities for the coastal defence of Ireland shall 
be given to the British Government as follows :
(a) In time of peace such harbour and other facilities as are indicated in the Annex hereto, or such other 
facilities as may from time to time be agreed upon between the British Government and the Government of 
Ireland;
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(b) In time of war such harbour and other naval facilities as the British Government may reasonably require 
for the purposes of such defence as aforesaid.
9. That within five years from the date of exchange of ratifications of this Treaty a Conference between the 
British and Irish Governments shall be held in order to hand over the coastal defence of Ireland to the Irish 
Government, unless some other arrangement for naval defence be agreed by both Governments to be 
desirable in the common interest of Ireland, Great Britain, and the other Association States.
10. That, in order to co-operate in furthering the principle of international limitation of armaments, the 
Government of Ireland shall not
(a) Build submarines unless by agreement with Great Britain and other States of the Commonwealth;
(b) Maintain a military defence force, the establishment whereof exceed in size such proportion of the 
military establishments maintained in Great Britain as that which the population of Ireland bears to the 
population of Great Britain.
11. That the Governments of great Britain and of Ireland shall make a convention for the regulation of civil 
communication by air.
12. That the ports of Great Britain and of Ireland shall be freely open to the ships of each county on 
payment of the customary port and other dues.
13. That Ireland shall assume liability for such share of the present public debt of Great Britain and Ireland, 
and of payment of war pensions as existing at this date as may be fair and equitable, having regard to any 
claims on the part of Ireland by way of set-off or counter-claims, the amount of such sums being determined 
in default of agreement, by the arbitration of one or more independent persons, being citizens of Ireland or 
of the British Commonwealth.
14. That the Government of Ireland agrees to pay compensation on terms not less favourable than those 
proposed by the British Government of Ireland Act of 1920 to that Government's judges, officials, members 
of Police Forces and other Public Servants who are discharged by the Government of Ireland, or who retire 
in consequence of the change of government elected in pursuance hereof ; Provided that this agreement 
shall not apply to members of the Auxiliary Police Force, or to persons recruited in Great Britain for the 
Royal Irish Constabulary during the two years next preceding the date hereof. The British Government will 
assume responsibility for such compensation or pensions as may be payable to any of these excepted 
persons.
15. That neither the Parliament of Ireland nor any subordinate Legislature in Ireland shall make any law so 
as either directly or indirectly to endow any religion or prohibit or restrict the free exercise thereof, or give 
any preference or impose any disability on account of religious belief or religious status, or affect
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prejudicially the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending a religious 
instruction at the school, or make any discrimination as respects State aid between schools under the 
management of different religious denominations or any educational institution or any of its property except 
for public utility purposes on payment of compensation.
16. That by way of transitional arrangement for the Administration of Ireland during the interval which 
must elapse between the date hereof and the setting up of a Parliament and Government of Ireland in 
accordance herewith, the members elected for constituencies in Ireland since the passing of the British 
Government of Ireland Act in 1920 shall, at a meeting summoned for the purpose, elect a transitional 
government to which the British Government and Dail Eireann shall transfer the authority, powers, and 
machinery requisite for the discharge of its duties, provided that every member of such transition 
Government shall have signified in writing his or her acceptance of this instrument. But this arrangement 
shall not continue in force beyond the expiration of twelve months from the hereof.
17. That this instrument shall be submitted for ratification forthwith by his Britannic Majesty's Government 
to the Parliament at Westminster, and by the Cabinet of Dail Eireann to a meeting of the members elected 
for the constituencies in Ireland set forth in the British Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and when 
ratifications have been exchanged shall take immediate effect
ADDENDUM NORTH-EAST ULSTER
Resolved:
That, whilst refusing to admit the right of any part of Ireland to be excluded from the supreme authority of 
the Parliament of Ireland, or that the relations between the Parliament of Ireland and any subordinate 
Legislature in Ireland can be a matter for treaty with a government outside Ireland, nevertheless, in sincere 
regard for internal peace, and in order to make manifest our desire not to bring force or coercion to bear 
upon any substantial part of the Province of Ulster, whose inhabitants may now be unwilling to accept the 
national authority, we are prepared to grant to that portion of Ulster which is defined as Northern Ireland in 
the British Government of Ireland Act of 1920, privileges and safeguards not less substantial than those 
provided for in the Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland signed in London 
on December 6th, 1921.
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APPENDIX C 
COLLIN'S DRAFT CONSTITUTION
1. Subject to ratification by the Parliament hereinafter provided for, from and after the _ day of _ 1922 
Ireland shall be styled and known as the "Irish Free State," and the executive, legislative, and judicial 
authority of the Irish Free State shall be derived from the people of Ireland alone, and for effectuating the 
said purposes the following provisions shall have effect.
2. The legislative power of the Irish Free State shall be vested in a Parliament herein called "The 
Parliament" which shall consist of the representative of the British Crown in Ireland to be called "The Irish 
President", a Senate, and a House of Deputies, and shall have power to make laws for the peace, order, and 
good government of Ireland.
3. The President of Ireland shall be appointed in like manner as the Governor General of Canada, and in 
accordance with the practice observed in the making of such appointments, and the law, practice, and 
constitutional usage governing the relation of the British Crown, or the representative of the British Crown, 
and of the British Parliament to the Dominion of Canada shall govern their relationship to the Irish Free 
State.
4. The Senate shall be composed as follows ....
5. The House of Deputies shall be composed as follows....
6. The oath to be taken by members of the Parliament shall be in the following form
I ... do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law 
established and that I will be faithful to H.M. King George V, his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of 
the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of 
nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations.
7. Each House of Parliament may make rules and orders in respect to the mode in which its powers may be 
exercised and upheld and with respect to the order and conduct of its business.
8. The Parliament may establish Departments of State, the heads of which shall be the Executive 
Government of the Irish Free State, and shall be responsible to the Parliament, and shall hold office on the 
nomination of the Irish President.
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9. The judicial power of the Irish Free State shall be vested in a Supreme Judicature to be called the High 
Court of Ireland, and in such other courts as the Parliament creates and invests with jurisdiction. The High 
Court shall consist o f .....
10. The Parliament shall appoint a permanent Public Service Commission, with such powers and duties, 
relating to the appointment, discipline, retirement, and superannuation of public officers as the Parliament 
shall determine.
